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**JOURNAL OF
THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY**

JOURNAL
OF THE
ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN
SOCIETY

VOL. XXXVIII

1951

PUBLISHED BY
THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY
2, HINDE STREET, MANCHESTER SQUARE, W. 1

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THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY
2, HINDE STREET, LONDON, W.1

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NOTICES

THE principal object of the Royal Central Asian Society is to maintain in England a centre for the provision and dissemination of information concerning Central Asia and adjoining countries.

The Council welcomes applications for Membership from those whose work, studies or military service may now lie in one of the countries of Central and Western Asia in which the Society is interested. Such Members are of the greatest help in keeping the Society up to date in its information. Members also can maintain their existing interest in these countries by keeping in touch with fellow Members.

Persons who desire to join must be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and must then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible. The Annual Subscription is £1 5s. There is an Entrance Fee of £1 payable on election.

NOMINATION FORM.

.....
.....
.....
(Name, with Rank, Appointment or Occupation and Address)

being desirous of becoming a Member of the ROYAL CENTRAL
ASIAN SOCIETY, we recommend $\frac{\text{him}}{\text{her}}$ for membership.

Proposed.....

Seconded.....

His
Her connection with Asia is :

(Entrance fee, £1. Yearly subscription, £1 5s.)

NOTICE TO MEMBERS

FOR the last few years the journal has carried a notice appealing to members to sign a deed of covenant. We are still only receiving almost £250 in income from this source. Now that members once more are living a more settled life, the Council again appeals for the signature of covenants by those who pay British Income Tax, and would particularly ask that those proposing new candidates for election should point out to them the advantage which will accrue to the Society if they sign such a deed at the time when they take up membership.

DEED OF COVENANT

I
of
hereby covenant with the ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY that for a period of seven years from the date hereof or during my lifetime whichever period shall be the shorter I will pay annually to the said Society such a sum as will after the deduction of Income Tax leave in the hands of the said Society *a net sum of one pound and five shillings* such sum to be paid from my general fund of taxed income so that I shall receive no personal or private benefit in either of the said periods from the said sum or any part thereof.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this

..... day of 19.....

Signed, sealed and delivered by the said

In the presence of.....

Address of Witness to your signature.....

.....

Occupation of Witness

NOTICES

THE Council acknowledges with gratitude the following accessions to the Library :

Dragon Fangs, by C. and W. Band. Allen and Unwin.

Mongolian Journey, by Henning Haslund. Routledge.

The Life of Reza Shah Pehlavi, in Persian. Presented by Al Sayyid Murtadha Hikmet.

Bizim Köy, by Mahmut Makal, in Turkish.

Treatise on the Geography of Iran, Persian text, in three volumes. Presented by Dr. M. Hikmet.

And a number of pamphlets, including :

Early History of Agriculture in the Middle East, by H. Field and K. Price.

La Tribu Arabe : ses elements, by T. Ashkenazi.

Tropical Ulcer. Advisory note published by the London School of Tropical Medicine.

The Siam Trade and Economic Review.

The Baha'i Faith, by Shoghi Effendi.

Zprávy Anthropologické Společnosti, Nos. 1-7.

Journal of the Iran Society, Volume I, No. 1, for July, 1950.

Members and contributors alone are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

The Annual Dinner of the Society was held on Tuesday, October 10, 1950. General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., presided and over 200 members and guests were present, including His Excellency the Sa'udi Arabian Ambassador, His Excellency the Turkish Ambassador, His Excellency the High Commissioner for India, and His Excellency the Israeli Minister, the Right Hon. Lord Killearn, P.C., G.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O., and Sir Leigh Ashton. It is hoped to give a report of the speeches in the next number of the Journal.

IN MEMORIAM

FIELD-MARSHAL THE RT. HON. LORD CHETWODE,
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

PHILIP CHETWODE was educated at Eton, where he won distinction on the running track and was a member of "Pop." From Sandhurst he was posted to the 19th Hussars and had a happy and joyous career as a young officer. But he also in quiet moments found time to read and study his profession. He was a regimental officer of remarkable promise, and in due course attracted the attention of Sir John French, C.-in-C. at Aldershot, who made him his Military Secretary.

When the 1914-18 war broke out he took his brigade to France and later rose to command the 2nd Cavalry Division.

There is reason to suppose that he had a marked disagreement with Sir Douglas Haig (as he then was) on the subject of cavalry training, with the result that, to the lasting benefit of those who served under him, he was sent to Egypt. He served first under Sir Archibald Murray and commanded the Desert Corps.

When Murray was replaced by Allenby, after the abortive second battle of Gaza, Chetwode presented the new commander with a plan for the capture of Gaza and invasion of Palestine which was accepted without alteration and proved completely successful. Allenby had reorganized his army and made Chetwode commander of the XX Corps—a formation which had a remarkable series of successes. On the conclusion of hostilities he held several major staff appointments and then went to Aldershot as C.-in-C. It was generally supposed that he would succeed the late Lord Milne as C.I.G.S., but he was not given that post because (so it was stated in high places) it was considered that he might not deal tactfully with politicians. Accordingly he was sent to India, first as Chief of the Staff, to become eventually Commander-in-Chief. His happy relations with the Indian politicians seem to belie the reason which deprived him of the highest appointment at home. It is certainly true that he was very outspoken at times and did not suffer fools gladly, and could deal out what he always called a "raspberry" in terms that were not readily forgotten, but he often concluded with some kindly bit of humour which softened the sting.

He was a wonderful man to serve. He was the soul of loyalty to his subordinate commanders, and once he had given his very clear instructions and approved of the plans to carry them out he never interfered. One of his chief staff officers has already borne testimony in the press how gladly his staff served under him in spite of "an unholy habit of waking about 4 a.m. and emerging map in hand with a new problem to be considered at once." But his commanders, his staff and his troops had complete confidence in him, for he never committed his soldiers to battle unless they had a fighting chance.

He thoroughly enjoyed his time as Commander-in-Chief in India, and formed with Lord Willingdon probably the best team of Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief which India has ever seen.

On return from India Field-Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode was appointed chairman of a Commission which went to Spain in 1938 to effect large-scale exchanges of prisoners and hostages between the Nationalist and Republican parties, and also to endeavour to bring about the cessation of the execution of prisoners. In spite of many obstacles and much opposition, the Commission persevered and met with a considerable measure of success. The Commission also became a valuable source of information and a channel for communications between both sides and between the Republicans and his Majesty's Government. Chetwode was so impressed by the effect of the bombing that he had seen in Spain that, when war broke out in 1939, he had built in his garden in St. John's Wood a very strong concrete shelter.

One of his favourite quotations was "My heart's on fire and eager for the chase." He loved a thoroughbred horse and a good gallop, and liked to try out his subordinate commanders to see if they could keep up the same pace as he did.

In addition to his many endearing qualities, which made him so greatly loved, he had a passionate sense of duty and a deep religious faith, though this last was a subject which he rarely discussed even with his most intimate friends. He had translated his sense of duty first and foremost into service to the old soldiers. He had frequently deplored the fact that so little was done for those who had fought our battles once they had left the army. When Lord Allenby died he took over the presidency of the Allenby Club in Holborn and, realizing that the premises were inadequate, was instrumental in obtaining the Victory (Ex-Services) Club in Seymour Street, where he continued to work on behalf of ex-service men and women—a duty, a happiness and a work which was very dear to his heart.

Though he was not actively connected with the Scout Movement, he took a deep interest in boys, and had already found an outlet for his desire to help youth in the Gordon Boys' Home. When his Majesty the King was crowned in 1937 he appointed Chetwode to succeed him as chairman of the school. He continued as chairman for twelve years and then remained on as vice-chairman.

It is probable that his sense of duty and eagerness to be of service to his fellows was the reason that he so readily accepted the chairmanship of the Joint War Organization of the British Red Cross Society and Order of St. John, in 1940. His wide experience, his powers of administration, organization and leadership, successfully steered this society, with all its ramifications, through the War. Benefits were conferred on countless numbers of those who suffered from the War; and in 1947, when the War Organization ceased to function, provision was made out of the balance of the War funds for the after-care and relief of disabled ex-service men and women and their dependents.

After he was raised to the peerage for his services during the War, he was a regular attendant in the House of Lords, and took his duty

there very seriously. His occasional utterances on Service matters, backed as they were by his wide experience and distinguished career, were listened to with marked attention.

Many honours were showered upon him, but they gave him only a brief and passing satisfaction, for in one with such a diversity of gifts and attainments there was a singular streak of modesty. He used to allude to three incidents in his life which pleased him. When he became a Field-Marshal he invited to lunch a distinguished politician who had told him on entering the Service that he certainly would not rise high in it. When he returned home on completion of his term as Commander-in-Chief in India it was generally supposed that he would be raised to the peerage, instead of which he was awarded the Order of Merit; an intimate friend remarked upon this, and Chetwode at once replied: "I would far rather have listened to what the King said to me when he gave me the Order." Thirdly, he was genuinely gratified when he was made Constable of the Tower.

Sorrow had touched him, and unmistakably diminished his natural gaiety, in the death of a beloved only son and of his wife, with whom he had lived in happy and satisfying partnership for so many years. Strong in his belief in the hereafter, he would not have sorrowed had he known that his life would be brought to an abrupt conclusion by an accident which he survived only a few days.

He left very definite instructions in his will that he did not desire to have a public funeral or a memorial service. His wishes were respected by his family. So he passed quietly out of a life of great distinction and great usefulness.

But his host of devoted friends, and many who had served under him, were sad to think that they had not been given the opportunity of paying respect to his memory or of giving thanks for the life of a great soldier and a great gentleman.

J. S. S.

FREDERICK PAUL MAINPRICE

THE early death of Mr. F. P. Mainprice at the age of 35 from a sudden attack of poliomyelitis, which occurred at Rawal Pindi on October 28, 1950, is a great loss to all interested in the North-west Frontier of India.

Mr. Mainprice joined the I.C.S. and was posted to the Central Provinces. He then transferred to the External Affairs Department, and after serving in the Eastern Bengal States was posted as Assistant Political Agent to the Lohit valley in Assam. From there he was sent as Assistant Political Agent to Gilgit, where he did admirable work, and remained until the administration was handed over to Pakistan. After serving that Government for some time, Mr. Mainprice left its employment and remained at Rawal Pindi till his death.

Mr. Mainprice was a most conscientious and sympathetic official, with a keen appreciation of the needs of the humbler members of the district; and if ever there were a protector of the poor, it was he. He had travelled considerably both in Assam and Kashmir, and had crossed Baltistan to the Nushik La and then entered Hunza.

He was a capable writer, and his account in *The Times* of the situation in

Kashmir during the early stages of the dispute was accurate and well informed and he gave a lucid account of events which he was well able to narrate.

It is hard in these days, when the interest in these distant but attractive regions is so slender, that this able and alert observer should be taken from us. He was one of the few links with the happy days that Gilgit and its Agency knew, and he will not soon be forgotten by the people for whom he worked so hard and whose welfare was so dear to him.

R. F. S.

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

By OWEN HOLLOWAY

Being the report of a lecture given on Wednesday, October 18, 1950, Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., in the Chair.

AT the first meeting of the Society one has ever attended, it is an embarrassment to be oneself the speaker. The Society's activities are things to read about comfortably abroad, as I have done for the last dozen years. The Journal has made me aware of what you will legitimately expect me now to be able to discuss in the student situation in the Middle East.

You are quite right to be impressed by the disproportionate importance there, in what is called politics, of university students and even schoolboys, and by the disproportionate number, or size, of institutions of higher learning. When I went to Egypt fourteen years ago there was one large university, and when I left it this year there were two flourishing, one more budding, and the seeds of still another planted. You would be right in surmising that this means a great many unemployed intellectuals, all cherishing dangerous thoughts. In 1937, it seems, 7,500 holders of a school certificate and 3,500 of a university degree could not find jobs, and in 1942, when you would think work for the forces would have absorbed them, there was still a total of 10,000. I remember an official high up in the Jewish Agency saying to me, on my first contact with the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1941: "Of course, we don't want any *students* yet," which might have been construed as implicit comment on the training of the head at the expense of the hand in neighbouring countries. I believe I once saw that Lord Cromer recommended far more manual training for the young people of Egypt, and only a strictly controlled modicum of purely intellectual studies. This point of view, however, stands no chance of popularity with the Egyptian Government.

To translate into human terms the situation I am trying to convey to you, I should explain that I have been teaching, with some ten other Englishmen and two Egyptians, in the English Section, one of the many sections of the Faculty of Arts, which is itself one of the many faculties of Fuad I University in Cairo. In the summer of 1936 (when one of these Egyptian colleagues was still a student) we had eight in the fourth year, taking their final examination; now there are more like fifty in the average graduating class, and I suppose about the same number in each of the four years of specialization in English literature. Rapid increase in numbers and consequent unemployment, however, are not the sole cause of this political self-consciousness. The only vocal class in a nation of illiterates must be very vocal. Egypt has, moreover, an outstanding position among Middle Eastern States, because it is not of modern growth or spawned into existence by a treaty, and because it has almost a monopoly, among the Arabic-speaking States, of the means to produce

the things of the mind. Its press has long been fabulously good, and there are fabulous possibilities for the film medium. I remember further when I was staying in Jerusalem the almost swooning ecstasy with which the lady of the house sank back into the cushions of her divan when the voice of the Egyptian announcer was heard over the wireless. When, in addition, you realize the native riches of Egypt that implement her press, films and radio, you can imagine how she is the reservoir of a flood of culture, of which the Middle East as a whole is the beneficiary. I once gave to an Egyptian highbrow monthly an article on an *avant garde* writer, and on that occasion I learned that their most enthusiastic, if not also most numerous, subscribers were in Iraq, which would thus learn something that America certainly, the country of this writer, and England probably, were not yet ripe for. Egypt is a name to conjure with. On my first trip to Anatolia, in 1936, people who would have been baffled to have to believe they had an Englishman before them—in Kayseri or Konya there “just ain’t no sich thing”—soon found their tongues again when they heard I came from Egypt, and it released a world of affectionate questions.

After saying this about what, personally, I have gathered was the position of Egyptian culture, I must come back to the student upholders of it and their politics. I believe that students in the Middle East are as far from understanding real *politics* as I am. It is important to my argument here to say what I understand by the term “politics.” I once had the honour of being allowed to propound a few of the problems that were on my mind to one of the ideologists of Zionism. He listened patiently—he was old and tired—and then said to me: “Mr. Holloway, politics is a nasty business; keep out of politics!” Anglo-American politics seems to me the domain of constantly worsening relations between the State and the individual. Whether or not we should be forced to detect some discrepancy between our pronouncement on future war and our ostensible Christianity, you will undoubtedly, at least, agree that there is no greater contrast than that between the man of action, who is a product of the West, and the saint, who is typically a product of the East. The intellectual and the student are ill equipped to understand the politics of the State, whose function (it has been said) is definable as the monopoly of legitimate violence, and which is concerned with power and the party passion and prejudice that go with the division of power. The intellectual can always understand a personal God of love, but never the impersonal reason of State. All I can tell you, therefore, about the Middle East is what a teacher sees with his mind and his affections; and what an ass he makes of himself if he ventures into political thinking! At the same time, I should like to explain why, though living in Egypt, I felt myself always an inhabitant of the Middle East, which is already a political idea.

Within four months of arriving in Egypt I found myself wandering in Anatolia. It had not needed any longer time to realize that Egypt needed a sustenance Egypt could not herself for the moment give her students. Turkey was the only country there that announced itself as not, it is true, solving, but at least seeing, any problem in the intercourse of Asiatic with European ideas. The progress of Turkey through trial and error

was a pattern of what could be expected in other countries that went through the routine of nationalism and self-sufficient national economy. For the next two years I followed the will-o'-the-wisp of an Egyptian patriotism imported from Turkey, which was deceiving wiser persons than myself. I did, however, pick up one useful idea, the idea of the Ottoman Empire, which was the starting-point for modern Turkey's *apologia pro vita sua*. After that, one became aware of the notion everywhere. Everybody in the Eastern Mediterranean seemed to be asking themselves, "Were we more, or less, happy under the Turks than we are now?" Young men might still be brought up to speak Turkish in Palestine, and be sent to Robert College on the Bosphorus. Driving in Palestine during the troubles of 1938, I just could not make myself put on one of those scarves with bobbles round it to look like an Arab, but I took refuge in the idea that as I was talking Turkish to the driver I was somehow under the ægis of the Middle East. Of course one learned more than that from the country of the ex-Ottoman Empire. One learned to disregard actual frontiers and to regard the situation as still fluid, as a matter of the continuing partition of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time that, for us Europeans, the Eastern Question really got into its stride, one did not lose sight of something else which these countries had in common—namely, their Western question. I myself have always urged Egyptian students, or the Turkish schoolmaster I found trying to paint from postcard reproductions of Cézanne, in Bursa, or he who rivalled Renan in clerical anti-clericalism in Niğde, to have some word which would be the converse of our, and their, term of "orientalist," and so to direct attention to the class of persons in the Eastern Mediterranean who were probing our Western civilization, and make them conscious of their station and its duties. At a later period I thought Zionism might be the Western leaven that would leaven the whole lump and not just Palestine only. I am ashamed to say I was taken in by the perhaps honestly pacific ideals of a minority group which had some idea of bringing Arab and Zionist together by playing with the standard of living. In 1946 I lived much of the summer in Jaffa, and listened to an Englishman, back from Haifa, who said that the healthy collaboration there ought to make the population of Jaffa ashamed to be so stand-offish and militant. I mention these absurdities only to show how, living in the Middle East even as a political illiterate, one has to face the dynamic aspect of the clash of East and West.

I have now come to the point where I must show you that clash in the Egyptian student.

The most prominent characteristic of the Egyptian student is his precocious intelligence. The Egyptian Government once imported a Swiss psychologist to advise the Ministry of Education, and very roughly what he found was that the more education a schoolboy received, the stupider he became. . . . The conclusion, I believe, was that there ought to be all manner of *physical* remedies for the *physical* troubles of precocious puberty. I believe this is a very limited treatment of the situation. We find the spirit of interest and then the slackening off just as much at the university level, where there is no marked physical development. Nothing

was more glaring in our English Section than the contrast of the bright intelligence which was the rule still in the student's second year, and the relative lethargy of his fourth year, when he was to take his finals. Surely it would not be too ambitious to generalize a little, and say: Where a bureaucracy is important, there exams are important, and where exams are important and work is done in view of marks, the iron enters into the victim's soul. In Egypt, certainly, he starts buoyed up by the enormous prestige of the university, the Eastern prestige of learning. He thinks of contact with the learned in terms of his own personal and human idea of the universe. At school, the formative influence on the life of the exceptional student, the one going on to the university, is perhaps as often as not the individual English schoolmaster, or perhaps friend, who took an interest: the student naturally conceives of learning in terms not of the discipline of science in the abstract, but of a continuing personal guidance through the paths of knowledge, with the teacher at his side. But there is perhaps a second explanation of the possible decline in his intelligence while at the university. His best efforts are sabotaged at present, in the Faculty of Arts in Cairo, not only by the universal application to his intellectual life of examination criteria, but by the number of languages he must learn simultaneously. Instead of naturally using a language of his own, Arabic, and, in the English Section, English, which is the language of instruction, he first of all has the duality of spoken and written Arabic (in the latter he is usually bad in proportion to the excellence of his English), and then he has the unnecessary requirement of a second European language, namely French, and finally, the preposterous imposition of Latin (introduced ostensibly, I believe, because Latin ought to be one medium of a partly Mediterranean mind).

But there is a last and even more important reason I would suggest for the student's uneasiness during his formative years as he wakes up to the world at the university, and that is, this environment that we may call "political." He sees a humanity divided into four classes, himself and the educated class outside all four, of course: first, a peasant population perhaps the most drastically diseased in the world, with the highest birth-rate, and death-rate, but one, in the world, and the most densely populated; second, a small new class of factory hands; third, the police; fourth, the European or Levantine business man, who sometimes seems as if he should be the scapegoat for the shortcomings or wretchedness of the other classes. Such is the social environment in which Egyptian students, like a category of persons in Dante's poem, "without hope, live in desire." They see the truly colossal waste involved in cheap labour under cheap conditions. Even in the process where we in the West could normally find sustenance, in the productive processes of industry and the competition of commerce, they are destined to deception. To take the opinion of the best book we have about Egypt, Mr. Issawi's (p. 89), the first feature of industry in Egypt is that it "has immediately assumed a monopolistic aspect, without passing through the stage described in textbooks as competition," and the second is that it "has grown and only lives behind the protection of a tariff wall." This is the world the student looks out on. It is annoying, as we are finding out, to be a satellite country, but it is

even worse to find that you are the puppet, apparently, of fate, of an insoluble situation. It seems to me that the alternative a young and sanguine mind will discover is, either a nationalism grotesquely compensatory in form, or else melancholy, apathy, and a disposition to set a high value on the life of pleasure.

It may be enlightening if I give you samples of the character and destiny of the thousand or more Egyptian students I calculate I have known fairly well over the years. You will probably allow I shall be most expeditious if I tell you just the best, and the worst. The one who was best was not, of course, the one who got the most marks, but was best in the judgment of all my colleagues who saw her work (for it was a girl), by those criteria we should use in granting an open scholarship at my own university of Oxford. It is in my opinion no accident that she was the most Egyptian student I have met. She would never go on a study mission to England. She did not come from the sort of school that produces imitation Europeans, and her mother was not English, which has been the case with more than one Egyptian student you may have met. Now, what has become of her? Just before leaving Egypt, I read her name and her husband's in the newspapers. They were in prison under the allegation that they were communists. So much for the best student, and now to the worst I have ever known—in fact, the only stupid specimen of a people of rare intelligence. I believe he had actually a certifiably retarded intelligence. What *his* affiliations were he himself told me, in a burst of confidence. It was during the war, and exams came round and he with them to seek my special favour. "You must help me, sir," he said, "for *I am on your side*. Do you know Mr. So-and-So [naming an Englishman]? I am secretly working for him," he said, in so many words. That was the worst student. Members must please believe me when I say I draw no moral from these two exhibits. Their affiliations may have been pure coincidence, and may not be exactly as alleged by others or themselves.

I have just implied that all Egyptian university students are intelligent, though I should not care to state *where* that intelligence *stops*. English seems to me to be a good medium by which they can receive the humanistic, or "liberal," education that fits you for nothing in particular but, in general, for anything, later. The plethora of ancient culture, and the penury of modern, in the Middle East might be dangerous, were it not for the artificial fertilizer of a secondary, thoroughly modern, language. At the same time, this importation into their life of something *so* foreign is a cause of maladjustment. Only a core of 15 per cent., say, in any particular batch of students could be trusted to pursue inquiry completely on the lines of the European scientific and causal universe: the other 85 per cent. should be guarded against it. At present their academic life is one perpetual cross-purpose. Some persons present may remember an old-fashioned classic by Nathaniel Hawthorne, called *The Scarlet Letter*. Stripped of its conventional reputation, it is just a melodrama of sin and redemption, spotlighting the theme of adultery, though not even that in any very alluring way. By some accident, this work found its way into the programme, to the unfeigned delight of the earnest 85 per cent. Noth-

ing I could say, or adduce, week after week, of better literature would shake them in the belief that this was daring work of revolutionary importance. Spontaneous taste, in short, you cannot count on in the majority of cases, because there are simply two different worlds, the East and the West. An easy solution would be to make the 15 per cent. candidates for honours, and have different lectures for the rest, but we are prevented from doing that by the purely quantitative appreciations of the present examination system, which insists that, to take honours, a candidate must be as good at Latin, French, Arabic, history as he is in the subject of his study, which of course no really good student ever is.

Another serious cause of unrecognized tension in the student body is the intellectual predominance of the girls. You might think it was natural they should be good at literature, but in fact you find women gold medalists in medicine too. I cannot pretend to offer any one explanation for their clear superiority to the men. A suppressed minority usually displays a greater effort, and they are naturally not addicted to the life of pleasure as by age-long tradition their brothers are. They are much less in politics than the men (though when they are at all, they are more so than any man would be). They may easily come from schools where English, and the scientific and causal world that goes with it, have been more consistently taught than in most boys' schools. Now, there seems to me considerable danger latent in a superiority which is not merely not going to serve as an incentive, but which will not even be recognized in later life. Even a university man marrying a university woman will be unlikely to treat her as an equal and a collaborator in his work. Hence women often cling to post-graduate courses of even the most baroque character, like Egyptology, in order to avoid sinking on to one of the gilded chairs that stand in a row in every respectable home, there to await the other women visitors and their tidings of a husband.

I cannot, however, hope to give you a real picture of what you have not seen. One of the greatest intellectual leaders of the Middle East is Nasreddin Khoja of Turkey, known in Egypt as Goha (I should explain he has been dead some time now). He was sleeping on the roof in the summer, and getting up without remembering for the moment where he was, fell over the edge. All the neighbours woke up at the crash, because the Khoja was a good Middle Easterner and a bulky man. "Khoja Effendi, Khoja Effendi," they said, "how do you feel?" He replied: "How *can* I answer that question, my friends? Only one who has fallen off a roof himself can know what falling off a roof is like."

However this may be, I am, nevertheless, not going to renounce telling you about students and the Middle East, but only going to try a different tack, beginning with the question why it is that countries are so different when you live in them from when you do not and are only a tourist or a statesman at a peace conference. Living *in* a country is itself an ambiguous phrase. My first chief always claimed he lived in Egypt as the other members of our staff did not, because he had a villa out in the country by the Pyramids of Giza, whilst we were in Cairo. He was probably right that it was a different proposition, because the next colleague of mine who took it into his head to live out that way died of a complication of one

disease upon another. I mention this, not to score a point against the sanitation, which would be silly and slanderous, but because I seriously believe that it illustrates that you either get on with the Middle East or you do not. The two colleagues I have ever had who did not suffer from exactly the same symptoms: trouble with the university, trouble with their landlords and with the plumbing, and, in one of the two cases, death. All these troubles were as irrational and freakish as the curse of the Pharaohs. There was, in the character of either of these two charming men, nothing you could have laid a name to which could be regarded as provoking. It was simply that they could not get on with the foreignness—and you will have noted by now that my theme is the irrevocable, or rather irreversible, character of the history which has made us Western and them, of the East: the *history*, and not the geography, please note—the human development, not the brute natural fact.

I need not explain at any length how, even though you do not “live in Egypt,” to quote that chief of mine, you nevertheless do exist there. It is thanks to a cushion of Levantine middlemen. By the epithet “Levantine” I designate those persons in the Middle East who have no marked national institutions or characteristics save those which they have picked up in a (probably) French school, and whose outlook is distinctively cosmopolitan. The determinant of this outlook is not so much the Levantine’s Greek, Italian, Jewish or Armenian so-called origin and name, nor his French school, as the present fairly vigorous division of his life into two parts, business pursuits on the one hand and pleasure on the other, both existences being conducted in a smattering of not less than four languages. Levantine is so like Levantine in Istanbul, or Jaffa, or Cairo, and so unlike the citizens of those countries respectively, that the Arab, if Levantinized (as can easily happen with the absentee landlords) seems to me to resemble exactly the Levantine Jew. These are the persons through whose agency it is possible for the European to be *in*, but not *of*, the country he may be living in: they feed and clothe him, and sometimes give him society and a species of contact, at second-hand, with the country itself. Thanks to them many a European has kept both his body and his soul alive, but at the same time they might well be the agency that unconsciously distorts our view of things. It is a few examples of that distortion, not indeed due to Levantines, that I want now to examine, to show you how hard it is for the West to understand even the Middle East.

I was one of two persons appointed to the Egyptian University, as we were then called, in the autumn of 1935, but newspaper reports from Cairo of student disorders were so alarming that the other appointee decided not to go. When I arrived in Cairo, I established myself in a hotel as near as possible to what looked like the central square, where I could at any time take good cover behind a large equestrian statue. Such was the idiotic impression I had received from our English newspapers, that I was certain the “side streets,” as I called the main arteries, must be full of ruffians armed to the teeth. Actually I have never seen in Egypt what I *had* seen in the country I had then just come from, the U.S.A.—namely, a solid wall of machine guns pointing at the civilian public, which is a language capital and labour talk in, there. Since that

false alarm in Egypt, I have been in many an actual rioting mob, of sorts. I have never got *quite* used to the way the distant roar gradually approaches one's lecture room, and a detachment of demonstrators at last flings open the door; all the same, I have never suffered any harm. On the contrary, in fact. Only on one occasion was the mob ever animated with any feelings that could really be described as personal—"Down with England!" which they used to cry, is a generalization no worse than "Bloody Trinity!" in the mouth of a Balliol drunk. This one occasion was when some political party or another proposed to make political capital out of the incidental remarks about Islam in a Shaw play we were teaching—safe in so teaching it, as we had thought, by the fact that someone had made and no one had objected to an Arabic translation of it. No member of this mob could have known except by hearsay what the trouble was about; they were from the Faculty of Agriculture or Commerce or something. But that is not why I tell the story; it is for what happened when these interlopers desired to spit upon the playwright in the person of his humble fellow-citizen. There occurred then what could happen just that way only in the Middle or Far East. Two or three of my class wafted me out and away through the mob and through the door: to hustle an object of solicitude would have been an unpardonable *lèse-majesté*, and I can only describe the motion to which I was subject as having the grace and ease with which a bride is led to the altar. I should have at least expected to leave my gown on the field of battle, like the gentleman who defied the wife of Potiphar, but not a thread was out of place. I hate to think what you may have heard from your newspapers about this. I am sure they announced that English residents in Egypt had become objects of execration to the merest schoolboy, and possibly even that his Britannic Majesty's Consul-General was to use his discretion about issuing Mills bombs to the able-bodied. Well, on just such another occasion I was going down a long street near the university and the disaffected schools, working out a problem in literary history and vaguely conscious of a sort of sporadic popping like a good restaurant, when an Egyptian schoolboy—one of those mentioned in your newspapers—popped up from nowhere, not to cut my throat, but to direct me away from the pops, which it appeared were the police firing into the air. Of course the boy knew I was English; he addressed me in English. Incidentally, I have never seen a policeman fire anything; they are far more the target of the students, though to be honest we do have a martyrs' memorial of the handful of students who lost their lives in the 1935 troubles.

The misinterpretation of student incidents, however, would be but a superficial example of what I think, on the contrary, we should recognize as the total misapprehension of the West on the subject of the Middle East. I do not say this presumptuously, so that I can then proceed to enlighten you, and take the credit for it. On the contrary: I am honestly submitting to you the problem of *different ways of life* which create *different ways of thinking*. All university students, whether in Giza or on Mount Scopus, or at Princeton, or in the no man's land between Balliol and Trinity, have a common superabundance of physical energy that I think should be able to establish an instant freemasonry between

them. The trouble is, what would happen the instant after. When you see things with different eyes, you are seeing different things. Students in Egypt (for example) are always affectionate, but one cannot but think it is cupboard love when, about the time of examinations, they tie themselves in knots with politeness: "Be *kind* to us" is the burden of their song—or, afterwards, "The questions were very hard," which is to say once more, "Be *very* kind to us, therefore." Now, is all this flattery, and bribery and corruption? Would you not find it hard not to suppose it was? And yet I am convinced it is not. I think it is because they do not really live in a universe governed by the principle of causality, one where hard work will be followed by good marks "as the night the day," but in a universe of religious bounty. In the same way, I once heard a person ask a railway guard a specific simple question—something like, Will the train be stopping at such and such a station?—and the answer was, in all sincerity: "That, Madam, is as God wills!" (I have omitted to mention they were both at the moment *on* the train thus actuated.) Of course, these are only funny stories, told about the Middle East in the West: if only we could somehow set the two side by side, on equal terms. They were, during the war. I believe some Olympian gazer might have smiled at the glaring contrast of East and West in Cairo itself. The class division, in this case of officers and men, which in its manifold forms is the basis of our English social set-up, was momentarily framed in the setting of a human society, where there are indeed servants and masters, but where there is dignity on both sides of the barrier. As Mr. Issawi's book (p. 147) says, "Egyptian society is characterized by an unusual combination of very marked economic inequality, with social fluidity and cultural homogeneity." There is of course nothing we can do about it. Except perhaps think.

The two worlds are mutually exclusive. I have never in my experience found a point of interpenetration, though I suppose you might, in the language of science, or in Basic English. As far as anything else is concerned, we are cut off, because there developed in our Puritan forbears the idea of a vocation, or *calling*, and of duty to the job therefore; of fixed prices, and *contract*; of not living in the present, but saving for the future. Our older universe of religious caprice was secularized; life had its humanity taken away from it. We acquired science; we lost religion and art. Asia, I suppose, is still the continent of the religions of the world, and if we take opium, as Edward G. Browne did for that fortunate eye-ailment of his in Yazd, we get that wonderful chapter of his "Among the Kalenders," and some chance of understanding. But no Western country has ever had anything remotely approaching, in esoteric splendour, the painting of Sung China, or the plebeian diffusion of all æsthetic joys in Tokugawa Japan. What above all we *have* was noticed by Carlyle in (I think) the 1830s, in our competitive, unsocial civilization: there is, first, its cool impersonality, the fact that the only measure one supposedly human being could have of another was a measure dictated by self-interest: hence the soulless inhumanity epitomized in the miserable, anonymous denizens of our peculiarly horrible large cities, that sprawl like the marks of a disease. Second, there is the subjection of our spiritual life to the

complete functional regimentation of commerce; as Carlyle put it, books were not only being printed, but also written, by machinery. Such is the West my student from Cairo will find when he comes on his mission here. And what is the Central Asia members of this society would find if they looked up from the colourful pages of their Journal, and actually *went* there? We may take the answer from a man of rare sensitiveness, from in fact the fourth of his novels dealing, though this time only in part, with Asia, from the episode in which M. Malraux describes the state of mind of the European envoy sent by Enver Pasha to report on his Turanian dream, and how this man comes back haunted by the weary changelessness, the utter boredom, of the culture he has invaded. His own culture was based on science, and science means progress and revolution without stopping and without stint. He did not realize before he went that that cut him off from Asia. I do not think Egyptian students ever know why they are unhappy in London. They had the impression, while they were in Cairo, that there was nothing they would not like; just so long as it was modern, all was grist to their mill. Once, long ago, at the Egyptian University one of the five or six parts of the course in the English Section was called "The Near East in English Literature." It was believed the Near East would be charmed to hear how its life and institutions had been delineated in the tongue that Shakespeare used. In fact, they wanted no such thing. "Down with the Near East," they might have said: "Let us make a new one in the image of the civilization of the Thames Valley or of Lake Michigan." I must say I should like to study their faces when they read Mr. Issawi's prophecy, or wish (p. 72), that Egypt may one day be not only mainly a cotton-producer, but a big vegetable and fruit garden, and dairy!

The West and the Middle East clash, I should say, at every point where they meet. Oddly enough, I do not think the clash is always a bad thing. I was once decoyed by a fellow-Westerner into visiting a very holy and (though I did not know it) forbidden shrine. We were wearing fezzes, and were, to my horror, mistaken for pilgrims, which was all part of my companion's plan. It was too late for me to record a minority vote against the temper of the meeting, and so we went the whole round of the sights, assisted by the pious purblindness of our successive conductors. When we got outside, as soon as we could speak, we found we had but a single thought, namely, Groppi's. Groppi's, I should explain, is the Cairo confectioner where the Levant is in all its splendour, like a Lyons' Corner House. But into this vulgarity we were (as it were) now self-propelled, or spewed out.

I think this little incident (which was even more of a surprise to my friend than myself, since he both loved shrines and hated Groppi's even more than I did) illustrates the kind of polarization, or generation of active and specific contraries, that might save our Middle Eastern student. Unfortunately, the mission to study in England which is desirable for him, if merely for his subsequent prestige and material welfare at home, operates in him only an uneasy marriage of two opposite cultures, inevitably ending up by the divorce of one *or the other*. Since there are so many intellectuals in Egypt who on their return from abroad have clearly

divorced their own country, though ostensibly living "in," and even teaching in it, I am perfectly prepared to learn that there will also be plenty who will divorce Europe. You can no more blend the two cultures than you could ever blend the man of action and the saint. St. Ignatius Loyola did it, but is he not the very type of man the Asiatic Dostoyevsky depicts in the Grand Inquisitor of his famous fable, who condemned Christ for subversive activity when Christ came back to earth? And is not the whole long life agony of that other great Asiatic, Tolstoy, the record of the clash between an Asiatic saint and European institutions?

I see no hope for Middle Eastern students who are passive victims of the clash, but even less for those whom it makes into mongrels. Of course, the Middle East will probably stand more chance of salvation from its intelligentsia than from either its business men or its inarticulate masses, and an intelligentsia is by definition a lot of unemployed, or otherwise uncomfortable, intellectuals. Some of them will be mongrels, like the immortal types of what I must really demote Mr. Issawi's work to call the best book of all on Egypt, namely Gogol's *Dead Souls*, which was written about the Russia of a hundred years ago. These persons might be called traders in ideas, who trade for the sake of trading. When one of them is fired to study his native country, he comes to a European whom he regards as an authority and asks for an authority—that is, a book by a European—on the world around him. You need not be afraid of the spread of communism among *such* students in the Middle East (or among any such students, for that matter): the parable of the Sower and the Seed and the Good Ground presumably indicates that ideas which do not have a foundation in reality will not live long. The second class of intellectuals is that which has espoused the West and divorced its own native land. They are your friends, and *they* will not turn communist. There remains the residue, personally I think the most interesting class of mind, that which, as I have suggested might happen, has divorced *you*. But they once were married to you, and they can understand your language. We have tried to help give them a liberal education: they have instincts for fair play and for a free market in solid, usable ideas. The bidding is open, and your rival has already arrived in the auction-room. The censorship inflicted on his ideas has seen to it that he arouses considerable interest. But do not fear: any legitimate bid you too may have to make will be heard.

SOCIAL WORK IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By Miss M. M. HAMILTON, B.S.Econ.

Lecture given on June 30, 1950, Brigadier S. H. Longrigg, O.B.E., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN, in introducing the lecturer, said: Miss Hamilton has kindly come to give us the benefit of experience which is somewhat unusual. She does not claim to be as learned in Middle Eastern affairs as some of those present, because she has spent only three years there as against longer periods; nevertheless, they were three very intense years spent mostly in Egypt, but also in visits to other countries in the Middle East. Miss Hamilton went out with a very definite slant; in fact, a whole-time active interest in a special branch, which is that of social work. She was already a most experienced social worker and social student in this country and has turned her hand to nearly everything in that field, so that when Miss Hamilton went to the Middle East she knew exactly what she was going to observe and what part to play. I feel we shall gather from her that she played that part with great acuteness and activity.

Miss M. Hamilton is a graduate of the London School of Economics. She has made a study of social questions in this country, and two years ago went to Cairo and was attached to the British Embassy to assist in dealing with certain social problems there.

During her time in Egypt Miss Hamilton had an opportunity of becoming closely acquainted with methods of doing social work in Egypt itself, and also attended conferences of such workers in Lebanon and Damascus.

She found there was a very great deal of interesting development in the field of social studies and treatment of such problems, and of that she will talk.

Miss M. M. HAMILTON then delivered her lecture, as follows:

I AM very glad indeed to have the opportunity of speaking to the members of the Royal Central Asian Society, because, as the Chairman has said, although I have had a short experience in the Middle East it is, perhaps, an experience gained as a result of a rather different slant from that of most people who go to that part of the world. I am still surprised at my own temerity in accepting the invitation to address you because, however different my slant on things may be, the fact remains that you must all be very much better acquainted than I am with conditions in the Middle East.

Before speaking of my relatively sketchy experience in the Middle East I would like to make one or two general remarks in regard to social welfare. Although there have been many attempts to define that term, it is extremely difficult to arrive at a satisfactory definition. Nevertheless, most people would agree that social work has two complementary aims—one can hardly speak of the first or second—one of which is to help people to help themselves and to make the most of their existing environment; the other is, where the environment militates against the individual's own efforts, to try to effect a fundamental change in that environment. Naturally, where there is a more fully developed society, as in the West, social welfare work tends to be with individuals rather than with their environment, and in the under-developed countries such as there are in the Middle East the tendency should be to concentrate on environmental change rather than on helping individuals.

Perhaps I should give an illustration of what I have in mind. For instance, it does not seem to me to be much use teaching people the advantages of cleanliness, and giving them hygienic instruction, if there is no possibility of their getting soap and water. First and foremost, it is necessary to work on the environment by means of public health reforms. After all, it is only one hundred years since Chadwick was working on those lines in England, and we are now so used to having hot and cold water gushing out of taps whenever we want it, that it is a little hard to realize that only one hundred years ago there was practically no sanitation and no piped water here. (Even now it is lacking in many rural areas.) Water supply and good sanitation and education in hygiene, at that level, are the first essentials in Middle Eastern countries. I am a little anxious because I think the impact of modern Western ideas is perhaps going to mean that such essentials may not be put first; there will perhaps be a tendency, for instance, to establish child guidance centres on a grand scale before there is universal education. In short, a temptation to deal with effects rather than causes.

You are all so familiar with economic conditions in the Middle East that there is no need for me to remind you of them. Where there is an enormous difference between the few very wealthy and the many very poor, problems are great and difficult to resolve. One has to watch rather carefully that there is not too much activity on the social welfare plane without the necessary economic reforms being put into operation. If that were done we might find that the true economic position was disguised and all the more difficult to recognize and to deal with. The difference between conditions in the rural areas and in the towns is also a source of difficulty in working out schemes for social welfare, because in the towns there are conditions and problems in regard to which it is often possible to use an adaptation of Western methods, but that cannot be done in the country districts. I believe I am right in saying that, for instance, in Iraq—and I know it is true in parts of Upper Egypt—it is extremely difficult to enforce the law, that in the villages remote from the capital it is the will of the local landlord which is operative; and as yet few of the big landowners have much social conscience. So that whatever reforms the Central Government may try to institute, until that situation is altered it is likely to be very difficult to make them effective in the country areas.

There is the added difficulty of political instability. It seemed to me that the Government departments were very much alive to the need for action and were anxious to develop a social welfare policy, but they never knew how long they were going to have to put their ideas into operation; no sooner had they some sort of plan started than the Government was changed and all their ideas were upset, whether good or bad, just because another Government had come into power. Nevertheless, Government action has been started. In Egypt there is a Ministry of Social Affairs, which has been in existence some ten years and has done a great deal. They were encouraged to a great extent by the work done by international voluntary organizations, which had experimented in various forms of welfare activity. One of them was on work in the villages. The particular organization of which I am thinking started a welfare centre in a village

not far from Cairo and then introduced it into two other villages. The basic idea is that the villagers should be encouraged to carry out their own welfare work. The village centre includes a clinic, a room for meetings and cinema shows, a small library in connection with the anti-illiteracy campaign, and perhaps a class room; there is a resident social worker, an agriculturist, trained also in the Cairo School of Social Studies, and a trained midwife. It is their job to win the confidence of the villagers, to encourage them, particularly the women, into the health centre, where they learn simple hygiene, and to help the men in their husbandry as much as the women in the care of their children; to help them to use what they have to the best advantage, and gradually to get them round to using, perhaps other methods and other tools. The co-operative buying of seeds and stud animals, for instance, has been introduced. The Fellah Department of the Ministry of Social Affairs have worked on this plan in 114 different villages scattered up and down the country, and they are also trying to introduce village crafts to supplement the income of the Fellah. That is only a small beginning, but a very promising one.

Somewhat the same method of work is followed in Syria by an American organization by which I was much impressed, the Middle East Foundation, which seemed to be working on very quiet, unobtrusive lines, but doing really a good job of educational work at the level at which it is needed. The basis of all good social welfare work is educational. Their method is to start by winning the confidence of the men, by offering them advice and help in regard to their farming, and then to introduce women "home-makers" into their homes to give simple instruction to the women in home-making and hygiene, and there are classes for the unmarried girls who have not been to school. They have started health centres supervised by trained Syrian midwives; one centre may cater for several villages, each with its local midwife whose old methods are gradually yielding to training. When I visited one centre I saw the work in very active operation. While I was there a man came in on horse-back to take the midwife back with him, as his wife was having a difficult confinement. Had we not been there she would have ridden pillion to her case; as it was, we all bundled into the station-wagon and off we went, the man showing us the way. When we arrived at his home a few miles away it was found that the woman needed hospital attention, so she was made as comfortable as possible in the station-wagon, with husband and midwife in attendance, and taken to the hospital in Damascus.

The Foundation is working in a fairly wide area around Damascus, and they have the co-operation of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health. The work they are doing should be a useful example to the Ministries, when they get the length of an effective rural policy, in the same way as that other organization in Egypt provided an example for the Ministry of Social Affairs there.

In Iraq I came into contact with the work of a child welfare organization which has been in existence for twenty-eight years and which provides child welfare centres. I saw four of these in Baghdad and I was told that there were another eleven outside the town in the country districts. From what I could see of the work in a short visit it seemed they were all run

on very sensible lines (which cannot be said of all such activities). My one criticism was that they were not as educative as they might be, because they were for sick children; there was no question of the children being brought regularly by their mothers, so the mothers were not given the day-by-day advice that would have helped them to bring their children up at a rather higher level. This method would probably have involved more work, if properly done, than the Centres could manage. The women's branch of this Society, however, has a centre in the charge of an English-trained lady doctor, where this more educative practice is followed.

I believe it is true to say that there is a feeling of social responsibility, some sort of social conscience, emerging in these countries, particularly in the towns. There are in existence today some purely national organizations, which have been operating for twenty or thirty years; and others are continually appearing—in Egypt there is a very large number covering many fields.

It is most important that these voluntary organizations should receive every encouragement. With the unstable political situation they provide continuity. If their work was to be done by Government departments it would almost certainly be interrupted, if not suppressed, and there would be difficulties connected with the Budget, and so on, which would retard the work. Besides that continuity, the fact that there are people outside the Governments actively engaged in the work, and getting experience, is of great value, because when Governments reach the stage of doing this work—and some of it is definitely work which needs to be undertaken by Government and should not remain the responsibility of voluntary organizations—then there would be a body of informed, experienced people upon which any Government, of whatever party, should be able to call for advice.

There is a factor in the emergence of this social conscience, this sense of social responsibility, which is of great importance and interested me very much, and that is the emancipation of the women. In Syria their emancipation did not seem to me to be very real, as though they were uncertain what to do with it. In Iraq I think it has touched relatively few; I believe I met most of the active women in Baghdad in the course of my short visit. The women everywhere are very much taken up with the idea of establishing their status, and at the same time they are anxious to do welfare work. It seemed to me that they were getting a little muddled with the two ideas. Undoubtedly they feel an urge to do something to help the very poor people and to alter the bad conditions under which they live, and the two things are inevitably bound together: unless the women can establish their own status it is going to be much more difficult for them to be effective in the social work that they want to do.

I felt that the answer to most of the problems lay in education, not the sort which is rather prevalent, the kind of parrot-like education which aims at achieving a string of letters after one's name, but a more important and fundamental type of education, which will promote this feeling of social responsibility, and with it a recognition of the need to *adapt* western methods to such different conditions.

I found in Syria that the women were exceedingly keen on educating

themselves and their children. The societies of women which I met were almost invariably societies of teachers, and their main activity was that of providing education for young girls, though there was interest in other kinds of welfare work. The organizations which I met with in these fields were not very flourishing—I understood much of their financial support had been diverted to the Arab refugees from Palestine.

Another most important question is that of training in social welfare. There are three schools of social study in Egypt, one a State school. At the moment there are very few people with the right kind of training to make plans or to put them into operation without making mistakes. It is always a great deal easier to learn from one's own mistakes than from other people's, but it is a very lengthy and expensive process, and a good deal of damage can be done in the meantime. Students from all countries are being sent to study social welfare in Western European countries, but, as I have said, it is open to doubt whether those who are sent on these missions have sufficient background education to enable them to adapt what they learn in Western universities, and from Western experience, to conditions in their own countries. On the other hand, there are experts from abroad coming to the Middle East, some at the invitation of Governments, who have no knowledge of local conditions.

I was glad to notice some tendency to think a little in terms of turning to Indian experience, and people have even been to Cyprus from Egypt to see how Western ideas have been worked out under conditions which are much more akin to their own than in the Western countries, to which they have hitherto looked for their ideas. That is a very important development in the use of foreign experience.

I spoke a little while ago of the importance of maintaining what we call voluntary social work by voluntary organizations. I want to emphasize this. Government departments are often enthusiastic; they know that social welfare is a question of the moment and that popularity may be gained by means of it, and it is possible that in their enthusiasm Government departments concerned with this question may swamp the voluntary organizations. How that is going to be avoided I do not know—perhaps by insistence on that wider higher education I have referred to and by educational propaganda amongst the ordinary people of the country so that they realize the value of these private or voluntary organizations.

Perhaps I may be able to make up for a few of the very many points I have left out if you would ask me questions.

The CHAIRMAN: Miss Hamilton has left time, deliberately, to enable questions to be asked, and that will add largely to the value of the meeting. I felt in listening to her that we must keep a sense of proportion in these matters. It is true that the act of the individual person in humanitarian matters is beyond praise; one cannot decry it even if it means trying to bail out the Atlantic with a thimble, and there will in human affairs always be room for the single worker or single small organization. But one has to ask in this field, Is that to be the only answer? Such work will create a tiny, tiny oasis in a most appalling desert of evil conditions. So often, too, the efforts of some of those to whom

Miss Hamilton has referred and the efforts of foreign voluntary workers are suspect. One hears the most fantastic and malicious accusations against people who are giving their lives for the purpose of serving these Eastern countries. It is all very discouraging and depressing. In any case, foreign effort is never likely to have the same effect as the indigenous effort of the people themselves, which fortunately is growing and of which one has seen a good deal in all these countries.

I believe the way in which to get a great deal of social work done is from the bottom, although that is less attractive from the humanitarian angle. If one is dealing with slums or slum conditions it is one thing for a devoted worker to plunge in and save, body and soul, some of the children; it is another if the Government or county council can be induced to sweep the whole slum away and build fair dwellings. That is too often only an idle dream. If the Governments would really put money and effort into the business of social improvement more could be done in ten years than a thousand years of pathetically small-scale voluntary effort can do. Often the zeal of Governments in the matter is quite genuine. They feel it is a question of the day and they must give a good account of themselves; and that would be the position of some of the supporters of the Government, the taxpayers, the wealthy pashas who know, after all, the worth, but when it comes to paying will not do it. The trouble is to get such people to treat their peasantry decently; they fail to do so because it means taking less out of the peasantry and/or paying more taxes. One has to admit that the social conscience on which big-scale Government action will depend is lamentably deficient. That is the greatest drawback throughout the Middle East. I am certain that the rich do not take their social obligations as seriously as they should.

Admiral Sir HOWARD KELLY: Did Miss Hamilton find in her study of welfare work any trace of the occupation of Syria for twenty years by the French?

Miss HAMILTON: Yes, I did, more particularly on the educational side. As I have said, most of my contacts were with teachers, and I found definitely that there was very strong French influence through the schools, where French was learned and French culture absorbed. There was an effort on the part of a group of Syrian women to counteract that influence by establishing a school based on Western methods, but really a modern Arabic school, and included in the curriculum of that school were lessons on civics and such subjects.

As regards the more strictly welfare side, which one thinks of in terms of centres and so on, there was the organization of the *Goût de dait*; there were also various similar organizations started by the different religious bodies, particularly the Roman Catholics, who were chiefly French.

In reply to other questions Miss HAMILTON said: The only anti-tuberculosis work I saw in Damascus was run in connection with the Red Crescent. I visited a centre run by the Red Crescent which in effect acted as an out-patient centre for the tuberculosis hospital, which I did not see. Unfortunately, it was in the process of being painted and redecorated and I did not, therefore, see it at work, except for the distribution of food which it undertakes.

I visited Iraq, but I did not get outside Baghdad and I was in that city for only a very few days. I did not hear a great deal about the rural side of things in Iraq, but I gathered that the land-owning sheikhs there are a law unto themselves. They seem to be slow in realizing that their enlightened self-interest should encourage them to treat their workers better, provide medical attention and so on. Though some sheikhs encourage visiting doctors, I know that there is difficulty in all Middle East countries in getting doctors to stay out in the villages, but the organization of which I spoke, the Child Welfare Society of Baghdad, has one centre in each of the provinces and has managed to get resident doctors at all of them. I was very sorry not to be able to learn more about the position outside Baghdad.

In Egypt it is very much to the advantage of voluntary bodies to work with the Ministry of Social Affairs, which can and frequently does subsidize their work. There is a tendency, of course, for whoever gives money to say what is to be done. That is why, I think, the scope of spontaneous voluntary work is going to be influenced and perhaps restricted. In one country I felt there was a definite tendency to absorb the best of the voluntary organizations and make it too difficult for the others to carry on. I must, however, qualify what I am saying by reminding you that I was there for only a very short time. I have given simply my own personal impressions of what I saw.

In the Lebanon there seemed to me to be some give-and-take between the Governments and voluntary organizations. The voluntary organizations have definitely managed to bring pressure on the Government department concerned to reform the position as far as child labour in factories is concerned. That was one specific piece of work they got done. Probably the Lebanon was the most advanced in social welfare of the countries that I visited. In Baghdad the Government was making efforts to cope with the really frightful living conditions by planning some satellite communities, but they were sadly handicapped by lack of experienced social administrators in the Ministry. They had, it appeared, had endless advice from numerous foreign experts, but seemed unable to utilize it—the fault may have lain in the number of experts. The voluntary societies appeared to carry on their work more independently of the Government here than elsewhere.

I think the Governments derive a certain amount of impetus from a fear of Communism, and whether that is true in the case of the welfare-minded members of the community as well I do not know, but as a guess I should think it quite likely. There again, I consider it is courting disaster if they are simply going to rush at social welfare and do a few superficial things for the sake of appearances and not at the same time pay attention to the economic reforms which are needed, because, in my opinion, without economic reforms the social welfare work they may do is so much wasted effort.

The women are doing something effective, and I think they have always had a good deal of influence, even before the modern idea of emancipation. That kind of influence continues as well as their new more open influence. They now have the two lines of attack, as it were.

Women are, I think, definitely taking hold of things. I was much impressed by the Iraqi Branch of the International Alliance of Women. Women in Syria and Iraq have formed Unions to join this International Alliance and that has had the effect of bringing all the active women together in one body so that they can plan their activities and work together.

In Cairo the Jewish organization for their own community was extremely good. There used to be several different societies, but they have been gradually brought under one co-ordinating body. A large welfare centre was put up in the Jewish quarter, which gave house room to all these organizations, dovetailed their work and made one complete and all-embracing organization of the whole thing. I was most impressed by the way in which the organization was being run. It undertook family case work from the Centre, and, arising from this, various classes and a soup kitchen were created, and they had erected dwellings for people whom they found could not get homes. They were also building a school.

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks to the Chairman and Lecturer, moved by Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.

THE ARAB REFUGEES: THEIR POSITION TODAY

By Miss S. G. THICKNESSE

THERE are five disturbing facts about the Arab refugees' position: in the first place, at the end of the third year since the Palestine war there are more refugees needing relief than there were in September, 1948, or even after the armistices of the spring of 1949; secondly, these refugees are now worse off than they were, because clothes have worn out, blankets and tents originally provided are in tatters, and harder than ever to replace on account of the Korean war and "stock piling" and the wool famine; thirdly, three years of destitution, with chances of political settlement and compensation as remote as ever, clearly have damaged the spirit of the refugees; fourthly, nearly a year after the setting up of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency, following the recommendation of the Clapp Mission, less than 2 per cent. of the refugees have been found employment; and, finally, contributions from member States of the United Nations promise to be as inadequate and at least as much delayed in payment as they have been throughout these last years.

The increase in numbers is due to the ending of the resources of a proportion of the refugees who originally kept out of the "bread-line" and have now joined it, in many cases leaving villages and swelling the numbers in the semi-organized camps; to the high birth-rate among the refugees; to the difficulty in practice of weeding out from the ration lists destitutes who are not strictly refugees, as well as to small numbers of new claimants for relief appearing after every trouble on the armistice frontiers, and to any expulsion of "undesirables" by Israel, such as the bedouin and the population of Majdal which have recently increased the dangerously overcrowded Gaza area. In the September report of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency it was reported that 860,000 rations were being distributed, 120,000 to refugees in Lebanon, 82,000 in Syria, to 430,000 refugees in Jordan, to 28,000 in Israel and to 200,000 in Gaza—these last representing double the number of the old population of that area.

Although it is understood that contributions of \$2,000,000 worth of clothes for the refugees have been made to Azzam Pasha, and that the British Red Cross is going to help with a clothing appeal in Britain, it is clear that the only solid help for the refugees is that they should find work. But it is exactly here that this hope has been dashed. The latest reports show that the Clapp Mission underestimated the number of refugees; at once underestimated the cost of large works-projects, such as irrigation schemes for Syria and Jordan, and overestimated the sums which the United Nations would make available; and, finally, that it counted on support from Arab Governments for the employment of refugees, and on the refugees themselves for willingness to work on afforestation and terracing even in remote places. Neither the support nor the willingness has been forthcoming. The result is that, with money becoming available

only at the last minute even to cover the cost of rations, the U.N.P.R.W.A., after months of hand-to-mouth existence, could report that only 14,000 of the 860,000 people on their ration lists were working, and even then only on such precarious work as road-making, petty afforestation, or such miscellaneous projects as the Jericho excavations, or in the admirable but extremely limited weaving and handicraft projects organized for the most part by individuals outside the U.N.—for example, by Miss Winifred Coate, of the Church Missionary Society at Zerqa.

Finally, there is the question of finance. Israel, as is well known, has refused to consider compensation apart from a general peace settlement with the Arab States, which even the possibility of a third world war does not seem to bring nearer. Israel has also, as is less well known, made dependent on a peace settlement the release of any of the £P4,000,000 or £P5,000,000 standing to Arab accounts in banks (including over £P1,000,000 in Barclays D.C. and O.) now subject to Israel. The Arab refugees are therefore incapable of helping themselves, and the U.N.P.R.W.A. has asked for a further \$50,000,000 from the member States of the United Nations for July, 1951, to July, 1952—\$20,000,000 for direct relief and \$30,000,000 for the "Reintegration Fund"—and another \$5,000,000 for the special hardship of this winter.

A "negotiating committee" was set up during the last General Assembly meeting at Lake Success to find out who was ready to give aid for Korean and Arab refugees. All the States expressing their readiness to contribute were to meet and settle their individual contributions before the end of the meetings at Lake Success. Again, however, there was delay, and it will be February at earliest before definite promises are made. Before then even the intended amount of Britain's contribution is unknown. From the refugees' point of view, all that seems certain is that, however little money is available for their relief, foreign U.N. administrators in the Middle East will continue to draw salaries (tax free) from twelve to twenty times the size of anything paid to Arabs qualified and fortunate enough to be given similar work. It was this ostentatious inequality, these huge salaries to U.N. personnel, who, however well-intentioned, are able to do so dangerously little, that struck Miss Dorothy Thompson, the American journalist, forcibly during her recent Middle East tour.

ANATOLIAN SCHOOL

EARLY in 1950 there was published in Istanbul a small book of 140 pages* which had the unusual good fortune of going through three editions in four months. The author, still in his teens, is one of the thousands of Turkish peasant boys and girls who are passing through the village institutes and going out as teachers in the village schools under the Government's ambitious programme, which calls for two thousand new schools a year for five years. The book consists of a hundred or so sketches giving this young man's experiences and observations during his first year of teaching in a village of about 700 inhabitants. The village is unnamed, but is situated in the vicinity of Nevşehir, south of Ankara.

The importance of the book is that here, perhaps for the first time, the Anatolian peasant writes his own story. Yet Mahmut Makal is no longer quite the peasant, save in his ability to endure primitive living conditions. His schooling has implanted in him an ideal, a fervour which his fellow-villagers do not share. Between himself and the community (his own home included) there is misunderstanding and opposition, mounting in times of excitement to antagonism. His book shows the struggle to be largely between the secular outlook which he and his school represent and the traditional religious outlook of the villagers.

No foreigner living in that village—and the term "foreigner" would have to include any city-bred Turk—could have observed the community as closely and naturally as does the author. He touches on many aspects of their life—husbandry, architecture, nourishment, finance, religion, superstitions, vital statistics. Naturally his school and the struggle to maintain existence on that barren soil in that harsh climate form the main themes of his observations. One can judge that this was a particularly hard year of frost and drought in a village poorer than the average. But if the bleakness, poverty and ignorance which he depicts are not entirely typical, they are shared in greater or less degree in a majority of villages.

The author does not hesitate to pile sorrow upon sorrow in a way which makes the Western reader wonder whether the incidents are not selected chiefly to feed the fires of self-pity. In these matters the Oriental convention is much more accommodating than is the stiff-upper-lip tradition of the West. In the Turkish original the simple directness of the narration gives the book an extraordinary vividness which tends to awaken lively sympathy both for the village and for this very youthful missionary of the Turkish Republic. The following review attempts to quote only incidents which bear more or less directly on his life as teacher.

He tells how he himself had finished primary school and completed two years in the next stage before discovering that story books, magazines and newspapers existed. Then, with every page of this new literature, so different from the school textbooks which he learned by rote, he found

* "Bizim Köy," "Our Village," by Bay Mahmut Makal. Varlik Yayinlari, Ankara Caddesi 80/1, Istanbul. Price, 100 kuruş.

fairy-tale worlds opening before him. He subscribed to one or two periodicals, after which waiting for the new month to begin was like an illness. The post came infrequently to his village, and his periodicals were delivered to the school office, to be distributed only when the headmaster happened to think of it—usually after two or three posts had accumulated. To look through the office window at those bundles of new magazines and papers lying there untouched made him almost ill with longing. But the headmaster's reply to his complaints was: "You look to your lessons, young man. What do you want with newspapers?" In their final year the headmaster prohibited any reading but that of the prescribed lesson books. Young Mahmut felt as though he were starving to death. But when he got to the Village Institute at Ivriz he found a library of hundreds of books.

On graduation from the Institute he was appointed to a new school in a village distant some ten hours on foot from his home. In September, 1947, he went to register the pupils and open the school. He found nothing but four walls of mud bricks which had been standing without roof, exposed to the weather for two years. Once before the village had been galvanized into building a school, which had never been completed, and had finally melted away without ever coming into use. So Mahmut was compelled to appropriate a portion of the mosque for his school. Finding their mosque invaded, the villagers were aroused to activity and hurriedly roofed the school with reeds, matting and anything that came to hand.

"Getting into the mosque was not easy," says Mahmut. "The preacher resisted with all his might, saying: 'I won't open my mosque to a *giaour* [infidel] school.' In this all the village was with him. A bit more and we'd have had a rebellion; but the district school supervisor was very popular and his good words won them over.

"After a couple of months in the mosque we were able to move the pupils to the partly covered school. There was no blackboard, no equipment, not even benches. Each child brought a sheepskin to spread on the mud floor. Thus we studied.

"Nor was it enough to open school. The parents still had to be persuaded to send their children, for the law on compulsory school attendance meant nothing to them. 'What good will my child get from schooling?' they would argue. 'Allah never lets his creatures starve. Let the boy learn to follow a yoke of oxen and mind his own business, as his father did before him. Teach him just enough for his soldiering and to write a bit of a letter for us. More than that is a sin.'

"In their first year those children learned to read even newspapers. And I am convinced that some day the villages themselves will find the cure for their ignorance and illiteracy."

But what of the old religious schools abolished by law for the past quarter of a century?

"It was ten o'clock on Monday, but not ten pupils had appeared. 'Sir,' these said, 'they went to Sergeant Isa's school for their morning lesson. We have had ours; they'll be along soon.'

"I stood stupefied. Who was this Sergeant Isa who had opened a

school? For days my head had been buzzing with the gossip. Every year Nejati Khoja or his son, Kelesh Khoja, used to teach the children. But this year Nejati Khoja had taken to his bed and Sergeant Isa had aspired to his throne. Mullah Mehmet had at once put at his disposal the very room which he had stoutly refused when we begged it for our school.

"In time I won back the pupils whom he had led astray, and so influenced them that attendance is now fair. There are still a few who go early to the other school and then come to me, after having their morning instruction, which consists of memorizing passages from the Koran.

"A week later something must have alarmed Mullah Mehmet, for he ordered the school to leave his house at once. The village elders gathered and agreed that Hussein Agha's old stable would do. The animals were driven out and the children brought in! There Sergeant Isa holds forth, and children—mostly girls—sheepskin in hand, are to be seen crowding in.

"One day with two of my pupils I went to visit Sergeant Isa's class. As we approached we heard one voice shouting and others reciting. When I pushed open the door the Sergeant rose and invited me to share his mat. Before us were seventy or eighty children squatting on their sheepskins, laughing, shoving and shouting. Two girls had babies in their laps, which they rocked as they memorized prayers. Parents are quite ready to entrust their girls to this school, but not to ours. With all my pleading we managed to register only four girls—and these never appeared.

"How I succeeded in sitting through the next quarter of an hour I scarcely know. The children were sitting in manure, for the stable had not been touched. Manure dust swam in the beams of light, and everything was indescribably filthy.

"Every Thursday 'Friday gifts' are showered on the Khoja—tobacco, cigarettes, dish upon dish of boiled wheat, dried beans, or wheat by measure. The mat or pillow on which the Khoja sits is brought from their homes by the children in turns. Whosoever's ear the Khoja tweaks must next day bring the pillow. These details I learned from my pupils.

"By bombarding the Ministry of Public Instruction and our inspector with appeals, while putting every possible pressure on the village council, I at last obtained an order for the collection of school rates in arrears and the spending of whatever was collected on the school building and its equipment. School rates constitute a supplementary tax on the village. Now it only remained to collect this debt and buy windows, a stove and school benches. The headman had accepted the necessity of doing this and was no longer making difficulties.

"We sent out the town crier, but not one individual brought in his due. So we sent the night-watchman from door to door. Some of the folk ran from their homes, some were taken suddenly ill, the majority gave a blank refusal.

"The village budget showed an appropriation for school purposes of Turkish £650 [about £83 sterling], but of this not one farthing was available. If the money was to be collected it had evidently to be done by me. So, accompanied by the clerk and council, I set out to sequester the counter-value of their debt, for scarcely anyone had paid his school rate since 1944, and even the least indebted owed over Turkish £30 [£3.16.0

sterling]. At the first house the people ran indoors and bolted the door in our faces. Some of the council were for breaking down the door, but we passed on. By this time the whole street had gone into hiding behind locked doors. A few were ashamed to hide, but these begged for a day or two of grace to settle their debt. By the end of the day we had made out one solitary receipt for Turkish £4.00 [10s.]. Nor had we sequestered any goods, since we had met only locked doors. For that matter, what was there worth seizing.

“The council was under such pressure that they did not dare let the matter go by default, as they had done in years past. They called in the county gendarmerie to carry off by force whatever they found in the houses. So a mass of sacking, rags, pots and pans, quilts and tatters of carpet were heaped in the house of the village watchman. Now, I suppose, we must make our benches out of copper pots and upholster them with the rags and sacking!

“Scarcely ten people in the village go by their own proper name; the others are all known by nicknames. These only are used, and in time the real name is forgotten, even by the person himself. The young people know their elders only by their nicknames, and the older generation do not know the names of the young folk. Often the nickname of the grandfather becomes the family name of his grandchildren. If I try to learn a child's real name from his grandparents, often they cannot answer without long thought. Nor is the real name much good when I do discover it, since the child answers only to his nickname.

“Shortened forms and diminutives are another source of confusion. Our village swarms with Hassiks. After much trouble I discovered that Hassik is a corruption of both Hassan and Hussein.

“One day I arrived at a neighbouring village shortly after a heavy rainstorm had left pools of muddy water in front of the school. One of the pupils lay down to drink from this muddy water. Evidently this was forbidden, for I heard another pupil call out: ‘Horruk is drinking; I'm going to tell teacher.’ Later I asked the master if Horruk was the name in which this child was registered. ‘In this village there is no registry of births,’ my friend replied, ‘so I put down whatever name they themselves use.’

“Near our school are three houses scattered on the hillside a little below and apart from the village. In each are from three to five children who, in their habits and outlook, are much behind those who live in the village proper. With much trouble I got the three children living in one of these houses so accustomed to me that they would come running whenever I signalled that I had sweets for them. But I never got them to speak more than a word or two. Even in the winter cold they wore nothing but a thin cotton gown over a cotton singlet. From head to foot they were a mass of dirt and grease. Several times I took soap and water to their faces, hands and feet, and cut their wild nails. Then one day the father came to me very timidly. ‘Sir,’ he said, ‘hear my petition. Don't get these children used to coming here. Chase them off. Please don't be

spoiling them with sweets and such. If they lose their innocence their morals will break down and the kids will go bad on my hands.'

"I need a school clock, but in this place, where time is measured by the hill shadows, who will listen to me? Simple people who can scarcely accept the need for a blackboard and benches will certainly resist the extravagance of a clock. 'This is just too much,' they say. 'We have got along with Allah's perfect timepiece ever since the days of Noah. Isn't it good enough for this infidel school?'

"Since coming to this village I take my baths in Sergeant Gani's stable, for I have no means of getting to the town, where there is a bath of sorts. But don't suppose that I bathe. I can do no more than loosen a little of the top layer of dirt. As there is no stove in the house, they set a crock of water near the fire, where, after a good many hours, it grows barely tepid. With this I wash as I can in a frosty stable. While I pour this lukewarm water over me, icy drops are coming through the roof. How the stock survives in this frigid place is more than I can understand.

"This is my case; what of the pupils? 'How many of you live in unheated houses?' Every hand goes up. 'How many have a place for washing?' Only one child responds, and he is rather well-to-do, having spent half his life in towns.

"When I say 'bread,' forget the city loaves and think instead of a large, thin cardboard disc. In this village they make it even worse than is done in my home village. Despite its thinness, the centre is often a rubbery dough that will not tear. But with what trouble is it made! My guess is that the labour of bread-making shortens the lives of the women by half. In autumn in some villages they work night and day for weeks, piling up sheets of bread enough to last till spring. Before each meal they take the necessary sheets from the pile and sprinkle these with water to soften and make them flexible. My home village is relatively modern; each day's supply is fresh made. Long before daybreak the women get up to knead the dough, and before the men are up and about this has been rolled into sheets and cooked on a heated disc of sheet-iron. Woe to the woman who should be a bit late with her bread! Not only will her man give her a good beating, but her name will be held in derision throughout the community.

"Here my sack of flour is with Sergeant Gani, where they make bread about once a fortnight. On the first day, when it is fresh, I can eat five or six sheets. But soon they dry and turn to slate. An hour before a meal I sprinkle some with water and wrap them in the tablecloth to soften. When they are stale I can down only two or three in a day. Once it took me over fifty days to eat what they had cooked for me. Sergeant Gani was worried and said to me: 'Man, in your place I'd be dead of hunger. You don't half try, that's what's wrong. One book should be enough for anybody. But you have piled book on book and give yourself to them instead of to bread.' To this his brother added philosophically: 'If city bread lies in your stomach one hour, ours lies five. This is a good thing, otherwise we would be scraping the bottom of our flour-bin by mid-winter.'

“ Notice the dull eyes and sallow cheeks of my children. Their heads seem too heavy for their necks, they answer dully; healthy children are not like this. Three times during the year, in October, January and April, I noted what each child had eaten that day, in order to observe their nourishment in the three seasons. I give below the answers of the second class, in which there are 31 pupils. On October 9, after the first lesson, I asked what they had had for breakfast. Twenty-one had come hungry without a bite of any sort, 10 had had a twist of bread (of the sort described above). Two days later I asked in the afternoon. All 31 had had bread with water-melon slices. My second inquiry was on the afternoon of January 20. Of my 55 pupils, 4 had had soup only that midday, 6 had had pilaf of cracked wheat [*bulgur*], 16 had had bread only, 4 had warmed up the previous day's pilaf, 5 had dipped their bread in grape molasses, 11 had eaten raw onion dipped in salt with their bread, 2 had found no one at home and had returned to school hungry, and 7 had been given dry bread only after they had cried for it.

“ Spring came, when all the extras had been consumed, and some had not even flour. As far back as February Gouja Dervish had come to the end of his flour stock and the village took up a collection for him. Now almost all have the same meals: morning, pilaf mixed with wild herbs and grasses, to collect which all the womenfolk roam the hills from dawn to dark; noon, bread and herbs; evening, pilaf and herbs. On the morning of April 1, 12 pupils came hungry, 11 had breakfasted on bread only, 7 on pilaf with herbs. At noon the same day all 30 had bread with herbs.

“ In the first reader is a sentence, ‘Daddy, buy me some honey.’ Of my 56 pupils, only one had ever seen honey, and he was from another village. The others pressed me with questions: ‘Teacher, tell us about honey. Is it like a horse, or more like a lamb?’

“ If it is not about religion a book or article or discourse is of no value in the eyes of the villagers. Oh yes, they will listen to anything that is read aloud, will show interest and express opinions. But when it is ended they slap on this expression: ‘All this is no good. Nowadays we have to listen to this sort of thing. But the other—ah! that's the real thing.’

“ The half-dozen books I have managed to assemble bulk up in their eyes like a mountain. ‘He's crazy,’ says one, ‘plain crazy. Not one of the books he reads is any good to religion.’ ‘Haven't you any pity for your eyes?’ asks another. ‘If you must spend your eyesight, why not spend it on useful religious books? There are some in the Roman letters, you know.’ And another: ‘Here you are, all by yourself, with no one to disturb you. Why don't you perform your ablutions and daily prayers and pay your debt to Allah instead of wearing out your brains on books and papers? You're a good sort and we like you. Put yourself right with Allah as you are with us.’

“ When my father came for a visit they got at him in the village guest-room and he came down on me with their bees buzzing under his cap. ‘Look here,’ he said, ‘either you begin to go to the mosque, or I am disowning you to-day. And another thing, you're going to stop reading those infidel books of yours. With all the world trying to be faithful

Muslim, are you alone going in opposition and serving unbelief, you crazy idiot? You should just hear what they are saying in the village about you. One look at a man, and they can tell just what he's trying to hide in his guts.'

"Don't just make a face and say, 'Muck!' At daybreak, when the shepherds take the cattle out to pasture, and at evening when they return, every girl and woman in the village, basket or tin in hand, rushes out into the dusty roads to gather manure. Some even collect the precious stuff in their aprons. Whatever they can bring home they knead and fashion into round cakes, which they plaster on the walls to dry. Then they stack them in the house, and these dried dung cakes are their only fuel. Of this kneaded dung they also shape vessels in which to store grain and other cereals. These vessels they dry carefully in some spot where the poultry cannot damage them.

"We kept school going till February let loose on us unprecedented storms and bitter cold. Only one or two of my children coming from well-to-do families—that is, families owning more than a single yoke of oxen—still had dung cakes for fuel. If I should ask them to bring one cake a day for the school, would their parents consent? Yet what was I to do, fighting alone against the merciless winter? 'Well, it's a battle, and you only die once,' I would tell myself. 'If I survive, a hero; if I die, a martyr.' It was then I learned the value of hope. If I had not warmed my heart with hope in that bitter cold I could not have kept on my feet for a single day. During February and March, while winter was on us with all its force, I burned not more than twenty dung cakes in my stove. These I got from the villagers to cook with. To light these I used up all the precious books and papers I possessed. Need I say that a dung fire burning for an hour or two had no effect on the temperature of the room? Indeed, the open air often seemed less bitter.

"We were gathered in Sergeant Gani's room. It was February 21 and a blizzard such as I had never seen was raging in the streets. Those who had gone to the mosque for the afternoon prayer had returned, and all of us were passing the time complaining and grouching.

"Suddenly the door opened and there entered a well-dressed young man carrying a valise. The collar of his overcoat was turned up and fastened together with a safety-pin. In his free hand he held the handkerchief which he had unbound from his head as he entered. He was a complete stranger to us all, but it was evident that he was stiff with cold, so two young men helped him off with coat and cap and shook off the snow. Then they removed his shoes, and he came forward and took his seat beside me. There was not a sound in the room. While admiring the smartness of his appearance, I was feeling ashamed of my own. I was completely the villager—face creased and sunken, eyes bloodshot, beard a week's growth. My trousers were covered with patches sewed on with my own hand. Though the overcoat which I had managed to buy for Turkish £28.00 [£3.12.0 sterling] still hid the rents in my jacket, it, too, was nearly finished. Sergeant Gani broke the silence with a word of welcome, and the young man gave us his story.

“ ‘I am from Kirshehir, and have just finished the *hafiz** course at Kayseri. Hearing of a very worthy *ḳhoja* at Konya, I disregarded snow and cold and set forth to profit by his teaching. Arrived there, I found that he had died. My funds were spent and my relations with my father are not cordial enough to ask him for help. But they took me to the busiest mosque in Konya, where I chanted the Koran so effectively that the assembly was fairly licking my lips.’ (At these words his hearers bit their lips and began to regard him with sudden interest. In their eyes the little Hafiz was growing by leaps and bounds.) ‘They collected Turkish £80 [£10.8.0 sterling] and gave it me. With 60 I had this coat made; the remainder was not enough to get me home. But they referred me to the village next to yours, where another 50 or 60 liras was collected. See, I have a letter of recommendation to you all from Mehmet Effendi (leader of their sect). But in that village was a rascal, a school-teacher. ‘Give him nothing,’ he tried to tell them. So there was a bit of a scrap, and they threw him out and sent him where he belonged. What else can you expect from those useless sons of — Please God you don’t have to put up with one of those fellows here.’

“All eyes were fixed on me as I sat there beside him, and he understood. What could I do but swallow the insult, for snow-blocked roads and black ignorance shut me in. But my head throbbed and a demon prodded me incessantly: ‘Don’t swallow this insult. In this village you are the representative of Atatürk’s revolution. It is for you to tear out this tongue which has been extended against the teachers’ army.’ Yes, but what can a solitary individual do against these forces of reaction? Though I racked my brains and tormented my heart, I could find no useful way of intervening.

“Meanwhile the young man continued: ‘The village didn’t want me to leave. “Stay here till spring; we will be your flock and collect for you whatever you need,” they said. Still, I wouldn’t stay, so they collected and sold 150 or 200 kilos of wheat and put the money in my pocket. You are the good folk on whom I am really counting. Mehmet Effendi promised you would look after me better than anyone. So now get busy.’

“One would think that this youth had a piece of the devil’s hoof in his pocket. Since morning these villagers had been shivering and groaning over their lot. But now they were carried up on a wave of excitement. Some pressed his hand, others kissed and embraced him. ‘Stay here,’ they begged. ‘What can you find elsewhere that we will not gather with our own hands and lay at your feet?’

“But the Hafiz insisted that he must be on his way in the morning and ordered them to collect his due and appoint the men who would guide him to the next village. ‘Nothing easier; we’ll carry you there on our shoulders,’ they answered.

“I asked a few questions of this youth, who gave his age as twenty, and when I began to press him a little his face darkened. Here he was robbing the village, speaking evil of those who really serve the country, yet all the village sided with him. ‘Get out, get out,’ they said to me.

* Hafiz—one who has memorized the Koran.

'You don't know enough to clean this man's boots. You go to your books; here is a real man!'

"It was time for the evening prayer, so we all rose and went out together. Jelal, the local head of their sect, came running through the storm and caught the Hafiz by the arm. 'Don't leave us, ever,' he panted. 'We'll do everything for you. You will make our village famous. We'll give our children to you and send that teacher packing.'

"The word ran like fire through the town, nor did they fail to add that the teacher had spoken disrespectfully to the Hafiz. My pupils were quickly turned against me and attached to the Hafiz. Once they had kissed his hand they ran hot-foot to the mosque, those very children who would everywhere greet me and hurry to my side. Now they would not look me in the face. I stood alone in the storm, while behind me some of the men were talking of setting on me and driving me out.

"About noon the next day Sergeant Gani sent his boy to my bitter room with some sheets of fresh bread and a cake of fuel. 'They shouted and sang hymns till daylight, my teacher,' said the boy. 'When they came out from the mosque they took up a collection for the Hafiz, and the whole community accompanied him beyond the village boundaries.'

"The magazines and books which I collect with such difficulty remind me now and then of life, but I have never found the means to create about me a little gaiety, a bit of movement. I thought for a while of a gramophone, but nothing came of it. Then a comrade suggested a crystal-set wireless with earphones, which would be cheaper than a gramophone. From a friend in Ankara I learned that such a set could be had for Turkish £42.00 [£5.8.0 sterling]. At first I was very happy, thinking this sum could be managed, but after seven months I had not been able to scrape even this amount together, so I had to give up this notion also.

"Sergeant Isa, the religious teacher, doesn't believe in the wireless. 'Don't try to tell me that in our own village we can hear the call to prayer given in Cairo. Just think of all the noises there are in the world from dawn to dark. Why doesn't your wireless catch and bring them all to us?' I explain till my tongue gives out. 'Someone hides under that box to make those noises and fool the people,' he insists. Many in the village side with Sergeant Isa.

"Whenever I visit the town I pledge my next quarter's salary to the grocer. Cigarettes and drink do not interest me, but with even this saving I return to the village empty-handed, without having been able to afford one or two magazines or a few sweets for the children.

"All my life I have never once had in my pockets what could really be called money. Whatever reached my hand was so quickly exchanged that it never got as far as my pockets.

"On Sundays, or sometimes when school has to be dismissed because of the winter cold, I take a book or magazine to the village guest-room and read aloud. Gradually I have got the men accustomed to expressing their opinions on what they hear read. If the subject is one which they can all readily understand, they are delighted. If it describes village life, they listen in mingled astonishment and pleasure, their astonishment being

that such everyday things should be in print on paper. I began with the short articles in the bulletins of the village institutes, and trained my hearers to listen and pay attention. They grew so fond of it that now they gather and send for me, so that I have often to leave my other work. Though my voice gets tired, I forget this, as I share their pleasure and feel that they are learning.

“From the 15th to the 20th of April it rained incessantly for five days. The water poured through the school roof as through a sieve and collected in a large pool on the mud floor. A piece of the wall collapsed, so that I sent the children home and set about saving my few belongings from the waters.

“Our school was built five years ago and resembles more than anything else a playhouse, such as children might build. One glance at the irregular foundation-stones, no bigger than one’s fist, is enough to show how indifferently it was built. These stones were set in mud, not mortar, and the whole structure was so shaky that we could never keep the door-frame and window in place.

“My mother became ill, for which reason I went home for the weekend. On my return there it was! The whole front of the school, from door to corner, had collapsed. ‘It was the rain,’ they said. Now what are we to do? Repairs are out of the question, for the foundations are worthless. A new building is hardly to be thought of. It’s a toss-up whether I should laugh, or cry, or stand and beat my breast. Tell me, friends, what am I to do?”

And there in front of his tumble-down school we take leave of Mahmut Makal and his village, only adding that this was not the end, as his book shows him returning after a hard summer in his father’s harvest fields.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF AFGHAN LIFE

By ARTHUR V. HUFFMAN

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MODERN Afghanistan dates from 1709, when, at Kandahar, Mir Wais Khan issued a Declaration of Independence of Persia. The present ruler, King Mohammed Zahir Shah, son of King Mohammed Nadir Shah, came to the throne on November 8, 1933. He is a member of the Durrani family, the House that has been dominant in the country for two hundred years.

STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT

Since 1930 the government, seated in Kabul, has been a constitutional hereditary monarchy. The Senate (*Majlis Shurae-i-Ahyan*) may consist of a maximum of forty members appointed by the king for life. The rarely convoked National Grand Assembly (*Majlis Shurae Milli*) comprises members who are elected for three years by the people.* Islamic law, in the absence of specific legislation, is interpreted and applied by the courts.

For administrative purposes the State is divided into great provinces, each called a *Walijat*, with a *Naib-ul-Hukma* at its head, and into smaller provincial districts called *Hukumat Iyala*, which are each governed by a chief commissioner called a *Hakim Iyala*. The great provinces are subdivided into districts at the head of which are found administrators responsible to the *Naib-ul-Hukma*. Names of the provinces are usually taken from principal towns in each region.† In addition to the *Naib-ul-Hukma*, the provincial cabinet may include a Financial Commissioner, Police Commander, Educational Officer, and Judge, as well as Directors of Traffic, Foreign Affairs, Statistics, Health, Communications, Revenues, Publications, Mines, Forests, Public Works and Tribal Affairs. In the Herat Province provision is made for a "Director, Scrutiny of Statistics," and for a "Chief, Trade Dispute Settlement Office," while in the Badakhshan *Hukumat Iyala* there is a "Director, Statistical Intelligence." These offices are not always subordinated to the next higher administrative unit, and the highest ranking official may be required to assume responsibility for the lowest function within the provincial administration.

Cities with more than ten thousand residents have city councillors

* The present senate consists of twenty-four members, while there are 122 considered members of the lower house. Standing committees of the lower house examine the affairs of the various Ministries and Departments.

† The great provinces are: Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Qataghan, Mashriqi, and Janubi. The smaller districts include Maimana, a commercial centre for that most important branch of economy, the breeding of *karakul* sheep and the manufacture of carpets; Farah, a truck stop halfway between Kandahar and Herat; Badakhshan, an area allegedly rich in mineral treasures, including rubies, lapis-lazuli and gold.

(Baladiyah) and a mayor (Reis). The capital city, Kabul, occupies an area of about five square miles and is the largest city in the kingdom. Kandahar is Afghanistan's second city. Most of the seven hundred foreigners reside in Kabul. It has been stated that "less than 10 per cent. of the total population (estimated at from seven to twelve million people) reside in urban centres of ten thousand or more inhabitants."* Towns with more than 10,000 population include: Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, Faizabad, Tashkurghan, Balkh, Gardez, Ghazni, Jalalabad, Shibarghan, Khanabad, Mashriqi, Janubi, Badakhshan, Pul-i-Khumri, Andkhai and Charikar.

TRIBAL ORGANIZATION—PRINCIPAL TRIBES

In addition to the formalized administrative set-up, there exists a multifold tribal organization in Afghanistan.† Each tribe can be broken down into the Kaum, or main group, and the Khels or Zais, which represent specific sub-groups whose members live in close proximity and whose members may hold lands in common. The chief of the tribe is the Khan,‡ to whom are subordinated the leaders, Maliks. In addition to these there is also the Kahol or family group, united by kinship. The senior of subdivisions, whose Malik sometimes has dynastic powers, is known as the Khan Khel. The Khans are elected by the clan or tribe, but the loyalty of the latter is more to the community than to the immediate chief. Khans represent a kind of landed aristocracy and they often become members of the Senate or National Grand Assembly. The Central Government may use them in assisting to maintain internal security and harmony in periods of tribal unrest.

Affiliated with the main tribes are found some alien groups (Hamsayah) which are considered inferior and in which the test of kinship does not apply. Such groups or individuals are united with the tribe by the vicissitudes of common ill-fortune or as a service reward.

The powerful influence of the blood feud or vendetta is frequently the original underlying principle uniting a tribe, and in the course of time

* "Afghanistan — Summary of Current Economic Information," International Reference Service, United States Department of Commerce, March, 1948, Vol. 5, Number 22.

† An adequate ethnological study would include a discussion of the origin of the Afghans, their tribal folkways and mores. Within the limits of this monograph, only superficial ethnographic data are discussed. It should be noted that it is difficult to determine to which tribal group an Afghan may belong because of the nomadic habits of a large percentage of the population and their custom of calling a man by the name of his place or origin, irrespective of his tribal or racial connection.

‡ Not to be confused with the common title "Khan" or esquire. Every man has two names, a combination of which is sometimes prescribed by custom. The son is usually never given his father's name, but combinations such as Mohammed Alam are quite common, and if, as is frequently the case, two men in a small village have the same name, it becomes necessary to add the name of the tribe, or if they be of the same tribe, the name of the father. The most common title of respect is "Sardar," which means prince. Every Afghan calls himself "Khan" as a matter of course, so that a complete name would, for example, be Sardar Abdul Sattar Khan Shalizi, of which only the second and third words constitute his real name. The last means that he is from Shaliz, a village near Ghazni.

merges into the fiction of common blood or kinship. However, among tribes where there are no bonds of kinship or common origin it is inevitable that there should be a greater tendency for members to assert independence of their chiefs.

Village communities exist for mutual protection, but the internal stratification is on tribal lines (except among the Tajiks), and the village operates as a unit only when danger from out-groups threatens. On the whole, the tribal community is democratic, especially in the south-eastern areas, where Pashtu is spoken.* In matters of importance the chiefs have little overt influence over their own clans or tribes, and all important decisions are reached by a public meeting or Jirgah. In the south the natives appear to prefer a more oligarchic procedure in settling matters affecting the group as a whole. A chief of the Ghilzai, for example, is quite able to control his own clan, and through the headmen of other sections may exercise considerable power over the larger tribe.

The hereditary transmission of leadership is not a fixed principle. The unfit are passed over in favour of those who are considered better able to order the men in war or direct their affairs in rare periods of peace. Social status is of little consequence, with the result that a man with a dominant, outgoing personality has a greater opportunity for asserting leadership than seems to be found among most other primitive groups. It is true that the Khan Khel, or senior family, may claim the hereditary right of furnishing at least the nominal chief of a particular tribe, but any member of that family may be chosen, the choice depending on the available candidates, and possibly, in time of danger, a man outside the Khan Khel may be made the leader.

All the principal tribes,† such as the Durrani,‡ the Ghilzai§ and the

* Pashtu is considered to be the official language and is being used in the primary schools as the medium of instruction. In the central and southern parts of Afghanistan, Persian is the more widely spoken of the two languages. In the north, Turkoman is used. Urdu is frequently used by members of the business community, especially in trans-Pakistan deals. Schools in Kabul provide instruction in English, French and German.

† Following is a list of principal tribes within Afghanistan:

<i>Name of Tribe.</i>	<i>Total Numbers.</i>	<i>Fighting Strength.</i>
Durrani	1,200,000	240,000
Ghilzai	1,000,000	200,000
Pathan	601,500	108,000
Tajik	1,500,000	350,000
Uzbek	750,000	150,000
Mogul	30,000	6,000
Hazara	550,000	110,000
Kafir (Nuristani)	70,000	14,000
Safi	40,000	8,000
Baluchi	25,000	5,000
Qizilbash	100,000	25,000

The Moguls are gradually being absorbed by the Tajiks, it is claimed.

‡ To the Panjpai branch of Durrani belong Barakzais, Achahzais, Popalzais; while to the Zirak branch belong the Nurzais, Ishakzais and Alizais.

§ Two principal Ghilzai clans are the Burhan or Ibrahim Khel and the Turan or Sodis. The former is subdivided into the Suleiman Khel, Ali Khel, Andars and Tarakis, and the latter into Hotaks, Tochis, Nassirs, Kharotis, Lohanis, Niazis and Dotannis.

Tajiks, are Sunni Moslems.* While members of the Shiah sect are found among subordinate groups, the Nazaras are essentially Shiah. The most nationalistic are the Durranis and the Ghilzais.

The Durranis, originally from the Ghorat, are the rulers, and only an insignificant number of them are migratory. Members of this group enjoy numerous special privileges concerning property, military conscription and government-service preference.

The Ghilzais have been identified traditionally with a Turanian tribe (the Khilji) said to have come to Afghanistan from beyond the Amu Darya in the tenth century with Mahmud of Ghazni's father, Sabuktighin. Unlike the Durranis, the Ghilzais are, for the most part, nomads, and annually several thousand of them migrate to the North-west Frontier Province and Punjab area of Pakistan, where they remain for the winter, returning with their flocks in the spring to the highlands of Afghanistan.

The Tajiks live mostly in the north and north-east sections of the kingdom and are essentially a fixed population. With this group the community, rather than the tribe itself, is most important. Those who live in rural areas are horticulturists and agriculturists and are noted for their natural ability in landscape gardening. Recruits for the Royal Afghan Infantry come almost exclusively from this tribal group, which is said also to have provided mercenaries for Mogul armies in the ages past.†

Nearly one million Pathans are completely independent and approximately three million are subjects of Pakistan. Pathans are distributed over the area from Afghanistan into Baluchistan and Kalat down to the Indus river. The Pathans are closely involved in transborder traffic, legal and otherwise. Their attitude toward the Government at Kabul fluctuates, and sometimes is formulated by their Khans, Pirs and Faqirs. At the time of the partition of India, the Government at Kabul presented demands to the British Government. Claims to territory in which Pathans resided were carefully avoided. The Afghan demand was for certain options in the plebiscite beyond accession to India or Pakistan. Strong exception to the Afghan note was taken by the Indian and Pakistani Governments and considerable additional tension was created by the Afghan press, which took the position exemplified by the following editorial: "We cannot understand why England should decide that Peshawar and its suburbs of Derajat and Kurram and other Afghan

* Islam of the Sunni doctrine is the State religion of Afghanistan. Missionary activity on behalf of other religions is prohibited by law. Tajiks were originally all Shiah. The Kafirs of Nuristan are recent converts to Islam.

† The principal Afghan-Pathan tribes from northern areas southward are:

<i>Tribe.</i>	<i>Clans.</i>	<i>Population.</i>
Wardak	Mayars, Mir Khels, Nuris ...	100,000
Mahmund	Salarzais, Mandozais ...	65,000
Shinwari	Sangu Khel, Sipai Khel and Ali Sher	85,000
Khugiyani	Mullagori, Kharbun and Sherzad	60,000
Mangal	45,000
Khostwal	50,000
Waziri	Darwesh Khel	50,000

territories incorporated in British India, but separated from India by the mighty Indus, should now be required to choose inclusion in either Hindustan or Pakistan only. In fact, the inhabitants of those areas should have the right to decide their future themselves and without any restraint, as has been decided in the case of the independent brethren residing in tribal areas. It is quite possible that these people might choose to unite with their own Afghan brethren."* The press of Hindustan regarded Afghanistan's action as open intervention in the affairs of another country, while the Pakistan press chided the Afghans for seeming to find a potent danger in the progressive influences stirring within the North-west Frontier Province and the tribal territories, and suggested that Afghanistan was using this annexation clamour as a "red-herring technique" in an attempt to suppress progressive influences from spreading into Afghanistan. The *Pakistan Times* declared: "The irredentist principle that Afghanistan is invoking is not calculated to serve her interests best. Her territories include non-homogeneous, ethnic groups whose separatist claims would threaten her territorial solidarity. Afghanistan's leaders† would do well to show a more correct appraisal of facts in their behind-the-scene dealings with Pakistan, who is anxious to remain on friendly terms with Afghanistan."

Since Afghanistan's two most important ports of entry, Chaman and Peshawar, are in Pakistan territory, the frontier problem did not become a prolonged source of friction. Furthermore, the policies of the leaders of the new Pakistan State, including "Operation Curzon," a military and tribal policy of withdrawing troops from fortified posts within interstitial transborder areas, seemed to appeal to the tribes generally and Pathans in particular. Promises of assistance in their hazardous struggle for existence, and long-range plans for education, economic development, irrigation and stable administration, were given the Pathans by the new leaders. Several personal tours by the Qa'id-i-Azam, his colleagues and his successor were politic.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION, CULTURE AND EDUCATION

Most of the population depends upon agriculture for a livelihood. It is difficult to secure reliable statistics on the agrarian situation, and almost impossible to provide exact data on land distribution. In any case, most cultivable land is owned by a few zamindars, who employ tenant and

Jaji	35,000
Barachi	20,000
Kakar	20,000
Gurbaz Wazir	15,000
Tani, Zadran, and Makhbil	50,000

* Translation from an editorial, "The Future of India and the Destiny of the Afghans," which appeared in the Kabul news daily, *Islah*, on June 9, 1947. See also Ahmad Ali Kozad's editorial, "Afghanistan and the Destiny of Afghans beyond the Frontier," *Ariana*, Vol. 3, 1947.

† The most vociferous Afghans were Hajji Najibullah Khan, ex-Minister of Education, and at present Afghan Ambassador to India, Abdul Husain Khan Aziz, ex-Minister to the United States, and Sayid Qasim Rishtiya, Chief of the Department of Press, Kabul.

itinerant peasants for the cultivation of their lands.* In the summer seasons the nomads travel to the higher grazing lands, where they carry on extensive cattle-breeding, subject to the feudatories who control grazing areas.

The urban population is divided into small upper classes of government officials, larger middle classes of merchants and artisans, and the largest lower classes of casual labourers living in great poverty. Industry has had little opportunity to develop satisfactorily. Many traditional home industries deteriorated as a result of an increasing dependence upon imported industrial products. With few exceptions, existing industries belong to joint-stock companies in which high government officials hold control and which operate primarily in order to supply the Afghan army and the Government. All factories are built at State expense and, with the exception of home industries, little private capital has been invested in industry.† Other installations, sometimes referred to as factories, are in reality nothing more than artisan shops.

Products of home industries continue to meet the demands of the native population in the lower economic levels. In cotton districts home industries are engaged in weaving, and they produce all manner of fabrics. Sheep wool is used for the manufacture of felt, rugs and clothing. Herat, Maimana and Qataghan are rug-weaving centres. Some silk fabrics are

* Arable lands amount to approximately 3 per cent. of the total surface of Afghanistan, and yet agriculture sustains, marginally, about 70 per cent. of the population. Agricultural techniques are undeveloped, and the primitive forked plough is the most generally used agricultural implement. Fields are raked with toothed boards, and harvesting is done with hand sickles and cradle scythes. Wheat is the most important grain cultivated. Barley, rice, millet, legumes, cotton, poppy seed and pistachio nuts are grown. The produce of truck gardens and vineyards (raisins, grapes and apricots) is a most important factor in export trade and the subsistence of the population. Although Afghanistan has over six hundred known deposits of mineral resources, including chrome, copper, lead, asbestos, coal, oil, silver, iron, sulphur, quartz, mica, nickle, slate and salt, lack of capital and transportation difficulties have prevented mining development, and the kingdom continues to depend upon agriculture and sheep-breeding. These mineral resources may play a more important rôle in Afghanistan's future economy, for it is claimed that the national economy cannot much longer continue primarily to depend upon karakul and agriculture. The war savings, estimated at about sixty million dollars, will probably be spent before 1950. The only hope for the future lies in a fourfold plan: (1) To develop the resources of the country; (2) To improve the quality of exported goods like dried fruit and karakul through better technical processing and scientific breeding; (3) Drastically to cut general imports and bring the standard of living to a still lower level, though such a move is dangerous and can result in internal discontent; and (4) To secure a loan or financial assistance. (The lender should, in such case, ask for special guarantees and concessions.)

† State industries include an arsenal and crucible foundry, match factory, cement factory, furniture factory, lapidarium, tannery and boot factory in Kabul; a fruit cannery and dehydrating plant and wool-weaving mill in Kandahar; a sugar refinery in Baghlan; a cotton-seed oil and soap plant in Kunduz, and a textile mill in Herat. These industries are greatly handicapped by inadequate transportation facilities, for there are no railways, commercially navigable waterways, air routes or surfaced arterial highways. Terrain favourable to heavy industrial traffic is rare. These industries are operated by water power, since the production of coal has been insignificant. Power for industry located at Kabul is transmitted by exposed cables which have been known to claim the lives of inquisitive tribesmen.

woven in Herat, Kandahar, Ghazni and Kabul. Leather goods and pottery are produced almost universally, but metal working seems to be confined to urban bazaars.

Although the Afghan Government has never gone as far as the Turkish and Iranian Governments in introducing Western customs and European clothing, since Amanullah's reforms Western culture has been accepted to some extent, particularly among the upper classes. Under the administration of the Ministry of Education, schools and colleges have opened and are being supported. Although primary school attendance is compulsory, it is not always enforced. In most of the larger villages and provincial centres there are elementary schools with from four to six grades in which basic training in Islam, reading, writing and arithmetic are offered. Primary schools providing instruction up to the eighth standard are in existence in only the large cities. In Kabul there are four secondary schools (twelve grades), a girls' school, a trade school, a teachers' training school, and an agricultural institute. The University of Kabul, opened in 1932, now consists of four colleges: Law, Medicine, Science and Literature.

Kabul has few libraries but one noteworthy museum built up with the efforts of members of the *Délégation Française d'Archéologie*. The Ministry of Education is in charge of all excavations and the protection of historically important sites. Several literary societies publish Afghan books and periodicals which are printed by the Government.

CONCLUSION

Afghanistan has been an unknown entity for too long a time. We can no longer afford to remain in ignorance about a nation that may have an important rôle to play in Eastern politics in the currently developing pattern of world powers.

The contemporary social order within Afghanistan is beset by disintegrating forces that might well be studied by the sociologist and student of international affairs. Dynamic social changes of a world-wide nature are reaching into this remote region and challenging its fixed, formalized controls. Young Afghans are beginning to demand opportunities for a life in which they may attain greater political and economic freedom; a developing middle class in Afghanistan is beginning to ask for representation and protection of its special interests; the hereditary power to mould public opinion and its manner of expression formerly held by tribal feudatories is disappearing; religious controls exercised by mullahs are being weakened by their own irresponsible leadership. Ultimately, the peasant masses will be reached by an enlightenment which carries with it a sharpened sense of social justice and a realization of the effect of adverse conditions. First to change may be the existing archaic feudal system of land ownership and tenure, with its attending complexity of socio-economic problems. One sees evidence of such change already in Pakistan.

Afghan leaders will need to evaluate critically existing institutions and formulate constructive proposals looking toward the development of an active citizenry to whom will be available the essentials of good living more equitably distributed, or it may find itself supplanted by another way

of life and another type of leadership. But while the improvement of the material conditions of the majority of the population is eminently desirable from every standpoint (for it would not only raise the general well-being, but would give an outlet to existing aspirations, which are stifled under depressing poverty), such reform of itself would not produce attitudes whereby the Afghan people would be able to take full advantage of the improved facilities for developing their capacities in democratically constructive ways. It is our obligation to help the development of such ambitions, not only in Afghanistan but throughout Asia; our obligation to acquire a systematic knowledge of all society so that adequate measures of progress can be adopted.

WHERE NOW, CHINA?

By W. GORDON HARMON, O.B.E.

Notes from a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on November 15, 1950, E. J. Nathan, Esq., O.B.E., in the Chair.

THE CHAIRMAN: China is very much front-page news today. It has not always been so. Sometimes it has been neglected, when those of us who lived in China felt that country deserved front-page news, because it is only by a continuous study of what has happened in China over the last quarter of a century that one really can appreciate something of the Chinese problem. In order to do that it is necessary to know a good deal about the Chinese people, and we are fortunate in having with us today one who knows the Chinese well, as Mr. Harmon does. He has lived for thirty years in China, and has been in the service of both the Chinese and the British Governments in that country. He has been in close touch with the rulers of China under the Nationalist régime—that is to say, the leading figures who were in Chungking at the beginning and end of the war; and he has also been in most intimate touch with the present rulers of China, who like to call themselves the Central People's Government. It is of those interesting people that Mr. Harmon is going to speak to us.

I AM aware that what I am about to say will not satisfy your needs, but I shall do my best to give you a brief description of some of the characters I met in China in both camps, the Nationalist and the Communist, and not endeavour to answer my own question, "Where now, China?" because I do not know where China *is* going.

Many of those present, I see, are old China hands, and it is a tremendous honour to speak to those who are such celebrities in their own right in China. Many of them will remember the old type of Chinese military sect who governed the country shortly after the Revolution, when we had such warlords as Chang Hsueh-liang and Feng Yu-hsiang attacking one another; each sometimes trying to persuade the other to attack his next best friend, and later signing up with his erstwhile enemy to attack a former friend again. Backwards and forwards these battles used to swing, and we all became rather expert at speculating what was going to happen. Until recently, most of us who had lived in China for any time at all could make a fair guess as to what life was likely to be. Now there is a very different set of rulers in the country and none of us has the courage to hazard a guess. One can only hope that certain things will happen, based on one's knowledge of the characters now leading the Chinese Government.

I got to know Chou En-lai, the present Premier, during the war; strangely enough, through one of his worst enemies, Chang Po-lin, founder and president of Nankai University. I got to know Mao Tse tung, through whom I met certain others, including the present leader of the Youth Movement, Chao Hu chang, who I see is going to the United Nations at Washington; also I got to know Tung Pi-wu, the Vice-President, and Lin Pu-han, one of the elder statesmen of the Communist Party. I mention these names because they are those of some of the present leaders of China, and I became fairly familiar with all of them

in varying degrees. Chou En-lai is a very close friend of mine, and he had a tremendous effect on China's policy in regard to the world in general.

Chou En-lai always told me, and I believed him, that he had a very friendly feeling towards the British. During the *Amethyst* incident he gave proof of that feeling: some may feel that the exhibition of Chou En-lai's friendly feeling was not very marked, but it was there. We have friends in the Communist Party, and there is something we can do for them. We have Yeh Chien-ying down in Canton, an extremely pro-British official appointed, I believe, for that specific reason. He was so friendly disposed towards the British that he was sent down to Canton to be in close proximity to Hongkong officials, and those who have come from Hongkong will tell you that the behaviour of the Chinese Communists has been very correct. They have never said or done anything provocative, and even when a British soldier got rather "fed-up" with his commanding officer and decided to take a jeep and motor all the way to England, the Communists took him in hand and were very kind to him; they arrested him, fed and clothed him, gave him cigarettes and pocket money, and eventually returned him with his jeep and all his equipment to the British authorities, very much to the surprise of the G.O.C., who did not expect to see the man back again alive, though he thought he might expect to see the jeep. The Communists have been very proper and correct in their behaviour. Mr. Trevor, the director of the Kowloon-Canton Railway, has been very successful in negotiations with the Communists when he has gone up to Canton. Perhaps one may say that is natural, since it is to the advantage of the Chinese Communists in Canton to have that railway open and running properly. Nevertheless, it is to the advantage of the Chinese to have all sorts of things done which have not been done, but we must give Mr. Trevor credit for having negotiated successfully with the Chinese. I think we can anticipate even closer relations with the Chinese Communists, provided we get our people in there who are prepared to negotiate with them. You may say: That's all very well; we recognized the Government in Peking on January 6, 1950, and the Chinese have refused to accept that recognition; it is all very well for you to say we can go and negotiate; how are we going to do that when a British Ambassador cannot get in and they are not prepared to accept him even if he could? It does seem as if the Chinese are behaving peculiarly and that I am talking peculiarly to say we can establish some relationship, when we cannot get our ambassador into the country. I think the solution to it is that we cannot send an ordinary ambassador with all the history behind him. For instance, the Chinese Government in Peking regards consuls in quite the wrong way; they regard a consul as an emblem of foreign imperialism. When you explain that you have consuls as trade agents who look after the general interests of the British out there, they are not satisfied; they say there is no need for consuls; they are really thinking of the old bad days of imperialism in China, when consuls ordered the gunboats to open fire on the Chinese. An ambassador is, I think, disliked in name by the Chinese. We want to send someone who does not go out as an ordinary ambassador at all, who will make a preliminary approach to Chou En-lai or, preferably, to Mao Tse-tung, who

I think is really approachable. Those who know him find him so. I met him first when he was rather a sick man. He had an ulcerated stomach when he came to Chungking in October, 1945, and my friend General Carton de Wiart, in his *Happy Odyssey*, having met Mao Tse-tung and having had dinner with him, does not speak very highly of him as a result of that meeting. I agree that he gave very little cause for anyone to speak highly of him; he refused to respond to anything; one only got a wintry and watery smile out of him. But when I saw him again later he was quite a different kind of man. The two Russian doctors, who are presumed to do nothing but treat him medically, seem to have cleared up that digestive trouble. I saw him in December, 1946, when I stayed down in Yen-an for ten days, and found him an amusing, entertaining and kindly companion. He does not believe in the old diplomacy. You have to state your claims bluntly. He told me he thought I was a fool and I reciprocated the compliment, and then we got on very well indeed. We were very frank with one another; he told me what a wicked Government we had; that he could not "understand how the British ever suffered themselves to be led down the path by them. No respectable Government in China would have anything to do with such rogues and rascals." I told him I was not Labour, but that I could not understand why he called Attlee and Bevin rogues and blackguards, and so on. He said that of course they were, because they had not the courage of their convictions; "they do not like us, but they dare not come out and meet us; at present we are not in the hands of the Russian Communists, and we have no desire to be governed from Russia. The man we like is Churchill. He hates us and he says so. When the Russians joined the war he said to them: 'We will fight with you, though we do not approve of anything you stand for.' That was the right way to talk." Curiously enough, Mao Tse-tung has a great admiration for another Englishman. When he had been rather kind to me I asked what could I give him as a mark of my friendship and appreciation, and he asked, did I want to spend much money? I said I did not wish to spend much: just the equivalent of about £10. And he said he would like all the books I could send him relating to the life of Oliver Cromwell. I said I would get hold of Carlyle's *Life and Letters* and do all I could to collect any others. I did that. When I asked Mao Tse-tung why he liked Oliver Cromwell of all men, he reminded me that Cromwell was a Puritan. I told Mao that he was an agnostic himself or even an atheist, and that Cromwell would have been very happy to dispose of him. He maintained that Cromwell was "one of the greatest men England, if not the world, has ever produced." I was astonished to find how much Mao Tse-tung knew about Oliver Cromwell; he had evidently read a great deal. He said: "Do you see this mark on my chin? That is a very ugly wart; and do you know that Oliver Cromwell had one too, but in a more prominent position. Oliver Cromwell always insisted when he had his portrait painted that his wart should not be removed. I insist when anyone takes my photograph that the wart shall be there." It is strange that Mao-Tse-tung should feel so great an admiration for Oliver Cromwell; he enlarged on Cromwell's abstinence, the way he lived with his army, and the discipline he imposed on the men. These were the

things which caused Mao Tse-tung to admire him, and he said that he hoped to run his own army on the same lines.

The man who runs the army is General Chu Teh, a most charming man. At one time he may have been quite well built, but age has bowed him and he looks older than the seventy-five years to which he admits. He is a man with an exceptionally clear mind. I was telling him of my relationship with his military representative in Chungking, Lieut.-General Wang Yu-no. I was engaged on liaison work with these people, and I used to endeavour to secure information relating to the Japanese army. I told General Chu Teh how difficult it was to obtain that information from the Nationalists and how satisfied I had been with the information I had from the Communist side. He replied: "Of course, we knew everything; the Nationalists did not know anything; mention any division you like of the Japanese army and I will give you details of it." I mentioned the 52nd Division, and Chu Teh rolled out a complete history of the division from the date of its landing in China until its surrender; he knew the names of the commanding officers, the code letters of the division, and every other particular I could ask for. What he said was accurate, as I proved when I returned to Peking and examined the papers there.

Chu Teh told me he could answer any questions about enemy formations. I said I had just come down from Peking and that we were puzzled about the troops coming and going; nobody knew whether they were properly equipped or under whose command they were, and so on; what could he tell me about the troops around Peking? He said General Li Tsung-jen had troops round Peking; he gave me exact details of every formation there, without reference to any notes, but merely from recollection. He was never in the least troubled to answer any such questions. One liked him very much; he was most charming.

There was one man who did not join in; he sat in the background and it was hard to get a glimpse of him, but I got a photograph one day. Incidentally, I got photographs of most of these men and they very kindly signed them. This particular man signed in pencil and I had it written over in ink by a Chinese friend because the pencil was gradually fading out. The man was Liu Shao-ch'i, the big question mark in the Chinese Government at the moment. He is the ideological expert of the Chinese Communist Party, and he does not come to the fore more than he can help; never until he is brought forward. The Chinese, who ought to know, tell me he is the link between Li Li-san and Mao Tse-tung, Li Li-san being the power behind the Labour Unions.

Mao Tse-tung is surrounded by men who are no longer young. Tung Pi-wu is getting quite old and others also are getting on in years. Lin Piao-cheng is perhaps the youngest. I am not sure of his age, but he is a fine strapping man. Lin Piao has been building himself up in his march from Mukden to Canton; he brought those men through different climates; they passed through different territories, living on different food; they passed through the villages of the garlic-eating Manchu peasants and made their way down into the rice lands of the south. The water in the various villages through which they passed was practically undrinkable—in one village it killed them off; yet these troops marched on to their

objective, because they were well-disciplined men fortified by a burning enthusiasm. Those in China at the time of this march—I was not there then—will bear me out when I say that they were extremely well behaved and triumphant on all occasions. The Nationalists could not put up any effective resistance at any time.

What is Lin Piao doing? Is he up in Manchuria waiting to step over the border into Korea? Or is he, indeed, in Korea itself? I dreaded the United Nations forces reaching the 38th parallel, sitting down there and doing nothing more. They must cross it, but I prayed that they would not go up to the Manchurian border; that would be inviting trouble, knowing that the Chinese depend on very extensive power plants along the Yalu river to supply Manchurian industries, and they would certainly fear our designs on those plants. If we headed in that direction and got too close the Chinese would step in at once. Such seems to have been the case. We went up to the Manchurian border and the Chinese stepped in, not without previous warning.

I do not think that Mao Tse-tung or any of the present leaders (except Li Li-san), who have roots in China, would take orders from Russia. Li Li-san has a Russian wife, but no relatives of Chinese origin, except third cousins fifty times removed. He will always, I presume, accept the dictates of Moscow, but I do not think that Lin Piao, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and the other generals in the Chinese army would accept a *dictat*; they might accept Russian advice and they might accept British advice. Mao Tse-tung asked me to persuade British advisers to go out to China; they want there doctors, engineers and every type of scientist to teach their people. He said he did not want them to come out "to order us about; we want them to teach our people; we do not intend that they should live out here as princes in the university; they will live in humble circumstances with ourselves; they will have no better house than I have; two rooms per man. If he has a wife, four rooms; if a child, six rooms; and so on; we will provide all their food, clothes, accommodation and pocket-money, and they will require nothing else." I reminded him that British and any other scientists would want to be paid for their services, and he replied: "Then I don't want them; I want people out here, not for my benefit, but for the benefit of the Chinese people; we do not want missionaries to teach us religion or hygiene; we want those who can teach us how to build roads and conserve water. You send out as many as you like able to do that and I will look after them. If it is a matter of an odd penny or two, I will always be prepared to dip into my own pocket and give them pocket-money."

I think it would have been a very wise and useful step if the British Government had sent out thirty or forty men for a period of five years each and paid them in England. Those men would have been on the front doorstep of the Chinese Government when the Communists entered Peking; they would have been established there to advise, and in the meantime they would have secured the friendship of these leaders of the Chinese Government. Unfortunately, no advisers went out apart from a few individuals who drifted out to China on their own and are still out there now. But Mao Tse-tung was willing and anxious to welcome the

British to China, and again he asked me to pass a message to the British Parliamentary Mission, which was out there at the time, to come and visit him. He asked them to go down to Yen-an and he would look after them and entertain them, take them around and give them all the facilities they required to see what they wished to see.

Yen-an has been described on many occasions, but it flabbergasted me. I saw no policemen there; they were not required, for there was no disorder of any sort. There was no traffic problem. There was no prostitution; no women were reduced to such a state. All were looked after. There was no starvation; nobody ill-clothed; everybody was well clothed, though there was no silk worn; all were in cotton. The children had chubby faces and were very happy and full of fun; the women were healthy and strong; the men of good, sound physique; all had free medical attention when required—almost as good as our National Health Service in England. But all that did not knock me over completely until I saw the dear old crones, the old peasant women of the north with their tiny little bound feet which they had not unbound for years, playing football! That was unbelievable. Nevertheless, I have photographs of them running round kicking a football with the sides of their feet. Mao Tse-tung was with me when we saw this, and when I commented on it he did not seem to think it strange. He strolled through the streets of Yen-an just like an ordinary peasant; no one followed him or took any notice. In Peking it was otherwise.

When I returned from Yen-an to Peking I hurried to see my friend Cheng K'ai-ming, who was the successor to Gestapo chief Tai Li, who died in April, 1946, in an aeroplane accident. I told this Chinese Nationalist what a remarkable place Yen-an was and how impressed I had been by it. He said: "That's a show window for you foreigners; it has all been dressed up. You did not get any further than Yen-an." I said I did not, although I could have done so but for lack of time. I had been told that I could go anywhere I wished, escorted or unescorted. I asked him, "Have you a show window?" and he had the impudence to reply that Tientsin, Shanghai and Peking were the Nationalist show windows. Whatever we say for or against the Nationalists, they have never produced a village, town or city which could equal Yen-an for law, order, good health, happiness and everything that speaks of a really comfortable and contented community. That stood very much to the credit of the Chinese Communist Party. Granted Yen-an was a show window, granted that all foreigners who went into Communist territory were taken there; still it was there; also a quaint university dug out of the cliff-side. We staggered up steps and saw students sitting out on little stools when it was so cold that I was breathing heavily into my gloves. There were students, boys and girls, sitting on their stools out in the open, drawing and taking notes of lectures, in the bitter cold, all dressed in the most horrible uniform. The hair of the girls was cut in an ugly style; the Communists have done nothing to beautify the women; their "beauty" was not a beauty which impressed one in any way.

I would not have dared to come here and talk to you if it were not that I feel that there is a chance of friendship between the Chinese Government

in Peking and the British Government. I feel we should do something as soon as possible to secure closer friendly co-operation between the two countries. Of course, nothing can be done until we get an ambassador in China and they will send an ambassador to England. I believe an unofficial approach can, nevertheless, be made to the Chinese Government which would result in the eventual appointment of an ambassador. When that day comes, if we appoint the right man—and we have got the men—we shall be able to woo the Chinese away from the Russians, towards whom they are drifting so rapidly now, and might eventually drift so that we cannot win them back. If we act soon enough we can win the Chinese over to our side and not be so terrified of having a great war out in the East.

Sir GILES SQUIRE: Could the lecturer tell us to what extent the Communists owe their easy victory over the Nationalists to Russian facilities, either in the way of military supplies or advisers?

The LECTURER: I have been out of China for two years, and I told my father (who had been there for forty-five years) when he had been in England for six months that he knew nothing about China, having been out of it for those six months! From those with whom I discussed the Chinese Communist campaign I understood there were no advisers with the troops who marched from Mukden to Canton. Certainly the equipment supplied by the Russians never was more than revolvers captured from the Germans on the Western Front during the last war. The arms and equipment which went to the Communists in the final campaign were taken from the supplies provided by the Americans to the Nationalist forces.

The CHAIRMAN: The lecturer has produced some thoughts as to an approach that we should make to China; in fact, we do require an entirely new approach to China and the problem of the Chinese People's Government. It is that Government that is now firmly established in China, and it seems to me that the sooner that Government is recognized by all the great nations, and that when we talk of the Big Five we can in fact talk of China as being included in the Big Five, the sooner we shall be a step nearer to the peace which we are all so anxious to achieve. I feel that our lecturer has helped us considerably in this problem and that to him we owe a very hearty vote of thanks, which I now ask you to accord to him in the usual manner.

IMPRESSIONS OF LIFE IN MALAYA TODAY

By J. DENIS DUNCANSON

Lecture given on November 8, 1950, Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN, in introducing the lecturer, said: We have the good fortune to have with us Mr. Duncanson, who was in the Army during the 1939-45 war and reached the rank of Major. He served in the Middle East, especially in Eritrea, where he was with Brigadier Longrigg, who formed a very high opinion of Mr. Duncanson.

After the war Mr. Duncanson entered the Malayan Civil Service and went to Malaya in 1946. The years since then have been partly spent in Malaya and partly at Macau in South China. He was then posted to the Federal Secretariat at Kuala Lumpur, from which he returned to England on leave last month.

Mr. Duncanson is going to speak to us on one of the troubled States in the eastern part of the world which come within the British sphere of interest. He comes to us fresh from the front, so we can expect to hear all the latest stop-press information in regard to what is happening in Malaya, and I feel sure it will be of the greatest interest to us all.

IT is more than an honour; it is a particular satisfaction when one comes home to be asked to speak about one's daily life in the Far East; it is an encouragement, giving one a feeling that life has a significance not only for itself with its daily troubles and pleasures, but also because in the background there are others who are taking an interest in it, and at times when it is particularly depressing, as it has to be, that is a fortifying consolation. At the same time, before I begin to speak about Malaya I wish to make sure that all here realize the limitations upon me when I speak on this subject. It is particularly important that the limitations be borne in mind. That is why I make use of the word "Impressions" in my title. Much is said as to Malaya and the other troubled States in the Far East which Sir Howard Kelly mentioned, and sometimes one hears the opinions of those who really know; sometimes they are the impressions of casual visitors. Although I am a member of the Malayan Civil Service, I have been in Malaya for such a short period of time that what I have to say is in the latter category: the impressions of a casual visitor.

The first limitation upon me is that I am only a junior official, so that I am not in on any of the State secrets, as it were. I am in the position merely of a person who lived in Malaya as any other member of the Malayan public lives.

The second limitation is one of the time I have been in Malaya, and that is important, because going there after the war I have had no experience of what went on in Malaya before the war or of what went on during the war. Both those periods are significant, I imagine, to the understanding of the present. That is particularly the case for the period of the war years. There is no doubt that people who lived in Malaya, whether as permanent settlers, as most of the Asiatics are, or as more or less temporary

visitors, as the Europeans are, underwent an experience which must influence their whole outlook on Malayan politics and Far Eastern affairs generally. In that I have no part or lot. Therefore in listening to me I ask you to take what I have to say with those two pinches of salt.

The first subject on which I propose to speak is the present constitution of Malaya, because it is important to know not only where the country is, but what is its status in its various parts. Next I propose to say a word or two on what have impressed me in my two years only there as the basic economic factors in Malayan life at the present time, though I cannot forecast how they are likely to influence Malayan life in the future. Then I propose to say what I believe to be the limitations the Emergency puts on the natural economic development of Malaya, and I shall add something in parenthesis as to how it affects the daily life of different types of people in Malaya. From there I propose to go to what to my mind is the more important topic, the social factors in Malayan life today, and those I propose to deal with under three heads: first, the intra-social development; that is to say, what is going on inside Malayan society considered as a whole; secondly, the inter-social development—that is, what is going on between different racial communities in Malaya, each of which forms on its own a compact society; finally, what the social consequences of this situation are from the point of view of the new factor of the Emergency which has now been afflicting Malaya for two and a quarter years and, unfortunately, shows no sign yet of letting up.

CONSTITUTION

Before the war the British Malay Peninsula was divided into three kinds of territory: there were the three Straits Settlements which constituted Crown colonies—Malacca, the oldest; Penang, the next in acquisition; and Singapore, the most recent and most settled, founded in 1819 by Sir Stamford Raffles. Then the Malay States, four of which constituted the Federated Malay States; they were Malay States which had shown the greatest promise and received the greatest benefit from the realization of exploitation of their natural resources, first their tin resources and later the possibilities of growing rubber; and to facilitate their development and ensure a type of administration under which that kind of economy could thrive their Malay rulers had accepted British administration. Then, outside the Federated Malay States, there were the five Unfederated Malay States, which were situated on the periphery of the Federated Malay States but were in rather lesser relationship to British administration and to the British Crown. Although the treaties which tied them to Britain were different, and although in many details of their administration they pursued separate paths, nevertheless basically they were in the British sphere of influence.

A new element has for many years been coming into Malaya—that is, the settlement of what we call the domiciled communities, Chinese and Indian—and the old Constitution after the shake-up of the Japanese occupation obviously was not going to be very satisfactory in the future. During the war a scheme was worked out giving the people a Malayan Union. Under that scheme Singapore alone was to remain a Crown

colony that would be separate and have its administration entirely on its own. The whole of the rest of the country, the other two Straits Settlements, the four Federated Malay States and the five Unfederated Malay States were to form this new Malayan Union. The administration was to be much more directly British in the Unfederated Malay States; in the Federated Malay States it was to remain much as before; the Malay rulers were to become constitutional monarchs, and they agreed to accept a central administration in a great many matters where there had not been formerly central administration.

Actually the idea of the Malayan Union became a thing of the past because, unfortunately, racial relations being what they are, it was not all that easy to bring these various races together into co-operation at one fell swoop. Malays in particular felt that they had been deprived of part of their birthright under this new Constitution which tended to give too much autonomy, in their view control, of Malayan affairs to the Chinese and Indian members of the community. There was a public committee set up under Mr. Cheeseman, the Director of Education, early in 1947, which committee consisted of representatives of all shades of opinion in Malaya and it went round the country hearing representations by members of the public as to what the new Constitution should, in their view, be. The consequence was that on February 1, 1948, we inaugurated the present Constitution of the Federation of Malaya under which each of the two Straits Settlements, Penang and Malacca, and each of the nine States accepts a centralized administration in one of the group of matters and has been given much greater autonomy in other matters. The details I will not now trouble you with, but the obvious division of authority is defence and foreign relations, which are centralized, and matters such as education are not centralized. Presiding over the whole Constitution is a Legislative Council which is not yet elected but may shortly become partially so. The Legislative Council of Singapore is one-third elected now and will become more so in the future. The Legislative Council contains representatives of all interests in Malaya, and I think they will have to agree that it has been most ingeniously worked out. There are representatives of labour, representatives of employers, representatives of financial interests and of agricultural interests, racial representatives, territorial representatives and so on. It is an ingenious Constitution.

The most important aspect of the Federation of Malaya Agreement, as the basic document is called, which each of the Malay rulers and H.M. the King signed in 1948, is what is called federal citizenship. It is a new idea in Malaya, but it is an attempt, without approaching too intimately the question of nationality, to bring together the different races of Malaya in a common pattern of control of public affairs. The races of Malaya do not yet, and possibly for a long time will not, constitute a single national society, but if they are going to live together they must give their loyalty to a single national administration, a federal citizenship, which is status, which, again ingeniously, has been devised to bring that about. Unfortunately, enthusiasm for federal citizenship amongst the mass of the domiciled communities has not been very great and there is a great deal of opposition on the other side from the Malays against its granting in any

case; but a compromise was reached in the Federation Agreement which laid down how a non-Malay member of the community could become a citizen of the Federation. The aim is to ensure that though he may still have divided loyalty his principal loyalty and his loyalty in time of a great crisis would be to Malaya. To bring this about certain qualifications were set up. The first was the residential qualification. A person could not become a citizen of the Federation of Malaya merely by going there as a tourist; he had to be there at least for fifteen years and had to sign an undertaking that he considered himself henceforward as a permanent settler in Malaya, that he did not intend to return to his other country, and that he realized that if he gave up his permanent settlement in Malaya he would cease to be a federal citizen.

Also it was thought best—and the Malays were particularly keen that this should be so—to have a language qualification. A Chinese or Indian cannot become a federal citizen unless he has a minimum acquaintance with English or Malay. What the minimum acquaintance with those languages should be, again, is a subject of quite warm controversy, and the whole problem of fixing what the qualifications for federal citizenship should be is one which is still not settled and may not be for some time. I believe that even now within the next few days alterations are to be introduced into the Legislative Council on that subject.

But the important problem which the Government seeks to tackle in this regard is the creation of a unity of administration of government, even though there may not be a racial unity. This is a problem which had to be faced one way or another, somehow or other, and the federal citizenship is the way that has been devised.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

Now I propose to give my impressions of what Malaya looks like on the ground, what the basic ecological facts of Malaya are. The fact which stands out most strikingly is that Malaya was never occupied by primitive man—certainly not within historical times. There has never been a Malayan population until recently; it is not a country which has a long history. The reason for that is that it was unexploitable by human societies which were simply organized. Ordinary food-gatherers could not get a living in Malaya; the jungle was too thick, and until the jungle of Malaya was cleared there was no possibility of man living on Malaya, or at least what possibility there was was very small, and the aboriginal population of Malaya before the nineteenth century was probably extremely small. There is a good deal of evidence available that even the aborigines there today, or many of them, have immigrated within the period of British administration in Malaya; they appear to be aborigines and we treat them as such because they live in the jungle, but they have not been settled there for a long period of time. This basic fact of Malaya, the jungle and the need to clear it—and it can only be cleared by highly organized forms of society—has meant that Malaya to be populated has had to await the period of modern economic development which could turn it into a plantation country, and it is essentially a plantation country. The hoped-for possibilities of agriculture and of food production by Malaya

are not great. The ordinary agriculturist cannot produce the capital which is necessary to clear the jungle, and it can only be cleared if there is a huge capital from which the agriculturist is going to derive a proportionate profit out of his investment. So the two basic facts of Malayan economy are, first, the jungle, which can only be cleared in the way I have described; secondly, the resulting lack of population.

There are, of course, besides plantations in Malaya a number of other activities. The State of Kalantan on the east coast, on the borders of Siam, has quite a densely populated agricultural area, and there are smaller agricultural areas in Kedah, but that is almost the limit of the possibilities of Malayan agriculture. Those areas are alluvial plains which have probably been exposed and have not had dense jungle on them.

The other main industry, apart from the plantations, which are mostly rubber, but include also pineapples, is tin; and tin is fairly concentrated; that is to say, there is probably tin in many parts of Malaya, but each particular area is cut off from the others; there is no massive tin belt. So, again, we have the country cleared only where there is tin, which is an area mainly in Perak and Selangor near the west coast.

The other industries of Malaya are subsidiary, and of course there is the great trade of Singapore, which depends entirely on the adjacent countries of South-east Asia. Though the profit from Singapore's trade comes to Malaya it is not a basic factor in Malayan economy. And that is another point which has facilitated and, in fact, made necessary the separation of Singapore administratively from the rest of the country.

If Malayan economy depends primarily upon the plantations, and the plantations mean principally rubber; and in a secondary sense upon tin, what is the future of these two commodities? There are now 6,000,000 people in Malaya, and it would seem that some change in world economy which no longer required tin and rubber—such a threat is the United States synthetic rubber industry—might cut the ground from under the feet of this new Malayan population of 6,000,000. What the answer to that is I do not know. So far both rubber and tin have since the war enjoyed a tremendous boom, caused partly, in the case of rubber, by the lack of competition from the Dutch East Indies. All the restrictive measures prevalent before the war have gone. Rubber estates in Malaya can produce as much as they like, and have done so. The rehabilitation of the world and the various causes which underlie stock-piling have led to a tremendous market for rubber and tin and prices have risen phenomenally, as you probably know. Rubber has gone well over 5s. per lb. now, which it had not been for something like thirty years, while tin is nearly £1,200 a ton, which is about twice the price it was even a year ago. Many argue that rubber has only a limited future; on the other hand, others say—I am no judge—that rubber is a cheap commodity like coal, and even though it may not continue to be used for the making of motor-car tyres and things of that nature it may, nevertheless, be possible to use it for the manufacture of new materials which have not yet been invented. How far that is so I cannot say, but I think it is a plausible hope that that will be the case.

At the present time, then, Malayan economy is extremely prosperous, and that prosperity derives from the new wealth from these industries, but

also from the method of distribution. A far greater proportion of the profits on rubber and tin now remains in Malaya. The reasons for this are several: firstly, the Asian population, as I have said, is becoming settled; it is becoming domiciled; the Chinese and Indians are no longer going home to China and India to settle; they are no longer sending remittances home as they used to do before the war, which was one of the biggest drains on Malayan profits.

Another factor is that less is being exported to Europe in the way of profits; a far larger proportion of the profits on rubber and tin is being paid out in wages to labour than previously, and, as you may have seen in the newspapers recently, the Government proposes to retain a much higher proportion of the price of rubber in export duties with a view to spending the money on social services in Malaya.

The general air of prosperity in Malaya has to be seen to be believed. It is impossible to compare it with the other countries of the Far East; the standard of living of everybody in Malaya is so high, and even quite poor labourers are thus becoming capitalists. It is an old phenomenon in the tin industry that many areas of the tin valley in Perak have been exploited for a number of years past by associations of Chinese labourers, who have put up a little money of their own and taken and sub-leased a tin area, worked it themselves and divided the profit amongst themselves. In that way a large proportion of Malayan labour has also been capitalized. Today that is becoming more so, because it is possible for quite poor people to speculate in the rubber market. I had a case recently of a clerk in my own department whose ordinary salary is about £17 a month, which is not very high in Malaya. I asked him how he was faring owing to high prices, and he told me he was doing extremely well because he and his son-in-law had taken out a contract for the supply of rubber, and they were making 3,000 dollars a month between them which they were investing in houses. Thus in many ways many things are contributing to making Malaya prosperous, particularly for the man-in-the-street.

The result of all this is a tremendous expansion, inspired largely by Government initiative in regard to many kinds of services, and these have been incorporated in what we call a Development Plan published last June, under which it is proposed to improve communications. Port Swettenham on the west coast is to be extended to take bigger ships, and also a certain amount of expansion of the railways is contemplated. New roads are being built all over the country, old roads are being widened and new power stations being built, a particularly large one at Klang. A large proportion of the fruits of taxation is being spent on agricultural projects: irrigation for the purpose of draining the swamps in western Johore, which swamps have been a permanent disability to Malayan farmers; coconut plantations mainly, and many things of that nature, besides ordinary social services; new hospitals, though Malaya is already densely populated with hospitals; new schools, although there are not a great number of children to go to the schools; and so on. The poorest of Malayan farmers who do not prosper otherwise in the prosperity of what might be termed the capitalist economy in Malaya, particularly on the east coast, are also being cared for by the setting up of a Rural Development

Board which will cater for their interests and see that a good deal of the profits do not remain only in the hands of plantation workers and so on, but will come the way of the poorer farmers also.

MATERIAL EFFECTS OF THE EMERGENCY

Into this scene of great post-war prosperity in Malaya we now have the explosion of what we call "the Emergency." It is a most difficult contrast to encompass in one's mind, because on the one hand there is great prosperity, high standards of living for all classes of society, and, on the other hand, the great insurrection which claims to be a movement for social reform and to bring about the very thing which obviously already exists. I cannot explain all the causes of the Emergency; I have no idea what the causes are, but I can tell you something of the consequences, and particularly how the Emergency affects people's lives. Some are very seriously affected; others hardly know the Emergency is on.

The Emergency is, of course, a terrible and almost disastrous drain on public funds. We are spending a quite fantastic sum of money, something like half a million dollars a day on the Emergency, by maintaining a tremendous force in the field, and that does not take into account even the enormous contribution by the United Kingdom Government, because although we in Malaya are spending half a million dollars a day, we are only paying for the police force and not for H.M. forces which are fighting alongside them and, in many cases, leading them into the jungle against this insurrection. The limitation of funds available for State investment and Government investment is really very serious.

We have this tremendous Development Plan and it is going forward, and the money at present is available, but if it were not for the Emergency three times as much money would be available. That is the first serious limitation. But that must also be offset by another contrast: the Emergency, strangely enough, is not interfering with Malayan production. Rubber production has gone steadily up and has not wavered because of the Emergency; tin production has also steadily risen. The only limitation of the tin industry is that normal schemes for prospecting for new sites have had to be abandoned. Apart from that the tin industry has not had its production interfered with. It, of course, has suffered tremendous inconveniences, but its own resources have taken up the slack without the actual product suffering.

The effect on the daily life of people of Malaya also varies very much. If you take the case of a European rubber planter in south Pahang, which is the central part of Malaya, where the bandits are particularly active, then the life of that planter is really very unpleasant indeed. Every moment of his life is in some way or another influenced by those bandits, the fear of them and the apprehension as to where they are going to attack next. If, on the other hand, you take the case, shall we say, of a trolley-bus driver in Penang, well, the Emergency is to him an item of news in his evening paper and as remote from his daily life as the fighting in Korea or the Berlin Air-Lift, to quote an example of two years ago. So that the Emergency does not affect everybody equally, and one cannot draw a unified conclusion as to its effects on daily life.

Perhaps the most notable effect of the Emergency is on communications. While practically all the main roads in Malaya and many of the side roads are perfectly safe for travel, nevertheless some are so subject to daily ambushes that travel is possible only in convoy. Most people, especially motorists, prefer to travel on their own, because they think it safer, but the police do not take that view, and for some roads they insist on convoys. The heaviest toll has been on the railways, which, of course, are particularly vulnerable. There have been innumerable derailments and they, unfortunately, have been pursued inexorably; they started on the small east-coast railway which runs up the centre of Malaya. Here the bandits tried all sorts of methods—pilot engines, loose rails, land mines and sniping, gradually working up to a highly organized technique which they have now applied, regrettably, to the main line which carries most of Malaya's produce, so that today very frequently the line is out of commission for even two days at a time, which is a serious matter. There are alternative kinds of transport, but it is serious to have the railway communications curtailed from the point of view of the enormous government investment therein.

The railway staff, however, seem to have borne up remarkably well under the strain. I had among my acquaintances an engine driver who had been derailed five times, and he said the experience no longer worried him; he had never had a scratch and was perfectly prepared to go on being derailed; it was, of course, unpleasant on the first occasion, but that was a thing of the past. While the railway staff have carried on, the public, unfortunately, have not always done so. Night trains are almost unfrequented; they are carrying on more for the sake of carrying on and making a brave show than for the traffic which is actually carried.

The next question which arises out of the Emergency is as to who actually gets killed. The biggest number of victims of these bandits—and bandits they are, there is no question about that—have been among the Security Forces—the police and the army. The next hardest hit—and it is important to remember this—has been the Chinese population. It is primarily a battle going on inside the Chinese community, and the biggest number of casualties, after those in the Security Forces, has been, socially and economically, amongst the prominent Chinese. They have suffered very badly indeed. Even before the war many of them were frequently the victims of extortion gangs, and those who are attacking them now are still the same extortion gangs. The area of the victims of these gangs is now very much wider, and any Chinese who shows in any way that he has co-operated with the Government becomes a victim; and that is not the only reason. Even if he shows himself to be, by the standards of these men in the jungle, a Chinese who lives a Western way of life, they may decide to attack him if they think him prominent. Many Chinese live under the most trying conditions, but they get through their lives very bravely. The explanation is that they have no alternative.

Next in order of casualties are the rubber planters, and they are attacked simply because they are Europeans and in the hope that there will be disruption of the organization of the rubber estates. It is now, I think, an exploded fallacy, but one still entertained by the bandits, that by dis-

rupting the organization of the rubber estates they can gain adherents to their ranks.

Finally, travellers in trains have been sniped at and killed. Those ambushed are usually quite brutally and barbarously treated. The methods of assassination, I am told, frequently included protracted laceration and dismemberment. After having shot a body the bandits rarely leave it without hacking it about with knives, just to show their barbarity.

SOCIAL FACTORS—INTRA-SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

Now I propose to come to the social problems, which are the most important today and about which least information is available in Great Britain at the present time. What is taking place inside Malayan society? I have already hinted at the settlement of alien communities and the domiciled communities from China and India. Whilst Malaya was first being developed and was organized on a plantation basis, labour also was organized on a plantation basis; that is to say, it came and went, and the pattern of labour organization in Malaya before the war was similar to what it was at one time in South Africa, in the West Indies and many other places. I do not mean in the West Indies in the days of slavery, but in the days of indenture systems. That has passed away, and after successive waves of immigration, each of which left a bigger deposit of settlers in Malaya, immigration has ceased and Malaya is settling down to form itself into a dominion. It is not, of course, comparable with the situation in colonies in Africa which have a long-standing indigenous population. It is similar to a dominion, except that it is not being settled by Europeans, but by Asians, in much the same way as Australia and Canada are settled. That society is now in the process of welding itself into one. It is not doing so consciously, but the Government is hoping that it will do so more consciously and faster and faster; processes are at work underneath and there is momentum to bring that situation about.

Of course the population of Malaya is beginning to show signs of increase, without immigration, under its own natural increase, and we are beginning to face the problems arising from an expanding population, a high birth-rate and a very low death-rate, relatively speaking. The problems are particularly noticeable in Singapore, noticeable obviously in overcrowding and housing; in less obvious ways in the difficulty in regard to providing educational facilities and things of that nature. But the problems are also arising in rural Malaya, in that the new pressure of population threatens, to some extent, to depress the standards of living, and in particular to militate against social service schemes, universal education and so on, which are deeply cherished, especially by members of the Indian and Chinese communities. There is a tendency towards urbanization which will bring eventually a number of problems which are familiar in Great Britain and other countries. That was revealed in the census made in 1947, which showed a much more marked population living in the big towns. Fortunately it is not yet a serious problem, and Malaya still remains predominantly a rural country, though not a farming but a plantation country.

Although Malaya is settling down in this way, the most urgent need,

the one which I previously mentioned, was reflected in federal citizenship, and the problem of the new Constitution is the emergence of a national consciousness, and we would like to see all sorts of feelings of civic responsibility developed amongst Malayan peoples. Unfortunately, those feelings are not yet very apparent. There is little interest on the part of those in one group in the fate of people of another group. That has been reflected, to some extent, throughout the Emergency: the people of one part of Malaya have been content to hear that the bandits were causing depredations in another area. Perhaps I should not use the word "content," but they were certainly not prepared to make any profound sacrifice to prevent those depredations. We might have hoped that the big labour force in Malaya would have commenced to organize itself spontaneously into organizations such as our trade unions in Great Britain. That has not been so. We have had to stimulate the movement, plant the seed, nurture the seedling, tend the tree, and even when the tree became big we have had to look after it. These things are inevitable. There are now a great many trade unions in Malaya, but they are not the result of a movement amongst the Chinese, Indian, or even Malayan labour; they are the result of our initiative; and this also means that there is little prospect at the moment of any body of opinion developing in Malaya to stimulate the Government initiative in administrative matters as we might have hoped. We might have expected that the Legislative Council would be able to express all shades of opinion in Malaya on administrative matters. Unfortunately, that does not seem to be happening and Government initiative still reigns supreme, though it would wish to delegate a good deal of its authority. The way in which that is happening is reflected in the Singapore elections. I have already said that the Singapore Legislative Council was partly elected, but, unfortunately, when it came to registered voters very few members of the population were prepared to register. We are now introducing elective measures for the municipalities.

Although there is little civic responsibility in the Western sense of that word in Malaya, I should not like to let you think that there is not a deep sense of civic responsibility of another kind. All Malays, Chinese and Indians are conscious of the need to live in an orderly fashion and to be good neighbours the one to the other. That is very marked in the larger cities. The people live in very overcrowded conditions, but they do not for that reason live in a state of lawlessness. Malaya has a very low crime rate. That may be explained by the Emergency; it may have drawn off the "cream" of the underworld. Even apart from considerations such as that, I think the Malaysians are well-behaved people, all of them. They have in that sense a profound civic sense; their overcrowded conditions are frequently not the result of economic depression so much as of habit. They like that way of living. When you go into the busy streets of Kuala Lumpur or Singapore, just as when you go into the busy streets of China, you see what appears to a European to be quite impossible overcrowding; however, it is not the overcrowding of misery but of great contentedness, even cheerfulness. Each Chinese family prefers to live in a small cubicle rather than in a large house; they are all very happy in that, to us, overcrowded state, and I do not think they would be prepared to make great

sacrifices for a more elaborate way of life. So, though we may regret the failure of Malayan society to begin to develop along our Western lines, nevertheless there are many consolations and the scene is not at all an unhappy one.

SOCIAL FACTORS—INTER-SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The next point in connection with the social factors is what I term "inter-social development"—that is, race relations. And this is the key to a Malayan society. The plurality of the races of Malaya strikes one on all hands at all times and in all contexts. Inevitably so. It might have been difficult to say whether the situation would have been easier if the population settled in racial areas, as it were. There is a certain amount of that: the east coast, for instance, is almost entirely Malay. Even those parts of the east coast territories which have been recently settled have been settled mainly by Malays, but for the most part the population of Malaya lives all mixed up, and yet, although that is so, although in central Malaya and in States like Johore, where there is a Chinese majority, there are little villages of Malays and Chinese close to one another, they do not mix. We of the British Empire can hardly expect them to mix. We have so many experiences in other territories that races do not spontaneously mix. Yet we have to bring about some kind of consciousness of nationality which will enable this miscellaneous, this heterogeneous, body of people to react as one in its economic and social life in the future, when it gets self-government, as it has been so frequently promised, when it has to stand on its own feet in, let us hope, the councils of the world and maybe also the strifes of the world. How can that be brought about? All the leaders of communities are very conscious of the need for producing some kind of *modus vivendi*, but few of them are prepared to go to the length of saying they will actually suspend their identity and fuse themselves in something new. And, of course, it is difficult for them to do so. People quote the example of the United States and say that Malaya should develop along those lines, but then two-thirds of the population of the United States to this day has its origin in the British Isles, and at no stage has the original British element in the United States ever been in a minority. That is not the case in Malaya. There is no obvious dominating community; there is nothing that these people can be assimilated to. There is no pattern which they can say they will take for themselves and become like that and live in that way. Something has to be created before it can be copied. That is one of the main problems, particularly of education, in Malaya.

It is possible, of course, that if Malaya did one day stand upon its own feet the pressure of this very unkind world in which we live—the pressure upon them from it would be enough to weld the races together; but at present the population is protected by the *Pax Britannica* from every kind of outside pressure, whether warlike or economic. Therefore that pressure is not a part of the Malayan social picture as a means of welding the people together. Until they are welded together we cannot submit them to their fate, so that it is our dilemma how Malaya can be made into a nation.

Although the races in Malaya live so completely conscious of their own

identity (and we have to remember that many of their forebears have only recently come to Malaya; one-third of the Malaysians, to be precise, have been born outside Malaya, although thirty years ago the figure was two-thirds, so there is already a great improvement), although the people are living in these racial compartments, as it were, nevertheless, they live in great harmony. There is no strife. Immediately after the war there were some scraps, especially in Perak, between Chinese and Malays, but they were largely a question of paying off old scores, unhappy incidents, which had taken place during the Japanese occupation, when one little village community thought it had been treated badly by the other and as soon as the Japanese administration had been removed it took revenge. Apart from those incidents all Malayan peoples are fully aware of this problem; they realize they must live together in peace, and it is interesting to see how every single council, every single committee, every activity of Malaya, brings members of these different races together in a very considerable willingness to co-operate.

The reasons for this harmony, which seems to be such a striking feature of Malaya, are probably several, and they are worth considering. Firstly, the Malays and Chinese and the Indians all have very pacific traditions; none of them have ever been really warlike peoples; and they are anxious not to get a reputation for being warlike or quarrelsome. Secondly, the Malayan economy has organized itself in such a way that these race distinctions become part of the economic distinctions, so that there is a preponderance of Chinese labour in the tin industry, a preponderance of Indian labour in the rubber industry, and a preponderance of Malay labour in agriculture, Government service and so on. They say to one another, in effect: You go and do that job; I will do this job, and we will all be part of the economic organization but not connected with one another. That has not been consciously done, but has come about of its own accord. Many would say it is one of the obstacles to fusion, one of the obstacles to the emergence of national unity in Malaya. But that is a long-term view. Undoubtedly it promotes considerable harmony. Of course, there is in the rubber industry a certain amount of racial competition between Chinese and Malays, and the attempt to form trade unions of both races has not been very successful.

Finally, there is no doubt that Western culture more and more is dominating Malaya and is acting as a catalyst in which culture and social characteristics are gradually transformed—in other words, in which fusion between these otherwise alien cultures has taken place. The Chinese all prefer to a man that their children should receive a Western education rather than that they should receive a Chinese education. That view is so universally held that I will make bold to say that it is universal. All our efforts were very hard put to it to find enough places for Chinese in any English language schools of Malaya, because the Chinese are so keen. The Indians have always, even when they first came to Malaya, brought a large degree of English culture with them, and there is no need to say that all literate Indians are also literate in English. The Malays, too, are very keen on Western culture, although they are the most conservative about giving up elements of their own culture—a little surprisingly, because their

own culture is alien to them, being Islamic and coming from the Middle East, whereas the Chinese culture is very intimate to the Chinese people. It is a strange contrast, but it is so.

One of the elements in the emergence of the Communist insurrection is the revolt of simple-minded people against this progress, against the advance of the West. They do not want to be shaken out of their ways; they do not want to give up their own cultural integrity, as it were.

SOCIAL FACTORS—THE EMERGENCY

Lastly, I would say a brief word about the effects, as I see them, of the Emergency on this dominant social problem of the emergence of a Malayan nation. The terrorism in Malaya is almost exclusively a Chinese phenomenon, because the bandits are almost entirely Chinese. Naturally there has been an anti-Chinese reaction. I do not think that has been very serious. It was more serious at the beginning of the Emergency when I was still in China, but it is one of the elements in the scene. People argue that the Chinese are responsible for this and that the Chinese must settle it, and that they must be made to pay for it. Fortunately, that point of view is much less marked now, but it is an element. The Communists, when they first came to Malaya in about 1930, attempted to produce a pan-racial Communist party, and it is very significant that, just as we are having difficulty in making a pan-racial nation out of the Malaysians, so have the Communists failed. I had the opportunity to read a great deal of their propaganda, which, as one would expect, puts the blame entirely on to the British for producing the racial differences amongst the people; but it is very significant that they have really found out for themselves that it is a fiasco, that they can only organize on the racial basis; and so the terrorism is organized on a racial basis. In fact, anybody in the audience who has read a translation by Pearl Buck of the medieval Chinese romance novel, *All Men are Brothers*, will have from that an almost complete picture of the scene today in contemporary Chinese villages in the depths of the jungle in Malaya. These people completely dominate the scene. But how do they do it? There is individual extortion. They threaten to take people's lives; the bandits tell the people that if they do not give them what they want they will cut their throats "tomorrow after dark." That seems to be the way of a body of men called the *Min Yuen*, which means "Officers of the People."

That is probably not the fundamental way in which the terrorism works; I suspect, though I have little evidence, that it is organized much more by means of group solidarities: somebody's son decides he is going to be a bandit, or that may be decided by someone else for him. So he makes his family co-operate with him, and his family may be influential in some way—they may have some economic pull, they may be social leaders in their village, and they are able to sway also a bigger number of people. So it goes on being perpetuated by these many unseen forces which are produced by many quite different situations. We found one gang, for instance, with children in school, so they would also be an element in it. And there is being produced in big areas a solidarity amongst the rural Chinese anyway to keep the bandits hidden if not to help them actively. This has

been one of the big problems. It is in that sense only that it can be said that the Communist insurrection in Malaya is a popular movement. It is not a popular movement by inspiration. It becomes popular by itself seizing upon the natural organization of village society and exploiting it for its own end. Only in that sense is it popular. Of course a simple Chinese peasant who may himself have been born in China—born, as many have been, in the bandit areas of Kwantung province, which has been dominated by bandits almost for centuries—when you say to such a peasant: “You are following a course of action which your ancestors have followed for centuries, but it is all wrong and we can prove you are doing wrong, because somebody or other in Malaya is getting hurt,” you are speaking to such a man in a language he cannot understand.

I mention finally the remedies the Government has in hand to deal with the situation. All these points are very clearly realized. The chief means of coping with them has been to bring the remoter communities, the Chinese, out from the jungle areas into the centres of population, where they can be seen and where they really have the will to resist extortion and intimidation or whatever these other forces may be which make them collaborate with the bandits, and they will be free to pursue another course. That is what is called “squatter resettlement,” or, to use the jargon used in Malaya today, “resquattlement.” There has been a good deal said in newspapers recently about that. It consists of breaking up these communities and giving them, as far as possible, a new way of life. I confess when I first came across this I said to myself: “Here is a natural process being reversed; these Chinese have gone out into the jungle, hacked it about a bit, and made a new way of life and a new economy; they are pioneers.” I felt a little uneasy when put on to this work that I was reversing a natural process; but I soon found these people were not in fact pioneers, for the reason that pioneering is not possible except under a highly organized economy and society which these simple Chinese peasants have not got. I realized that they are not pioneers at all, but they are the margin of society. People came to Malaya and proceeded to make themselves a good living on rubber, tin, or whatever it was, and through no fault of their own, perhaps because of the Japanese occupation, they could not earn a living any longer and were driven into the jungle. So they are not pioneers and it is not pioneering that is being interfered with. It is in the long term very much to the advantage of these people to be brought into the big centres of plantation occupation—I will not say the big towns—where their children can go to school; they can enjoy hospitals and enjoy all the benefits of this gathering prosperity in Malaya; and we hope they will rapidly, or at any rate gradually, become conscious of belonging to this new Malayan nation which so much occupies the minds of everyone in the Federation.

Group Captain H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD: The Malayan basket has two large eggs in it, tin and rubber. Is nothing being done about the cultivation of rice, because the rest of the rice-producing countries are very short of that food? It seems there is a chance to spread their agricultural interests in that direction.

Also, is indenture labour from India now entirely at an end? When I knew Malaya we had to have thousands of people from abroad to carry on what the country needed.

Mr. J. D. DUNCANSON : Of course, the Government in Malaya is doing what it can to encourage agriculture, but the nature of the country is such that it is not conducive to extensive agriculture. The Rural Development Board will be occupying itself mainly with local matters. I mentioned the schemes for irrigation in West Johore which have the same end in view. That agriculture could ever replace tin and rubber and maintain the present population of Malaya, which has actually passed 6,000,000 this year, is generally held by the experts to be out of the question.

As to the second question, indenture labour in India has been at an end for a great many years now; the Government of India stopped emigration to Malaya in 1938, but there is a tremendous resident population of Indian rubber tappers and of Indians to do other jobs.

Mr. BYRT : That is unindentured labour. Immigration goes on?

The LECTURER : Yes, individuals can come in for very special reasons, but there is no longer any immigration; we have reached the stage which the United States reached in 1920.

Sir DASHWOOD STRETTELL : What proportion of the Civil Service is Chinese? I have always heard that a majority were Malayan and that was a good part of the reason for the present terrorism.

The LECTURER : I am afraid I cannot give anything like the accurate proportion; there is no ban or anything of that kind on Chinese in the Government service. They tend to prefer some jobs to others and the Government also tends to prefer them for certain jobs rather than others; where the Chinese compete by educational standards with the Malays they generally succeed better than the Malays. On the other hand, there is a strong antipathy amongst many sections of the Chinese population to work in Government jobs. They prefer to make their living outside. There are no Chinese in the administrative grades of the Civil Service, except in one or two specialized posts and also in education.

The CHAIRMAN : We all have to thank the lecturer very much indeed for a most interesting discourse. Personally, I have been astounded, and I am sure you all have been, to think that what he called a "casual visitor" should have accumulated in such a relatively short time such a mass of information and have been able to come here and express it with a fluency which I have rarely heard equalled by those four times his age. I am sure Mr. Duncanson has a great future before him. I believe he is developing his knowledge of Chinese so that he may be able to deal more intimately with the difficulties he has mentioned. We can only wish him success in his career and thank him for coming here and giving us this most interesting lecture.

EARTHQUAKE IN E. ASSAM, AUGUST, 1950

THE following eye-witness account may be of interest to members :
The last twelve days have been very thrilling for us here, for we have been on the edge of the epicentre of the fifth largest recorded earthquake. It even puts Quetta in the shade!

The first shocks were felt about 7.45 p.m. Indian Standard Time on August 15. It had been a holiday, due to the fact that it was Independence Day. The ground shuddered and then seemed to tremble quietly. This went on for a second or so and we decided to evacuate the bungalow, for it seemed more than a mere tremor. The trembling increased and a rumbling resembling muffled thunder came from the ground. It seemed as if the earth beneath us had turned into water, for definite waves of movement could be felt as well as vibrations. It is difficult to recall any special features except to say that it was most unpleasant to feel one's knees sagging and knocking. The whole performance lasted for some three and a half to four minutes, and as it died away the falling of landslides down the mountain-sides could be heard very plainly. There were several minor quakes during the next half-hour and then at frequent intervals of fifteen minutes or so all night and next day. We were in an uncertain state for seventy-two hours, as some of the tremors were large enough in intensity to drive us outdoors. We have, in fact, had several tremors a day up to this time. The epicentre seems to have been in the Himalayan foothills in Sadiya. The main damage was done in the area from North Lakimpur, Dibrugarh Dum Duma, Pasighat and in the Abor country. North Lakimpur was badly damaged, and roads for miles cracked open with deep fissures which quickly filled with water. Blue sand was forced up over roads and covered quite a lot of paddy land, thus destroying the newly planted crop.

The Subansiri River where it leaves its gorge at Pathaliapam ceased to flow, and we were all anxious lest it should break its block and rush down, sweeping all before it. The other theory was that it might change its course and appear elsewhere. Rain started just after the main earthquake and has gone on intermittently ever since. This prevented a plane recce of the blocked river and hampered supply drops. Above all, it made the lot of the homeless even more miserable. Several tea gardens up here have been temporarily put out of action. They are Seajuli, Cinnatolliah and Pathaliapam. A small garden, Bordesbam, the opposite side of the Subansiri, was covered with sand forced from the earth and has since disappeared under water. There was no wall of water when, after five days, the Subansiri started to flow again, but the water gradually rose until it covered the Pathaliapam village and area with 4 feet of water. In this area isolated villages have been swept away, and in others the inhabitants can be seen clinging to roof-tops. Food already prepared has been dropped in some places.

I gather that in the hills the shocks were very heavy, and most of the

Daffa paths have been blocked by slides. On the few days when the hills have been visible we have seen huge bare patches which were once jungle-covered stretching thousands of feet from top to bottom. A few Daffas whom I have seen say that they have had no communication from the interior villages, but a wireless message from the Apa Tanang Plateau $93^{\circ} 50' E.$ $27^{\circ} 35' N.$ says that shocks of great intensity were felt and that the tribesmen danced and beat drums all night in an effort to placate the spirits.

Some damage was done to the oil wells at Digboi, but not much. What has happened, of course, is that, due to the rains and the shifting of river beds, the whole Subansiri delta has been inundated. Farther north the Dihang and Dibang have flooded, and this has caused the waters of the Brahmaputra to pile up and flood.

Our own local river, the Ranganadi, which changed its course in an earthquake years ago and left its bed near our tea garden, last night decided to return. It has cut off a number of villages, and we have spent to-day fetching marooned families off their roof-tops. There seems to be no sign of the rain ending and no promise of any dull moments for days to come.

THE SINKIANG-HUNZA FRONTIER

A BOOK, *Pivot of Asia*, by Mr. Owen Lattimore, published in March, 1950, in the U.S.A. by the Atlantic Monthly Press and Little, Brown and Co., makes the following statements in an Appendix III on the subject of International Boundaries on the Pamirs.

First, it quotes the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1895: thus "Her Britannic Majesty's Government engage that the territory lying within the British sphere of influence between the Hindu Kush and the line running from the east end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier shall form part of the territory of the Ameer of Afghanistan, that it shall not be annexed to Great Britain and that no military posts or fortifications shall be established in it." On which Mr. Lattimore comments: "The Russians, both Tsarist and Soviet, have stood permanently on the 1895 demarcation as far as it concerned both their own claims and British claims. Nor, as far as the Pamir sector of their frontier is concerned, have they had any disputes with either the Chinese or the Afghans. The British, right up to the end of their rule in India, stood on their 1895 demarcation of the new Wakhan valley frontier with Afghanistan and had no further contact with the Russians across the buffer."

Mr. Lattimore concludes that "This wording [in the agreement as quoted above] does not state explicitly but does allow it to be inferred that, in the British view at the time [1895] south of the Russian frontier and north of the British frontier, what territory was not Afghan was Chinese." The ordinary reader of the agreement may be excused for wondering what language could be more explicit on the point.

Dr. Lattimore then continues:

It seemed desirable to emphasize a buffer between British and Russian territory rather than contact of British and Russian frontiers. The British maps, accordingly, emphasized a meeting of Afghan and Chinese territory that separated British and Russian territory. On the other hand, there had been no formal demarcation of the British-Chinese frontier in this region. It therefore seemed undesirable to make any definite statements in writing, conceding specific territory in the Pamirs to the Chinese. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that British maps on the whole continued to delineate a meeting of Afghan and Chinese territory up to the time of the Russian Revolution. As late as 1920, indeed, in the map attached to *Through Deserts and Oases of Central Asia* by Ella Sykes and Sir Percy Sykes, the buffer continues to be shown as an Afghan-Chinese buffer. Sir Percy Sykes was British Consul-General in Kashgar in 1915. By 1926, however, when C. P. Skrine (who had also been Consul-General in Kashgar) published his *Chinese Central Asia*, the map attached to the book showed no Anglo-Chinese frontier on the Pamirs, and left it possible to infer that British territory went on around the end of the Afghan buffer and met the Russian frontier. Similarly, and with special clearness, the map attached to *Between the Oxus and the Indus* (London, 1935), by Col. R. C. F. Schomberg, who over a period of years travelled intensively and extensively both on the Pamirs and in Sinkiang, unmistakably delineates British territory spreading around the end of the Afghan buffer and a trijunction of British, Afghan and Soviet Russian territory, rather than of British, Russian and Chinese territory.

Pursuing the hypothesis further, it may be suggested that this change reflected

not only the change from friendliness between the British and new Soviet régime, but growing British concern over the decay and instability of Chinese rule in Sinkiang.

It does not seem far-fetched to suggest that the British, by altering their usage in the drawing of maps, were diplomatically making preparations for the possibility either of Soviet expansion into Sinkiang, or the coming of a régime in Sinkiang that might be more friendly to the Soviets than to the British régime in India. In either event it might well have seemed to the British that it would be better to claim as strong as possible a frontier in direct contact with the Russian frontier, than to try to support a weak or perhaps even unfriendly Chinese régime in its claims to territory separating British and Russian territory.

There are three questions that the reader of the above passage will ask at once. Firstly, Did the British not make "any definite statements in writing" as to Chinese territory in the Pamirs? Secondly, Did the British "alter their usage in the drawing of maps" in this way, either in the two books cited above or anywhere else? Thirdly, What is the frontier between what used to be British India and Sinkiang?

The answer to the first and second questions is that Mr. Lattimore (or his assistant collaborator) is incorrect in his premises.

The Chinese territory concerned in the above "hypothesis" is the area called alternatively "the Chinese Pamir" and, more precisely, "the valley of the Taghdumbash Pamir" and its tributary nullahs. For although the whole valley is commonly styled the Taghdumbash Pamir—and this usage is that of the earliest maps and also of the most recent—some geographers prefer to restrict the term Pamir to the slopes on the left bank of the Karachukur or Taghdumbash River, leaving the steeper tributary nullahs of its right bank nameless, or including both banks in the general district of Sarikol, which lies between the Russian Pamirs to the north, Wakhan, the Afghan Pamir to the west, and the watershed of the Hunza River and its tributaries to the south.

The Afghan Boundary Commission did its work in 1874, and Russia was not then in any of the Pamirs. In the 1880s Russian soldiers and explorers began to tour the Pamirs and the Karakoram. In 1890 Sir Francis Younghusband obtained permission from the Chinese authorities in Sinkiang to proceed round the Pamirs, "which at that time were considered Chinese territory." In 1891, however, on a second trip he found that "a small Russian force had entered the Pamirs and proclaimed them Russian territory." He encountered them and they showed a map with the boundary claimed by the Russians coloured on it. This boundary "included the whole of the Pamirs except the Taghdumbash, and extended as far down as the watershed of the Hindu Kush by the Khora Bhort Pass." Captain Younghusband lodged a report on his having been detained by the Russians as on "Russian territory" at Bozai Gumbaz in Wakhan, and made "to proceed to Chinese territory by the Wakhjruj Pass"—that is, the pass from the Wakhan Pamir to the Taghdumbash valley—and

the upshot was that the Russian Ambassador in London apologized to Lord Salisbury for the illegal action of Colonel Yonoff, and the Russian Government declared in the Pamir Agreement that Bozai Gumbaz . . . is beyond the sphere of Russian influence.

It was by this agreement in 1895 that, as cited above, Wakhan was assigned



SKETCH-MAP TO SHOW FRONTIERS ON THE PAMIR-KARAKORAM WATERSHEDS OF THE U.S.S.R., AFGHANISTAN, CHINA (SINKIANG) AND INDIA/PAKISTAN (HUNZA)

Glaciers are shown in black, the heights of some peaks in each watershed are given in feet above sea-level.

Indications of glaciation in the S.E. corner of this map are only provisional, the area is still largely un-surveyed. The Chinese boundary runs sharply southwards on the east side of this map so that the valley to the N.E. of the Shimshal Pass is in China.

to Afghanistan, and it is obvious that both England and Russia at that time—1891-95—accepted the Taghdumbash valley as Chinese territory.

The above is the only official statement on the matter. But as Mr. Lattimore makes no discrimination between official and private statements and maps, which are alike “British,” it will be convenient to take the two together here.

Sir Thomas Holdich, a member of the Pamir Boundary Commission, wrote later (in a book published by the Oxford University Press):

From the point where the Sarikol barrier between Russia and China touches the Hindu Kush at its junction with the great Muztagh barrier between India and China, it becomes the southern boundary of Afghanistan, which territory lies between it on the south and the upper tributaries of the Oxus (or Panja) River on the north. Afghanistan thus stretches out a long arm to the north-east from Badakhshan, touching China at its farthest eastern extremity, and preserving a narrow buffer between Russia and India. This long arm is the Afghan province of Wakhan, and it is worthy of note that at the point where the Hindu Kush overlooks Kala Panja . . . the full width of Afghanistan intervening between Russia and India . . . (is) something less than ten miles.

There is no ambiguity about this. The Agreement of 1872, the Afghan Boundary Commission of 1874 and the Pamir Commission of 1894-5 fixed a frontier on the ground and on the map between Russia and Afghanistan and between Afghanistan and India, and another agreement fixed the frontier between Russia and China, to prevent aggression by either Russia or Afghanistan.

In 1874 Hunza was independent territory but a vassal of China in respect of a not closely defined area in the Taghdumbash Pamir and Sarikol. There was therefore no definite frontier on the ground between them. When in 1891 Britain extended the frontier of India to include Hunza and Nagir, and Hunza ceased to be an independent territory, British control stopped at the watershed of the Hunza River. But for forty years Hunza continued to pay money every year to the authorities in Sinkiang as a vassal grazing herds in the Taghdumbash valley. This is evidence that the Government of India accepted the Taghdumbash valley as Chinese territory.

There are two categories of maps. The first is surveys, on as large a scale and as accurate in detail as possible. The second is sketch-maps, drawn to bring out some special subject and omitting anything irrelevant to that: these are often not quite accurate in scale.

From the time of the surveys of the Forsyth Mission (1874) it has been taken for granted that between the Yarkand River and the Afghan frontier the boundary between British India and Sinkiang ran on the Karakoram watershed “which separates the rivers of India on the south from the rivers of Central Asia on the north.” But that line has never been shown precisely on any ordnance survey map, because the watershed in question was not accurately mapped. It is part of the second highest mountain complex in the world, a mass of ice peaks, glaciers and eternal snow rising to its highest summit at 28,250 feet above sea-level, which can only be crossed at a few passes, the lowest of which is 15,600 feet above the sea, the rest of the area being impenetrable except by the most expert mountaineering expeditions. Neither India nor China needed to fear aggression from

the other. It was therefore only necessary to fix the frontier on the passes and to establish that the Taghdumbash valley to the north was in China and the Misgar valley running to the south was in British India. There is quite an amount of variation between one and another of the earliest maps as to the general direction of even these valleys, as the ranges were then unsurveyed. Official maps are still provisional in a few parts (*cf.* Eric Shipton, *Blank on the Map*). Therefore no Ordnance Survey map showed the whole Sino-British frontier because it was impossible to do so accurately. Maps, however, coloured to show political affiliations always endeavoured to indicate that Russia and India were not contiguous, though in the older maps it was often done by showing China's south-western extremity as a right angle, whereas in the last two decades it is more commonly given a tongue running up to meet the tongue of Afghan Wakhan. Certainly some sketch-maps are ambiguous if studied apart from their accompanying letterpress, since, unless exaggeration is used, a distance that is only some 15 to 20 miles will hardly be visible on a map of, say, 100 or 200 miles to the inch.

The map provided by the Royal Geographical Society to accompany *Chinese Central Asia*, by C. P. Skrine, states that it was drawn from maps of the Survey of India. It therefore, of course, shows no Sino-Indian boundary. The map at the end of *Between Oxus and Indus* is anonymous, but gives very closely the Ordnance Survey line for the Russian-Chinese frontier north of the Taghdumbash, and similarly omits to show the southern limit. There seems, however, no reason to tear these maps from their accompanying letterpress, and the "statements" of Sir Clarmont Skrine and Colonel Schomberg are "definite." On pages 35 to 37 of *Chinese Central Asia* Sir Clarmont Skrine calls

the Mintaka Pass the Great Divide which separates India from China. . . . It was a great moment when we stood for the first time on the soil, rather the rocks, of China and looked northwards upon the Pamirs. . . . At the mouth of the Mintaka we were within a few miles of the frontiers both of Afghan Wakhan and of the Russian Pamirs, so that three Empires and one kingdom very nearly—but not quite—met close to us.

Colonel Schomberg, on page 218 of *Between Oxus and Indus*, says :

The last village in Hunza is Misgar, where there is a telegraph office to keep in touch with events on the frontier. . . . Above Misgar two tracks take off leading into Chinese territory. As the traveller climbs up to the passes on the frontier he gazes over an expanse of snow and rock.

And on pages 156 to 158 Colonel Schomberg gives reasons in detail why it was undesirable (in 1935) for the Mirs of Hunza to continue holding grazing in the Taghdumbash Pamir, "present Chinese territory." In Colonel Schomberg's previous book, *Peaks and Plains of Central Asia*, published in 1933, the sketch-map at the end very clearly marks the Sino-Indian frontier along the Mintaka-Kilik line.

There has been a continuous series of "definite statements in writing" from Sir Francis Younghusband in 1889, Sir Thomas Holdich (quoted above), through Captain Deasy, who made a semi-official survey of part of the mountain barrier between India and China in 1896 (*In Tibet and Chinese Turkestan*, pp. 358-359), Colonel Etherton (in *Across the Roof of the World*) in 1911, Captain Blacker in a lighthearted narrative published

in 1922, Sir Clarmont Skrine in 1925 and Colonel Schomberg in 1933 and 1935, Mr. Peter Fleming in 1936, and other private travellers down to Colonel H. W. Tilman in 1949 and Mrs. Shipton (wife of the last British Consul-General at Kashgar) in her book published in 1950. It has indeed been impossible to find any British author who wrote about the Taghdumbash valley during those sixty years who did not make a "definite statement" that it belonged to China.

To complete the story of the maps accompanying these narratives or those published by the Survey of India or in atlases, it may be added that the British did "alter their usage in the drawing of maps," but for the opposite purpose to that suggested by Mr. Lattimore's "hypothesis." In the Ordnance Survey map of the area, published in 1941 (second edition 1942), being issued for the use of the R.A.F., who would be flying over ranges wide of the passes, the approximate line of the Sino-Indian boundary was printed in red (red being also used for the definite lines of the adjacent Afghan and Russian frontiers) in a series of repeated words—"Indo-Chinese Boundary," "Indo-Chinese Boundary"—along the provisional line of the watershed, so that fliers might be in no doubt that the Taghdumbash Pamir and Sarikol was Chinese territory.

To provide the answer to the third question, the following notes have kindly been supplied. Sir Herbert Todd writes :

When I was Political Agent in Gilgit from 1927 to 1931 I travelled extensively along that frontier from Darkot in the west to the Shimshal in the east, and can assure Mr. Lattimore that there was a well-recognized and respected tongue of Chinese territory protruding south-west from the Taghdumbash Pamir (or Sarikol) to meet the north-eastern tongue of Afghan Wakhan, thus interposing a narrow buffer between British India and Russia; and there was no deep-laid plot to rub it out whilst no one was looking. Surely no Government in the world if contemplating such a plot would have been so naïve as to set about it by putting up private travellers to falsify their illustrative sketch-maps. That is really a most ingenuous suspicion.

I suggest that this "foremost authority on the deep interior of Asia" should consult any English school atlas. The first one I picked up to-day—Bartholomew's, 1947—clearly shows the Afghan and Chinese fingers meeting and dividing British India from Russia.

Hunza claimed definite territorial jurisdiction in the Taghdumbash Pamir and not only grazed their own herds there, but the Mir actually collected a grazing tax from all graziers in that area up to near Tash Kurghan. This was long tolerated by the Chinese Central Government and in fact encouraged, because they claimed suzerainty over Hunza not only in the Taghdumbash but for some distance south of the Kilik. If I remember rightly, the Chinese used, long ago, to send official emissaries to Baltit, the capital of Hunza, to accord recognition of a new Mir. The Mir sent a formal deputation annually to Kashgar with customary tribute of well-recognized *nazar*, and, as Lattimore truly indicates, such presents or tribute were of little value compared with the silks, green tea, etc., which the deputation received from the Chinese Government as *khillat*,

the customary return present given by a sovereign to his loyal subjects throughout Asia on the occasion of the payment of the annual *nazar*.

The position of the Hunzawals was, in fact, like that of so many tribes along the border of India and Afghanistan. An international agreement on a frontier has frequently cut tribal lands in two, with little acceptance or recognition by the tribesmen themselves, who have happily, and often mischievously, accommodated themselves to the benefits of a dual nationality.

The Dogra Maharajahs of Kashmir, of course, always claimed suzerainty over Hunza up to the Karakoram passes; and Hunza, whilst incapable of repudiating it altogether, was wont to play off the one sovereign against the other. The Central Indian Government eventually posted a Political Agent at Gilgit with one purpose, amongst others, of composing these conflicts between the Kashmir rulers and their unruly tributaries; and Hunza became reconciled to the tenuous suzerainty of Kashmir so long as it ran through the Political Agency in Gilgit. Thereafter they paid their annual tribute of a small piece of alluvial gold to the Kashmir Government through the Political Agent at an annual Durbar held at Gilgit. They also received valuable *khillats* in customary acknowledgment of the act of fealty.

It might also be of interest to note that the Hunza tribesmen of the Shimshal valley, a side valley of the Hunza valley, actually exercised cultivating rights in lands lying over the watershed of the Shimshal down in Chinese territory. The Chinese were not so ready to tolerate this and spasmodically detached frontier guards to turn out the Shimshalis just before the harvesting season. I well remember the annual excitement in Baltit as to whether the cultivators would be able to reap their sparse barley crops in time to man-handle them back over the watershed before the Chinese Government could intervene or the winter snows close the passes.

HERBERT TODD.

Colonel E. H. Cobb, O.B.E., formerly Political Agent at Gilgit from 1943 to 1946, adds the following note :

Nowhere did India's and Russia's frontiers meet. And India/Pakistan have inherited that position from us on the transfer of power : the whole of the Gilgit Agency, including Astor, is now under Pakistan's control.

To come to the Hunza-Chinese boundary. The recognized boundary is now the watershed of the Hunza River. At various times the Mirs of Hunza have laid claim to territorial rights in the Taghdumbash Pamir. And as the Sarikolis were Maulais, owing spiritual allegiance to the Agha Khan as did the Mir of Hunza himself, the Mir of Hunza acted as their local spiritual agent.

After the Hunza-Nagir campaign, when the former Mir fled in exile to Chinese Turkestan, the British installed as Mir Muhammad Nazim Khan under the suzerainty of the Kashmir Durbar. The Chinese Turkestan governor sent representatives with presents to the Mir from time to time.

The Mir of Hunza had no difficulty in maintaining his influence over the Sarikolis at the head of the Taghdumbash Pamir, and British influence in Sinkiang was high. Trade via the Kilik or the Mintaka Passes and

from Yarkand to Leh flourished. The Chinese were on friendly terms with the British and the Mir.

In World War I the Gilgit Scouts established a forward temporary post at Payik in the Taghdumbash Pamir, and Colonel Blacker of the Guides skirmished in this area "On secret patrol in High Asia," but British officers were discouraged from inspecting the Hunza Scout post at Payik, and India never laid claim to any territorial rights beyond the Kilik-Mintaka (or Karakoram) watershed.

The Mir of Hunza was, of course, only too anxious for the British to support his claims to grazing rights in the Taghdumbash. With civil war in China, Sinkiang became almost a separate entity divorced from all central control from China. Civil war followed in Kashgar with the Tungan Rebellion in 1932. Russia stepped in; Russian officers advised and controlled the finances of Sinkiang with collective bargainings. The British consular officials became virtually neutral prisoners in the Kashgar Consulate. All the Indian subjects had to renounce Indian nationality or be pushed over the Mintaka Pass as refugees. Posts were built and occupied by mounted constabulary all along the border—at Dafdar, Payik and Mintaka Karaul—with advanced pickets just inside the Chinese boundary, one between Mintaka Karaul and Lurgaz facing the Mintaka Pass and another facing the Kilik Pass and the Wakhjir Pass into Afghanistan. The Mir of Hunza became frightened, having lost his graziers and flocks in the Taghdumbash; there are few grazing grounds in Hunza.

The Mir of Hunza made such a fuss about his loss of alleged grazing rights in the Taghdumbash, and the Hunza population was so thick on the soil in Hunza, that the Mir was placated by an increase in his subsidy and by the granting of a Jagir in Gilgit and Matamdas, where a Hunza colony was established, land allocated and a new irrigation channel developed. The Mir of Hunza openly denounced any connection with the Chinese in Sinkiang; he declared in open Durbar that he had altogether "divorced" Sinkiang.

Meanwhile the Government of India, at the Mir's request, built and occupied a Scouts' post at Kalamdarchi at the point two and a half miles beyond Misgar, and patrolled regularly up to the Kilik and Mintaka Passes. Sir Eric Teichman, adviser to the British Embassy at Chungking, also travelled across from China to Kashgar and on to Gilgit and Delhi, and in 1937 strongly advocated the renunciation of any claim by the Mir of Hunza to rights in the Pamirs. It is at about this time (1935) that Colonel Schomberg made his statement recommending that the Government of India should "buy out" the Mir in some such way as was later followed.

When I reached Gilgit that was the position. The Hunza mail runners were subject to terrible privations, and it was with the greatest difficulty that we could keep the mail going once a week between Misgar and Tashkurghan. They had to take all their food with them and were not allowed to speak to any local inhabitant. But with the pressure on Russia at Leningrad and with the Japanese occupation of the east of China the atmosphere again changed.

All the Russian advisers were withdrawn to Russia from Sinkiang.

Chiang Kai-shek's Kuo Min-tang Party sent Chinese Manchurian officers to garrison Sinkiang. Chinese relations with the British improved. China sent a party of engineers by air to Calcutta from Chungking to explore the possibility of a motor road from India to China via Gilgit and the Mintaka or Kilik Passes, an altogether impracticable project in the circumstances, as it would have been prohibitively expensive.

I was ordered to arrange an international postal service overland from India to China via the Mintaka, and therefore went to Tashkurghan and, with the able assistance of Mr. Gillett, our Consul-General at Kashgar, inaugurated the new overland postal service which came into operation via the Mintaka Pass.

In 1946-47 the political situation changed again. Chiang Kai-shek's Kuo Min-tang Party virtually lost control of Sinkiang. The border posts on the Russo-Sinkiang boundary were attacked from the Russian Pamirs. The Chinese officials from the Taghdumbash posts escaped to Gilgit over the Mintaka and were repatriated to Chungking via Delhi.

Sinkiang was again, to all intents and purposes, behind the Iron Curtain. Then followed the 1947 *coup d'état* in Gilgit when the Hindu officials of the Kashmir Government to whom we had handed over Gilgit were deposed. The Gilgit Agency quietly and naturally slid into Pakistan. The Mir of Hunza has been the guest of the Agha Khan in Bombay and also of the Pakistan Government. The Gilgit Agency is now controlled from Peshawar, not from Srinagar, and the jeep road from Abbottabad to Chilas over the Babusar and on to Gilgit up the Indus valley has been completed.

To return to the Hunza-Sinkiang frontier question. We may definitely say that the Hunza State has acceded to Pakistan and that Pakistan has inherited the British India-Chinese boundary as that existed before the independence of India and Pakistan.

The boundary follows the Kilik-Mintaka-Karakoram line. The Hunza boundary on the north-east is the Shimshal valley watershed. Colonel Schomberg has written of this valley. The Shimshalis are a wild and unsophisticated people and exceedingly poor. There is a route to Yarkand at the top of the Shimshal, and the real limit of the Shimshalis' grazing grounds in the Upper Shimshal was said to be an old *bangot* or primitive stone fortification. There was no regular communication over the Shimshal route at all, and as far as the map was concerned the watershed of the Hunza River system, or Great Divide, was always accepted as the international boundary.

I hope I have made it clear that Pakistan has inherited the *status quo* as actually maintained by us with regard to the Kilik-Mintaka-Karakoram boundary line. The watersheds of river systems and not maps in these almost inaccessible regions are the natural accepted boundaries.

REVIEWS

Afghanistan : Past and Present. By Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler. Oxford University Press. 1950. Pp. xiv + 330. 21s.

Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler has served first as a soldier and later as a district officer on the North-west Frontier of India, and spent a number of years at Kabul—the last six of these as British Minister. These are his most obvious qualifications for writing a book on Afghanistan, but he has others—a deep sympathy with its people (the “grain of love” which Lyautey regarded as essential), an effective literary style, a sense of humour, and an enthusiasm which has survived his own departure from the scene he describes, and impelled him to devote years of study to his subject.

The first sixty pages of his book deal with the geography, early history, and races of Afghanistan, but the general reader, for whom accounts of unfamiliar peoples such as Bactrians, Ephthalites, and Yue-chi tend to be indigestible fare—however delicately served—will find more to hold his attention in the following twelve chapters, which by skilful selection and compression cover the two hundred years from the establishment of his rule as “first King of Afghanistan” by Ahmed Shah Abdali to the transference of power in India in 1947.

Although the story, or most of it, has been told before by various writers, it was well worth retelling in a compact form, and the narrative is saved from being a dry farrago of geography and history—“maps and chaps”—as such summaries tend to be, by the lively comments of the author, who has no hesitation in using the first person when expressing personal views or illustrating points under discussion from his own experience. It is his interpretation of events—his attempt, as he describes it, “to discover not so much what people did as why they did it”—that challenges the reader’s attention.

The third, and last, part of the book summarizes the “lessons of the past” and draws conclusions from them as to the probable course of developments in the “unknown future.” This is obviously difficult and controversial ground, which the author approaches with an appropriate mixture of modesty and courage.

His central theme is the importance of the Hindu Kush as the “ethnic, geographic and economic division between Central and Southern Asia,” and as a “strategic frontier on which a stable Government may rest.” (This theme runs like a refrain throughout the book, Afghanistan being constantly referred to as “the country of the Hindu Kush,” and the Afghan rulers as “the present guardians of the Hindu Kush.”)

Such passages might seem to invite objections of two kinds: first, that a frontier which has in fact been penetrated by such invaders as Alexander, Timur and Babur, and was always liable to be outflanked at Herat, hardly justifies the author’s view of its importance in the past, and, secondly, that no mountain range can adequately protect a country from air attack, still less from the “barbarian’s” latest weapon of ideological warfare. The author meets such objections—though whether he refutes them must be a

matter of opinion—by saying that the Hindu Kush has “served throughout the ages as a breakwater, diverting westwards the flood of the great migrations from further Asia, and protecting the north-western approaches to India. . . . The barrier has not been sufficient to arrest the movements of the great conquerors, but it has protected India from the full force of the invading nomad hordes, and during the periods when India has been strong it has furnished a stable frontier for her Empire.” And again: “No mountain range, save possibly the Pamirs, is able of itself to ensure stability if the power behind it falters.” There seems no reason to criticize the last statement—although the suggested exception of the Pamirs might be queried—but one would like to hear an authoritative military view on this subject. (There is an interesting allusion to it in Lieut.-General Sir Francis Toker’s latest book, *While Memory Serves*, chapter ii.)

On this conception of the cardinal importance of the Hindu Kush line the author bases his appreciation of our Afghan policy in the past, and his estimate of the probable course of future events. So he criticizes the British withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1881 as a “gamble”: “Never perhaps in an issue of such importance did a great nation gamble on so slender a chance . . . we retired from Afghanistan, leaving the vital North-west Frontier of India, the mountains of the Hindu Kush, embedded in the territories of a man of whom we knew nothing.” He admits, however, that this withdrawal did, in the event, solve the “major problem” on hand, although it created a minor one, that of the frontier tribes, “which has defied solution ever since.” Of the Durand Line, which he regards as the obstacle to any satisfactory solution of this problem, he has hard things to say.

In the third part of the book he draws his conclusions from “the lessons of history” and tries to “peer into the unknown future.” The results are certainly interesting and stimulating, though they may startle some readers, and be resented by others. His views as to the “real cause for the termination of the British Empire of India,” or the effects of environment, in which he finds grounds for his “belief that the Hindu civilization is not emerging, as some have thought, from the bondage of British rule into a new and vigorous growth, but is in fact in an advanced stage of disintegration,” or the logic of events which will eventually bring about the “fusion of Afghanistan and Pakistan,” deserve careful reading and cannot be represented fairly in quotations. They will not in all cases, perhaps, be found convincing. It seems unlikely, for instance, that the rulers of the present India would accept an arrangement by which they would “not take part in any further discussions on the future of the north-western frontiers of India, save possibly as financial backers to any scheme of frontier defence intended to safeguard the whole sub-continent,” while one may doubt whether the available evidence really establishes it as a fact that in the policy of the successive conquerors of India “there was the same fundamental feature, that the safety of India depends on the degree of control which the rulers of India can exert on the mountains of the Hindu Kush and the Oxus valley, for only thus can the ‘barbarians’ be kept at arm’s length.” (The picture of the Greek “deputy commissioner” is delightful and would surely have appealed to Kipling!)

Some minor criticisms may be offered. "Central Asia," by the author's definition, lies north of the Hindu Kush, while the greater part of the book deals with developments in the area to the south of that range—*i.e.*, in "Southern Asia." And as the author, it seems, has not travelled north from the Oxus, his account of events in "Central Asia," such as the great Russian advance from the Aral Sea (though illustrated by a most useful map), lacks the freshness and vigour which his personal experience lends to other parts of the book. The three last words of the sub-title seem in fact to be somewhat misleading.

We occasionally read in the press that there is a continuity of purpose governing all Russian foreign policy—whether Tsarist or Soviet—and that access to a warm-water port in Europe or Asia is an objective which has always been deliberately pursued. It would have been interesting to hear the author's views on this subject. He alludes to the lack of such access as an "extraordinary anomaly," but does not mention the point in his discussion of the Gorchakov memorandum of 1864, nor does he refer to Skobelev's remark as to the "tanning of the Asiatic hide."

Other matters on which the author's views would have been welcome are the degree of validity attached by the present Afghan Government to the Treaty of 1921 in their dealings with the Government of Pakistan in frontier affairs, and the possibility that the latter Government's community of religion with these tribes might enable them to achieve results unattainable by their British predecessors. But when so much of interest and value has been compressed into 300-odd pages it is perhaps ungracious to ask for more.

Throughout the book the author, although outspoken, as has been seen, in the expression of his own views, is at pains to state both sides of a case impartially. He is generally sparing in praise or blame of individuals (although in one instance he is clearly over-generous), and is anxious to be fair—even to Lord Auckland! Documentation, conveniently given in footnotes or appendixes, is usually adequate, although one would have been grateful for references to the evidence for the figure of eight million for the population of Afghanistan, and for the statement that in 1921 the country was "teeming with possibilities for . . . the mining expert."

The book, as one would expect, is very well produced. More illustrations would have been welcome, with a photograph of the Hindu Kush range as a frontispiece. There is a beautiful one of the Ashraf valley. There are four very helpful maps, and the index, though not exhaustive, is adequate for practical purposes, as is the bibliography.

Small oriental countries are appearing in the headlines of the world press in unhappy succession. One may hope that the turn of Afghanistan will be long in coming, but if and when it does this book should prove its value to any student of affairs. One reader, at any rate, has already found in it much that he had overlooked or forgotten, and good reasons for reconsidering his previous ideas.

R. R. M.

Palestine under the Mandate, 1920-1948. By A. M. Hyamson. Methuen and Co., Ltd. London. 12s. 6d.

The author, well known as a historian of Palestine and of the Jews in England and elsewhere, was Director of Immigration from 1920 to 1934.

He defines in the preface, and maintains throughout, the difference between a Jew (a member of the Jewish religious community) and a Zionist (a supporter of a political or national organization, who need not be a Jew).

The purpose of the book is to give a brief account of the stewardship of the British civil administration in Palestine from July, 1920, when it took over from the lax form of Ottoman government, till May, 1948, its close. The great advance made in that period, and the impossible task of fulfilling a Mandate drawn up contrary to normal laws of human nature, are fairly and moderately stated and based on historical facts. The view taken all through the book is that the Balfour Declaration laid down that Britain would use her best endeavours to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, with the reservation that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities."

The book is so well balanced, free of bias, and clear in statement of facts, that one hesitates to upset that balance by singling out any special points. For if these facts had been known, many politicians, writers and sentimentalists could have avoided many errors and much bitterness in the past and may avoid them in the future.

A very wide circle to-day should learn and be interested in the facts set out in these chapters. The first three chapters sketch the special interest of many well-known British from Queen Elizabeth's time, when the number of Jews in Palestine was estimated to be about 4,000, till the beginning of this century, including the days of Oliver Cromwell and of Puritanism. At one time Great Britain semi-officially assumed protection of Jews at the Porte.

The chapters on Immigration, citizenship and employment are perhaps of special interest, since the author was the "unduly harassed" Director of Immigration and also, at times, of Labour. His account of the many methods adopted to evade the regulations, such as that of the professional "husband" who brought in wives and their relations one after another, indicates what he was up against.

He illustrates in his final chapter that, whatever mistakes were made, it was the British Administration that brought about developments, in many different spheres, that have not been surpassed in any neighbouring country.

S. F. NEWCOMBE.

A Year amongst the Persians. By E. G. Browne. Third edition, with a foreword by Sir Ellis H. Minns. A. and C. Black. 1950. 30s.

Over sixty years have elapsed since Edward Browne spent his year amongst the Persians. In that space of time many changes have occurred in Persia. Travel has been revolutionized by the introduction of the motor-car and the making of good roads; railways have been constructed and air services put into operation. Many of the towns have been modernized, and, superficially at least, the way of life of the people has undergone much modification. Yet, if one probes beneath the surface, one finds a great deal that is unaltered, particularly as regards the spirit of the country and its inhabitants. This is one of the reasons why *A Year amongst the Persians*, the third edition of which has just appeared, still has a very decided appeal. Travel books are usually soon out of date, but this book is no ordinary record of a journey, as it goes much further and deeper than the mere jotting down of casual impressions and of unimportant data regarding the districts traversed and the places visited. It owes much of its value to the fact that its author was exceptionally well qualified to get to know the people of Persia, through his being able to converse with them

in their own language on a wide variety of subjects. The book is also well worth reading—and re-reading—because of the insight which it gives into Browne's character and of what it reveals of his truly remarkable abilities.

The reviewer, who in much later times came under Browne's spell at Cambridge, has always found in this early work evidence of his great power to interest and to charm.

Sir Ellis Minns, who was for many years one of Browne's colleagues at Pembroke College, Cambridge, says in his brief foreword: "Even now, to speak of Browne to a Persian, to say that I really knew him, is to meet an instant response of wonder and delight." The reviewer has frequently had the same experience in Persia, where the name of Browne is still one to conjure with. The fact that the third volume of his great *Literary History of Persia* has been translated into Persian and has recently been published in Tehran is proof of the great esteem in which that work is held in that country.

The first edition of *A Year amongst the Persians* was published by A. and C. Black in 1893, while the Cambridge University Press produced the second edition late in 1926, only a few months after the author's death. Both editions have for long been out of print, and it is therefore a matter for rejoicing that the original publishers have now brought out the third edition. They have performed their task extremely well; in carrying it out they received valuable aid from the Cambridge University Press, which authorized the photographic reproduction of the text, as well as the use of the blocks for the frontispiece portrait of Browne and the map.

L. L.

A Practical Dictionary of the Persian Language. By Dr. J. A. Boyle. Pp. vi+193. Luzac and Co. 21s.

This very handy little book appears to be the modern successor to Palmer's Dictionary, although it lays no claim to such parentage. The words appear in parallel columns in Arabic characters, in English transcription and in the English translation. This is essentially for everyday use, and translations are as concise as possible. Like Palmer, and unlike Arabic dictionaries, the book reads from its left to its right-hand cover. The type is clear and the transcription normal, except for following the rather disconcerting modern convention of using e for kesra instead of i: this is apt to confuse those who come to Persian from Arabic, as in transcriptions of colloquial Arabic it is usual to use e for the short fatha, but may perhaps be due to the former general use of French as a medium of European studies in Persia.

The purpose of this book is "to provide the means of reading books and newspapers in the modern language," and it should serve that purpose well.

The English-Arabic Cookery Book—Kitāb el Tabakh. Compiled by E. Gertrude Joly. In English and Arabic. Pp. 239. Dar-al-Hayat, Beirut, Lebanon.

A cookery book should be not only a concise reference book of practical details, it should be readable for itself alone. It should switch the mind from uninspired food which, through shortage or convention or lack of imagination, is set before the family, often with monotonous regularity. It should whet the appetite and fill the reader with an urge to find those nuts or spices or herbs which will make all the difference to the day's meals. There is much in *The English-Arabic Cookery Book* which does just these things and which takes the reader in imagination or retrospect to the lands of the Middle East. There is very much more which will be invaluable to the Eastern housewife who may read the recipes in Arabic and who

has been offered a most excellent and representative assortment of dishes in the traditions of Europe and America, as well as those of her own country.

The book gives that great variety of soups, sauces, sweets, breads and cakes known to the West, and it is therefore natural that Western recipes outnumber those of the East. On the other hand, in "Vegetable Dishes with or without Meat," Middle Eastern recipes predominate. One's mouth waters at the memory of chick peas crushed with sesame oil and lemon juice; of pine kernel sauce and of lettuce leaf scoops holding crushed wheat flavoured with parsley, mint and onion. The skill of the Eastern housewife is shown here, and these recipes should be most helpful not only to newcomers to the Middle East, but also to housewives in Britain even if present shortages necessitate modification.

Although this collection represents a tremendous amount of work and patience, one cannot but regret that the author, with her many years' experience and great knowledge of the Middle East, has given us no information about the customs and traditions which are associated with some of the recipes she has collected. It seems a pity, too, when so many excellent recipes are being translated into Arabic for the first time, that the author has not confined herself to using one large spoon only and level measurements and one standard cup only throughout her book—thus introducing to Eastern housewives that precision of method which is being used more and more in Europe and is already soundly and successfully established in America.

Universities and National Life. By S. R. Dongerkerry. Hind Kitabs Ltd., Pp. 115. Rs. 4.8.

These articles, reproduced from sundry Indian journals and periodicals, provide a convenient summary of the Sadler and Radhakrishnan Reports and of President Truman's Commission on Higher Education. The author places value on the Western contribution to contemporary Indian culture and emphasizes the necessity of building up the national character now that independence has been achieved. Unity was the result of foreign pressure, and there is now a danger of the disruption of Bharat into linguistic and other fragments. Mr. Dongerkerry wants a federal or national university for "consolidation of her nationality."

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

Indian Classical Sculpture. By Chintamani Kar. Alec Tiranti, Ltd. 1950. Pp. viii + 38. Illustrations. 6s.

This outline survey of Hindu and Buddhist art from Asoka (third century B.C.) to the Guptas (ninth century A.D.) is a good money's worth. There are eighty-six clear and attractive illustrations, a map showing the main centres, and just the right amount of historical introduction.

India: Our Finest Monument. By General Sir George Barrow, G.C.B. King Bros. and Potts, Ltd., St. Leonards-on-Sea. Pp. 139. 8 $\frac{3}{8}$ " x 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". 16s. net.

Sir George joined an Indian cavalry regiment, the Scinde Horse, in 1886, in those days when the British prestige in India was higher than ever before and the Indian staff corps was the salt of the earth. Life in the Indian cavalry had everything to it that the best type of Englishman could ask for, and with it went a sense of achievement, something India needed and could get in no other way. But the world moved on. The very success of our tutelage inclined our once appreciative protégés to govern themselves. England had many commitments. Mr. Atlee, with the full experience of three years on the Simon Commission, decided the time had come to make a change. Arguments for and against lead nowhere.

It may be that 90 per cent. of India's millions would have been happier under the British. Even that is marginal. When educated India desired, and was fit for, its own government, it was never the way of Anglo-Saxon policy to deny its claim.

General Barrow devotes his first few pages to a quick and effective sketch of the Indian service—its variety, problems and religious dissonance. Moslem, by the way (p. 14), does not mean a righteous man—it means one who has submitted himself to the will of the Deity.

Then follows a very readable hundred pages on the history of India and how the British came to dominate the scene—200 years during which 120 millions increased to 400, and the blessings of sanitation, law and order, irrigation, education and others were brought into being as nowhere else in Asia. The author does not bring out, as Dr. Ahmedpar's writings prove, that Britons finally checked the process of elimination of Hindus by Moslems—by death or conversion. Naturally Moslems regret what they still regard as an interruption of a worthwhile process.

The last twenty pages record with studied moderation what the author clearly regards as a ghastly mistake, a broken contract to the princes and the people, a concession to anarchy, and a breach of trust. History only can decide this issue. One can hardly expect an earlier generation to see eye to eye with such a revolutionary departure from things once so obvious.

There are misprints and evidence that earlier papers from which this volume was compiled have been corrected rather than rewritten. The price, for what is offered, is not cheap. Nevertheless good reading is provided and the all-over picture gives a clear, comprehensive view of India as it was.

G. M. R.

All Through the Gandhian Era. By A. S. Iyengar. Hind Kitabs, Ltd. Pp. x+327. Rs. 8.

A contemporary curse is the good journalist who writes bad, hasty books. A. S. ("Garvin") Iyengar is not only what the blurb calls an "ace journalist" who became Principal Information Officer to the Interim Government of India in 1946, but one of those Indians who write more fluent and more readable English than many English writers. Of Viceroys, he is very just to Wavell, what many would call unfair to Willingdon, and Mountbatten did no wrong. Mountbatten did, however, as Mr. Iyengar records in two places, describe the partition of India as "the most crazy thing from top to bottom." Well, the crazy pavement has been laid.

Happy Toil: Fifty-five Years of Tropical Medicine. By Major-General Sir Leonard Rogers, K.C.S.I., Kt., C.I.E., LL.D., M.D., F.R.C.P., F.R.C.S.Eng., F.R.S. London. Frederick Muller, Ltd. Pp. 371. 18s. net.

Any book from the pen of Sir Leonard Rogers always demands keen interest and respect, and the present volume is no exception. He details the history of his early life and portrays his brilliant and at times chequered career in his early medical studies, and the chapters show clearly his keen interest in his work, his vitality, pertinacity and ability to withstand long hours of study.

He showed signs of interest in research work early in his career, and on joining the Indian Medical Service in 1893 at the age of 25 he was fortunate in being selected, largely on his record, to undertake an investigation into kala-azar in Assam in 1896. Although he was unable then to solve the riddle of this dread disease with a then mortality of up to 94 per cent., his researches provided valuable data and paved the way for the ultimate differentiation of the disease from malaria. Here again the text shows the tenacity of Surgeon-Captain Rogers in his researches, and his powers of travelling long distances by foot in the Assam hills if he felt that by such travel he could advance the elucidation of his problems.

One of the most illuminating narratives in the book is Chapter VII, wherein is related Rogers' brilliant researches into the causation of liver abscess—his discovery that it was associated with amœbic rather than bacillary dysentery, and that the

dysenteric liver abscess was primarily sterile; that his method of hypodermic removal of fluid (aspiration) rather than open operation saved many lives; and that emetine (an alkaloid of ipecacuanha) was far more effective in treatment than the drug itself. The reduction in mortality in the British Army in India was reduced from 92 per cent. in the years 1898-1907 to 23 per cent. in 1908-17 after the publication of his researches in 1906, and eventually to 0.6 per cent. in 1928-37.

Perhaps the most valuable of the author's researches was into the treatment of cholera, mainly in 1906-17, and detailed in Chapter X. This disease had been endemic in India, China, Russia and many other countries for many decades, and in 1905 the mortality in India was 59 per cent. Rogers by his untiring efforts and careful researches had reduced the mortality to 20 per cent. between 1915 and 1919. During the years 1912-21 the average annual mortality in India was 375,000. He had to work on false hypotheses and negative the data and treatment laid down by previous workers, and by his energy and perseverance evolved a course of treatment most of which is still in force. The writer can vouch for the fact that in 1917 every military or station hospital in India, both I.M.S. and R.A.M.C., and probably the civil hospitals also, possessed a box containing "Rogers' Cholera Outfit," with detailed instructions as to treatment and every facility for carrying it out. He spared no efforts until he had evolved efficient treatment applicable to the various stages of the disease, whether it was collapse, reaction with hyperpyrexia, or suppressed renal function.

Besides these researches that have called for special mention by the reviewer, the author investigated, amongst others, the prophylaxis and treatment of leprosy, filariasis, snake venom (1901-03), and the differential diagnosis of dengue from malaria.

There is also an interesting Chapter XIV that involved years of research after Sir Leonard's retirement from the I.M.S. into his study and eventual claim that the principal epidemics of India—plague, smallpox and cholera—could be foreseen through meteorological studies in time to take measures to limit their incidence.

Many honours were bestowed on the author, of special note being a knighthood in 1914, Fellow of the Royal Society in 1916, and a signal honour, a K.C.S.I., in 1932.

There is nothing to criticize in the book—indeed, it would be presumption to do so. The whole volume is very readable and written in an easy flowing style. The text is well printed and on good paper. The author details his achievements and honours in an unostentatious manner, and his graphic accounts of many of his researches, at times thwarted by higher authority, keep the reader's interest and attention. The book is perhaps of special value to the medical man, but it is not too technical to be of great interest to the layman.

There is an appendix giving a bibliography of the author's more important publications with dates; Appendix II with a long list of academic distinctions and honours; also an index.

L. M. R. (M.D.).

This My Voyage: By Tom Longstaff. London. John Murray. Pp. 324. 23 illustrations. 15 maps. 21s.

Before the foreword the author quotes from the hymn to Artemis by Callimachus of Cyrene, the prayer of Artemis to Zeus for an inheritance—"Give me for mine own all mountain lands . . . the high places shall be my home." The foreword begins "Voyaging is Victory said the Arabs." These two motifs dominate the book, for in the course of his voyage, which is happily not yet concluded, Doctor Longstaff has grasped a goodly part of the inheritance for which Artemis prayed and has carried out much exploration, especially in High Asia.

When at the age of fifteen he told his father that mountain travel was his ambition, he was urged to take up a medical career first, and this was to stand him in good stead.

Doctor Longstaff has wisely arranged his fascinating story in topographical rather than chronological order, from the Alps to the Caucasus and in 1905 to the

Central Himalaya. There he and his two Swiss guides, the brothers Brocherel, were the first human beings to look into the Inner Sanctuary of Nanda Devi. In 1907 he was chosen to join the first reconnaissance of Everest—which was intended to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Alpine Club. All arrangements were well in hand, and the auspices favourable, “when the Olympian Lord Morley put down an illiberal foot,” apparently not wishing to awake suspicion in the then Imperial Russian Bear. So the author hurried west to Garhwal and tackled Trisul, second only to Nanda Devi in that group. Rush tactics, involving an ascent of 6,000 feet in one day, with Alexis Brocherel leading for ten hours, were crowned with success, and established, though it was not claimed as such, an altitude record of 23,360 feet.

Doctor Longstaff turns the clock back to 1905 to tell of a thousand-mile walk across the Himalaya which included exploration of the vast mass of Gurla Mandhata, 25,340 feet just south of Lake Mansarowar. Here he and the Brocherels together created another record by avalanching down 3,000 feet in a couple of minutes; miraculously the only damage done consisted of a few cuts and bruises, two broken crampons and lost hats and ice-axes.

In a short chapter on the Everest 1922 Expedition, where he was doctor and naturalist, he describes the mountain as forbidding, “the brutal mass of the all-in wrestler, murderous and threatening.”

Harking back to 1909 he tells the story of his great exploration in the Karakorum, when the main axis of the range was found to be miles further north than the Survey of India had shown, so the then kingdom of Kashmir gained five hundred square miles from Chinese Turkestan.

During the first world war Dr. Longstaff served with the Gilgit Scouts, and this gift from heaven enabled him to see with his own eyes much of the wild region between the Western Himalaya and the Eastern Hindu Kush. Further west still he found other fields of interest in the Canadian Rockies, in Spitzbergen and in Greenland, and his last chapter is a short, vivid survey of the mountains of Britain, concluding with those especially delectable ones in and about Coigach, the extreme north-west corner of Rosshire, that enchanted land where he has “come back to live.”

The fourteen maps drawn by the author's wife are clear and easy to follow and there are many delightful photographs.

H. W. T.

In Seventy Days—The Story of Malaya. By E. M. Glover. Pp. 248, 20 illustrations. Frederick Muller, Ltd. Second Edition, 1949.

The author of this book is a journalist who was in Malaya for some years before the Japanese conquest and who got away from Singapore in the very last stages of the disaster of February, 1942. He thus had excellent opportunities of observing the events leading to the fall of Singapore, and, since the original edition of his book was not published till 1946 and the present edition not till 1949, of achieving an objective judgment based on his personal experiences.

Unfortunately, he fails lamentably to take the opportunity. The book is, one might say, a long string of complaints against the colonial administration. All the tedious, platitudinous, irritating nonsense that journalists wrote from the depths of their ignorance in 1942 appears here again in a book issued in 1949 by a man who cannot plead the excuse of ignorance. For example, the familiar criticism that the colonial administration failed to arm and train the local people for defence is once more brought forward, though the author must be aware of the shortage of weapons which prevailed. He also repeats the familiar stories about excessive drinking on the part of his fellow-countrymen in Malaya, though this has been amply answered by more than one competent authority. It is unnecessary to comment on all the points which the author tries to make: we are all familiar with the sort of thing. The attitude which he adopts may have been understandable, even if not justified, in 1942: then we were suffering under a great strain,

some of us had undergone great hardship, and until we had recovered our sense of perspective some degree of bitterness and a need to find a scapegoat were almost certain to arise. In that time many of us said things, and some of us wrote things, which we would not be anxious to be reminded of now. Mr. Glover, however, seems to write in 1949 in the mood of 1942. It is a pity that before publication he did not study and make use of the various despatches and individual books which since the end of hostilities have shed some light on the situation in Malaya. It is a pity, too, that he did not bear in mind from the beginning of his book a sentence which appears on p. 218: "The Empire had started off on the wrong foot, due to its general unpreparedness, and we would not get into military step until the engines of war were available to keep pace with the march of manpower." Whatever may be thought of the prose style, at least the sentiment is sound. The explanation of our failures in South-east Asia during the war lies not in the action or inaction of local administrations or in the conduct of the European communities in the countries affected, but in the attitude of the Government in the United Kingdom in the years between the two wars, and that attitude in its turn was a reflection, or was intended to be a reflection, of the prevailing sentiment of the people of the United Kingdom.

The book has its interest as an example of the immediate reaction of the individual to the disasters of 1941-2; its interest and value lie in the picture which is given of the writer's own mind; but as a history of the period it is not commendable. The author, too, ought to be aware that Singapore was founded in 1819 and not, as is implied on p. 26, in 1839.

B. R. P.

Pivot of Asia. By Owen Lattimore. Little, Brown and Co. Pp. xiv + 288. Boston. 1950. \$3.50.

This book is indispensable to anyone acquainted with Central Asia who wishes to bring his information up to date. It includes a lucid account of the last ten years in Sinkiang which, being largely based on Chinese sources, describes the policy behind events from an angle that is new and valuable to the Western reader. There is a marked unevenness of writing, since much of the book was contributed by a team under Mr. Lattimore's direction; the parts for which he seems to have been personally responsible are far the most readable.

The picture drawn of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's rule is horrifying, perhaps the more that the authors do not think so. They criticize the British for being "intensely suspicious" of that military dictator during his first period when, under Russian influence, he was issuing Liberal three-year plans and torturing only religious leaders; though they do join to deprecate his second, anti-Russian period when, according to Mr. Lattimore's sources, 80,000 people were imprisoned and the tortures used included skinning alive (p. 78). The team are already highly suspicious of British acumen and motives, so one hesitates in suggesting that to Englishmen who had spent many years in Asia it was, perhaps, "clear" from the start and not only "in retrospect, that Sheng Shih-ts'ai was guided throughout by opportunity rather than by principle." Mr. Lattimore also forgets that British policies in the past could not be uninfluenced by her position then as the leading Muslim power in the world. But he avoids the subject of Islamic influence all through the book.

There is a brilliant analysis of Chinese policy (see especially pp. 88 ff. and 187). There are illuminating passages on the Mongol population, a tiny but neglected minority. There is a most useful chapter on geography and economic development; though someone forgot that fruit is part of the staple diet of the country. The chapter on the Peoples of Sinkiang is not only extremely confused (and in parts scarcely reconcilable with either Chapter I or the scholarly Appendix II), but also it gives a picture of the racial make-up that is in the nature of caricature. The essential homogeneity of the country in culture, language, religion, geography, climate and economic interdependence is ignored and heavy emphasis is laid instead on every local difference of origin or dialect, which are certainly no greater than are to be found in every state represented at U.N.O. One can easily

understand why the Chinese have reverted to the pre-Muslim name of Uighur for those of their subjects that we have been accustomed to call Turki (a name to which they are equally entitled), for the latter name reminds the world that these subjects of China have a unity of cultural history and language with Russian Asia (and to a lesser extent with Turkey). One of the pleasant things in the book is the strong evidence it gives that a large majority of the Uighur/Turkis still desire to maintain the Chinese connection, though naturally standing for reforms that may safeguard them against any repetition of the recent misrule. May this not be because they feel they are better off so than they would be under the pressure of the proletarian régime of the U.S.S.R.? No doubt they should be called Uighur so long as that is their official name. But to extend it to their language (elsewhere described as "Turkic") is an unfortunate piece of pedantry, since it is one and the same language that is spoken in different dialects by Uighurs, Tatars, Kazaks, Turkomans, Uzbeks and Kirghiz, and to call one language by six local names is a mistake. Here the ethnographic researches of the author and his team have made them unconsciously support the deliberate fissiparous policy of the U.S.S.R. and of China. They are helping to emphasize differences where the Kulja group of Turki Nationalists emphasize the endless points of correspondence.

Except for a poor map, the book is admirably produced. But when self-confessed experts write on a country of whose population 90 per cent. speaks Turki, it is irritating that the transcription of Turki names is a complete muddle. Any consistent system would have done. But here the five consonants that in standard English transcription would be transliterated by q, k, kh, ħ and h are hopelessly confused. Neither have the authors followed the permissible simplification of using k for both hard and soft k and h for hard and soft h. If the Russian (?) use of kh for hard k is preferred to the normal English use of q or k, then something else should have been found for the consonant that has nearly the value of the final sound in "loch" for which English writers usually use kh, as in Khoja, Khotan or Shaikh. For instance, on p. 171 the k in Karakash and Komul is hard and should not be written in the same way as Khotan. On p. 192 Kutayba and Khara ought to be spelled alike, again with a hard k. The title Khoja, which is spelled in the normal English way on p. 235 and elsewhere, appears as Hodzha on p. 249, where, on the other hand, Kara is for once spelt in a pronounceable way. On p. 55 and elsewhere Kazak should begin and end with the same letter. When in Kuchar I was told that dropping its final r was a common spelling mistake because neither Chinese nor the goitrous people of neighbouring Aqsu pronounce it. It is dropped throughout this book. On p. 89 the Kulja delegates would look more natural to English eyes were their names written Ahmed Jan, Rahim Jan and Abu'l Khair.

In an appendix on p. 267 there is a "hypothesis" that is being dealt with elsewhere in this journal. That what ought to be a reliable book should be marred in this is unfortunate; especially since Mr. Lattimore and his group had official sources of information at their disposal and were working on grants from the Carnegie Corporation and Columbia University.

The Tibetan Book of the Dead. By Evans-Wentz. Pp. 50 + 248. 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press.

Since time immemorial man has speculated upon death and what lies beyond it, and all the great religions of the world have attempted, each in its own fashion, to enable their followers to meet its terror with the confidence born of knowledge. The Tibetan Book of the Dead therefore takes its place in a series of similar manuals, of which the most famous is perhaps the Egyptian Book of the Dead and the most recent, the *De Arte Moriendi* of medieval Christianity. As its conceptions are foreign to the ordinary Western reader, it is fortunate that it has been edited by Mr. Evans-Wentz, who has not only made a profound study of the doctrines of the Tantra, upon which it is based, but has a gift for their lucid and easy presentation. In this he is ably seconded by Sir John Woodroffe, whose valuable foreword raises many issues in the field of comparative religion.

We have a great change from the earlier Buddhism of the Hinayana, which tells only of a judgment followed immediately by the rebirth of the soul in one of the six states of existence here, once the soul is freed from the body it dwells for a longer or shorter period in the Bardo or Intermediate State, during which it is assailed by the most frightening sounds and sights. If it has the power to remain unaffected by them and realize their unreality it is released from the round of the Sangsara into Nirvana, but otherwise (and this is more usually the case) it falls inevitably into appropriate rebirth. Underlying the whole of this process is a complicated system of demonology, and in order to gain freedom it is presumed that the dying person or his guru has highly developed magical powers. As the ordinary person does not have such powers he naturally in Tibet has recourse to the lama, whose business it is to guide the soul safely upon its unfamiliar path, and so great is the faith of the ordinary Tibetan in his ability to do so that it would take a revolution in thought to break the priesthood's hold upon the country. In fact, Mahayana Buddhism, which had its origins in Kashmir and Bengal, seems to have assimilated many Persian and even Hellenistic influences (there are certain resemblances between this book and the Greater Mysteries), and when it was transplanted to Tibet it incorporated much of the Shamanistic Bön religion which spread throughout Mongolia.

This is therefore a most interesting work to all who study the varieties of the religious instinct in man. But the spirit world to which it transports us, though fascinating to a certain type of mind, is not one to be approached without knowledge and protection, and it is good to see that Mr. Evans-Wentz in his note on p. 187 emphasizes how dangerous the Tibetan lamas consider the practices of modern spiritualism to be.

H. O. C.

Burma. By D. G. E. Hall, M.A., D.Lit., F.R.Hist.S. Hutchinson's University Library. Pp. 184. 1950. 7s. 6d.

This book is a mine of information, and should be most useful as a textbook or book of reference, whether read alone or in conjunction with such classics as *The Silken East*, *Mandalay and Other Cities of Burma*, and *A Burmese Arcady*.

It has a clear map which, however, errs in omitting the N'mai Kha, the eastern of the two rivers which unite to form the Irrawaddy. Fort Hertz should also have been included. It may in the future play the part of Inverness to Myitkyina's Perth, in relation to many of the "highland" tribes on which the efficiency of the Burma Army depends. The map would be improved by shading to differentiate between the hill country and the valley of Burma proper, making it easier for the student to realize that here are mountains comparable in height and extent with the Alps, and having an even greater influence on racial and economic problems.

The book could be improved by a more complete ethnological summary. Kachins, Chins, etc., are dismissed in a few lines, yet they served with great distinction in both world wars, and are quite distinct from the Burmese as regards language, customs and dress. The first Kachin qualified as a hospital nurse in 1912, and Kachin Shan, Keren and Tangthu nurses served with a front-line field ambulance in the Burma retreat. A Yawyin (Lisu) was King's Orderly Officer at Buckingham Palace in 1927 (incidentally he was 6 feet 3 inches in height). Such people are bound to have considerable influence on the future of Burma.

An excellent book, which should find a place on any bookshelf dealing with S.E. Asia.

C. L. DAY (Lt.-Col.).

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR,

ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL.

SIR,

In his review of *Wall Paintings from Ancient Shrines in Central Asia discovered by Sir Aurel Stein* (p. 335 of your July-October issue, Vol. XXXVII, parts III and IV), E. B. H. incorrectly states that "from the earliest times until, and after, the days of Marco Polo trade between China and the West (silk being the chief cargo carried westward) was taken by caravan across the whole latitude of Asia." Just before, he had written that "only in modern times has there been any communication between China and Europe by sea."

Having made a special study of the question, I think I can furnish the following information concerning this point, which may interest readers.

1. With the discovery of the S.W. monsoon in the Indian Ocean (A.D. 50), trade in silk with India was started by Rome, who installed counters in Ceylon and India especially after A.D. 150. The Emperor Marcus Aurelius even sent an embassy to China for this trade in junks from Malabar. Part of the trade in the West went through Syria, goods being landed at Aila (Akaba) and Leuce Homo (el Haura) and taken overland to the reweaving centres on the Phœnician coast.

2. In the third century A.D. the Sassanian Persians forced the Romans out of this profitable commerce, and with the fleets they built in the Persian Gulf took over the silk trade with India. The Syrian centres died out.

3. Byzance succeeded the Sassanians in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the Early Sung dynasty of south China took to the sea, and its silk-carrying junks sailed as far afield as Ceylon and the head of the Persian Gulf (fifth and sixth centuries A.D.).

4. Silk producing had by now been implanted in Constantinople by an artifice of the Emperor Justinian, but a considerable part of it still came from the Orient, as the demand was greater than what could be produced in the Byzantine Empire. The Arabs now appear as the seafaring middlemen, having successfully managed to eliminate Venetian and Genoese competitors. At the time of the T'ang dynasty in China (early ninth century A.D.) the route was by way of Basra, Oman, Kedah, Canton (Khanfu) and Zeitun (Ts'uan Chow).

5. All the Mongols did in the thirteenth century A.D. was to reopen the land routes (please note the plural) which had been closed ever since the eighth and the ninth centuries A.D., first by Tibetan incursions into Central Asia, and next by a revolt in the Che kiang, Fu kien and Kuang tung (reported by Abu Zayed and Mas'udi), in which mulberry trees were cut down and all Western traders expelled.

I am, sir, yours faithfully,

PETER, Prince of Greece.

BET UL FALAJ,
SULTANATE OF MUSCAT AND OMAN.
July 24, 1950.

DEAR SIR,

While fully agreeing with Major Jarvis, in his review of "The Arab of the Desert," that there is no such thing as a dhow on the Arab seas to-day, I would ask for further consideration of the death sentence which his view, "there is no such thing as a dhow and no Arab has ever heard of it," may have passed on a useful if inaccurate word. I am sure that no Arab in the area which Major Jarvis's books have made so familiar to us has heard of a dhow; I know that the word is

untamilar to those ancient pirates, the Ka'ab of Arabistan (Khuzistan), and to other seagoers of the Shatt el Arab, and the doubt always exists strongly that when the word is familiar in other areas it may have been carried there by the English. The case for the prosecution is formidable.

For the defence I would say that the Ka'ab had no need of dhows if, as I propose to submit, they were large war vessels. The Ka'ab, and to some extent the Al Kowasim (Jowasmi) pirates, were operating at comparatively short range off friendly shores; they could cram their jalbuts (does this derive from the English jolley boat or the Portuguese galliot, by the way?) full of well-armed boarders and prize crews, and survive comparative discomfort for a few days or weeks. But the fleets of Muscat and Oman, cruising for months off the Malabar coast or off Portuguese-held Africa, needed a larger vessel, since they were more dependent on boarding than on gunfire in taking a prize, and must have carried their own reinforcements to replace casualties, quite apart from the question of comfort.

I give an extract from Colonel S. B. Miles *Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf*. After listing the types of craft then in construction in Muttrah, the ship-building centre of Muscat, and Sur (I imagine he was writing between 1870 and 1880), he says:

"The largest vessels used in former times were the kalba and dhow, but both vessels are now extinct. The kalba was the earlier type and of peculiar architecture, and was succeeded by the dhow. The dhow had a high stern and poop projecting considerably over the rudder and was frequently of large size; the war or piratical dhow of the nineteenth century carried, it is said, 400 men and forty or fifty guns. The last dhow seen by me in the Gulf belonged to Al Bahrain and was painted with two tiers of ports; the yards of these vessels were called 'formel' by the Arabs, and these dhows in former times were of prodigious length; Welsted measured one 140 feet long."

A Zanzibari I have met in Muscat assures me that he has always understood that the Muscati fleet which defeated the Portuguese and colonized Zanzibar consisted of dhows. He says that the word is of Swahili origin and is now in general use for various types of craft, spelt, using the Arabic script, *dāw* (you will note, not justifying the *h*), and with plural *mādāw*. I know nothing of Swahili and so cannot say whether the formation of a plural is evidence of origin. It certainly is not in Arabic (e.g., Bank—*Bunuk*, and that classic, autobus—*awatobis*). It is certainly a red herring to mention that the Muscatis, at the close of the seventeenth century, about the time they captured Zanzibar, sacked Diu, a Portuguese port on the Indian coast.

For Major Jarvis I have to admit that I have so far failed to find the word in Arabic histories of Oman; Arabs, though, have some reluctance in writing slang or non-Arabic words, unless, as they write (*kuzi*) in Iraq, in brackets. The word is also not now in use in Muscat, and the fact that it strikes a chord may be coincidence. Could not some member of the Society serving in Zanzibar give a verdict?

If, however, we condemn "dhow," what are we to use instead? "Khashaba" appears to be the best word from the Gulf point of view, but familiarizing the English reader with it would take time. Perhaps it is better to leave well alone.

Yours faithfully,
G. C. CAMPBELL.

DEAR SIR,

I am interested to read Major Campbell's explorations into the history of the dhow, and I expected that something might be known of the craft in the Zanzibar region. One gathers from Col. Dickson's book, which I was reviewing, that the dhow is not known in the Persian Gulf. I like the new Arabic plural of the word "autobus"—*awatobis*, which recalls the days of the dog-cart in Egypt and its plural "daggakit."

C. S. JARVIS.

AFGHANISTAN: A STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

By SIR KERR FRASER-TYTLER, K.B.E.

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Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society

VOL. XXXVIII

APRIL—JULY, 1951

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PUBLISHED BY
THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY
2, HINDE STREET, LONDON. W.1

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NOTICE TO MEMBERS

FOR the last few years the journal has carried a notice appealing to members to sign a deed of covenant. We are still only receiving almost £250 in income from this source. Now that members once more are living a more settled life, the Council again appeals for the signature of covenants by those who pay British Income Tax, and would particularly ask that those proposing new candidates for election should point out to them the advantage which will accrue to the Society if they sign such a deed at the time when they take up membership.

DEED OF COVENANT

I
of
hereby covenant with the ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY that for a period of seven years from the date hereof or during my lifetime whichever period shall be the shorter I will pay annually to the said Society such a sum as will after the deduction of Income Tax leave in the hands of the said Society *a net sum of one pound and five shillings* such sum to be paid from my general fund of taxed income so that I shall receive no personal or private benefit in either of the said periods from the said sum or any part thereof.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this

..... day of 19.....

Signed, sealed and delivered by the said

In the presence of.....

Address of Witness to your signature.....

.....

Occupation of Witness

NOTICES

THIS Society has always put first among its aims that it should serve the interests of those at work in the countries of Asia. The Society has unusually wide contacts because over half its members are working abroad. The membership is growing, but the Honorary Secretaries would remind all members that the Council will be very grateful for their co-operation in proposing for election those who can help the Society in maintaining and extending its work. It is hoped that every member will try to bring in at least one new member this year in honour of the Jubilee of the Society, which will celebrate its fiftieth anniversary in October, 1951.

The Annual Dinner of the Society will be held this year on Thursday, October 11, 1951, at Claridge's Hotel, London, W.1. The cost of tickets will be 30s. a head, exclusive of wine but including waiters' tips. Members coming home on leave from abroad who may wish to attend are asked to get into touch with the office for further particulars.

The Council acknowledges with gratitude the following accessions to the library :

Fifty-six books and pamphlets on Central Asian subjects, presented by Colonel R. C. F. Schomberg, including works by Henning Haslund, *Tibetan Readers*, *The Turks of Central Asia*, by Czaplicka, and *Archæological Explorations*, by E. Trinkler.

Also the following :

The English-Arabic Cookery Book, by Mrs. E. G. Joly. Presented by the author.

Bizim Köy, by Mahmut Makal (in Turkish).

The Baha'i Faith, 1844-1950, by Shoghi Effendi.

Three volumes on *Topographical Survey Method*, by Maj.-General H. A. Razmara (Persian text with an English précis). Presented by Dr. M. Hikmet.

Humidity Statistics for N. Persia (Persian text), presented by Dr. M. Hikmet; and a number of pamphlets presented by members, among which may be mentioned in particular :

The *Journal* of the Iran Society, of 42, Connaught Square, W.2, which succeeded the occasional *Proceedings* in 1950.

The *Quarterly Journal of Current Acquisitions* of the Library of Congress, which includes a useful list of recent publications on Asiatic affairs. It is available at a price of 35 cents from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, 25, D.C.

Members and contributors alone are responsible for their statements in the *Journal*.

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN PERSIA

By M. PHILIPS PRICE, M.P.

Report of a lecture given on December 13, 1950, Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: I hope that Mr. Philips Price is duly flattered by the very large audience we have been able to gather together to hear his lecture. He has always been so good in giving the Society his *première* of the many voyages he makes in Persia and adjacent countries, and there is hardly anybody more intimately acquainted with the inside questions of all the Turki-speaking countries of the Middle East and Central Asia. He has been spending some weeks this autumn in the north of Persia and in Kurdistan, both Persian and Iraqi. He hopes now to give us his impressions of this latest visit, and we are particularly glad to have the opportunity of hearing him.

THE grave turn of world events recently is causing us to direct our attention predominantly to the Far East. But at least in Europe, if not in the United States, there is an instinctive feeling that the decisive phase of the cold war with Communism will be centred further to the West, either in Europe or the Middle East, or in both. In this Society we are concerned with everything affecting the life of the people of Central Asia, and we naturally seek information on recent developments here.

When the Communist offensive started in South Korea last June, I, for one, felt that this was only a new phase in the struggle for power between the Russian Communist world and the rest of the United Nations. That struggle might become acute at any point along the many thousands of miles front in Europe or Asia. Russian Communism has inherited the diplomacy and tactics of the old Tsar's empire. These are the tactics of a great land empire radiating its influence from a continental centre outwards to the peripheries. Thus if Russia was blocked during the nineteenth century in her expansion in the Balkans, she withdrew and tried to extend her influence in Persia and Afghanistan. If she was blocked here she slowly crept forward through Manchuria to the Pacific. The Russian General Skobelev, who commanded the Russian armies that annexed Turkestan to the empire in the latter part of the nineteenth century, once said: "The more we engage Great Britain in Central Asia, the more sensitive she becomes about India and the more amenable we shall find her in Europe." If, therefore, the United Nations gets bogged down in Korea, what more favourable opportunity would there be for Russia to make a move either in the Balkans or in the Middle East? It was because I felt this last summer that I planned to visit one of the weak spots in Asia where Russia has in the past and can again at any time press down upon her neighbours. And there are in the Middle East conditions specially favourable to Russian penetration. I decided, therefore, to visit Persia and the Kurdish regions bordering that country and Iraq. I would ask myself the question during my journey, What chance is there of Russia staging another Korea here?

It is necessary before we go any further to examine the nature of the

new challenge from the north that is being made to the old world of the East. I said just now that there are many features of similarity between the Russian imperialism of the Tsar's time and of the Soviet Union today. But there are also differences. Tsarist imperialism was predominately territorial in its expansionist aims. Communist imperialism, on the other hand, is predominantly social and economic in its approach, and aims at the internal disruption of its victim and the imposition of a new form of society with a stereotyped ideology. The unpleasant fact that faces us is that society in many of the countries of the Central Asian plateau that border the Iron Curtain is in process of gradual dissolution. Modern ideas are acting corrosively on the old Asiatic society, with its archaic land systems, peasant poverty and mass illiteracy. Unless the influences from the West are accepted by the leaders of such public opinion as exists among the peoples of Central Asia to guide them into the new era, the motive force for change will become Russian by default. In that case a large part of Asia will pass under Communist and hence Russian control, as it has in China. Fortunately it seems that our wise handling of the situation on the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent has at least prevented this from happening there.

What prospect is there, then, that Persia will survive, keep her independence and pass over into a modern State? That was the question I set myself to answer. I spent eight days in Teheran and saw people from the Prime Minister down to the peasant refugees from Azerbaijan, impoverished by the bad harvest of 1949. I saw also foreign advisers to the Persian Government, Persian administrators and professional men, and finally peasants in their villages. Whenever one visits any Central Asian country between the Bosphorus and the Indus one is struck with the similarity of the social problem that has to be faced in all of them. With the exception of Turkey, where great progress has been made since the Ataturk Revolution, and possibly of Afghanistan, where conditions are very much as they were 100 or 200 years ago, all the rest without exception are socially unbalanced and politically unstable. This applies to all the Arab countries, and especially to Persia. And, moreover, Persia is in a specially dangerous position geographically, for she is right on the frontiers of Russia. In the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan in Eastern Transcaucasus are people of the same race, language and religion as those in a large part of north Persia. What easier task than to stage another Korea here? When I was in Soviet Azerbaijan in 1945 I remember seeing in Baku units of an Azerbaijan national army, recruited from the Caucasian Moslems who had seen service before Stalingrad. That army was being demobilized when I was there, but I expect it would be quite possible to get it into line again for an invasion of north Persia. In Soviet Azerbaijan itself unquestionable social and economic progress is being made. The lot of the common people is better than it was in Tsarist times. Modern agricultural methods, co-operative farms and education are steadily spreading. No one, of course, is free to express his views, and the only form of political activity allowed is that of the Communist party. But, then, people there never have been free and therefore do not miss what they never knew. South of the borders in

Persia are the same people as in Soviet Azerbaijan. They are living in villages whose social structure cannot be very different from that existing in the days of Cyrus and Darius. The whole history of Persia is the history of one tyrant following another on the throne of the Shahs. These tyrants came mostly from the mountain tribes in the north, west and south, who rose to power, founded dynasties, imposed their will on the placid inhabitants of the villages and oasis towns of the Great Central Plateau, became effete, and made way for a new tyrant. But that kind of thing cannot go on in this modern age.

The patience of the Persian peasant is proverbial, but he has a great sense of pride in the ancient culture and history of his country, although he may actually be unable to read or write. The colossus of the North is distrusted and feared, and this has always made the Russians cautious in advancing too far into Persia. But times are changing. Education is slowly spreading, even in Persia, and one can say with confidence now that there are people, especially among the urban intellectuals, who would think that Communism is the only hope, if nothing better turns up. People who think like this are not necessarily Communists at all.

During my time in Teheran I collected material on the land tenure system, the methods of agriculture and the prospects of the Seven Year Plan. I found some Americans and British who had been busy in recent months in collecting statistics with the aid of Persians for the Seven Year Plan organization. According to these investigations, the average peasant income per head throughout all Persia is twenty pounds a year and sixty pounds a year per family. That is before deductions are made for the share of the crop due to the landlord. There are, of course, some peasants who earn more, and some who are virtually destitute whenever the summer rains or the winter snows in the mountains fail. The land system in Persia is based on what is called the Five Units of "land use." Thus the produce of the farm is divided up into five units—

- | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| 1. Land unit | } | goes to landlord for providing land and water. |
| 2. Water unit | | |
| 3. Labour unit | } | goes to the peasant who cultivates and provides livestock and seed. |
| 4. Livestock for cultivation unit | | |
| 5. Seed for planting unit | | |
| unit | | |

On this basis the landlord gets two-fifths of the produce and the peasant three-fifths. But if the peasant is poor and has no resources to fall back on in a bad season, he cannot carry on without borrowing seed and draught oxen. He has to borrow either from the landlord or from the village usurer, and has to accept any terms they offer. Thus a peasant may get only one-fifth of his whole crop—that is, the one-fifth for his labour and nothing else. He may even get less if he has to accept very onerous terms. Of course, the landlord has to provide the water which in the plains of central Persia is brought from the edge of the mountains by "kanats," or underground aqueducts. These may cost a good deal for upkeep and repair. On the other hand, in Azerbaijan and the Caspian

provinces where there is a rainfall, the water unit falls out, and the landlord gets only one-fourth of the produce. Thus in some cases the landlord may not take a very large part of the peasant's produce. In others he may take the lot. He is often a moneylender as well to the peasant with few or no resources, and then he may take up to four-fifths of the total produce. The old type of Persian landlord used to live in his villages and share his peasants' difficulties, helping them in their troubles. I have photographs I took years ago, when I was in Persia before the first World War, of landlords and their families living quite modestly in their villages. But in modern times motor-cars and telephones have virtually done away with this type of landlord, who has become a rarity. Most of them prefer to live in Teheran or Tabriz or Isphahan in nice houses, spend their rents there and pay occasional flying visits to their villages.

Actually, then, it is the indebtedness of the poorer type of peasant, either to his landlord or more often to the village usurer, that is the trouble. And what the Persian peasant needs badly is a system of agricultural credits to lend him money or kind at moderate rates; an agricultural bank, for instance, lending the lower income group among the peasants their seed or draught oxen at reasonable rates, or, where the land is suitable for tractor cultivation, hiring out a tractor.

But the trouble with schemes of this sort in Persia is that no organization exists for cheap credit. Persia is mainly in the stage of the predominance of merchant capital, and the urban middle classes much prefer handling goods that someone else has made, and making a quick turnover at anything from 30 per cent. to 50 per cent. profit, to lending money to a bank at 6 per cent. which will then lend it to the poor peasant at 10 per cent., and help the latter out of his troubles. Moreover, there is no item in the Seven Year Plan providing for cheap credits for Persian peasants. When tractors are imported they go to a few large farmers or landlords on the Mugan steppes or in the Caspian provinces. Instead the first year of the plan, which ran from July, 1949, to July, 1950, provided for 15 per cent. of the money allocated for the year for the purpose of paying off the debts of the old State industries founded by Riza Shah, which through incompetence and corruption had lost most of their capital. Then a sum was allocated to found a Persian company to exploit all the oil regions of Persia that have not been let out to foreign concerns, such as America and Great Britain. This is rather typical of what is going on. The peasants' miserable state is known to all and recognized. But it is so much easier to beat the anti-foreign drum and to finance schemes to eliminate the foreigner than to tackle the problem that really matters in the villages.

Showy schemes of public works are initiated. Thus under the Seven Year Plan the Azerbaijan railway is being extended from Mianeh to Tabriz. Yet in this road age an expensive railway passing through mountains is bound to lose money. But, of course, it has propaganda value, so it is proceeded with. One cannot deny the value of some of these schemes. Irrigation and hydro-electric schemes on the Karun river, clean water for Teheran, are enterprises that are much needed, and these

last two are proceeding, with, of course, the usual interminable delays. Also the spraying of the Caspian Province marshes with D.D.T. against malaria has been a great success, and the funds for all these have been found out of the Seven Year Plan funds. If that goes on year after year malaria will be stamped out of the Caspian provinces.

Yet the fundamental problem of peasant poverty remains and nothing is done in regard to it. Some voluntary effort at reform is going on. In some districts, especially in the Shiraz region, groups of peasants have been formed for joint cultivation of land on a co-operative basis. Also in some districts I heard of demands on landlords for security of tenure of those peasants who had been on their holdings for a certain number of years. Several prominent members of the Government told me that they thought the time had come for a graduated tax on incomes from land ownership. There is no doubt whatever that this is the view of H.M. the Shah and his Government, but their problem is to get this idea accepted by a landlord-ridden Mejlis.

Meanwhile some steps are being taken to improve the present methods of cultivation, and this in time will benefit those peasants who have resources. It will not affect those who have no resources. Thus, I visited the Hyderabad Livestock Improvement Station. Ten years ago it was founded by Riza Shah. It is an enormous place which could easily house 200 cattle. I found there one bull and six cows which had been there for ten years, and had produced about six calves between them. They were distinctly showing signs of wear. I was told that the war had been the cause of all this, but of course the war ended five years ago. I could see that the Persians in charge had the right ideas, and no doubt the trouble lay in Teheran. Some artificial insemination was being done from semen imported from Denmark. Attempts are now being made to cross European bulls with Seistan and Azerbaijan cattle. At a veterinary establishment close by I found things were going well under the direction of French experts. Serum was being prepared for fighting contagious abortion and rinderpest, which had come in from the Afghanistan frontier in recent years. T.T. serum was also being produced. Some rather pathetic attempts were being made to cross merino rams with local sheep to improve the quality of the wool. The merino rams were very inferior types.

I also visited a seed-testing station out towards Kasvin which appeared to be working well, providing improved seed to peasants in the Teheran area. I found the yield of wheat was from 9 to 20 cwt. an acre, which was not bad. But the milk yields of cows averaged no more than 120 gallons per cow per annum.

As regards education, some progress is being made. In the villages round Teheran literacy is 7.5 per cent. Among the adult male population it is 20 per cent., which means that among women literacy is still negligible. And this is an area which is probably more progressive than most. Throughout the whole of the country about 5 per cent. of the population are literate. In Tabriz I spent a day visiting villages and went to two primary schools. Out of a population of 6,000 in one village I found 150 children attending school and 100 adults attending evening classes. These figures are, of

course, very low, but they are at least a beginning. The schools seemed well run and the teachers keen and intelligent. Simple religious instruction is given, based on the Koran, and once a day the children are taken to the mosque for prayer.

The general picture, then, of Persia that one gets today is that progress is being made in some spheres of activity, but that little or nothing is being done to deal with fundamental problems of land tenure and peasant poverty. On the other hand, for the first time I have met members of a Persian Government who have not only talked about getting a move on, but have given the impression that they meant what they said. On the four other occasions that I have been in Persia I have always met ministers who talked pleasantly, but obviously had no intention of doing anything. In this respect the Prime Minister, Mr. Razmara, is a forceful character, an army man with a knowledge of how to get things done, and an agile mind. He comes from humble origin and is not the usual nominee of the hundred families who own Persia. He owes his appointment to the Shah, who is convinced of the need of that type of man for his Government. The Prime Minister has also got round him a number of quite competent young men, some of them from the landed aristocracy who are disillusioned and want to see a change. This, I think, is one of the most hopeful things I saw in Persia.*

The Government is seriously trying to tackle the problem of how to finance the Seven Year Plan. Up to now the oil royalties on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have been used to fill up the annual deficit in the budget. Now the Government have taken the oil royalties to finance the Seven Year Plan. This would mean a gap to be filled, and from talks I had with prominent people I formed the impression that the Government would like to fill it by a graduated tax on landed properties. In order to put the finances of the Seven Year Plan on a firm basis, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have been asked to make certain concessions. A new agreement, most favourable to Persia, has been negotiated with the company which will give the Seven Year Plan an equivalent of £12 million a year and a one-time payment of £26 millions in respect of increased retrospective oil royalties. That agreement has been signed, but has not yet been ratified.

All, therefore, should be plain sailing. But, of course, in Persia nothing ever is. And there in the Mejlis are powerful landed interests entrenched and determined to wreck the career of the Prime Minister, even if in the process they bring Persia down as well. I don't say this is true of all members of the Mejlis, which contains men of great intelligence, and a few even of integrity. But there is also a more sinister element in the Mejlis which is reflected in the National Front Party, led by the Mullah Kashani. There is a religious element about this party which reinforces a bitter xenophobia. It is a Persian form of what in Sunni Arab countries has taken shape in the Moslem Brotherhood. It professes to believe that all Persia's ills are due to foreigners. It is unscrupulous in its methods, and appeals to the demagogues of the local bazaar. It has most of the representation in the Mejlis for Teheran, and

* Written before the assassination of General Razmara.

its main cry is "Throw out the foreigner and take over the oil company." How they would run the great Abadan oil refinery when the British experts were gone, and they with a population which is only 5 per cent. literate, never seems to enter their heads. They are, however, probably the decoy duck put out by the big landlord interests in the Mejlis, who use them against the Government and the Shah. Every proposal put forward by the Prime Minister is denounced as selling out Persia to the foreigner, and so a committee of the Mejlis has, since I left, turned down the new oil agreement which will guarantee finance for the Seven Year Plan for years ahead. The real reason, I think, for this is that the landed interest in the Mejlis want to bring down the Government, which they suspect, with reason, is out to reduce their privileges, and make them contribute to the national revenue. They are prepared to wreck the Seven Year Plan to accomplish this.

That is the situation in Persia today as I see it. It is about as dangerous as could be with Russia watching in the north. If the Razmara Government falls, and one of the old brigade gets back to power, if there should be a hard winter, or an assassination of some important person, followed by riots of destitute peasants, that is just the situation that Russia wants to stage another Korea. Russia does not usually move against a neighbour where conditions are stable. But here is just the situation which she might be able to exploit. But the worst has not happened as yet, and may not. Certainly foreign observers and the Teheran embassies are convinced that Persia has never before had a Government that has shown such ability and determination to institute much-needed reforms. Moreover, owing to the good snowfall in the mountains in the previous winter, there has been plenty of water in the canals and a good harvest. So we must live in hope.

One word about the rest of my journey in Persia. I got permission to enter Persian Azerbaijan and to travel round Lake Urmiah to Rizayeh and then south-east, crossing the Iraq frontier at Khaneh. This is typical Kurdish country to which Russia has been paying particular attention for some time past. The Kurds occupy a stretch of country where the Turkish, Persian and Russian frontiers meet, from Mount Ararat to the head-waters of the Tigris, and then eastwards almost to Kermanshah. All through this country the Kurds are a very important and in some places a dominant element in the population, and thus form an ideal medium for Russian intrigue and propaganda.

When I was in this country during the first World War I remember the Kurds were in loose alliance with the Turks, and the Russians were fighting both, and we were with the Russians. Now, however, the Russians are trying to espouse the Kurds and rouse them against Turkey, Persia and Iraq by promising them an independent Kurdistan.

I kept my eyes open, therefore, to see what, if any, influence Russian propaganda was having. I set out on my journey from Tabriz and rounded Lake Urmiah, passing by Marand, Khoi, Shapur, and reached Rizayeh at nightfall. All along the frontier region conditions seemed quiet. Between Marand and Khoi I passed encampments of the Jelali

Kurds, who were taking up their winter quarters. Farther on, near Shapur, I saw the Shakakh Kurds largely settled in villages, and bringing their produce to the local bazaars.

Thirty-eight years ago I had been in this region as a young man, and I remember the authority of the Shah simply did not run there. The Kurdish Agas, the local Persian landlords and commanders of Russian garrisons that had been posted in this no-man's-land were the sole authority. Things are very different now. There is passport control on all the roads and one meets gendarme patrols from time to time. In Rizayeh, formerly Urmiah, there is a modern town, a Persian Governor, or "Firmandar," and a garrison. The Kurds from the neighbouring hills come in to do their shopping, where formerly they came to raid. There are twenty-one schools in Rizayeh and eighty in the villages, to which some Kurds send their children. I went to a prize-giving at a middle school which might have been at any similar school in Europe. The Kurdish chiefs are made to keep a town house, and to live there so many months in the year. In other words, the writ of the Shah runs in Kurdistan now.

The Persian Government recognizes the Kurdish chiefs and their tribes. They do not try to break up the tribal organization, as the Turks have done across the border. The Turks are strong enough to do that, but the Persians prefer to leave it to a natural development which they think will lead to the gradual political absorption of the Kurds. At the same time, they do not encourage any cultural autonomy among the Kurds as the Russians do. The Kurdish language is not recognized and is not permitted either in the schools or in the law courts. The only country in this part of the Middle East outside the Iron Curtain with a liberal policy towards minorities is Iraq, where the language and customs of the Kurds are respected. This is probably due to the British influence in the time of the Mandate carried on by the Iraq Government.

Yet the Russians seem to think that it is amongst the Persian and Iraq Kurds that they might make headway with their subversive propaganda. For the Russian broadcasts are all in the dialect of that part of Kurdistan spoken along the Persian-Iraq frontier. I heard from some quarters that it was having a little effect, but only among the intellectuals in the Kurdish towns of north Iraq. In Sulaimaniyah, Zorbil, and Kirkuk Kurdish teachers, doctors and journalists think Russia will give them independence after the third World War. There is no evidence that it is having any effect among the Kurdish chiefs, and the trouble last summer among the Javanrudi Kurds was the usual sort of action which the Persian army has periodically to undertake to control the supply of arms getting to this tribe.

I ought to mention the Assyrian Christians, 6,000 of whom have come back, since the first World War, to the region west and south of Lake Urmiah, which was one of their original homes in the early days of the Christian era. They are a remnant of this ancient community, to which a few have been added from a large population which once inhabited the Hakkiari highlands. From inquiries I estimated that they are roughly divided into three equal parts: Catholic Chaldeans, who are allowed by

the Pope to keep their old Syriac script. A Mission of Dutch and French Fathers is still allowed to live in Rizayeh to look after them. About one-third of them are Presbyterians, but the American Mission which looked after them left soon after the first World War. Finally there are about 2,000 followers of the original Nestorian Church of the fourth century A.D., who still carry on in the old churches. The one in Rizayeh was in good order and had been restored. It is a very interesting place, and may be over a thousand years old, with a tomb which is said to be that of one of the three Magi. There are, however, only three priests in the whole of this region and there is no one to consecrate more, as the bishop lives far away in Iraq. Masses appear to be said only during the winter, for in the summer the three priests are generally working out in the fields.

In general one may say that although the Persian, Turkish and Iraq Governments have the situation in Kurdistan well in hand, one must expect Russian propaganda and intrigue in this region to go on, and attempts to be made all the time to prise open a weak spot in the Middle East, and so assist the spread of Communism. The lesson in Kurdistan is the same as in the rest of Persia, that if Communism is to be halted, popular discontent must be met halfway. Material progress to raise the standard of living of the people, the elimination of social injustices, and of the gulf between rich and poor, is the fundamental task in Persia and in Kurdistan, and one of the guarantees against the spread of Communism. The Western nations are vitally interested in the peaceful development of Persia, for on the Persian gulf lie the great oil reserves, which are of such importance to world economy. Whatever happens, no Korea must be allowed to happen there. But there is the difficult question of the maintenance of the integrity and independence of this ancient kingdom of Persia, with its old civilization and culture, which we must try to help to pass over to the modern world and escape being absorbed into the great cauldron of Communism.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to ask Mr. Philips Price to tell you what he told me during luncheon in regard to his return through Turkey. I feel sure others would like to hear what he gathered in his brief passage through that country.

Mr. PHILIPS PRICE: I was not in Turkey for very long, because I was recalled to my duties in the House of Commons by the Government Whip and I had to put off an interview with the President of the Turkish Republic in consequence. When I reached England I was not wanted for a division after all, and naturally I felt somewhat annoyed.

Turkey, of course, is a great bastion of stability and common sense in the Middle East. There is no question about that. The Turks may not be great thinkers, but they are great doers; there is no country which has passed through a revolution which, in some ways, is not unlike the Russian Revolution, and at the same time has passed out of it again and been through a dictatorship and a one-party system, and has passed out into the system of free discussion and free contest between two parties. I found that the Turks were feeling very proud that they had shown at their last General Election that they were really a very democratic country. Even the defeated Popular Party of Ismet Inonu, which was feeling rather sore at

its defeat, was very proud that, although it had been defeated, it had by its action in going out so quietly and becoming the Opposition in Parliament proved to the world that Turkey was really a democratic country. There is a certain amount of bitterness between the parties, accusing each other of many things, but that is, I think, a passing phase.

Of course, Turkey has much the same sort of problem as there is in Persia as regards economic development, but Turkey has no great landed estates and no very poor peasants. There is no great difference between rich and poor, but the Government have the problem of raising the standard of living of the Turkish peasant and his level of agriculture, which is very primitive, in the same way as all Middle Eastern countries have. Turkey is less handicapped by an archaic land system than Persia is and much more ready to go ahead; steady progress is being made. I found when I was in Turkey earlier that half the national income was being spent on the army, but now I find they are not spending nearly so much, the reason being that, thanks to American aid, the building of roads, improvement of ports, and the mechanization of the Turkish army, they need not keep so many men under arms. That is a great advantage to the economy of the country. There is real improvement going on. Marshall Aid has been very helpful also. The Turks, like the Persians and the Arabs, are inclined to spend the money on rather showy schemes which do not bring an adequate return: building large houses and so on. Up to a point, it is necessary for propaganda reasons. Probably one of the reasons why the Popular Party was defeated is that they went too far that way, and the present Government is trying to invest what they have from Marshall Aid in rather better schemes, so they say. That is the idea. In general, I had a very good impression of Turkey.

The CHAIRMAN: The time has come when I must close the meeting. I can only tell Mr. Philips Price how intensely we have all appreciated what he has told us about the situation in this perhaps now the most crucial part of the world, where so much may hang on what is happening in Persia in the near future. He has given us an illuminating idea of the general trend of thought in that country, and we have an opportunity now of seeing what the risks and dangers and the hopes may be there. So we can only thank you very much, Mr. Philips Price, for letting us have so immediately after your return to England the value of your experience, and we want you to realize how very much we have appreciated it. (Applause.)

THE STATE OF TIBET

By H. E. RICHARDSON, C.I.E., O.B.E.

Luncheon lecture given on March 15, 1951, Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: It is most fortunate that this meeting has been confined exclusively to members of the Society, otherwise we should not have had sufficient room. Mr. Richardson was educated in Scotland and at Oxford University, and entered the Indian Civil Service in 1930, transferring to the Foreign and Political side of the Government of India service in 1934.

After working in Bengal and then Baluchistan, Mr. Richardson became British Trade Agent at Gyantse, and went to Lhasa as officer in charge of the British Mission there from 1936 to 1940. After a short spell on the North-west Frontier of India, Mr. Richardson was sent as First Secretary to the Indian Agency-General at Chunking from 1942 to 1943. He became Deputy Secretary to the Government of India for the External Affairs department in 1944.

In 1946 Mr. Richardson returned again as head of the British Mission to Lhasa, and was asked by the Government of India to stay on in that capacity in their service after the transfer of power in 1947. He returned to England a few weeks ago on the termination of this appointment. There is no one who can speak with the same authority on the subject of the present critical position in Tibet. Indeed, it might be said that Mr. Richardson knows more about Tibet than any European ever will know again. He comes to us really fresh from the Tibetan uplands. We have a great opportunity of learning from him here this afternoon, and we are all looking forward to hearing what he has to tell us about a country where so many stirring events are happening at this particular time.

IT is a great honour to address the members of a Society with so much experience of Asian affairs. An examination of Tibetan political affairs from a Western standpoint is bound to concentrate on the shortcomings of the Tibetan system and to omit the spiritual and material excellences which are quite un-Western. I like the Tibetans and their way of life and have no desire to go on record only as a critic, but there will be no time this evening for me to pursue their elusive charm into the fringes of metaphysics.

The Society heard less than a year ago from Mr. Hopkinson, formerly Political Officer in Sikkim, an account of the relations between Tibet and China, and I am going to assume that you are all aware that since 1912 Tibet has enjoyed complete *de facto* independence, and also that you know that the frontier between Tibet and China runs approximately along the upper waters of the Yangtze and not, as Chinese maps have it, about 100 miles to the east of Lhasa.

Before considering the latest turn of events in Tibet it might be useful to consider, briefly, the nature of the Tibetan Government which has got to face this very serious crisis. The organization has changed hardly at all since the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the rule of the Dalai Lamas was established in its present form. At that time the system embodied social and constitutional ideas going back still farther into the dim beginnings of Tibetan history in about the eighth century. It is

not possible to draw an exact parallel with English history though, roughly, one may compare the Tibetan social system as it is today with England in the fourteenth century.

The Dalai Lama is, of course, absolute ruler in all things spiritual as well as temporal. All kinds of unimportant details are referred to him for a decision, and if he is a strong man not one of his officials will dare to initiate any action or even volunteer advice. The executive that carries out the Dalai Lama's orders includes monks and the lay nobility who hold land in return for which they are bound to render service to the Government. Not part of the executive Government, but exercising a very great influence upon it, are the monasteries headed by the three great pillars of the State, Drepung, Sera and Ganden, all near Lhasa and containing between them about 20,000 monks. These overgrown institutions were originally the support of the Dalai Lama against other sects, but now they have become something of a Frankenstein, because they are fanatically conservative, and it is fear of reaction on their part, which might throw the whole of Tibet into confusion, that acts as a deadweight against the introduction of any new ideas into the country.

The whole of this superstructure—the Dalai Lama, the officials, nobles and monasteries—rests on a feudal society. The land is all parcelled out into estates which are held complete with their cultivators, who have to till the land in return for food and clothing provided by the overlord, and the monasteries are the biggest overlords of all; they hold by far the biggest share of the land. There are a few persons who hold directly under the Government, but, in general, the whole of the population is bound to the land.

I do not propose to judge that system on moral grounds. It has worked for centuries and has not produced any extreme hardship. The land produces more than enough food and clothing and the Tibetan is naturally cheerful and easy-going; he is physically strong and resilient. His standard of living is probably higher than that of the Indian villager, and there is certainly no envy of the Indian way of life on the part of any ordinary Tibetans who have been down to India and seen it for themselves.

The Tibetan peasant is accustomed to taking orders all his life, but this has not crushed his self-respect. Still, the chief factor in his acceptance of his lot is, of course, religion: he feels that by taking his humble place in society he is furthering the ends of Pagpa Chenrezi, as he calls the Dalai Lama.

A system such as I have described could only hope to survive for very long in isolation; and Tibet, in addition to geographical isolation, has been isolated by the continuing internal weakness of Chinese Governments in the past. The link with the Ch'ing emperors was comparatively light, and was endured quite readily because the emperor was a semi-divine figure and a protector of the faith. After 1912, when the Chinese emperor and the influence of Buddhism were swept away by the Revolution and a Government without any particular regard for religion came into existence, feeling became a little more bitter on the subject, but over against that the Tibetans had the advantage that in any trouble that arose

with China they could now rely on the diplomatic intervention of the British Government in accordance with the agreement between the United Kingdom and Tibet which was the outcome of the conference at Simla in 1914.

In their very lengthy survival the Tibetans see justification of their belief in their Government, which is a government through and for religion, and since no other country has a government or religion like theirs this strengthens the inclination of the Tibetans to avoid close contacts with other countries. This is not a conscious political device; it is not a deliberate attempt to use religion as an opiate for the masses. It may be superstition, but it is certainly not hypocrisy, because all Tibetans, high and low, have a really deep devotion to their religion. Nevertheless, there have been from time to time Tibetans who have realized that a political system of that sort could not go on indefinitely; so far they have not been able to do anything about it, because the only way to break the circle would be to break the power of the monasteries, and, apart from foreign intervention, the only way of doing that would be the emergence of an almost miraculously strong and resolute Dalai Lama.

The thirteenth Dalai Lama did try to bring some modern ideas into his administration, in which measures he had the advice and the friendship of the late Sir Charles Bell and the assistance of the British Government and the Government of India. But the monks were too much for him, and in the long run his reforms only intensified their resistance and their suspicion of the executive. When the thirteenth Dalai Lama died, in 1935, there came one of those minorities that are an inherent weakness in the system of rule by Dalai Lamas, and during that period no strong man emerged with the desire or the courage to make innovations. The Tibetan Government during this minority had to bring their country through the troublesome and difficult period of the last world war, and they did this without making any very great changes. In fact, their sole concern was to hand over Tibet to a new Dalai Lama in exactly the same condition as they had received it from the late Dalai Lama. There were a few changes. They acquired a little knowledge about ways of dealing with other countries, and the exchange of politenesses, even with the United States Government, which seemed a long way away. A good deal of money flowed into Tibet during the war years, but it fell into individual hands and did not do any good to the country. But the changes were entirely superficial, and the Tibetans' basic ideas were not altered by the last war.

Therefore, when the Tibetans saw the rise of Communist power in China, its sweep through that country, and the rapid collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's régime, they were filled with concern and bestirred themselves to protect their way of life. They acquired some arms and they also considered some social improvement was necessary, so they abolished forced labour, which had been a heavy burden on the peasants for many centuries. In addition, they took the opportunity in the summer of 1949 to evict the Chinese Nationalist Government mission from Lhasa; that mission was not in any way concerned with the Government of Tibet; it had quasi-diplomatic status. The Tibetan Government packed them

all up and sent them politely out of the country, for the very sensible reason that they feared some of the members of the mission would transfer their allegiance to the Communists.

At this time, in all their difficulties the Tibetan Government knew perfectly well that the only country to which they could look for practical support was India. They had sent missions to the United States and to the United Kingdom a little earlier, and those missions had seen that there was nothing to be expected but kind words and expressions of friendship. Like other people, the Tibetans pinned great hopes on the Moslem governors of Chinghai and Kansu to put up resistance to the Communist advance, and when the whole of China's north-west collapsed almost overnight and when the Communists began to announce that Tibet was next for "liberation," there was something very like panic in Lhasa. I believe that if the Chinese had managed to push even the smallest force up to Jyekundo, on the border between Chinghai and Tibet, in the winter of 1949, Lhasa might have collapsed at the sound of the trumpets. But nothing happened and the Tibetans began to recover heart. They were offended and their resistance was stiffened by the creation by the Chinese of a "Provisional Government of Tibet," which they established just over the border in China.

The Tibetans set about recruiting what was for them a very large number of troops, and they set up a new office which was to collect food and supplies, and transport them to the armies in the east. They also decided to send missions abroad to plead their cause in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, India, Nepal and China. It was not clear what they wanted. They may have wanted arms. They certainly wanted sympathy, and it may have occurred to them at last that if they hoped to stress their independence they must do something about it. However, the whole plan was made in alarm; it was hurried and badly thought out, and the despatch of the missions was announced before the Governments in question had agreed to receive them. At this time the Chinese propaganda machine had been grinding out a lot of accusations against the United States and the United Kingdom, charging them with imperialist designs on Tibet. Whether or not that affected the decision I do not know, but, at all events, the United States of America and the United Kingdom replied to the Tibetan Government that that was not a suitable moment for receiving such a mission. That, of course, disappointed the Tibetan Government a good deal and they turned all their attention to an attempt to get some kind of peaceful settlement with China. They had probably already some contact with the Communist authorities in Jyekundo, and early in the spring of 1950 a curious unofficial Communist delegation reached Lhasa from Jyekundo. They were not very well indoctrinated, because they began by saying that the new Government in China was very kind-hearted and would let the Tibetans manage their own affairs. When a shrewd Tibetan said that events in China seemed to prove that the Government there had other ideas, the blunt men of Chinghai replied: "Oh, yes, that is what we always have to say at the start; Communism will come a little later."

Nevertheless, in spite of this warning the Tibetan Government con-

tinued their attempts to negotiate, and they wanted to send a mission to discuss matters, at Hong Kong, with Chinese Communist officials. You may have read of accusations in the press that the British Government and the Government of India prevented the Tibetans from making contact with the Chinese Communists. That is a long story, and I cannot go into the details of it now. The trouble was probably due mostly to Tibetan political inexperience and lack of appreciation on their part of the difficulties facing other governments. In spite of the delay in being able to begin negotiations, the Tibetan Government were surprisingly optimistic of a settlement during the summer of 1950, and they did not take alarm when there was a frontier fight in July, when they lost two Indian wireless operators. It seems that they still had hopes of a kind of local settlement on that border and they did not believe reports which were circulated that the Chinese were massing men on the borders of Tibet. The blow fell in the beginning of August, when Liu Po-Cheng announced that the invasion of Tibet was imminent. The Tibetans at once appealed to their one good friend, the Government of India, and the latter made representations in Peking. After some delay they received what appeared to be a very favourable answer. Mr. Chou En-lai said it was the intention of the Chinese Government to settle their differences with Tibet by peaceful means, and he also agreed that the Tibetans might negotiate with the new Chinese Ambassador who had just been appointed to India. So that Tibetan fears again settled down for a while. They went on with their training and collection of supplies, but there was nothing of the urgency that one would expect in a country threatened by invasion.

At the end of September, 1950, I left Lhasa. That was the season of the annual parties that are held there; everybody was taking it easy, and they had their eyes only on the course of negotiations which had just begun between their representatives and the new Chinese Ambassador. At all events, no one was prepared—apparently not even the Chinese Ambassador in India—for the invasion of Tibet by Chinese troops about October 7, 1950. This information took rather a long time to find its way through to India, and when it did it was turned into the most alarmist reports; indeed, the press had stories of the capture of place after place in Tibet, culminating in the taking of Lhasa within a few weeks of the original invasion. Almost all of this was entirely untrue. What actually happened was that Chamdo, the capital of eastern Tibet, was taken by a Chinese force which was not, apparently, very large; and a little later a small Chinese force found its way to Gartok, the capital of west Tibet, probably from Khotan. The exaggerations may have been based on Peking radio broadcasts, and they may have been intended to test Indian and other reactions. If that is so, Peking may have been surprised by the strength of Indian condemnation of their action. The Government of India protested strongly, but did not get much verbal satisfaction; they were kept waiting, and insult was added to injury by accusations that India was indulging in imperialist intrigue in Tibet. The Indian press, which had hitherto taken little interest in Tibet, now realized the value of a policy which had preserved for many years over 1,000 miles of frontier

in complete peace at negligible expense. But probably the greatest blow to Indian opinion was the breach of faith on the part of the Chinese, who had promised the Government of India to seek a peaceful settlement with Tibet and then had almost immediately launched an invasion.

In Lhasa the news brought near-panic, and it may be that at that time the monasteries saved the situation. Whatever one may say about them as ultra-conservatives, the monks are certainly full of spirit. They said the Dalai Lama should not leave Lhasa and that they would fight for him to the last man, and they meant it, however unpracticable that might seem. So the Tibetan Government remained in Lhasa, and as a measure to improve matters they arranged that the old and rather unpopular Regent should retire and that ruling power should be given to the Dalai Lama. He is a boy, still under sixteen, an exceptional child both intellectually and in his conscientiousness and public spirit, but to put such a burden on him at such a moment was asking too much. In any case, it was eventually decided that the Government should leave Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama left on December 19, 1950, with almost all his high officials. This time there was no opposition from the monks. So at present the Tibetan Government, the Dalai Lama and the majority of his officials are staying in the Chumbi valley, near the Indian border. There are two Chief Ministers in Lhasa who are carrying out the routine administration. The Government of India's mission in Tibet is still in Lhasa. The Tibetan troops are stationed between Lharugo and Giamda. The monasteries are carrying on as before; trade with India is going on very actively, and the price of wool is higher than ever.

On the Chinese side there has been no advance from Chamdo and Gartok. I understand that the Chinese have reduced their troops in Tibet to a mere handful, and they are administering the east and west districts through captured high officials of the Tibetan Government.

One of the latest pieces of information I saw in the press was a report of the failure of negotiations between the Tibetan representatives and the Chinese Ambassador in India. But almost at once that was followed by a report of very friendly and peaceful offers made by local Chinese officials in east Tibet in which they promised to preserve the position of the Dalai Lama, to respect freedom of belief, and to maintain monastic property untouched.

Throughout the whole of this business there has been such a variety of action and approach by the Chinese Communists that one may wonder whether they have a plan or whether they are acting as opportunists and following whatever line appears promising. I would like to note what they have done recently. They announced that they would liberate Tibet by force, and then they almost at once agreed to a peaceful settlement. That, in turn, was followed almost at once by invasion. The invasion was successful, but it was not pressed. Not very long before that, they had set up a provisional government under supporters of the boy whom they have put forward as the new Panchen Lama, but since they entered Tibet that provisional government has been ignored. Formerly they made numerous broadcast attacks on landlords and monasteries. The latest report is that their offers to these classes were extremely conciliatory. The

only point on which the Chinese Communists have been completely consistent is their attack on the United States of America and the United Kingdom, and their claim that, in whatever they are doing in Tibet, their object is to save Tibet from the imperialistic designs of those two Governments.

Is it possible to believe that the present peaceful offers are more reliable than those obviously false charges which are uttered with the same breath? The Chinese must know now quite well what the position in Tibet is and the quantity and quality of the opposition likely to be put up. They must also know that the departure of the Dalai Lama from Lhasa is likely to have weakened morale and cohesion; and they have also seen that the only country to support the Tibetan appeal to the United Nations was El Salvador. It is possible the Chinese are waiting for warmer weather before lengthening their lines of communication even against such opposition as they expect—and there may yet be a sting in Tibet's tail. It is possible they are still waiting to learn more about India's intentions; and it may be that their accusations against the United States and the United Kingdom are merely intended as a hint that if those countries do not intervene in Tibet, the Chinese may not find it necessary to occupy the country. Whatever may be the reason, the immediate signs are that the Chinese want a peaceful arrangement in Tibet. It is possible to think of many explanations for that. There are the administrative problems in China itself, owing to lack of officials, and there are reports of agrarian unrest there. There are also Chinese military commitments and their relations with Russia, especially in Manchuria and Sinkiang; but these are matters for China experts, and I should like to mention only a few special or mainly Tibetan considerations which might incline the Communists to prefer at a start to follow the old policy of the Chinese Empire and to try to dominate Tibet through a Tibetan Government on traditional lines rather than to try to occupy the country and set up a Communist régime.

First, Tibet's resources are very little known; there is certainly no obvious wealth there, and communications are primitive and difficult, so that I am doubtful whether Tibet would be of great material or strategic value to China—by itself, I mean—without very great expense. Secondly, military occupation could only mean occupation of strategic centres, outside which in the great expanses and thinly scattered population there could remain pockets of opposition which might develop into dangerous resistance. In the third place, the Chinese must know that they are unlikely to get hold of the Dalai Lama without a peaceful settlement. Formerly the Panchen Lama was very useful to the Chinese as a pawn and excuse for interfering in Tibet, but on the Tibetan mind his hold was quite different. The ordinary Tibetan was worried by the absence of the Panchen Lama, because he is one of the chief jewels of the faith who ought not to remain out of the country. So, if a puppet government were to be set up in Tibet under the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama were to go into exile the position would be reversed and very much to the disadvantage of the Chinese. In the fourth place, it might suit the Chinese Government for a time to maintain a government in Tibet which

could maintain the relations with India. A complete occupation of Tibet by the Chinese would mean complete closing of the frontier with India so far as that is possible, and this would cause economic unrest in Tibet and start off a new régime in an atmosphere of discontent. Tibet's biggest trade is wool. The Chinese might want wool, but it is doubtful whether they could take it to China and pay for it at anything like the high prices ruling now in India. Perhaps also they would even prefer to have the foreign exchange which those wool exports bring in. They might, therefore, want to start with remote control rather than direct rule, in order to preserve contact between Tibet and India.

Of course these speculations may be upset at any moment by some new action on the part of the Chinese, but whatever form of government does emerge in Tibet I think it must be clear that the present feudal system is near the end. So many advantages to Tibet could follow from that change that it is sad that it appears it must come about through Communists. The Tibetans themselves under a strong and tactful ruler could have done a good deal to improve the system without a direct attack on monastic power, but it must be admitted that beneficial changes would be very much easier with removal of monastic opposition. And despite current Chinese promises it seems certain that they will curtail, if not abolish when they get the chance, the monastic estates which maintain, perhaps, 300,000 sturdy men in idleness. If the numerical strength of the monasteries could be reduced, that would break their stranglehold on the executive, and it would also free a large number of men for work and for breeding, and it would allow the executive to make improvements without hindrance. With a careful choice of innovations and improvements suitable to an agricultural and pastoral people Tibet could support a much higher population with a higher standard of living. If the monasteries could be curbed, without being abolished, religion could still remain as the master idea to unite the Tibetans as a distinct people.

But I am afraid it is no use looking for a Utopia. However, the Chinese have had to allow a great variety in administration even in their own country, and perhaps the changes that will come to Tibet may be gradual and they may occur without destroying the Tibetan national spirit. In fact, there are some changes which might even strengthen that spirit. Of all countries India will watch with particular anxiety to see what emerges from the old easy-going obscurantist, feudal, priest-ridden Tibet. We may all hope that it is to be a Tibet with its distinctive religion, thought, habits and cheerfulness, and with Tibetan aspirations.

The CHAIRMAN: I have no status so far as this Tibetan question is concerned, but I have the distinction of being one of the few here to have been presented to the Dalai Lama. It was at Christmas, 1905, when the late Dalai Lama came down to see Lord Curzon in Calcutta, and I was serving in the flagship there at the time. The Dalai Lama came aboard my ship.

Group-Captain H. ST. C. SMALLWOOD: Does the lecturer visualize certain steps being taken in Tibet to destroy the religious authority of the Dalai Lama in exactly the same way as the living Buddha, the Bogdo Gegen,

in Outer Mongolia (which one might call a sister country) was destroyed? The Russians went there and succeeded in completely eliminating the succession of the living Buddha; also there was prevention of any strong religious feeling. The Court of Lamas was abolished by the Russians. It seems the Chinese, who are themselves such apt pupils of the Russians, might easily try to get control of Tibet by eliminating the religious side by preventing the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama.

Mr. RICHARDSON: Tibetans all know what has happened in Mongolia. Extinction of religion might be necessary for the Chinese, if they want to dominate Tibet with their own form of régime. But I hope that the Chinese may not be such apt pupils of the Russians in all things. That is a matter for the experts on China. In the meantime, I do not think the Chinese could undertake the wholesale extermination of religion at present. I believe that in Mongolia it took a matter of five years to accomplish that.

Mr. O. WHITE: How does the Panchen Lama come to be in China? Was there any attempt on his part to usurp the powers of the Dalai Lama before he took to flight?

Mr. RICHARDSON: The boy whom the Chinese now call the Panchen Lama is a child of twelve and is alleged to be the reincarnation of his predecessor, who fell out with the late Dalai Lama about 1922 and fled from Tibet. It was impossible to get a settlement of that question. The supporters of the late Panchen Lama stayed in exile in China and have always been a possible source of trouble to Tibet. The Tibetans themselves have not accepted this boy, although he is, in their view, probably the best of the candidates.

Mr. M. L. CONNOR: Have aircraft been used in Tibet or is there a possibility of their use there?

Mr. RICHARDSON: The only aircraft I know of which went near the centre of Tibet was an American bomber which lost its way and crashed in the Brahmaputra valley during the war.

Mr. CONNOR: Is it possible to have air bases in Tibet? If the Communist aggression against Tibet were Russian-inspired, could the Russians use Tibet as an air base in the possible event of aggression against India?

Mr. RICHARDSON: In the first place, I do not know whether anybody knows that the Communist aggression was inspired by Russia; in the second place, I do not know whether the Chinese want the Russians in Tibet. Thirdly, I do not think there is any immediate fear of an invasion of India. If the Russians want Asian air bases I should think they have all they need in Sinkiang.

Mr. A. H. BYRT: A few years ago, I remember, it was desired to get back into India a British official who was ill at Lhasa, and the question arose whether an aeroplane could be sent in to fly him out. The air authorities replied that it would be possible to get an aeroplane into and down in Tibet, but at that altitude it could not take off from the ground again.

Mr. RICHARDSON: That was in 1935, and it concerned the late Mr. Williamson, who died at Lhasa. In these days a plane could perhaps take off by the aid of rockets, if necessary; but it has to be remembered

that there is no oil in Tibet, and it would be necessary for the plane to carry all the fuel it needed for the return journey.

Mr. C. W. LANGE: Some time ago there was a very powerful official in the Tibetan Government, but he was an official who also had a certain Western outlook. I refer to Tsarong Shappe. Is he still in Lhasa? Is he still concerned with the government or is he relegated to the back-ground?

Mr. RICHARDSON: He is still in Lhasa. He is a man of strong character and was for some time a powerful official; he had his period of greatness. He was commander-in-chief of the army and a cabinet minister. He took part in the reforms of the late Dalai Lama, but when the reforms failed he lost most of his influence. For that reason he lost interest in politics and took more interest in business. He is still alive, and was in Lhasa when I left. He still works for the Government, but seems to have no desire to take the lead in political affairs.

Mr. J. C. BOWEN: I would like to ask Mr. Richardson if he could tell us what the attitude of India would be supposing Chinese troops were to occupy Tibet and then claim the boundary which China has always claimed, and has never given up? That boundary goes down into the lower valley of the Brahmaputra.

Mr. RICHARDSON: I gather from public statements of the Government of India that they have every intention of maintaining their frontier with Tibet on the McMahon Line, which runs along the axis of the Himalaya.

Mr. J. P. MILLS: Is there any truth in the report I read that the Chinese have come down as far as Rima, and that the Tibetan officials have withdrawn from the little outpost there? Also whether, in order to gain the friendship of India, Tibet has stopped that niggling at the McMahon Line which we suffered from for so many years?

Mr. RICHARDSON: I also saw a report of the Chinese occupation of Rima, but in view of fairly reliable information that there are hardly any Chinese troops in east Tibet now, I think all that is likely to have happened is that a few officials found their way to Rima. They may have looked over the Indian border and gone back when asked to do so. There was also some report in the Indian press—I cannot remember exactly when—stating that there was no cause for alarm on that frontier at the moment.

As to the niggling, that went on for a long time, but it latterly became simply a habit. The Tibetans have become quite used to the situation, and their officials who sometimes stray south of the frontier have been effectively pushed back to their own side of the McMahon Line.

Sir HERBERT TODD: How are the monasteries recruited? Is there any strict selection and period of novitiate or do they become a refuge for the lazy and other disreputables, as happens in some monasteries in the East? The lecturer referred to the monks being prepared to spill their last drop of blood in fighting for the Dalai Lama. I would be interested to hear whether they are really loyal not only to their religion but to their form of government.

Mr. RICHARDSON: As to recruitment, it used to be said that every family with two or three sons had to put one into a monastery. In fact,

families with three sons are often glad to get two of them into monasteries, because that takes them off the ration strength, as it were. They get their food free. They have to be sound in wind and limb, but as they go into the monasteries at the age of six or seven one cannot tell much more about them than that they are physically fit. They are certainly loyal, in fact madly loyal to their religion and to the Dalai Lama, but they are not very fond of the executive, if the questioner includes that in their government. It is religion and the head of the religion that commands their loyalty.

Sir HERBERT TODD: The lecturer referred to the standard of living in Tibet as being higher than in India. Was he talking only of peasants, or comparing the various grades of society in Tibet and India?

Mr. RICHARDSON: I should have made clear that I was referring to village life and the peasant. I do not think one can compare high life in Lhasa and Bombay.

The CHAIRMAN: If no other member has any questions to ask, I will call on the President to propose a vote of thanks to the lecturer.

General Sir JOHN SHEA: I have been so very deeply interested in what the lecturer has told us that I would like to propose a vote of thanks to you, Mr. Richardson, not only for what you have said but for the very charming way in which you have expounded what we now know is your vast knowledge of Tibet. (Applause.)

A RECENT TOUR OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA

By VICTOR PURCELL, C.M.G., Ph.D.

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on November 29, 1950, Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Dr. Purcell is the chairman of our South-east Asia Panel and as such is responsible for studying South-east Asian matters for the benefit of the Society and the Journal.

After serving in the Green Howards during the 1914-18 War Dr. Purcell spent twenty-six years, from 1921 to 1946, in the Malayan Civil Service. During World War II he was attached to the War Office with the rank of Colonel. In 1945 he went back to Malaya as Principal Adviser on Chinese affairs to the British Military Administration. In 1946 he went to Lake Success as Secretary to the Working Group of United Nations on Asia and the Far East, and in 1947 he was Consultant to the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

Since 1949 he has been Lecturer on Far Eastern History at the University of Cambridge, but he has maintained his connections with South-east Asia, so that you will realize that Dr. Purcell is fully qualified to give the fullest and most accurate information on the subject.

He is, I think, going to tell us about a tour he made of South-east Asia last summer, which included attendance at a Conference at Lucknow. I am not sure whether that is the Conference which was arranging to spend £300 million of our surplus deficit on countries which have separated themselves from the British Empire. If so, I am sure he will justify the action taken.

FIRST of all I can state that the Conference I attended was not that which is going to spend whatever money is to be spent, because the organization responsible for the Conference I attended has not that money to spend! It was a Conference of private individuals.

Between the middle of July and the end of October, 1950, I visited Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya, Indonesia, Java and Bali, the Philippines, and Hong Kong, and finished up by attending the Eleventh Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Lucknow, India. I was able to meet most of the leading personalities of the regions visited, including Pandit Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, Thakin Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma, Marshal Pibul Songkram, Prime Minister of Siam, President Quirino, of the Philippines, Sutan Sjahrir and other Indonesian statesmen, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, General Carpentier and other high officials, besides hundreds of members of the communities concerned.

Before I attempt to generalize, perhaps you will allow me to give a summarized account of the countries in the order in which I visited them.

It was three years since I was last in Burma. In 1947 I stayed with the last British Governor there, Sir Hubert Rance. I arrived in Rangoon shortly after the assassination of the Premier, Aung San, and his six ministers by their political rivals on July 19, 1947. Incidentally I was then representing the United Nations, and on behalf of that organization I laid a wreath on the coffin of Aung San. Three years later—in July, 1950, to be exact—I again visited Rangoon. I found that while it had improved a little in outward appearance, nevertheless the place was full of refugees

living in temporary shacks, and it appeared that squalor was kept at bay only by the greatest efforts on the part of the municipal cleaning department.

You will remember that Aung San went to Japan with his colleagues before the last war; in 1940 he returned to Burma and was with the Japanese in 1942, and when eventually he became disillusioned with the Japanese intentions he was instrumental in switching sentiment in Burma in favour of the Allies and against the Japanese. When the British returned to Burma their intention was to bring Burma as soon as possible to dominion status, but Aung San and his followers had other ideas, and they were able to get a majority in the Legislature.

Following the assassination of Aung San in 1947, his successor, Thakin Nu, came to London and obtained a treaty from the British whereby Burma was made independent. That independence became effective on January 4, 1948. Instead of being able to apply themselves to the very urgent problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction, the Government found themselves faced by a series of rebellions; first, that of the White and Red Flag Communists (the Red Flag Communists being known as Stalinists and the White Flag Communists as Trotskyites, because of their different policies, but really things in Burma do not go like that and political parties are decided by the personalities of the leaders). The Government was beginning to get the insurgents under control when the second rebellion took place, this time of the Yellow Band P.V.O.'s—People's Volunteer Organization—which had been raised by Aung San as a measure to deal with the problem of resettling the enormous number of soldiers who had been raised for the war under the Japanese and which were eventually used against them. That organization broke into two halves, one with the Yellow Band and the other with a White Band. The Yellow Band insurgents remained faithful to the Government. The Government was getting this rebellion under control when the third took place, that of the K.N.D.O.'s—Karens' National Defence Organization—a section of the Karen minority. This was at the beginning of 1949, and it looked as if Burma must inevitably fall into complete disruption.

Then on July 19, 1949, the Prime Minister, Thakin Nu, announced a Peace Within One Year Campaign, which at the time seemed fantastic; it did not seem possible that Burma could be brought to any condition of order in such a short space of time. However, by the following Martyr's Day, July 19, 1950, the third anniversary of the assassination of Aung San and his six ministers, Thakin Nu was able at Peace Celebrations which I attended to announce a considerable degree of success. It was claimed that 90 per cent. of the insurgents had been disposed of, but those in a position to judge were willing to accept a smaller figure—namely 25 to 30 per cent. Nevertheless, it was true that communications had been established by rail as far as Mandalay and also on the Irrawaddy river. I gathered that though the Government had a firm control over the towns there was still a great deal of disorder in the country districts. However, trade had improved and there were signs—and I am glad to say there are still—of continued improvement in that regard.

Internationally, Burma had adhered to the United Nations resolution on Korea, but the Prime Minister had a good deal of indiscipline to contend with on the part of his own supporters. The Government is that of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (A.F.P.F.L.), a coalition of ten or more parties formed by Aung San, the principal among them being the Socialists and the Trade Union Congress. I will not go into the details of the Prime Minister's troubles, but one of them was the adherence of certain leaders of the T.U.C. to the W.F.T.U., or the Communist-inspired International Labour Organization.

The Chinese in Burma are not, comparatively, numerous; there are about a quarter of a million of them, but Burma has now recognized the People's Republic of China and the old Chinese Embassy have taken on service under the new Government. The First Secretary told me that they expected a new ambassador at any time. They had to send two members of the Embassy to Peking to be indoctrinated. I asked whether they were receiving any money from the Communists in Peking, and I was told they were not and that the only funds they had were from the sale of passports. The passports are the old Nationalist passports and their sale is one of the amusing sidelines of financing during these changes-over.

Siam—or rather Thailand, which is again its official name—I found a great contrast to Burma. Burma was squalid and not very happy, whereas ostensibly Siam was in a state of considerable prosperity owing to the fact that it is probably the biggest exporter of rice to the rest of the world. In spite of great corruption in some of the higher ranks of Government, notorious corruption which nobody seems to worry very much about, they are able to pay about 400 million ticals into the Treasury and the Siamese (or Thai) grower receives somewhere about six times the price for his rice that he did before the war. Even allowing for the decreased value of money, it means he is getting a great deal more for his rice and is therefore quite happy. There are no "landlord and tenant" problems in Siam.

When I met Marshal Songkram I expected to find a typical dictator, with a jutting chin, staring eyes and a rather stupid face. I was pleasantly surprised to find him round-faced and jovial; in fact, very forthcoming and affable. I was told I need not worry what questions I asked him, and I interviewed him for about an hour; he would have gone on talking had it not been for the fact that his Cabinet was meeting in the next room.

I asked him about the Chinese troops in the Kengtung State of Burma. When I was in Burma there was a matter which was attracting a good deal of attention amongst the Burmese—namely, that 2,000 or 3,000 Chinese troops fleeing from the Communists in Yunnan had got into this Shan State in Burmese territory, and when the Government troops were sent against them to disarm and arrest them they found the insurgents had dug themselves in and that they began shooting at the Burmese. You know that Siam still recognizes the old Nationalist Government based on Formosa, and I said to Marshal Songkram: "They say in Burma that the Kuomintang in Siam are attempting to finance and to make the Chinese troops in their resistance to the Burmese troops in Kengtung

State a nucleus to be used as a sort of springboard for the recovery of Kuomintang control in China and the restoration of the Nationalists; and they say also this is done with your support." He laughed and admitted that 60,000 ticals had been raised for the troops by public subscription among the Chinese of Siam, but added that he had told the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires that this must be discontinued, and he had also refused to allow supplies to the Chinese troops for their return to Yunnan.

I then asked Marshal Songkram about Pridi Panomyong. The Government in Siam is a dictatorship; that is to say, that the position of the Prime Minister and the Government depends upon the support of the army. The army itself is said to be divided into factions, but so far as I could ascertain there was no immediate threat, or perhaps even armed threat, to the Government of Marshal Songkram. Outside, however, he has a deadly rival who is none other than Pridi Panomyong, Songkram's colleague in the rebellion of 1932. Pridi has been heard of in Macau and then in the Mergui archipelago, and it was rumoured that he intended to engineer a *coup d'état* and get rid of Marshal Songkram. I asked the Marshal: "Is Pridi Panomyong going to try to get you out by organizing a coup?" Marshal Songkram replied that Pridi, though no doubt he would like to do this, could not succeed in displacing him (the Marshal) without external help, because he had not enough support in Siam; in fact, he could return only on a Communist ticket. I may mention that Marshal Songkram, whatever his shortcomings, is a man of considerable personal courage. A few months ago he arrived late for an official dinner at Bangkok, and explained that he had been held up by "a little domestic trouble." The next day the papers were full of the fact that his valet, while brushing the Marshal's clothes when he was dressing to attend the dinner, had pulled out a revolver and begun shooting at the Marshal, who, by dodging from pillar to post, managed to escape the bullets, and eventually he attended the dinner. A man who can pass that off as "a little domestic trouble" is not the sort of man to worry about the fact that the Navy uses his portrait as a dartboard in their messes. That is one of the semi-humorous aspects of the Siamese set-up. There is something rather theatrical about it all. In spite of this old rivalry of the factions they have some sort of secret intercourse underground, so that many things are done by negotiation and they either agree or shoot one another. It is one of those delicately arranged negotiations!

The Siamese are deadly afraid of the Chinese community in their midst. There are probably over 3,000,000 Chinese in Siam. The Marshal told me 4,000,000—that is to say, one in every four or five persons in Siam is a Chinese. They have retained their own habits of life and their education. They have control of about 95 per cent. of the country's industry. All the rice-milling is in Chinese hands, and although since the middle-class rebellion in 1932 there had been many attempts to curtail the Chinese share in Siam's industry, these attempts have been unavailing. For example, only in the last year or two there has been issued a list of thirty callings which the Chinese are not allowed to exercise, from the making of images of the Lord Buddha to hair-cutting and taxi-driving. However, it does not seem to worry the Chinese; in fact, they are the

more prosperous people in the towns of Siam. They are merchants and they stick to their mercantile quality.

I interviewed, first, the Thai Chamber of Commerce—that is to say, the Siamese merchant body. The President looked so Chinese to me that I treated him as if he were, but he was scandalized and said he was a Thai and that the Chinese were a lot of rascals. That is fairly indicative of the Siamese attitude. I saw the same sort of thing in other countries. There are a great many Siamese who have predominantly Chinese blood or other non-Siamese nationality.

Shortly after visiting the Thai Chamber of Commerce I went to the real Chinese Chamber of Commerce in their own premises. There were about a dozen typical Chinese business men there, all looking very prosperous and sleek. I began by asking them questions about local politics, but they immediately said they knew nothing about politics; they were merchants; they only bought and sold. Then I asked, "What about education?" I knew very well that there had been strife between the Siamese and the Chinese for many years over the question of the schools, how many hours a week the Thai language should be used as a medium of instruction in certain subjects and how many hours a week should be allotted to the teaching of Chinese. The object of the Siamese is that anybody educated and brought up in their country should be brought up in the habits and customs and language of the local people. The Chinese merchants said they knew nothing about education; they were merchants; their only duty was to obey the laws of Siam. I bowed to this interpretation while pointing out that they were also human beings as well as merchants and presumably had opinions as well as children. They were obviously discomfited by the fact that I should think they had any interest except in buying and selling, and they rose to go; but when they were going out the Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce asked if I would like to see the Chinese press, who were waiting outside. I said I certainly would; and there filed into the room six or seven of the most obvious young Chinese Communists—lean, pock-marked, bright-eyed with fanaticism—or malaria. They might have come straight out of the Malayan jungle. I mention this to show the sort of entire contrast there is in this one community. And, mind you, the whole of the Chinese press in Siam favours the People's Government. It is Communist. In fact, a millionaire in Singapore named Aw Boon-Haw owned an anti-Communist paper in Singapore, an anti-Communist paper in Hong Kong, and a pro-Communist paper in Bangkok. There is nothing odd about that, in that no other paper could exist there.

There you have that essentially mercantile community still carrying on buying and selling and still thinking that under the Communists they can continue in the same way—that they will always be merchants. In fact, probably they will be, because even the most extreme Communists could not in one generation attempt to nationalize or bring the Chinese mercantile activities in South-east Asia under their scheme; so the Chinese merchants really think that, whatever happens, they will still be the merchants.

To return to the Communists of the press, I found they were armed

with a knowledge of my identity and with translations of some of my writings in Chinese, and it is a great advantage to have something written on which to question one. We talked of Korea, Hong Kong and so forth, and eventually they asked: "Where are you going now?" I said I was going to Indo-China on the following day, and they asked, "By what plane?" To which I replied, "If you try to sabotage my plane I will have you strung up by the neck!" They all laughed and we parted on very good terms.

I next proceeded to Indo-China, touching down at Pnompenh, where I had a talk with the commandant of the airport—from whom I gained the impression that things were bad in Indo-China. Cambodia, which until recently had been comparatively untouched by the insurgents, is now unsafe, although, when I was there, one could still sleep fairly safely in one's bed in the capital.

I then went to Saigon-Cholon, where I spent only five days, and a very intensive five days; I do not think I had many moments of rest, as I was taken everywhere. I met a large number of people. Incidentally, I heard six bombs explode in those five days; I counted them carefully so as not to exaggerate when I spoke to audiences like this. One of the bombs went off on the spot where I happened to have been not long before. They are not very lethal bombs, mostly home-made, the intention being to intimidate rather than to kill, although the bombs *can* kill, and *do*, several persons at a time. In Saigon-Cholon there are now about 2,000,000 people, whereas there were less than half a million before the war. The place is full of refugees who have come in from the surrounding country to avoid both sides of the civil war, the French as well as Viet-Minh. The French are liable to regard as enemies all people they do not know, and therefore people come in for protection under the French. There was naturally terrible overcrowding, there being thirty in a room in a number of instances. The Chinese number about 400,000 in Cholon, and both the French and Viet Nam are collecting taxes from this area. I was told that the French got $1\frac{1}{4}$ million piastres a day and Viet Nam collected about half as much, which means something like double taxation. Rice is a fantastic price per pound; it is taxed in its area of production and at the point of arrival. The bombs were usually exploded as reminders to shopkeepers, gambling farmers and private individuals as to what would happen if they did not pay up regularly to the funds of the Viet-Minh. The bomb I mentioned exploded in front of the Great World gambling park in Saigon and killed about four people. There is everywhere an atmosphere of tension. In the Rue Catanat, which is a fine street, one sits in a café wondering what the other fellow is doing with his hand in his left-hand pocket. There is that sort of atmosphere; whoever you are, you are bound to be affected by it. The French put a very bold face on it all; they carry on as if things were perfectly normal, though they are not by any means. Some Frenchmen will be frank and tell you the very great burden this is upon the French people. For example, they are losing 250 French officers a year killed in action. As one Frenchman put it to me, that is equal to the annual output of St. Cyr, the French Military College. I was given no figures in regard to

the losses among other ranks—many of the troops belong to the Foreign Legion or native levies. No doubt the casualties among the rank and file are in proportion. It is a very serious war. As for the cost of it, a Frenchman in some position of authority said it was costing France more than they had received from the United States in the shape of E.C.A.

While I was in Indo-China there was an American Mission; there was, and is, I believe, a project for the United States putting \$30,000,000 into Indo-China as a beginning. My feeling is that Indo-China is a bottomless ocean and anything poured into it will be lost. However, it is a matter for the consideration of those who are in power or have the right to advise Governments whether or not they are taking away from centres of danger such as Western Europe resources which are not being used to the best advantage in Indo-China.

I met a number of Vietnamese officials, among them the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Governor of Central Vietnam. All these were at great pains to explain to me that they were not French stooges, and, indeed, in their endeavour to remove this suspicion some of them were very rude about the French.

I went from Indo-China to Singapore by air. It seemed to me that I saw rather too much of the air on this little journey; actually I made in all forty-one flights. As I flew on to Singapore I felt that when I reached there I should probably find a situation similar to that in Saigon—a general feeling of tension. I had been keeping in touch with Malayan affairs over a long period, and when all one gets is a catalogue of horrors, of murder and violence, it is bound to produce a depressing effect. However, when I reached Singapore and had looked round I was, I must admit, very pleasantly surprised. Singapore I have known for thirty years. I last was there in 1947, when it was still suffering from the neglect of the Japanese occupation. I found that Singapore had since undergone a transformation. All the buildings had been refaced and nearly all of them repainted; even the Cathedral, which was a dingy grey Victorian Gothic structure, had had a coat of whitewash with dubious results, but, still, there it was. There were gardens that had sprung up on the waste plots of land and they were beautifully kept; there must have been a genius of a gardener. Altogether there was a spirit of civic pride. Nor was that impression dispelled on a little closer examination. I found that the Government had a sense of urgency. There were some quite ambitious development schemes in progress—a welfare scheme and housing schemes, even though the latter might be inadequate to the demands of the ever-increasing population, but so is it the case here in England. There were houses going up everywhere, and there was also a big educational drive; schools were being built literally by the score; I believe thirty or forty a year are being put up. Those schools were for the teaching of English so as to reduce, if possible, the lead which the Chinese schools have obtained in past years. Of course, on going deeper one could not deny that the emergency had spilled over from the Federation into Singapore. There had been a number of incidents. For example, in April there had been an attempt on the life of the Governor, and shortly before I arrived the Communists had been able to burn down a huge rubber

storehouse; also, the Senior Chinese Inspector of Schools, an old friend of mine, who had been on my staff for many years, was wounded, when riding in a bus, by three bullets fired by a Communist gunman. I visited my old friend in hospital and found that he was recovering. His only offence was that he was a Chinese Inspector of Schools serving under the British; the Communists objected to that and warned him, and then later they shot at him. Such incidents were so far apart at that time, and I think that is still the case, that they were not enough to affect the general tenor of life in Singapore. Walking round the streets I formed the impression that it was still the same old Singapore that I had known in earlier days; I felt Singapore was still a going concern and, mind you, it is prosperous. Rubber at that time was over 3s. 6d. a lb., and has since gone even higher, and that sort of rise in price is immediately reflected in the look of Malaya, which is dependent primarily on rubber and, secondly, on tin.

My visit to the Federation was largely confined to the towns of the western side of the peninsula; the only part of the countryside I visited was in the south part of the peninsula, where I saw some of the squatter settlements. The problem of Malaya is mainly that of the squatters. They are agriculturists, vegetable gardeners, people who grow small crops. They are all dotted about the country on the fringe of the jungle. I believe the essence of what is known as the Briggs Plan is the resettlement of these squatters and bringing them under control. I visited two settlements, to reach which we had to pass through very disturbed areas. The night before our visit there had been an attack on a police station in one of the villages we went through, and the murder of local Chinese. This was a commonplace happening several times a week all round this area. The first settlement visited was one for squatter-tappers, people who earn their living by tapping rubber on the neighbouring estates. The idea is to bring all these squatter-tappers under administrative control. On this particular settlement there were their huts and right round them a small barbed-wire fence. There was a transit camp, and the tappers were given financial assistance and a piece of land, and a great attraction from their point of view lay in the fact that they were given permanent titles to their land. They were also given other inducements, some of rather an indulgent kind, such as pedigree pigs being brought in to improve the pig stock, selected seeds, and so forth.

The other type of squatter settlement I visited was that of the vegetable gardeners; they supply the towns with vegetables and are an essential part of the Malayan economy. These vegetable gardeners have also been given plots of land, but larger ones. In this particular settlement there was no barbed-wire fence. The object of this experiment was to bring these vegetable gardeners under administration and to keep them away from bandit influence. As a result of many years' experience in the East I would guarantee that these squatters were well disposed towards the settlement officers and towards visitors like myself. I tried to detect whether there was an undercurrent of sullen resistance, but found no sign of it; the squatters were generally pleased to be brought into a place where they had some sort of protection from "squeeze" and intima-

tion. The problem is immense. One has only to look at an air photograph of the jungle to see that it is literally pock-marked with houses and clearances in all sorts of out-of-the-way places. From these isolated places these squatters have to be brought into the settlements, where they come under administrative control. Up to two or three months ago perhaps 50,000 squatters had been dealt with, but there are in Malaya about 300,000 to 400,000 such squatters, so that it will take some considerable time to deal with them all in this way. The question is whether the resettlement can be speeded up. Ideally the officers should be Chinese-speaking, but Malaya is so far behind in that regard that the authorities have had to proceed as best they can with officers who know only Malay. There is also the attitude of the Malays. They have shown a great deal of reluctance to agree to the funds being voted for the purpose of these settlements. It is an expensive process, and so many Malays feel that the Chinese are being unduly pampered at the expense of themselves.

Urban Malaya is quite different from rural Malaya; in fact, Malaya has two faces. The first is that of urban Malaya, which one sees in Singapore, Penang and Kuala Lumpur. That is a fairly cheerful face, which shows some interest in living and some hope for the future. There is a certain amount of development taking place. For example, in Kuala Lumpur there is a huge Unilever soap factory going up, which is some indication of a belief in the future. As to the rural face, if you rely purely on your impressions of urban Malaya you get a distorted and incomplete picture. When you talk to the planters and miners occupying remote posts—and they are mostly very remote—you find they are living under conditions of exceedingly great strain. They live in their bungalows, which are now turned into small fortresses with barbed-wire round, and which have constantly to be floodlit at night. Thus, because of the Terror, these people are denied even the comfort of going to sleep in the dark! Directly they leave their bungalows they are in danger of being ambushed and shot. This is all naturally a very great strain on the women living in these remote areas. There are those two distinct aspects of Malaya. However, I would say that if Malaya is left to itself it will ultimately be able to solve its own problems, but the question is, *Will Malaya be left to itself?*

From Malaya I went to Indonesia as a guest of the Indonesian Government. I am glad I accepted the invitation, although I was hesitant to begin with. The Indonesian Government arranged for me a conducted tour of Java and Bali, and I travelled some hundreds of miles by road, visiting Jakarta and environs, Serpong, Bogor (late Buitenzorg), Bandung and towns and villages within a thirty-miles radius of it. I went to Jogjakarta by air and saw the ruins of Borobudur; also I visited Prambanan, Surabaya and many parts of the island of Bali. I saw all sorts of activities—universities, a school of medicine, domestic science schools, day schools, vocational schools where people were taught to make wireless sets, to do oxy-acetylene welding, etc., domestic industries, an observatory, even a deaf-and-dumb school. Incidentally, at a domestic science school in Jakarta I had the only decent cup of coffee I had on my whole journey.

One of the troubles in this area is the disproportionate number of Dutch

Eurasians and Chinese as compared with the Indonesians. I believe in the medical school of the university of Jakarta 80 per cent. of the students are Chinese. In Bogor I visited medical research stations, museums and so on, which were going on as usual. A number of Dutch advisers were still there, and they live under rather cramped conditions. For example, I went to have coffee with the family of the head of the Rubber Research Institute and found he was living with other families in his house. He hoped to get rid of the others shortly; but that was a hope! You will realize that nowadays conditions for Europeans are different from those which previously existed. Nevertheless, these people continue to carry on. There is still a good deal of bitterness between the Dutch and the natives, but it does not extend to the Dutch advisers. All foreigners have been removed from the purely administrative posts; I do not think there are any Dutch advisers left in the Department of Foreign Affairs. The departments are run pretty well by Indonesians. I will not go into details of the interviews I had with Ministers and other statesmen, such as Sjahrir and others; that would take longer than I can expect you to listen to me.

Perhaps the most important information I had on my Javan journey was in regard to something I already knew: that the Indonesians have adopted English as their second language in place of Dutch. That is not because of vindictiveness against the Dutch, but because there is a feeling that English is much more valuable to the Indonesians as a secondary language than is Dutch. The implications are enormous; it means a potential 80,000,000 or more persons will be added to the English-speaking world, and that should mean another 80,000,000 who will not willingly fight against us. The British Council are doing very valuable work in this connection in Indonesia. I have in the past been critical of certain things done by the British Council, but I will say from my experience in Indonesia the Council are doing a very fine job and on the right lines. I heard a great deal about disorder or insurgency in the Preanger district and also of the violent behaviour of the Extremist Muslim Organization, Dar ul Islam, near Cheribon, but I personally saw no sign of any of this. I had two police attached to me to look after my safety, but I did not think them necessary; in fact, they frightened me more than I was frightened by anything or anybody else, because they were always on the look-out behind bushes and so on. Nevertheless they were there. Incidentally, the chief security officer asked me not to go by road more often than I could help, but I did quite a lot of travel by road. I went by road from Jakarta to Bogor (Buitenzorg) and then to Bandung; I visited textile factories within thirty-five miles of Bandung and went to the observatory, which is situated in a very lonely place. Judging by my experience, Indonesia is orderly and life is being carried on peacefully and more or less normally in most places. My personal experiences, of course, do not allow of a complete picture of the situation, and I can state only what I saw and heard. I saw nothing, for example, of the Celebes or of Amboyna.

Unquestionably, the Indonesians were very thin on the ground from the point of view of administration, especially in the lower grades of the public service. Many Dutchmen were being retained as advisers, though

they were, I gathered, about a third of their pre-war total. The Governor of West Java has 13,000,000 people in his area. No doubt the main reason why the Indonesians are carrying on so well is that their country had not been the scene of intense fighting between the Japanese and the Allies and has therefore not suffered the devastation that there is in Burma and the Philippines, also the Dutch have bequeathed to them a very fine administrative machine. The latter fact I did not fail to point out to the Indonesians themselves and also to the Lucknow Conference which I later attended. That was not denied, and I believe when the bitterness has died down that fact will be more fully realized and appreciated. The impression left on my mind by Java and Bali was on the whole a very hopeful one.

Jogjakarta is tired; it has been in the centre of the rebellion, and one does not find the same cheerful attitude evident in other places. Nevertheless, the national feeling is strong and they make light of the scares regarding minority rebellions. I would like to add something in regard to the minority troubles, but that would mean taking time out of proportion.

I next went to the Philippines, and I must say that Manila had improved since I visited it three years earlier, when I attended the United Nations Conference in 1947. Obviously there was still a great deal to be done. Some thousands of people are still living in temporary shacks and the economic condition of the country is not good. You probably know that the United States have put over \$2,000,000,000 one way and another into the Philippines since 1945, and yet the area is still in a bad way; the Filipinos needed help from the United States again this year. The United States sent the Bell Mission, and when I was in the Philippines the report of the Mission had not yet been published in Washington. When one asked the Filipinos about the matter they said the Department of State in Washington was busy "toning down the insults to Filipinos." The report has since been issued with the insults toned down, and even so I think it is a fairly formidable indictment of the corruption and general ineffectiveness of Filipino administration. I met President Quirino and we talked about the Hakbalahap rebellion, which he said was being helped to some extent by Chinese Communists.

From the Philippines I went to Hong Kong, the one remaining window on Communist China. I met there a number of Chinese friends and I had the advantage of speaking Cantonese. I learned some very remarkable things. It is hard to select the most remarkable. I heard that in China they had gone a long way to solving the food problem; that they now have a grain surplus for export; also that they had successfully stopped deflation. I believe in China in 1947 there were 18,000,000 Chinese dollars to the American dollar; now it is 31,000, which is some sort of achievement. Perhaps another remarkable thing I learned would strike your imagination more than any other. A Chinese friend told me that the new Chinese textbooks issued by the Communists start off with the first lesson as follows: "I do *not* love my father, I do *not* love my mother, I love my *country*." (Some versions say "want" instead of "love.") We all know that Chinese civilization has been founded on

filial piety for a period of some thousands of years. That lesson is obviously a very direct cut at filial piety. I could tell you about the compulsory weekly day of confession of sins against the party and of adults who have to do a weekly day of work for the Communist troops, washing their uniforms, digging latrines, etc. But I must now leave China and Hong Kong and proceed to Lucknow.

At Lucknow I attended the Conference organized by the Institute of Pacific Relations which Sir Howard Kelly thought might be connected with the £1,868,000,000 to be spent in Asia under the Colombo Plan. That is not so. It was the Eleventh Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, an international body which holds periodic conferences. One was held at Stratford-on-Avon three years ago. The Conference is attended by those who come to it in an unofficial capacity, people selected from all interests of society. The Conference at Lucknow lasted for a fortnight. I will not say it was interesting all the way through—such conferences never are—there were periods which dragged, but there were also longer periods when the discussions went with zest.

The most noteworthy feature about the Conference was the conflict between the United States and the Indian delegates, which clash arose over India's desire for neutrality and refusal to accept defence commitments. The Indians had about 50 delegates there and they were playing on the home ground, so that they could bring along their best people, and they were pretty good. There were about twenty United States delegates. They represented journalism, business, the law and so on, and they came in the frame of mind which led them to come with the idea of stating the terms on which they were willing to extend help to Asia, whereas the Indian attitude may be stated in this way: that they would consider on what terms they would receive help, if any. They were not in a complacent mood; in fact, they made it clear that they were willing to do without any help if it meant any military commitment or any strings being attached to the advance of money. That attitude of mind is very general in Asia. The Indonesians had a similar attitude. It was clear that was the attitude of the Asian representatives at the Lucknow Conference. The implications of that I leave you to dwell on. Obviously we have to deal with a very different frame of mind from that which we expected to find in Asia.

The British at this particular moment are very popular in India. When I was in that country three years ago I attended the Indian Economic Conference held at Calcutta in December, 1947, and was the only European there. The Indians were quite friendly even at that time, but there were provisos which took the form of "in spite of 150 years of regrettable rule," etc., and that kept coming into all appreciations of the British, like King Charles's head. On my visit this year that proviso had entirely gone and what the Indians had to say about the British was flattering. Mind you, we must not bank too much on that. Much of this conversation took place off the record. At the Conference table the Indians were strictly factual, and were thinking of "economic imperialism," but so far as personal relations are concerned I think that one or two little examples will help you to realize the attitude. I went

to a little party at which the Americans were present and one Indian remarked: "Oh, well, whatever you say about our ex-British masters, we had the greatest respect for their ability and their integrity. For our present political bosses we have nothing but contempt." The man who said that was himself in the Administration. Then, when I was riding through Lucknow in a pedicab (a form of locomotion unknown to those who lived in India before the last war), a middle-class Indian cycled for a mile or so beside my pedicab to tell me how sorry he was that the British had gone and how he wished they could return; he added that that was how his friends felt. I am told that in the country districts a very common form of salutation is "Sahib, when are the British coming back?" and when people are told that the British are not coming back their faces fall. Of course, we must not take that sort of thing too seriously. No doubt it is a reflection of present discontents: they think of the good old days under the British, and no doubt rosy spectacles come between them and the object they are looking at. It also has some relation to the great influence of the I.C.S. officials, and other Britons interested in the people's private affairs. Whatever the reason, it is rather satisfying to find that now that the British yoke has been removed from the country there is no running sore on its back. That is a very good thing. And, mind you, it is only three years since independence took place. We must not carry this feeling of satisfaction too far, but, nevertheless, it is a feeling on the part of the Indians of which we should be wise to take advantage.

There were many more subjects discussed at the Conference at Lucknow, among them the position of Pakistan and Kashmir. Sixteen countries were represented at the Conference and naturally all the delegates had their own stories to tell, and they were all very important stories.

I want, in conclusion, to get down to one or two generalizations. Firstly, there was the indifference of the Asians to the troubles of the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. The delegates did not, generally speaking, regard Communism as a threat. Country by country the whole of the Communist problem was gone through and in every case there was an attempt to play it down, to diminish it; in fact, they made a pretty good case for saying that Communism was no immediate domestic threat in India. The attitude towards the U.S.S.R. appears to be that whilst they very much resent the Communists in India, wherever they happen to be, they have not any special feeling of animosity towards the U.S.S.R. The Asians will tell you over and over again that they regard the present set-up of the world as a contest between two power blocs, one represented by the U.S.S.R. and the other by the West, the United States in particular, and of course Britain and the United States. I am transferring to you now the feeling of the Conference, and that feeling was so insistent that I do not think there can be any other opinion. There was but one lone voice in the whole of that Conference which uttered anything in a contrary sense. They also said that they did not wish, in fact they intend not to be involved if they possibly can avoid it in any conflict between these two power blocs; therefore they are unwilling to commit themselves to any strategic or military agreement.

As regards financial assistance, the Asian countries admit that they need it, but that they do not wish to have any strings attached to it. They are afraid of the loss of some of their newly won sovereignty : so that they are obsessed with their nationalism. They are, generally speaking, not interested in what is happening outside their own country; every thought is focused upon their own concerns. They regard talk of Communism as something in the nature of a bogey. As regards Korea, they are, as you know, adhering to the United Nations resolution, but they are not altogether happy about it. Pandit Nehru takes a definite line of his own. He opened the Conference at Lucknow and his speech was probably repeated throughout the world. He took a very strong line against going beyond the 38th parallel; in fact, he referred to General McArthur as "the man who did not know where to stop." That attitude is very much reflected in the opinions of those in other Asian countries I visited. They *do* feel confused and worried about Korea.

Moreover, I would add that the stories one hears about Korea as circulated in Asia do not coincide always with those one finds unanimously accepted in England. That is unfortunate, because it means that opinion is blurred by this counter-propaganda of distortion, or rather a different statement of the facts concerning a Korean incident.

Now, sir, I have occupied a whole hour and I do not feel it would be fair to continue longer. I have endeavoured to give a factual outline of my journey and to present to you some of the opinions which are prevalent in Asia at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN: We have heard a very interesting account of his journey from Dr. Purcell. As to the sentence in the new Communist textbooks against parent-worship, we had a strong indication how such feeling can operate in Turkey, a country so completely and absolutely Moslem that one could not conceive of life in Turkey without the Moslem faith; and yet by one stroke of the pen that disappeared. It is reviving a little now. It was unbelievable that such a thing could happen in Turkey, and I imagine that the unbelievable can also happen in China.

With regard to the feeling in India in connection with the departure of the British, you may recall that it was said at the end of the Irish rebellion, when there was peace and we talked about removing our troops: "You would not take your troops away? What are we going to live on?" I suppose those Indians have more or less the same idea.

The proceedings closed with a vote of thanks.

DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

SINCE the first of these reports appeared in the Journal (Vol. XXXVII, Part II) a year ago, one outstanding development in which both China and Britain are concerned has overshadowed all other considerations in the minds of those who interest themselves in Chinese affairs and in Sino-British relations. This is the fighting in Korea between the United-Nations-sponsored republic of the South, supported by forces under the United Nations flag, and the Russian-sponsored North Korean People's Republic, whose armies were reinforced in December, 1950, by organized formations of Chinese troops (introduced as "volunteers").

To this clash all local developments regarding China have seemed to be related subordinately, though the limit and implication of Chinese action in Tibet (particularly in its effect on Buddhist feeling in South-east Asia) has also been a matter of active interest. The unfolding of the Chinese People's Government's domestic policies and intentions with regard to establishment of normal diplomatic and trading relations with other countries seems, therefore, not worth retailing in detail; its expression during these last months has been universally read in terms of a world crisis.

At a meeting in January, the Society's China Panel heard and discussed a first-hand report on conditions and trends inside China today, and an appreciation of the effects of developments there on the world strategic situation.

In China's internal affairs the People's Government had, at the least, effected short-term improvements sufficient to claim for it recognition as the country's best administration for at least twenty-five years. Particularly mentioned were the improvement achieved by this Government in China's financial structure and in the collection of taxes, the rehabilitation of the transport system, and the control of food supplies. The new "People's Courts" administered a rough-and-ready justice not unsatisfactory to those whose experience was of the variations by previous Chinese Governments on what the West thought of as the rule of law. In addition, there was a new sense of discipline in the army and the civil service. These achievements, it was suggested, sprang largely from a new spirit aroused by the Communists among large sections of the Chinese people. Whereas before the behaviour of individual Chinese was conditioned by selfish motives modified only by family loyalties, the Communists had led them in many cases to do things in spite of themselves because the new creed so demanded.

Arising perhaps equally from this new spirit, however, were factors dangerous both for China's internal development and for her international relations. In the economic field, dogmatic antagonism to the rich had given rein to unrestrained and often unreasonable action by labour against employers to the detriment of economic progress. While the new China's strength of purpose was formidable and frightening, the lack of develop-

ment of her physical resources remained a problem not soluble along these lines. And the subservience of the policy to a rigid creed had laid a dead hand on progress in science and the arts as part of the development of a complete police State, with no outlet for democratic opposition to authority.

These tendencies, it was held, were reflected in the development of an approach to foreign relations which was outrageous, according to the accepted rules of diplomacy. At the same time members were advised against thinking that China was run by Russia. Although there were many Russians in the Peking ministries and in the Shanghai municipality, as well as groups helping with air defence and railway reconstruction, the impression given was that China was using these Russians for her own purpose rather than the reverse.

As for the obvious link between the Kremlin and the Peking line in foreign affairs, this might be held to arise as much from the actual attitudes of the Great Powers to matters in which China was concerned as from pressure on China by Russia. To Peking the elimination of American influence in Korea, the inheritance of Formosa and the acknowledgment of her claim to Great Power status in the United Nations were fundamental aims. The People's Government leaders genuinely felt that the United States was the major obstacle to fulfilment of those aims, and mutual mistrust had been fed from both sides. Britain herself was regarded in China as having been sluggish in according recognition to the new régime, and in advocating its rights within the United Nations.

Discussion was then set against a broad outline of some of the strategic issues involved. The basis proposed was that it would be an act of folly for the Western powers to commit themselves to a full-scale military clash with China, and that if these powers had to fight Europe must be the theatre. In the Far East it was Malaya which, for reasons of supply and communications, most mattered. But it was recognized as unrealistic to expect the United States tamely to relinquish her position *vis-à-vis* Formosa, to abandon the Korean enterprise, which she had led with the support of the bulk of the United Nations, and at this stage to agree to full admission of the Chinese People's Government to the United Nations.

Discussion on Korea raised the question whether the United States, through the United Nations, had not made a fundamental error in sponsoring the establishment of the republic in the South. Experience of the country suggested that the establishment of what the West would consider a "free" Government there was quite impossible, and that the American conception of political freedom was not acceptable to the Koreans. Hence the present relation between the Chinese and the North Koreans, combined with the traditional interdependence of China and Korea, seemed to make ultimately inevitable a régime in Korea (under whatever international auspices this was originally set up) which was Chinese-sponsored and Communist-flavoured. The view was put forward that recognition of this as a fact by the Western powers was essential in their approach to a negotiated settlement.

On the other hand, it was pointed out that a settlement leading to this result would lead to grave dangers for Japan in so far as she was associated

with the outlook of the Western powers, and particularly to strategic risks for the United States' position there while her interests were balanced between protective occupation and rearmament of the Japanese themselves. The Japanese, it was stated, were equally indifferent to the American and Russian ways of life, and would in all cases follow their national interest, which was closely linked with access through Korea to Manchuria's steel and coking coal resources. On the world scale, a situation where the attraction for Japan was towards the Communist bloc would have a grave effect on American readiness to divert military strength to the defence of Europe.

In discussion of developments in China's attitude to her more southerly neighbours there was some difference of view as to whether the People's Government is moved by Communist expansionism on an ideological level or whether she is attempting to revive the purely *Chinese* tradition of paramountcy over the countries contiguous to her. It was doubted whether she wants direct control over these countries, but the question was open whether she would wish the primary basis of her influence to be through political alignment of indigenous Communist movements or through her national status and the position of overseas Chinese. At all events, it was recalled that the United States policies of the past ten years in attempting to eliminate "colonialism" had combined unfortunately with the circumstances of the Japanese war to create something of a vacuum, which both indigenous Communist-nationalist movements and China as a leading Asian power might be eager to fill. A combination of resolute anti-Communist action, particularly in Malaya, with readiness to deal realistically with the People's Government as representative of a Great Power, might at least have the effect of mitigating Chinese Government support for movements of rebellion in South-east Asia.

In sum, the general trend of argument at the meeting about the relative feasibility and value of three possible policies to contain Communist expansion in the Far East was roughly as follows :

(1) A direct full-scale attack, primarily by air, on the People's Republic was thought both unlikely to effect a change of heart and likely to involve the Western powers catastrophically in a theatre whose call on resources would be out of all proportion to its importance in world strategy.

(2) A "half-way" war, such as would presumably develop from the institution of diplomatic and economic sanctions against the People's Republic and from continued support for Kuomintang activity from Formosa, together with continuation of the present campaign in Korea, was not viewed with enthusiasm, but the effect of political pressures within the United States (combined with the strategic factor of the future of Japan) in impelling the American Government to follow some part of this course and to urge it on her allies was widely recognized. Against it was set the consequential difficulties to be anticipated in defending the present position in Hongkong and Malaya, and for those new Governments in South and South-east Asia endeavouring to establish themselves on a basis of Nationalism against attempts from outside to impose Communism on them.

(3) An attempt to come to terms with the People's Republic, on the

basis of full recognition of its status and of negotiation and compromise on equal terms with regard to broad questions in dispute, while maintaining the overall Western attitude towards Communist expansion, was thought to have some—if a slight—chance of bringing to the fore those elements in the new China which had shown their worth in domestic affairs and which might possibly recognize the value for China herself of modifying dogmatic adherence to the Stalinist line in favour of economic and diplomatic relations with the non-Communist world. The difficulties, snubs and setbacks which such a course was likely to meet were fully acknowledged, and there was wide scepticism as to the possibility of a fruitful outcome. But in view of the general circumstances no objection to it as a *pis aller* was sustained.

ANNUAL DINNER, 1950

As reported in our last issue, the Annual Dinner of the Society was held on Tuesday, October 10, 1950, at Claridge's Hotel. Over two hundred members of the Society and their guests attended, including their Excellencies the Sa'udi Arabian Minister and Madame Wahba, the High Commissioner for India, and the Israeli Minister and Madame Elath. General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., presided, and the guests of the Society were H.E. the Turkish Ambassador, the Rt. Hon. Lord Killearn, P.C., G.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O., and Lady Killearn, and Sir Leigh Ashton.

THE toast of "The King" was given by the President and loyally honoured.

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT

Gen. Sir JOHN SHEA said: Your Excellencies, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I should like first to say how deeply I feel the great honour that has been done me in making me President of this Society. It is an honour of which I am profoundly conscious and which I receive, as you can readily understand, with considerable diffidence. But I do welcome the opportunity of doing some further service to this Society of which I was Chairman during the war years.

As to the Society itself, we are glad to recognize that it is in a very flourishing condition and that we continue to receive a number of new members. But, as I said in my address at the Annual Meeting, we do really want more members, because in this welfare State which does so much for everybody we have not found an immediate effect on our own particular conditions, and our expenses continue to go up. We are really very anxious indeed to keep our subscription down to its present modest figure and not to increase it if possible. Also, we want more members because we think we have a service to render the community by increasing interest in the various countries which are within our orbit. You will all agree that never before in our history have those countries been of such great interest or more fraught with destiny than they are today.

I should like to begin by congratulating His Excellency the Sa'udi Arabian Ambassador, whom we are very proud to have as one of our members, on the Golden Jubilee of King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud and on the fact that peace has been kept for so long in that part of the world. This is the more satisfactory because we find unhappiness and discord in the adjacent territories of Egypt and Jordan, which have accused Israel of a breach of the armistice treaty, and Israel has countered by making a similar charge. This particular subject has been referred to the Security Council, which first has to decide what is the real root cause of the discord between these two countries. Their economic and geographical positions have a great deal in common and are complementary. They are both antagonists of the internationalization of Jerusalem. It was hoped that their particular differences could have been reconciled some time ago; but it seems impossible that this can happen until the frontier incidents, of which both parties have complained, are settled.

Farther east we come to Persia, which appears to be a very easy and happy hunting ground for Russian intrigue. It is our custom in this Society to leave the question of India and Pakistan, so far as our lectures are concerned, to other Societies (the Royal India Society and the East India Association), but we may note in passing that Pakistan has difficulties with Afghanistan on her frontier, and until India and Pakistan are reconciled over the Kashmir question there are elements of danger. Just as Persia seems to be a very easy area for Russian interference, so Tibet, if and when it is invaded by Communist China, will become a very difficult problem to solve.

Going farther east, it is impossible to think of Burma without deep sorrow, because the situation in that country is more than tragic. That beautiful country, so rich in population and resources, has, ever since it was granted independence more than two years ago, been riven by strife and discord, and any form of security is completely absent. The only note of happiness to which one may refer in connection with Burma is the fact that Mr. Kingdon Ward, who has delighted the members of this Society so often by his lectures, and who was reported to have been killed in a recent Burman earthquake, is, I am very glad to say, alive and unhurt. We are most happy to learn that he and his wife are safe. (Applause.)

Continuing our journey, there is certainly every reason for hope and encouragement, because British prestige, which has fallen so low in the East, can certainly be revived on a sure basis by the definite determination to hold on to Malaya and to Hong Kong. In Malaya we hope that in time the difficult situation will become easier, happier and better; but I suppose that in the end it will really depend on the actual quelling of Communism in the neighbouring countries.

I have never been in China and I cannot claim any special knowledge about that country. I prefer to defer to the opinion of a member of this Society, Sir John Pratt, who has unique knowledge and experience of China. He tells me that it is quite wrong to think that China ever has been or ever will be under the domination of Russia. He considers that Mao-Tse-tung, the leader of Communist China, hopes that his position in China will eventually be somewhat analogous to that of Stalin in Europe and that China itself will revert to the position of an imperial State surrounded by satellites.

Lastly we come to Korea. The onslaught of Northern Korea against Southern Korea has enabled the member States of the Atlantic Pact to know what such an offensive can mean, and we may be quite sure that if there is to be any security in Western Europe they must now immediately set about ensuring it. You all know the position of Korea as it is today and how the United Nations troops have been ordered at last to cross that nebulous frontier, the 38th parallel. When the soldiers have finished their job, the Commission, which has now been ordered by the United Nations to make a plan for the future of Korea, will begin a more difficult task.

When I started to address you I told you how deeply I felt the honour of being President of this Society. Perhaps one of the things that I

welcome most is that of being able now to renew my association with my old friend Sir Howard Kelly, with whom I worked so long on the Council of this Society, and as it is his privilege to propose the health of the guests I will now ask him to do so.

Proposing the toast of "The Guests," Admiral Sir HOWARD KELLY, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., Chairman of Council, said: First of all, I want to thank our President for his very kind remarks about me, and to say how delighted every member of our Society is that Sir John Shea should be now in his rightful place as President after all the work he has done to keep the Society going. (Applause.)

May I express the regret of Lord and Lady Mountbatten, who had accepted the invitation of the Council, but, owing to family mourning for Lord Mountbatten's mother, are unable to be here tonight as our guests.

We have here tonight three guests who have done very great service to us in the sphere of our interests, which is growing wider and wider as the years go on. The first is my old friend the Turkish Ambassador. During practically all the war years, except for an excursion as Ambassador to Moscow for a year, His Excellency was the head of the Turkish Foreign Office, and so was responsible to a large extent for the formulation of the policy of the Turkish Government during those fateful years. You know during that time how, in spite of bribes and menaces, the Turks maintained their attitude of benevolent neutrality, an attitude which rendered us infinitely greater service than any other action on their part could have done.

When I first came home from Turkey one of my friends said to me, "Do you mean to say that you have been out there for four and a half years, and you could not bring Turkey into the war?" I replied, "My dear fellow, I had the greatest difficulty in keeping her out of it." Turkey was a strong bastion on which our forces could depend. Had Turkey come into the war it would have meant the withdrawal of most important forces and material from the other theatres of war which might have materially affected operations in those theatres. H.E. Cevat Açıkalın was also personally responsible for that "benevolent neutrality" which was shown to us at the time of our Leros misfortunes. It was thanks to him that services were rendered to our forces in distress and so many lives were saved. He has been in London for four and a half years further to cement the friendship between our two peoples, so that we shall have something to depend upon if trouble breaks out again, as I hope it will never do. I should also like to congratulate him on the accession of Turkey to the Security Council.

Lord Killearn was one of the most successful people we have ever had in China. He had a magnificent presence, he was direct and straightforward, he possessed a great sense of humour, and he had a quality essential out there which, for want of a better description, I will call the quality of the successful person. I remember being at a dinner he gave in my honour at the Peking Legation. It was at that dinner we heard of the Mukden incident, which meant the destruction of the arsenal of our pre-war ally in North China, and incidentally the loss of a large number of gold bars which had been stored there. I stood with him on the roof

of an hotel at Shanghai and looked across at the international bridge to see the Japanese bombers carrying destruction wherever they went. At the end of those proceedings Lord Killearn was elected by both parties to be chairman of the council to discuss the cessation of the struggle, and peace was temporarily eventually restored.

We next met when he was High Commissioner and Ambassador in Cairo, one of the most complicated jobs you can imagine. He was Ambassador to a foreign Power in a city which was occupied exclusively by our own troops, with representatives of all the enemy States trying to create trouble. He had to entertain masses of "V.I.P." and also less important satellites like myself who came down there to be fed, and in addition he was chairman of the Commission of Ambassadors which arranged for the feeding of the whole of the peoples of the Middle East.

After the war there he was sent out as Special Commissioner to South-eastern Asia. They had already there a High Commissioner, they had a Governor-General, and four or five Governors, but he went out there to sort out what they were all supposed to do. He had to arrange in addition for the cessation of warfare in Indonesia and the distribution of rice in South-east Asia.

Our next guest is Sir Leigh Ashton, Director of the Victoria and Albert Museum in London. I first met him when he was the head of one of the special missions to Turkey during the war. Since then he has come back into his own and has been Director of the Museum for which he had worked for so many years in a lower capacity. He is entitled to be here tonight as one of the greatest authorities on oriental art. We can count on him to develop and increase our knowledge of that subject to the utmost. In the museum which he controls he has shaken off the apathy of Londoners with regard to museums. He has arranged the rooms to his heart's desire and a most remarkable job he has made of it, in addition to all the foreign exhibitions which he has arranged there. I hope those I am addressing will get into the habit, as I have done, of going to the museum once a week or once a month.

Then we have among us this evening as members of the Society, His Excellency the Sa'udi Arabian Ambassador, always a most faithful friend of ours; also His Excellency the High Commissioner of India and His Excellency the Israeli Minister. They are all here in a new capacity. We are very happy to congratulate Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt on his appointment as Commander-in-Chief the Nore. Sir Cecil is one of our very few faithful naval members. We have with us also two distinguished working soldiers who at the present time are responsible for the training of the armies and the officers of the future—namely, Lt.-Gen. Sir Richard Gale and Maj.-Gen. Sir Hugh Stockwell. Finally, we have another member here to whom I would like to pass a little message—namely, Mr. Gulbenkian. He is the owner of a wonderful collection of pictures which is making a voyage to the other side of the Atlantic, and very deeply and earnestly we pray that they may before too long be returned to this country for our appreciation and enjoyment.

I ask this company to drink the health of "The Guests."

Replying to the toast, H.E. CEVAT AÇIKALIN, the Turkish Ambassador,

said: My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is my privilege tonight to thank, on behalf of my very distinguished fellow guests, the distinguished President and the Council of the Royal Central Asian Society for the very kind invitation to attend their annual dinner. I am sure I express the view of all when I say how pleased we are to be here tonight among the members of this learned Society of world-wide repute.

It would indeed be a fallacy for this humble speaker to attempt a panegyric on the far-reaching work of the Royal Central Asian Society. Nevertheless I cannot refrain from expressing my great appreciation of the work done by this Society in the field of knowledge and understanding. If a motto had to be found for the broad activities of the Royal Central Asian Society nothing, I am sure, would be more fitting than a saying of the great Muslim Prophet who commanded his followers to "pursue knowledge even unto China." I think that it can safely be said that the learned members have been even farther than China in search of all the values which are lying in the heart of Mother Asia, whose mighty soil has, through all the centuries, nursed great ideas, great peoples, great civilizations and great nations, and today Mother Asia has every reason to be proud of her children, who have reached maturity and, as sovereign, independent and healthy States, are playing their rôles in the community of nations.

It has been said that pioneer traders have been the best ambassadors to establish intercourse among peoples. That may be right, but history has shown that, although indispensable, relations based on purely material, temporal interests are not sufficient to build real friendships among nations, and that a knowledge and understanding of the culture, spirit, heart, ideals and sorrows of a nation are indispensable elements of a sound basis on which one can erect something really strong. This being so, the significance of the service rendered by the Royal Central Asian Society emerges clearly, and one is filled with sincere admiration for the magnitude of the work done.

Gentlemen, Sir Howard has had some very kind words for me and my country. In any other case I should have accepted them as a very pleasing and courteous compliment, but coming from him, I think they need some comments.

It has been my privilege during many years to have very close contacts with him, but although we knew each other as well as we knew ourselves, we have never expressed verbally and publicly what we were certain to feel each about the other. Tonight Sir Howard made the first breach in our tacitly appreciative and silent friendship pact, thus I have to attack him on his own ground.

Sir Howard had been on a very special mission and in a very special capacity in Turkey during the difficult war years, where, by his dignified attitude, straightforwardness, gift of observation and great sincerity, he not only won the esteem and the appreciation of all those who had to deal with him in an official capacity, but also the hearts of many of my country-folk as a charming *homme du monde* and a reliable friend. Admiral Kelly, as we knew him in Turkey, is, and will always be, remembered as one of the true friends of that country, which he so well

understood, and loved because of the attachment he felt among its people for his own.

In fact, it was the privilege of a few of us to witness the birth and growth of one of the most important achievements in the history of our times—namely, the building and establishment of Anglo-Turkish friendship, with all its far-reaching consequences. It is indeed edifying to remember that the happy state of the strong and sound friendly relations between Turkey and Great Britain is not due to the hazards and vicissitudes of bygone years, but chiefly to the will and careful choice of my country which, through its centuries-old experiences, has chosen to bind its political destiny to that of this hospitable country.

For those who have contributed even very humbly to this labour of love, the present state of relations between Turkey and Great Britain is a very gratifying spectacle.

But I see I have deviated from my original purpose and indulged in some loquacity. I beg to be excused, and thank you again for the very kind hospitality you have extended to all of us. (Applause.)

Sir LEIGH ASHTON, Director of the Victoria and Albert Museum, also replied to the toast, and said: I must say that I feel very happy this evening because, as a permanent Civil Servant, I cannot talk to you about politics. I am very pleased to be here and very grateful to my old friend Sir Howard Kelly for asking me to come as your guest. I owe a great deal to him for reasons which some of you can easily imagine. When I was in a very humble capacity in Turkey and was deciding that I was of no use as a diplomat, I was extremely happy to rely on Sir Howard Kelly's grey bowler hat at the races. Nothing could have done more for the prestige of England than to see Sir Howard Kelly at the races as one of the most charming English types which you could possibly find anywhere. I should like to say that to him now—I have never been able to do so before.

When he asked me to come here tonight he did so because I am extremely interested in the arts of all the Asiatic countries, and when I say that I would like also to say that one of the great advantages of the arts and one of the things that is most important about them is that they speak with no fixed language of their own. You do not have to say a word about a picture, it either gives its message to you or it does not. There is no difference between the great masters of art in England or in Persia or in China, except in what they try to convey to you in their own way, and I believe that the arts, like music, which, again, speaks with no fixed voice, have an international significance. They are an international method of communication between countries which is vitally important.

Recently, for my sins, I went to a conference of UNESCO. I do not mean, in saying "for my sins," that I think UNESCO is a bad thing. It is not a bad thing and it has been very much maligned. It is trying to do a job which perhaps from the circumstances of the time it cannot do quite as well as if it were in an entirely different situation. But I was very much annoyed and made angry because people who spoke for the arts at that particular conference, and also those who spoke for

literature, spoke about these things in a political sense. Now, you may take one or another form of the arts and you may employ a political subject to express yourself, whether in painting or in a piece of music or in poetry, but if you insist on dividing the arts into national sections it proves that you do not in fact really understand what the basis of art really is. Sculpture, music and painting may have a national flavour, but they are all in fact one of the most international forms of expression that could possibly exist. I should like to say in this Society that I did notice a feeling among delegates at that Conference that they wished, very naturally, to crack up their own particular arts at the expense of the benefit which art or music might bring as an international solvent.

Here in London what we should like very much to have, and what I hope we may possess one day, is a great oriental museum, because in London we have all the elements of one of the greatest museums you could possibly have, devoted to oriental subjects. The Scarborough Report recommended it, but until such time as there is money to produce that great centre I am afraid the idea will have to go begging. A great many people, including, I am sure, a great many members of your Society, are helping the intention that we should here show through every form of collection that we have, the great interest that is taken in this country in all other countries, but especially those of the orient. If one day we have, as I hope, a great Asiatic museum here in London, I am sure that the efforts and interests of this Society will have contributed in a great degree to persuade the authorities that such a thing should come into existence.

Therefore I have great pleasure in seconding the Turkish Ambassador in reply to the toast of the guests, and in thanking your Society for inviting me to be here.

The toast of "The Royal Central Asian Society" was proposed by the Rt. Hon. the Lord KILLEARN, P.C., G.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O., who said: I confess that I rise tonight with considerable diffidence. When Sir Howard Kelly suggested that I should propose this toast—this very important toast—I was rather taken aback, because I knew that there would be a distinguished company here and I felt that that company would contain very many people far better qualified than I to perform this duty. Since coming here tonight I have realized that that suspicion was more than justified. Anybody who looks around these tables will realize my feelings at the moment, and I hope it is not too flippant of me to suggest that you should follow the advice given with regard to the poor pianist—that you should not shoot him, because he is doing his best.

Mr. President, there was one thing you said in your opening remarks on which, before I go further, I should like to say a word: that is the need—the essential need—at this crucial moment for enlightened knowledge and guidance on matters dealing not only with Central Asia but with Asia as a whole—from the Middle East through Central Asia to the Far East. I have often felt in the course of a fairly long Service career, most of which, by hazard, has been passed in the

Far East, that, no doubt owing to its great distance away, the public of this country and the press and Parliament of this country are not always sufficiently seized with or educated up to the importance of what is going on in that remote part of the world. A wicked thought went through my mind about a year ago when there was the tension in Berlin (I am not going to talk about politics)—was it not possibly partly because something was going on on this side of the world that it was made a good cloak for events much farther away on the other side? For that time of tension in Berlin did synchronize with developments in China.

To get back to my main point, the trouble really is that it is necessarily hard for people here in England always to realize that what is happening thousands of miles away on the other side of the world may conceivably be the key to the whole position. That is perhaps carrying it too far, but anyhow Asia and the Far East is a part, and a very big and important part, of the present complex and involved world situation.

Therefore, all power to your elbow! The more great Societies like this, the Royal Central Asian Society, with its prestige and standing and its command of expert knowledge—the more that they can focus, develop, and increase interest on what is going on at the other end of the world, the better for all of us and the better for the world as a whole. I hope and believe that that important side of the activities of your Society will develop and increase all the time from strength to strength.

I fortified myself before making this speech by looking up a few facts and figures. The first thing that stood out seemed the leading part played in the early years of this Society by Lord Curzon. Some of us are old enough to remember Lord Curzon in his younger days. He was a brilliant politician. When he was Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office he devoted particular attention to developments in Central Asia, and he was attracted to a group of other experts, some of whom are still with us, who had got together in 1901 and founded this Society. They founded it deliberately to get informed opinion together in the belief, the conviction, that developments of immense importance, world events and world history, were likely to be shaped in Central Asia. And who shall say that they were wrong? That was in 1901; and then, in 1907, if I have got my history right, there came the agreement with Russia, and as a result that mysterious land of Central Asia, the land of the Turkis, of the Uzbegs, of the Kirghiz, and many other peoples—the land of Timur and of Babar—I will not say was sunk into oblivion, but lapsed into obscurity and no longer occupied men's thoughts as it had done before. But not before your Society had been founded and had taken root and was doing admirable work. It was serving as a contact centre for experts of all kinds—military and civil officers, business men, travellers, anybody who had felt the magic of these vast areas of Central Asia which, some say, was the cradle of the race, and which in any event is most romantic in every way. These experts with specialized knowledge were linked together through this Society,

and it proceeded with its work assisted by many very famous men among its members.

Perhaps it would not be out of place if I here referred to your late President, Lord Wavell. Lord Wavell was a most lovable character, a great man and a great friend. I like to recall that I had the privilege of serving alongside him in Egypt during the war years. He was magnificent there, as all the world knows. At one time he was fighting five campaigns on different fronts. As far as my own observation goes I only once saw him flinch, and that was only temporarily. That was when we were overrun at Ageila in the Western Desert. It is a tragic loss to the country and to the Society that he should have died so prematurely. Another member whom I might refer to, because it brings out the varied activities and interests of the Society, is Lt.-Col. Frederick Spencer Chapman, upon whom you have recently conferred your Lawrence Medal—he is an author, a mountaineer, and a man of heroic achievement.

The Society has spread its wings since its birth, and instead of being confined to Central Asia it now has study circles on many cognate problems in adjacent countries. Thus it covers the whole Asian continent, starting from Turkey, through Arabia, and right on to the Far East. I have not actually, unfortunately, ever been in Central Asia. My greatest friend, the late Sir Eric Teichman, when he was quite a junior, was sent up to the Tibetan frontier at Tachienlo, where he helped to bring about peace between the Chinese and the Tibetans of that day.

But I have been in China and the Far East, and it was there I met Sir Howard Kelly. Indeed, I remember the dinner at the Legation in Peking to which he has just referred. It was a dramatic occasion. I personally think that much of the trouble with which the world has since been afflicted flowed from the events which took place at that time, because the next thing was the occupation by the Japanese of Manchuria, with its far-reaching consequences. We none of us played a particularly heroic part in that affair. Not that we could have stopped it. It would have been ridiculous of course to suppose that we could physically save the situation in far-off Manchuria. But what we could have done was to have taken a firmer attitude on the moral issue, instead of which the matter was relegated to the League of Nations, which produced an excellent report and made a lot of recommendations, all of them good, but they were produced long after the stable door had been forced open and the horse stolen by the Japanese.

I can remember other little incidents about that time. Innumerable scraps went on in Shanghai. Here let me put on record, we all felt in this disturbed state of affairs that the best fellow to be under was Admiral Kelly, and I should like to take this opportunity of saying a word in appreciation of our association together in China and of thanking him for what he has said about me tonight. Admiral Kelly was in his ship, H.M.S. *Kent*, and we had an arrangement whereby we met every evening to pool our information. One night we were sitting talking when there suddenly arose a terrific racket nearby. It sounded like machine-gun fire, and close by in the Nanking road. We thought that the balloon had really gone up this time, but when we went out to find out what had

happened we found that owing to certain false rumours of a victory over the Japanese, the Chinese had got all their firecrackers together and were busy letting them off up and down the Nanking road.

I have travelled to the Far East by many routes—by air, by land, and by sea—but, alas! never by one particular route—the most famous journey probably in all the world—namely, the famous old silk route, out of Persia to Samarkand, across the Chinese frontier to Kuldja and Merv and Tashkent, across the Gobi desert to Lanchow in Kansu, and eventually to Hangchow and Peking. That was the route by which Nicholas Marco Polo travelled, bringing Western to Eastern civilization; from the Venetian Rialto to become the Governor of a Chinese province and the friend of the Mongol emperor. The early Franciscan missionaries went that way, and John de Plano Carpini, first Archbishop of Peking (A.D. 1328). He consecrated Mongol assistant bishops, and finally, just to show that there is no real truth in the saying that “East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet,” the Mongol Emperor (the Great Khan) despatched a mission to the Pope at Avignon in 1338. Even more interesting is the fact that our Edward III received the Sacrament at the hands of one of these Mongol assistant bishops consecrated by Archbishop John. Then the iron curtain fell, the curtain of Eastern fanaticism, and the great land route was closed. It was not until the Portuguese later came round by the Cape of Good Hope that contact between the West and the East started again. The old historic roadway, though never quite deserted, never regained its importance.

Now we have another iron curtain, not from the Far East but nearer home, and what is going on behind it, who shall say? We hear reports, we hear rumours of enormous developments in that distant region—of enormous agricultural production, of possibly the biggest cotton fields in the world, of the starting up of a vast textile industry, and, more than that, rumours of a Russian move eastward even so far as to join their comrades under the walls of Lhasa in Tibet.

In the light of all these developments, which nobody can accurately gauge, who will say that Marco Polo, your patron saint, if I may so call him, or Lord Curzon, your first President, would have been wholly surprised? Is it not very much what Lord Curzon himself foresaw about fifty years ago?

Ladies and Gentlemen, what I rose to do was to propose the toast of your Society, and I give you accordingly the health of the Royal Central Asian Society.

MINERAL PROSPECTS IN EASTERN PAKISTAN*

By NAFIS AHMAD

Head of the Dept. of Geography in the University of Dacca, E. Pakistan

EASTERN Pakistan is tucked in between the strategically important areas of South-western China, North-eastern India and Northern Burma. It is a province of fair size with an area of 54,115 square miles and has a teeming population of over 46 million. It is largely river built and water soaked, with an average annual rainfall of 80 inches. It is predominantly agricultural, but since the dawn of independence it is being increasingly realized that without a programme of moderate industrialization healthy economic development will not be possible. Power and fuel requirements and domestic mineral exploitation are a necessary adjunct of such a programme. This realization has led to the schemes connected with various investigations into the geological possibilities and mineral prospects.

Pakistan's mineral position as a whole is inextricably linked with the geological conditions of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Eastern Pakistan's peculiar position in this respect is a legacy of the Radcliffe Award of the Boundary Commission of 1947, which assigned to it mostly a flat, alluvial plain. With the exception of the Chittagong hill tracts and South Sylhet there is hardly an upland country anywhere.

Owing to the geological implications an overwhelming proportion of India's minerals were concentrated in the peninsular region of ancient origin. The younger geological formations of the west, north and east contained fewer minerals. Thus as a result of the partition Pakistan as a whole emerged poorer in minerals, though the richer in agricultural resources. Even then most of the share of Pakistan's minerals is located in the west and the Eastern Pakistan area has come out a poorer third in this respect. But it will be incorrect to say that by virtue of its geography and geology the area would have an entirely mineral-less future. No doubt she has severe natural handicaps, but with careful investigation, well-organized prospecting and judicious exploitation some minerals such as coal and oil are likely to be found and would constitute a useful addition to East Bengal's expanding natural resources.

THE EXISTING MINERAL POSITION

For a full appreciation of the province's existing mineral resources and future possibilities it is essential to keep in mind certain basic facts.

(1) The whole of the Indo-Pakistan area lying west of the Hoogly-Bhagirathi-Ganges line, with one exception, consists of geologically younger Tertiary and alluvial formations. The only exception is the old formations of the Assam Hills (Goro, Jaintia and Khasi). Before partition

* A paper read at the Section of Geology and Geography of the Third Pakistan Science Conference held at Dacca, January 10-14, 1951.

this area mainly yielded the oil of the Digboi region. In a small way there was the Darjeeling and Barshora coal (in the Jaintia hills) and some minerals of minor importance. It was at the end of May, 1949, that there came the news of the spectacular coal finds of good quality from the Garo hills in Assam (Siju, Darangiri, Khosegari, Dapsi and Tholgori, etc.), with prospects of yielding no less than 76 million tons in all. The rest of the area had received only occasional attention by the Geological Survey of private enterprise during the years before partition. It must be said in fairness, however, that the dense cover of vegetation blanketing the surface rocks in this area has always been a discouraging factor for the geologist.

(2) Out of the fuels, East Bengal at present produces none, though there are prospects of the future exploitation of both coal and oil. There are no metallic minerals beyond stray finds of iron oxides. The province has an abundance of sands and clays, and produces some sandstones, limestones and gravel. Salt extraction from the sea-water can be further extended and developed.

FUTURE EXPLOITATION

The above is by no means an encouraging picture. What of the future? Naturally, the pride of place in such an assessment must go to prospects of petroleum. Geologically, the occurrence of mineral oil in the sub-continent is restricted to the extra-peninsula, where it is found in young Tertiary rocks of ages ranging from Lower Eocene to Middle Miocene.

OIL

An important region is the Assam-Arakan oil belt, stretching from Assam (Digboi) south-westward through the Surma valley and the Chittagong Hill Tracts districts to the Arakan coast. Dr. Wadia says* that oil shows are found in association with the Brail Series in the Surma valley and Upper Assam and are continued through Chittagong to the Arakan coast. In these areas indications of petroleum are common in several localities where anticlinal structures are responsible for oil traps.

According to another view,† the general structure of the ridges protruding from the alluvium on the eastern side of East Bengal is anticlinal and the wide intervening valleys are synclinal. The rocks here are mostly of the Miocene Age and consist of fine sandstone and clay deposited by some mighty river which probably preceded the Brahmaputra. These ridges and *tilas* (hillocks) are thickly covered with forest growth, as the annual rainfall is over 100 inches. But, owing to the possibility of oil, many years back the oil companies, particularly the Burmah Oil Company, prepared a geographical map of the area by making traverses and filling in the gaps with the help of aerial photographs. Drilling was also undertaken in the Patharia forest area by the Burmah Oil Company after 1920. These test wells still exist. After the partition of India the political boundary ran through this area, and owing to the vagueness of the Rad-

* Wadia, *Geology of India*, 1944 edition, p. 250.

† H. Crooksrnk, *The Search for Oil in Pakistan*, Fourth World Power Conference, London, 1950, Paper No. 6.

cliffe Award in 1947 a boundary dispute cropped up between India and Pakistan for the fixation of the line.

The Bagge Tribunal* unanimously held that the line of demarcation passing through the Patharia forest as originally made out by Radcliffe should be maintained. This line actually cuts the forests into two portions from north to south. In view of the previous geological work and test drilling, some 80 per cent. of the possible oil-bearing area in the region remains within the Pakistan borders. There is an additional impediment to oil exploitation in this area in the shape of the undefined nature of ownership of minerals. In fact, the permanent settlement of Bengal has left this ownership in a nebulous condition.

An interesting aspect of the oil prospects in East Bengal is occasional finds of inflammable gas while boring wells in parts of Swandip island and Noakhali in the south, to Purbandhala in the north, in Mymensingh district. Besides, petroleum indications have been observed at Khasimara, Prithimpasa and Higimangura in the Sylhet district. Dr. Crookshank thinks that opinion can be said to be mildly optimistic about the future oil prospects of East Bengal.

With this proven oil area now within the East Pakistan territory, steps have been taken by the Pakistan Government to exploit the oil resources of the Patharia forest. In accordance with the provisions of the Pakistan Petroleum (Production) Rules, 1949, the Burmah Oil Company have formed a new company in Pakistan known as Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. They have recently been granted an oil-prospecting licence in the Patharia area. It is proposed to carry out vigorous drilling, for which the necessary machinery will be provided by the Burmah Oil Company. Some drilling machinery has already been shipped from Karachi to Chittagong.† It is expected that the yield in this area will be over 1,080,000 barrels per annum, or about 500,000 tons a year. According to another report,‡ the exploitation will be at a rate of 3,000 barrels a day. A refinery will also be set up in East Pakistan, possibly within the next three years. Recently, the Government of Pakistan have granted thirty-two licences for oil prospecting in Pakistan. Of these eight are in East Pakistan in the Chittagong district and the Chittagong hill tracts, covering an area of 200 square miles.

An American company has put forward to the Government plans of a preliminary aero-magnetic survey. The places where the company wishes to prospect are Patiys, Jaldi, Sitakund, Dakhin Nullah and Inani in the Chittagong district, and Camupora, Semotang and Olantang in the Chittagong hill tracts.


These developments are of considerable interest in view of the estimated annual requirements of East Pakistan—viz., 350,000 gallons of aviation fuels and 140,000 tons of kerosene oil. Future requirements at a moderate pace of industrial development and rising consumption during the next five to ten years are estimated at about three times the present needs.

It is clear that oil is present in East Bengal over a wide area. But its location and exploitation are no easy matter. Systematic and planned

* *The Gazette of Pakistan*, Extra, February 10, 1950, pp. 88-92.

† *Dawn*, Karachi, August 6, 1950.

‡ *The Statesman*, Calcutta, August 7, 1950.



prospecting will be followed by difficult test drilling. All this is a highly technical and costly business. An example is the test drilling which was undertaken at Lakhra in Sind from May 24, 1948, to February 10, 1950, without striking oil, though drilling reached a depth of 12,666 feet, thus becoming one of the deepest test wells in Asia. Therefore, exploitation for oil in East Bengal will depend on a combination of geophysical and other methods and must wait till necessary questions of finance and technical arrangements are adequately solved by the Government and private enterprise.

COAL

While the predominance of Tertiary formations is an advantage in the case of oil prospects, it is a limiting factor in the occurrence of coal in East Bengal. Coal is the most important of the minerals raised in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. In 1944 India produced 23 million tons, and the present output is about 30 million tons. Of this output 89 per cent. comes from South Bihar and West Bengal. Pakistan's total output is about 350,000 tons. It was 240,777 and 331,964 tons in 1948 and 1949 respectively. East Bengal produces none at present, though the annual requirement is to the tune of about 3 million tons and in the next ten years will certainly rise to 5 million tons. All the coal mined in the Pakistan areas is inferior Tertiary coal or lignite. These peaty lignites were deposited under a mantle of Recent to Sub-recent alluvium.* The geological history of the Sylhet and the north-eastern part of the Tippera district is interesting. The area lies between the foothills of Khasi-Jaintia and the Garo hills in the north and the Tippera hills and hillocks to the south. The low-lying area is traversed by numerous meandering streams and is full of *bils* and lakes. In the wet season most of the area remains under water. The present coal exposures in many cases occupy the sites of former hillocks which have been cut up and cleared to provide cultivable lands. This has happened in the last 100 years or so.

The specimens so far collected, from the Chittagong district or the Madhabpur and other localities in South Sylhet and north-eastern Tippera, naturally present samples of brown coal or lignite, characterized by larger moisture and volatile matter, ash and sulphur content. Some of these lignite seams, so far reported, are said to have a thickness varying between 2 and 6 feet, occur above the water-level of the streams and are covered by about 12 feet of silt. Other finds in the deltaic parts of East Bengal are those of layers of peat composed of forest vegetation and rice plants. In fact, in numerous *bils* of the area peat is in the process of formation at present, and is used in many cases as a manure by the people, though the chief use of peat is as fuel, after cutting and drying. The lignite is soft, and when fresh it is brown and the moisture content is high. In the open air it dries to about 12½ per cent. within a fortnight, and thereafter it dries slowly. On exposure to air it rapidly darkens to almost black.

In the last year lignites have been located at Chak-Rajendrapur, Ma-

* N. M. Khan, *A Survey of the Coal Resources of Pakistan*, Fourth World Power Conference, London, 1950, Paper No. 26. Also see M. Haque, *A Short Note on the Lignites of East Bengal*, Third Pakistan Science Conference, January, 1951, read at the Geology and Geography Section.

dhabpur, Manikpur and Madhumalaghat (in South Sylhet and Tippera district). Specimens are being regularly brought to a small test laboratory of the Geological Survey of Pakistan located in the Dacca University. The test results have been as follows* :

	%
Moisture and volatile matter	59.46
Carbon	24.52
Ash	16.02
Calorific value (B.Th.U.)	9,600

The South Sylhet lignites, both under water and surface deposits, have sulphur content up to 1 per cent. The Madhabpur lignites were located earlier, but during the last two years specimens have been collected and analysed from the following localities :

Sylhet district : Sialuri, Najafshahi, Dholgaon, Katpara, Nawabpura, Shahpur, Shahjibazar, Ambaria, Salla, Chak-Rajendrapur, Madhumalaghat.

Tippera district : Kalachar, Dariapur, Sonamura, Harashpur, Panchgaon, Chanduraghat.

For the last year a party of the Geological Survey of Pakistan has been investigating the possibilities of lignite deposits in the Sylhet and Tippera districts. It will not be surprising, therefore, if geological investigation is rewarded in the near future with finds of reasonable quantities of lignite from these areas, though as yet it is too early to gauge the full possibilities of these deposits. Tests have revealed that these lignites can best be used in the form of briquettes. They are also considered suitable for use as fuel in thermal plants. It will be possible to obtain a number of useful by-products like oil, pitch, tar and spirits from this coal.

If a line is drawn to join Madhabpur to Harashpur railway station (about thirteen miles from Akhaura railway junction), then a number of lignite localities fall west of that line within a perimeter of five miles from the metre-gauge railway. This is fortunate, as in case of systematic exploitation good rail transport to Akhaura will be a distinct advantage. Akhaura is almost equidistant from Chittagong, Dacca-Narayanganj industrial area and Sylhet. The future use of lignite in the industrial development of these three centres will be relevant in relation to transport costs.

IRON OXIDE

A word should also be added about iron oxide possibilities in the province. Iron was certainly worked on a large scale in many parts of India in olden times, and certain areas in East Bengal figured no less in this industry. But modern needs require large deposits which are lacking in this area. Iron ore occurs in the subcontinent chiefly in the form of the oxide—haematite and magnetite. But the main area is the peninsula.

* N. M. Khan, *A Survey of the Coal Resources of Pakistan*, Fourth World Power Conference, London, 1950, Paper No. 26. Also see M. Haque, *A Short Note on the Lignites of East Bengal*, Third Pakistan Science Conference, January, 1951, read at the Geology and Geography Section. Also see *Directory of the Economic Minerals of Pakistan*, by the Geological Survey of Pakistan, 1950.

Elsewhere there are considerable deposits of lateritic hæmatite. In East Pakistan iron oxides have been found near Rangamati* in the form of river-rolled material and in the shape of deposits near Latu in Barlekha thana and the New Dona tea garden (both in South Sylhet). Investigation of these finds should be carried on. The ore may come handy for local use. But too much hope of these leading to large finds of iron ore should not be entertained.

MINERAL POLICY

The Government of Pakistan's mineral policy should be directed to the conservation and increase of her resources in the national interest. More systematic geological surveys should be started with a view to locating and developing whatever mineral resources the province possesses. This work will depend on the organization and building up of an eastern wing of the Pakistan Geological Survey, including the posting of trained geologists and geophysicists.† A well-equipped test laboratory should be set up in East Bengal.

Finally, it is suggested that mineral rights should be separated from land ownership rights, if necessary by proper legislation. This will discourage adventurous and selfish individuals from keeping geological information hidden in grandmother caskets. It is a step, therefore, in the right direction that the Government of Pakistan have drafted rules laying down conditions for the grant of concessions for petroleum and mineral resources. An enactment was passed, known as the Mines, Oilfields and Mineral Development (Federal Control) Act, 1948, according to which the work connected with the development of mines and minerals has been taken over by the Central Government. Two more sets of fresh rules have been framed for the grant of mining concessions—namely, the Pakistan Petroleum (Production) Rules, 1949, and the Pakistan Mining Concession Rules, 1949, which came into force from September 1, 1949, and October, 1949, respectively. This work will be handled by the new Department of Mineral Concessions.

To end this brief survey, the conclusion is inescapable that the main economic development of East Bengal and her industrial future cannot be based on her mineral wealth. Her industries will have an agro-industrial complex and the main source of power will be a combination of hydro-electric power and imported coal and oil for a long time to come. The possibilities of the industrial utilization of oil and lignites will be clear only after the initial stages of exploitation are successfully overcome.

* Red oxide of iron in a well-protected form has been found plentifully on ground level near the town of Rangamati (meaning "coloured earth") sixty-five miles up the Karnafuli river from Chittagong. The stones are obviously water rolled and carried down from hill slopes farther east. They were formerly the result of under-water deposits. Tests have revealed that the oxide can be profitably used in the making of paints, etc.

† A geologist with a couple of assistants has recently been posted to the area by the Geological Survey of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan also acquired the services of Messrs. Powell Duffryn Technical Services Ltd., of England, to report on the coal production of the country. The report has been submitted recently.

ISLAM AND THE COMMONWEALTH

By SYED WARIS AMEER ALI, C.I.E.

Lecture delivered at a meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society on February 28, 1951, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the chair.

The **PRESIDENT**: Syed Waris Ameer Ali, who is to speak to us today on relations between the Moslem world and the British Commonwealth, is a member of a distinguished Moslem family which traces its descent from the prophet Mohammed himself. Syed Ameer Ali's father, the Right Hon. Syed Ameer Ali, was the first non-European member of H.M. Privy Council. He was also the founder of the Moslem University at Aligarh in the United Provinces.

The lecturer himself was educated at Wellington College and Balliol, and after taking his degree at Oxford he entered the Indian Civil Service to join the judicial branch, where he had a very distinguished career.

On his retirement to England during the last war he was from 1939 to 1945 War Services Adviser to the High Commissioner for India; he also initiated a scheme by which non-Europeans were enlisted and commissioned in this country.

Syed Ameer Ali is a very constant member of our Society. Incidentally, he is a very good shot, and was a member of the India rifle team at Bisley from 1930 to 1938.

NOT many years ago the British Empire used to be spoken of as the greatest Islamic power in the world, for no less than 120 million Moslems owed allegiance to the Crown, the greater part in the old Indian Empire, others in Malaya and parts of Africa. The fact that a Minister until recently in the Cabinet claimed to have disintegrated the British Empire, and that the new name for what is left is "the Commonwealth," cannot dispose of our vital interest in the Islamic world, and especially in those Moslems who still are our fellow-subjects. Long may they remain so! The geographical factor is obvious. The new Dominion of Pakistan and the Moslem States to the west cover most of our vital oil supplies; the Arabian peninsula and the fertile crescent to the north cover the approaches to Africa, now so important to the free world. People in these islands are less conscious of the human factor. Moslems formed nearly half of the old regular Indian Army and a very large part of that army as expanded during Hitler's war, whilst at least 50,000 Moslem merchant seamen served at sea in allied and especially British shipping during that most crucial time.

As for the measure of these men, a Punjabi Moslem officer was the fourth generation in his regiment, enlisted in the '20s as a Sepoy, and rose to King's Commissioned Major with a decoration, before losing his eyesight and a leg in close combat on the Burma front. Previous to this he had led an attack on a Japanese strongpoint with a raw company of Moslem lads from the Peshawar plain. His word of command was prefaced by "There are the pagan Japanese and there is your objective." The company charged over the open and suffered 180 out of 200 casualties, but it took the position. My brother secured this officer a Government grant of 20 acres of canal land near his home, but whether he survived the massacres subsequent to the partition of the Punjab in 1947 we do not

know. As for the seamen of the Royal Indian Navy and the merchant service, theirs were the ordinary hazards of a war in which so great a proportion of our shipping was sunk. A boat from a ship torpedoed far out in the South Atlantic was groping for survivors. The English mate in charge saw a drift of white flotsam on a wave crest. When he got near he saw that it was the serang's (the boatswain's) white beard wagging in the water. The old man called out, "Never mind me, I have a lifebelt; pick up the others first." I returned to India in 1919 in a ship manned by the survivors of a Lascar crew who had had three other ships torpedoed under them in the Kaiser's war.

The tradition of these loyalties still persists. I found a couple of Royal Pakistan Navy petty officers in, of all places, the South Kensington district post office just before the New Year. With the simple curiosity of the East, they asked all about me—Did I live here, and why? I replied, "Yes; I am a 'Shahi Adami' (King's man). I took the oath of allegiance to the King-Emperor many years ago, and to no other." This was received with beaming smiles of appreciation. Nor is this sentiment confined to Moslems. At the time of the partition in 1947 the regiment in garrison at Sialkot, a unit a century old, was ordered to parade for its components—Punjabi Moslems, Sikhs, and Hindus—to be separated and allotted to the new Dominions. The men refused to be parted from their comrades, most of them being the fourth generation in the regiment. They declared that they wished above all to continue to serve the King as of yore, or, if that were not permitted, then either of the new Dominions as a unit. They flatly refused to be separated and were in consequence disbanded.

Such sentiments are not always understood, but we ought to take them into account, and their encouragement may be of the highest value in the troubled and dangerous years that lie ahead.

One of the danger spots to us is Malaya, where Communists, for the most part Chinese by race, are holding at bay Crown Forces many times their number, and endangering the greatest dollar-earning source of the Empire. From all accounts the Moslem Malays, the original inhabitants of the land, are not by any means the most backward in support of law and order. Yet the emphasis seems to be laid on the Chinese in Malaya, many of whom are doubtless most reputable people. Some have given their lives in upholding the law; many others have been murdered. A considerable residue, however, some 300,000, are squatters, some of them part-time bandits. Many others sympathize very naturally with their compatriots in China. Indeed, according to *The Times* of February 1, quite a number of young Chinese in Malaya are seeking temporary permits to go to Communist China in order to avoid compulsory service in the special constabulary. Instead of sending back yet others, who can well be spared, to their land of origin, expensive schemes of resettlement, re-education, etc., are initiated, which are likely to be effective just so long as the Communist menace is not intensified. What is the ordinary decent Malay to think of this, and has ever so much care and forethought been bestowed upon him in the past?

Nay, more; shortly after the reoccupation of Malaya, a Constitution was drafted that would have placed the Malays at a disadvantage *vis à vis*

the Chinese and other foreign immigrants, a Constitution which fortunately did not take form. At about the same time, Sarawak, the creation of the Brooke dynasty, was purchased by H.M. Government from the ruling Rajah, to the detriment of his heir's right of succession.

This was acclaimed in some quarters as a possible means of abrogating the so-called privileged position of the Malays, who after all were loyal subjects of the State and whose forbears had helped the original Rajah Brooke to bring peace and order to the land. Also about that time a most curious statement appeared in an influential London paper—namely, that it would be contrary to British interests to have what it styled a “Pakistan block” stretching from Western India to Malaya; a most extraordinary idea and one physically impossible, but it showed the lines upon which some publicists think. One would have thought that the bogy of Pan-Islamism would have vanished with the Caliphate, if not with the Kaiser's war, when that potentate made the great mistake of thinking that his Turkish alliance would arouse the whole Islamic world against Britain and her allies.

The idea of Moslem backwardness appears to be a sort of convention. In an article in *The Times* Professor Julian Huxley mentioned *en parenthèse*, “the Backward Northern Moslem Emirates of Nigeria.” A senior British official since told me that it was supposed that the Northern Nigerian Moslems were apathetic in comparison with the southern peoples in the terrific demand for the new English education. Yet when the matter was mooted eventually to the Emir of Katsena he was delighted at the idea of the spread of that education in the north. Curiously enough, when the present Government's groundnut scheme was initiated, over which the taxpayer is now £36 million down, scores of thousands of tons of groundnuts grown by backward Northern Nigerians were left rotting on the ground at the railheads for want of rolling stock depleted by the war, the replacement of which should have been a *first* priority.

This anti-Islamic prejudice manifests itself in unexpected quarters. One would have expected that in an age where our principal potential enemy combines a revival of ancient Tartar despotism with Czarist expansion under the cloak of “dialectic materialism”—that is, militant atheism allied to Marxist cant—those professing any revealed religion would have met with fellow-feeling from the adherents of long-established faiths in the free world. One can understand, it is true, a certain antipathy from leftists, fellow-travellers, and those with an “Au revoir” look over their shoulder towards the Iron Curtain. It is, however, most regrettable when very high dignitaries of the Anglican Church publicly compare the Communist threat to religion with the alleged “wiping out of the Eastern Churches by early Islam.” Incidentally, Islam never wiped out any Christian Church, but continuously showed a respect and toleration for Christian beliefs and religious organizations, inculcated by the Prophet himself. The Koran lays down in no uncertain terms that Christians and Jews are “peoples of the Book” equally endowed with revealed religion along with Moslems, and not to be confounded in any way with atheists and polytheists. The Vatican, it may be noted, is not making the mistake of spurning Moslem support in the war against the new atheism.

It should be emphasized here that Moslems not only respected Judaism, but gave asylum to large numbers of Jews, with freedom of religion, when they were expelled from Christian Europe with barbaric thoroughness as late as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Many years ago I was accosted on a dark night in an Oxford quadrangle with the Jewish salutation "Shalom Aleikum." This was a Ukrainian Jew expressing his thanks for the toleration and hospitality accorded by Moslems to his co-religionists, which he said their successors would never forget. Alas that this should have gone with the wind of militant Zionism, and the Palestine controversy! I am aware that this is treading upon delicate ground, but in dealing with Islam and the Commonwealth we are bound to take it into serious account. It implies no lack of sympathy with religious Judaism, and no lack of disgust at the vile treatment of Jews in Europe of late years, to regret very deeply that Zionism has taken the form of a secular State with strong expansionist tendencies, that it has expelled close upon a million Arabs in much the same way as Jews were expelled elsewhere, and that it is filling a small area with an esurient mass of immigrants from Eastern Europe that will give force to the militant Zionist ambition to conquer the whole fertile crescent as far as Basra. To quote from this Society's latest journal, "Israel has made dependent on a peace settlement with the Arab States the release of any of the £P4 to 5 million standing to Arab accounts in banks (including £P1 million in Barclays) now subject to Israel. The Arab refugees are therefore incapable of helping themselves." Two distinguished Sephardic Jews expressed the greatest regret to me that their community had been permitted to play so small a part in the Zionist movement. They rightly said that the Sephardi of true Semitic descent have had so much association with Moslems that had *they* shared substantially in directing the movement matters would have proceeded with far greater mutual accommodation. Whatever folly the Arab League may have committed in making war upon what is virtually a European army, armed and partly manned from behind the Iron Curtain, the plight of the Arab refugees and the fear of Zionist expansion poison the atmosphere of the Middle East. It is in the highest degree in accord with public policy to settle these matters in a just and reasonable manner, under the influence of the great Western nations.

It is quite to be understood that Jews in influential positions should sympathize with the settlement of their Ashkenazi co-religionists, in the main descended from Slavonic or Ugro-Finnish converts to the Mosaic law, in a land sacred to three religions. The Holy Land was conquered from the Turks in 1917 by the late Lord Allenby, a third of whose army was composed of Moslems. Our chairman today was one of his generals. Is it too much to hope that the Jews of the West will press for a reasonable settlement of all these outstanding questions, for a restraint of further ambition of territorial expansion, and an abandonment of anti-Islamic influences, in the interest of the whole Western world in retaining the vital position of the Middle East? One cannot be certain of the attitude of Israel in a conflict between Russia and the West. Many of the immigrants to Zion came from lands behind the Iron Curtain, and no one can be sure

that a deterioration in the Western position might not bring about a new Czechoslovakia. The Arab East is far too divided, far too backward physically and industrially, ever to wipe out Israel. The danger is on the other side. It is an unfortunate fact that Jewry has been inspired by a certain animus against Islam from its very inception. This probably arose from the Prophet's claim "to restore the pure worship of the God of Abraham," and to his subsequent preaching of a monotheism freed from rabbinical accretions.

We are all fully aware of the threat hanging over the ancient country of Iran, or Persia, which has had a continuity of national existence since many centuries B.C. Her rulers appear now to be well aware of the need to foster the economic advancement of their subjects. Their neighbour to the east, Afghanistan, is less fortunate in not having the inestimable advantage of fructifying oil, and remains in much the same condition relatively as she was fifty years ago. You will recollect the failure of King Amanullah in moving too fast in modernizing that distant land. Unlike Persia, Afghanistan is a State with no long history, having been at diverse times part of the Persian and Mughal empires.

Within her boundaries are races of Turkish, Iranian, Indo-Aryan, and Mongol stocks speaking totally different languages. The first King of Afghanistan was a brother general-of-horse along with my great-grandfather's grandfather in the army of the Persian conqueror Nadir Shah. On the murder of that monarch, in 1747, Ahmad Shah, the chief of the Abdali tribe of southern Afghans, a loyal and gallant servant of his late master, made for home with his tribal horse and as much of the royal treasure as he could secure in the confusion. He then changed the name of his clansmen from Abdalis to Duranis, "Pearlies," and assumed the sovereignty of an Afghanistan united for the first time in history. The subsequent story of the Durani royal family is well known. At any rate there is no shadow of ground for the claim of the Afghans of today for a new State of Pukhtunistan to be carved out for the tribesmen on their eastern frontier from a great part of western Pakistan, more especially as these same tribesmen have never taken kindly to Durani rule from Kabul or for that matter to any other rule. At this moment they appear to be almost solidly for Pakistan, and to be behaving better than at any other time for centuries. It is quite true that Afghans of all the races are passionately independent and display solidarity when attacked, as British Indian armies of old sometimes found to their cost. Equally they are known for fickleness and unreliability. An unfortunate proverb about them, widely quoted, is only too applicable to the present agitation, sponsored in high places not only in Kabul but in Hindu Delhi, to dismember western Pakistan. The new Pakistan Government appears to have made every effort to be neighbourly to the Afghan State, giving it free access to the sea, etc., and this is its reward. Those sponsoring the agitation appear to be inspired by a primitive jealousy, aroused by the memory of the short-lived Afghan rule of Kashmir and down into the Punjab, that was ended a century and a quarter ago by Ranjit Singh and his former Napoleonic officers, aided by the internecine quarrels of the Durani royal family.

This brings us to Pakistan, the great new Moslem State, still one of the Dominions and not yet a republic. Apart from its position as the western bastion of the Indian subcontinent, and the eastern buttress of the Iranian countries, it has a greater Moslem population than any other State in the world. I was fortuitously present when the original idea of Pakistan was adumbrated by a guest at the dinner-table of the late General Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, then a member of the Secretary of State's Council in London. Dominions were at the time in the air, Lord Halifax having with Mr. Baldwin's concurrence shortly before given his blessing to Dominion status for India. I was alone of the company in considering that the idea of Pakistan was of doubtful practicability, and in counselling adherence to the original motto of the Moslem League when it was founded by my late father and the Aga Khan—"To promote the interests of the Moslems of India and loyalty to the British Crown." On the other hand, with the increasing avidity of the Hindu Indian National Congress, the Moslems of India were apprehensive of the loss of their national, which meant their religious, identity, and they could not be blamed for demanding a State where they might be free. Powerful influences were against them, but, as General Toker unfolds in his terrible tale of the last two years of British rule in India, the state of mind of the Congress and Mahasabha Hindus was such that the Moslems were bound to press for a country of their own to ensure not being reduced to the status of a depressed class. As it is, 35 millions of Moslems were left in the new Hindu India, which its rulers describe as a "secular State" but its subjects as "Ram Rāj," pure Hindu rule. It is true that a small proportion of Moslems is employed by the Hindu Government. One such I knew, who had held high office under the old Imperial Government, stated that he had felt obliged to leave his home in retirement and take up employment many hundreds of miles away at Delhi, to which he was summoned by the Hindu Government, for fear of consequences if he refused. We know that there were more than 1 million killed immediately after the partition of 1947, the great majority Moslems, and 14 million homeless of both religions. There have been many murders and forced conversions of harmless and isolated Moslem artisans, etc., out in Hindu villages, and who knows what is still going on in the rapid disintegration of order in India? We also know that there are some 11 million Hindus left in Pakistan who now appear to be perfectly happy in their normal vocations, and one even reads of a Pakistani governor thanking a Hindu notable for initiating a great industrial enterprise in the N.W.F.P.

Owing to the insane haste in which the abdication from India and the partition were conducted in 1947, Pakistan started not only with the strategic disadvantage of being divided into two parts 1,000 miles away, and accessible by land only over Hindu territory, but also with a flood of starving refugees fleeing from massacre and terror, and without the very elements of a modern administration, even to tables and chairs. Those who have wrought this amorphous mass of misery and confusion into a State in being are worthy of the highest praise.

It is not invidious specifically to mention the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, a former landholder in the United Provinces, and Sir

Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister, a member of the Ahmadiya sect. This small Moslem community contributed some 500 officers and 15,000 other ranks to his Majesty's forces in the late war, when not a few of the present rulers of India were in comfortable detention for activities against the allied war effort. The leadership of these Moslem statesmen, exiles from the new India, and successors of that remarkable but difficult personage the late Mr. Jinnah, more than anyone else the prime mover of the Pakistan idea, has had an extremely good effect upon the lower personnel. Unaccustomed as many of these were to the offices vacated by the departure of the old Imperial cadres, there seem to be far fewer complaints of administrative deterioration from Pakistan than from the neighbouring republic.

Nor must we forget that Mr. Jinnah and his successors had the foresight to retain a substantial body of British administrators in high posts, and of British officers in the fighting services of Pakistan, during the formative period of the State, which owes them a very great debt of gratitude. The fact of Sir Frank Mudie being in charge of the Western Punjab was of inestimable value in dealing with the millions of miserable refugees that poured into the province from India in the terrible autumn of 1947. It was also fortunate indeed that a British governor was at the head of the frontier province when the tribesmen swarmed in to the holy war in Kashmir.

Nor were these the only handicaps for the new State. Instead of accepting the fact of partition *de bonne volonté*, the new India lost no opportunity, great or small, to spite Pakistan, from the refusal to surrender the share of arms, munitions, etc., due to Pakistan on the proportionate division of the assets of the old Empire, to interference with communications. In fact, the "secular State" is seething with jealousy at the separation of predominantly monotheistic and egalitarian Moslem areas, and bitterly disappointed at not being able to rule the whole peninsula. "Brahmans still rule in Benares," but they and their kind long to rule as far as Arakan and the Khyber.

If Communism comes to India we shall in all probability witness the transformation of Brahmanism once more—"Brahmans will still rule in Benares," but as commissars.

A fact worthy of remark is that four of the leading Communists in India are Mahratta Brahmans, and it was stated by *The Times* that they have gone underground. The secret core of Brahmanism with its roots in Western India—the body in all probability associated with the murder of Mr. Gandhi—appears to have reinsured itself. It may in future find in the worship of Lenin a not inapt reincarnation of Shiva, the Hindu destroyer god, who has taken the place of the King-Emperor on some stamps of the new republic.

The worst feature for the moment of this spite against Pakistan is the typical evasion of the recommendations of the United Nations mediators for the settlement of the dispute about Kashmir, a dispute that is poisoning relations to the point of compromising not only the safety of the two dominions but of the whole of southern Asia.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan refused to attend the recent conference

of Imperial Premiers in London unless the matter was discussed. He won a great moral victory. The matter *was* discussed, with what result we know. The next step remains with the United Nations, and it is to be hoped that they will be more successful in overcoming Indian obstinacy. *En passant* let me give you an instance of the natural good feelings of the ordinary decent workaday Hindu of all the castes of Northern India. New Year greetings reached me this January, in the same letter, from a prominent Hindu lawyer, a former principal clerk, and last and most pathetic my untouchable sweeper—after twenty-one years.

The main reasons for the undue tenderness hitherto displayed to the new Indian Government, apart from the old and unnatural liaison between the British Labour Party and the Indian Congress, the party in India of big business and caste Hinduism, appear to be as follows :

First, the idea that the new Hindu India will be the mirror as well as the leader of Asiatic national consciousness. We have now seen how tender it is to the Chinese Communists, and how its Prime Minister has openly professed its incapacity to help Tibet. The late Imperial Government was able to send a force over some of the highest passes in the world to Lhasa in 1904.

Secondly, the hope that the new India will be a tower of strength against Communism in Asia.

A Government that has pensioned or reinstated the Indian prisoners of war who joined the Japanese is not likely to have at its command armed forces of the reliability that would be required in a major war. This fact is unfortunately better understood by others than by the Western world.

Thirdly, the natural desire to retain the Indian trade connection and existing British commercial interests in India. This is wholly laudable, but business men are not always infallible judges of long-term consequences. I recollect a prominent English business man asserting some years ago that "our superiah brain powah" would uphold British business interests in a free Burma, and the very same remark made by a Labour M.P. about India before 1947.

The existing conditions point to the conclusion that Pakistan is a far better "risk" for the Western nations than India, which is more likely to be a grave liability than an asset in a major war or other serious trouble. The United States appear now to incline to this opinion, and a pungent comment there is that Pandit Nehru has far too much influence on British policy.

In the face of this criticism cannot some influence be brought to bear upon the Government of India to be more accommodating over a solution of the Kashmir dispute and other outstanding questions at issue with Pakistan? Why should all the influence be wielded by them? When it comes to a British ship laden with explosives for India blowing up in the Red Sea, the method seems obvious. Presumably we require explosives ourselves for rearmament. We should, I submit, be fully justified in refusing to allow any more war material to go to India unless and until the Kashmir dispute is settled in accordance with the U.N.O. award. Much of this and other exports to India is still paid for out of the sterling balances credited in London to India for heavy expenditure by the Imperial

Government at inflated prices during the late war. Our export returns may be slightly lessened for a time, and those profiting here by such exports at the British taxpayers' expense may cry to heaven; but rest assured that few urban Hindu traders will stand for long against the prospect of free imports.

To sum up, it is difficult to expect a coherent policy when so many cross-currents bear. If, however, we are to cope with the Kremlin in Asia, which *has* a coherent policy, it is incumbent on the Western powers to evolve a reasoned method of approach to the Moslem East as a whole. I am not for spoiling anyone, Moslem or otherwise, but Colombo plans are not enough, and in any case are unlikely to benefit the majority without a considerable interval. A reasoned political policy is just as necessary as economic development, more so perhaps, for safety of life and family is sometimes valued in the East far more than material possessions.

First of all, as Israel greatly depends on contributions from U.S.A. and British Jewry, it should be brought to restrain its immigration, its armaments, and expansionist tendencies, as well as to a just settlement in regard to the Arab refugees. In parts of Arabia care should be taken lest the sudden wealth acquired by some elements from oil should lead to the pauperization of others. The Persian problem is well understood. Afghanistan should be persuaded to conduct herself with more good neighbourliness to her sister Islamic State, Pakistan, and every assistance given her for economic development suited to her primitive but virile population. A supreme effort should be made to end the corroding Kashmir dispute, and all others between Pakistan and India. Without early action, it is to be feared that the whole Middle East and Southern Asia may in the near future present us with as grave a set of problems as any other we have had to face since 1945.

A MEMBER: Could Syed Ameer Ali say whether it is true, as recently stated in *The Times*, that the Kashmir problem is having a very bad effect in Pakistan upon Pakistan-British relations—that the Pakistanis do not like the British quite so much as they previously did?

The LECTURER: So far as the ordinary Indian or Pakistani is concerned, I should think that 90 per cent. of the people never had anything but a considerable affection for the Europeans with whom they had relations, especially for the British. Naturally, however, the Pakistanis, who consider that they belong to the Empire and still acknowledge His Majesty the King, are very concerned and somewhat sore at the moment, that the other people get the best of both worlds and that the Commonwealth does not appear to be able to do anything about it. Rightly or wrongly, they think there has been an undue tenderness on the part of the present British Government towards their protégés in the Government of India.

Col. G. R. ROUTH: Dr. Ambedkar, in his book *Thoughts on Pakistan*, relates rather sadly that the British interfered with the Islamization of the Indian subcontinent. Has the lecturer any comment to make upon that?

Syed AMEER ALI: Dr. Ambedkar is a distinguished representative of the Scheduled Castes in Bombay, and I do not think they had a very

fair opportunity to appreciate the past history of India. Those whose forbears had something to do with it on one side or the other claim that it is totally incorrect to say that the Moslems ever exterminated the Hindus. I have heard it said that the great mistake the Moslems made was in not forcibly converting all Hindus, but that is beside the point. You will find that Moslems and Hindus actually lived in perfect amity, that Moslems served Hindu princes and Hindus served Moslem princes.

I was shooting during Christmas, 1922, in the Fyzabad district of Oudh. There was a lake which was a remnant of an old river cut off many centuries ago. On each side of the lake there was an old village, each going back to the thirteenth century A.D. Their first settlement owed its existence to the Moslem viceroys of the Pathan dynasty of Delhi. Most of these viceroys had Hindu troops serving them, young lads who wanted to get away from home, very much like the Normans who served in Scotland. The people in these two particular villages were Hindu Rajputs in one and Moslem Rajputs in the other village. They told me they were "blood brothers" and that up to fifty years ago the peoples on each side used to exchange daughters and intermarry. The folk of the one village were descended from one Rajput brother who remained a Hindu, and the others from a second Rajput brother who turned Moslem out of conviction. His descendants were Moslems and they lived in perfect amity with the Hindus until at least that year 1922. I must confess that I saw no signs of extermination there. I could cite numerous other such instances of Hindu and Moslem amity and consanguinity.

A MEMBER: Is it a fact that after nine centuries' rule the Moslem population was only a quarter of the Hindu, which goes to prove that the Moslems tolerated the Hindus?

Syed AMEER ALI: Absolutely, sir; that is what I was saying. In fact, a large proportion of the Moslems of India are descended from converted Hindus. In Southern India a large proportion of the Christians are descended from converted Hindus. I do not wish to mock at anything anyone else believes, but they preferred the higher ethic to one that involves the worship of sticks, stones, and the forces of destruction.

Brig.-General SPENCER WESTON: How would you suggest that the British or any other Government could contribute to the settlement of the Kashmir dispute except by the use of force?

Syed AMEER ALI: I do not think there is need for force at all. All that is necessary is to clamp down on the sterling balances and say there will be no more war material sent from this country unless there is compliance with the recommendations of UNO. That would be a drastic step to take, but I think the time has come to take it. These people are the creation of the present British Government. Do not tell me, sir, that the great majority of Hindus care one rap about Kashmir. The great majority of Moslems do care, because they know that there are 500,000 refugees from Kashmir. And, moreover, according to *The Times* in October, 1947, in a very striking special article from a correspondent on the spot—we can look up *The Times* and see the actual words—the Maharajah of Kashmir at the head of his own army had them recently evicted in a most summary manner—I think the word used was stronger

than "summary"—210,000 men, women and children who were his Moslem subjects in the Jammu province. The cure would be no more war material, and no more exports paid for out of the inflated sterling balances in this country due to inflated prices paid by the Imperial Government during the last war.

Miss W. KELLY : How does Pandit Nehru reconcile his attitude towards Kashmir with his attitude towards Hyderabad?

Syed AMEER ALI : My dear lady, ask me another ! Somebody wrote to *The Times* after he had had one and a half hours' interview with Nehru, who had given him every kind of reason why he should retain a force in Kashmir, to say that it had convinced him that India was in the wrong. You all know Mr. Philips Price, who is a distinguished member of our Society, and a supporter of the present Government in the House of Commons. He is now out in Kashmir, and yesterday he contributed a most illuminating article by telegram to the *Daily Mail*, which General Weston might be interested to read.

Major E. AINGER : Syed Ameer Ali made the point that if Pakistan were to be forced out of the Commonwealth the consequences would be incalculable. A possible consequence would be the weakening of the Moslem opposition to Communism. There is the parallel case of China, where some well-informed people suggest that the Communist religion is so strong that it has overridden feelings of nationalism. In fact, it was even suggested, though I think that is going too far, that it might be possible to divide the iron and coal of Manchuria fairly between Russia, China and Japan under the cloak of religion. The point I was going to make on the unforeseeable consequences if Pakistan were to become unfortunately an enemy of the West is that the only country to which Pakistan could turn would then be Russia. But there is there the problem of a clash between one religion and another. The basic religions of China are not apparently standing up to Communism. Whether Christian civilization will stand up to it is a problem. What is the position of Islam as a spiritual force when opposed by this new spiritual force?

Syed AMEER ALI : That is a very big problem. It must be remembered that the average Moslem is a religious person, otherwise he would not be a Moslem. He dislikes and fears Russia—always has, Tsarist or otherwise. There is the old proverb : *Khirs Rus Dushman-i-Islam*—"the Russian bear, enemy of Islam." On the other hand, we must always remember that there are 30,000,000 Moslems in the Russian Empire in Russia and Central Asia. Whether they are ill-treated or not, we do not know. Perhaps no more than or no less than the other peoples in the Russian Empire, and the people in those areas have always been bullied by somebody, their own former indigenous rulers included. It is only a matter of another lot of bullies equipped with more modern equipment.

I think there is grave danger in the case of Pakistan that, if that country were goaded into a war against the new Hindu Government, which would be backed by a copious supply of armaments paid for out of the sterling balances, there would be defeat and the new Indian army would get into the plains of Pakistan, and we would have much the same sort of thing as happened in 1947—massacres and wholesale evictions. Then, as Nature

abhors a vacuum, there would be a spill-over from Central Asia, as there has been many times in past history—in pagan times, in Alexander's time, and in Moslem times. There would be that very serious risk. I do not think that risk is too far-fetched to draw attention to it.

Major AINGER: You do not think that the spiritual force of Islam is sufficiently strong to combat the spiritual force of Communism?

Syed AMEER ALI: The spiritual force may not hold out when women and children are being massacred by Sikhs and Hindus. Is not that so? Any port in a storm. And if one's so-called co-religionists come over the frontier, there you are.

The CHAIRMAN: You will agree that we have listened to a deeply interesting lecture; unfortunately our time is up and we must draw the meeting to a close. I am sure there are many others in the audience who would like to ask the lecturer questions and to hear his views.

He commenced by discussing the fighting qualities of the Moslem soldier, and I would like personally to take this opportunity of paying my tribute of great admiration of, and affection for, the Moslem soldier, with whom I served for so many years.

A most distinguished person in this country, talking to me recently about Communism, said that the frightening thing about Communism was that it was a religion in which Communists so firmly and fanatically believe. If that is so, then it must be opposed by organized religion. I believe that the Moslem religion is one of the few organized religions in the world which will oppose Communism, because both in faith and way of life the Moslem is entirely opposed to the Communist tenets and, therefore, I do sincerely trust that, as Pakistan is backed by the whole of the Moslem world, our legislators in high places will make it their business to support Pakistan without any let, hindrance or doubt whatsoever.

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks.

THE FRONTIER STATES OF DIR, SWAT AND CHITRAL

By LT.-COLONEL E. H. COBB, O.B.E.

Being notes of a lecture given to the Society on January 17, 1951, illustrated by lantern slides. The President, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the chair.

The Lecturer served in the Political Department of the Government of India and was for many years closely associated with this part of the North-west Frontier Province, as Political Agent at Chitral, at Gilgit, and at the Malakand up to the transfer of power in 1947.

THESE mountainous countries are now part of Pakistan, and the map and photographs from the area illustrate its strategic importance, the difficulty of communications, and the necessity of maintaining strong and able government at this focal point, "where three empires" used almost to "meet."

The normal line of communications between these States runs roughly parallel with the Afghan frontier, north from the Malakand pass up the Swat valley to the border of Swat with the Kohistan, thence from Chakdara through Dir State and over the Lowarai pass to Drosh and Chitral.

The Upper Swat canal passes by the Benton tunnel under the Malakand pass, a wonder of British engineering enterprise which astounds the tribesman who meets it for the first time, to give irrigation water and electric power to a large part of the Frontier Province. A "Gibraltar rock" covers the approach from the north by which the modern motor road and the old Buddhist road climb to the summit of the pass. The hillside is covered with the lowest-growing of the pines (*Pinus longifolia*), and Græco-Buddhist sculptures have been collected from ruins in the neighbourhood which bear witness to the influence of the short period of Greek occupation.

At Chakdara the Swat river is spanned by a strong iron bridge which is protected by a castellated fort on the right bank in Dir territory. At Landakai deodar sleepers which have been floated down the river are collected for onward transport to the plains by lorry. This is the site of the first of over eighty forts which are so conspicuous and convincing a sign of the strong rule of the Wali of Swat. Each fort is square in shape, surmounted by four square towers at the corners, which are reproduced as the emblem of the State, is connected to the rest by telephone, and is manned by the local armed gendarmerie. The administrative headquarters of the State is at Saidu Sharif, founded by the Akhund of Swat, whose shrine is an object of veneration for Moslems far and near. This saintly leader supported the tribes in their opposition to the British forces at Landakai and at the Ambeyla. But his son sought the recognition of the British Government when carving out the State by his own indefatigable efforts from the warring tribal factions. He achieved success, and assumed the title of Wali (ruler) of Swat, or Miangul Gulshazada,

Sir Abdul Wadud, K.B.E. He now lives in retirement and has been succeeded as Wali by his son.

The ruler's house at Saidu Sharif is in a sheltered position facing north-east, simply and efficiently designed, supplied with electric light, all modern conveniences and European furniture, and surrounded with lawns, rose beds and flowering trees. Memorable is the fine vista towards Mount Mankial at the head of the Swat valley. Strong forts guard the approaches to a long wooden bridge, and the guards are armed with .303 magazine rifles and wear the local pakol, or homespun cap, adorned with a moonal pheasant's crest. The river, wide and swift, is crossed at all seasons on primitive-looking rafts supported on huge inflated bullock skins. Rich rice fields, all irrigated by a system of small canals on either bank, produce a most profitable crop. The hillsides are covered with scrub, brambles and wild olives, and provide ample cover for the rock partridge (*Caccabis chakor*) and the francolin (*Perdrix Francolinus*), which are well preserved by the ruler for himself and his many guests. There is a famous duck shoot in the extensive terraced rice fields at Udegram, where over eight hundred duck have been shot by parties of twenty guns from regular butts constructed from rice straw—a happy venue for four or five shoots annually.

A high fort at Peshmal amongst the Dardic clans faces the Kohistan, or mountain region, at the source of the Swat river. The steep hillsides of the upper valleys are more suited to grazing than to crops, and at high levels are covered with fine cedar forest (*Cederus deodara*). The alpine pastures are carpeted with wild flowers in summer, and are grazed by wandering Gujar herds. In these wild mountain fastnesses the protection of an escort is necessary.

The first Wali is perhaps the most striking frontier character for a century, for he has founded a prosperous State based on efficient administration, and a just but firm rule that recognizes the local customary law. A hinterland of warring clans has been transformed into a country served with wide roads, hospitals and schools and a large feudal army. The Wali has shown himself to be a strict disciplinarian, a kind friend and a terrible enemy. His able son, Miangul Abdul Haqq Jehanzeb, C.I.E., took a large share in the development of the State, and is now exercising full powers as ruler, while his grandson, Aurangzeb, has been recognized as Walahad, or heir apparent.

The route over the Swat river at Chakdara into Dir State was chosen by A. E. Mason for his adventure story *The Broken Road*, and it is only recently that by the motor road over the Lowarai pass it has been linked to the last section up to where the road ends in Chitral.

Dir State has a special strategic importance, for it is flanked on the west by the tribal territory of Bajau and the eastern boundary of Afghanistan. It includes the rich valley of Adinzai, and between it and Swat on the east is a natural boundary which was demarcated by Sir John Maffey (now Lord Rugby). The whole of the road therefore lies within the limits of Dir, and is adequately picketed for safety. It commands a fine view of the Panjkora valley where tribal territory approaches nearest and where, during the relief of the Chitral garrison in 1895, skirmishes some-

times took place. The present ruler of Dir, Nawab Sir Shahjehan Khan, K.B.E., is an administrator of twenty-five years' experience, who is well versed in the intrigues of the independent tribes on his border, which are constantly engaged in local faction fighting. He is a keen sportsman and fond of hawking and shooting. He is accustomed to stay at Balambat on the Panjkora river in winter, where he can combine hearing and settling the cases of his subjects from Jandol across the river with good duck shooting and chakor driving in season.

From the river the road climbs continuously to Dir fort, the Nawab's residence, and thence still more steeply to the summit of the Lowarai pass, which is the boundary of Chitral State. The steep lower slopes are covered with dark-foliaged holly-oak, which gives place to spruce, blue-pine, cedar and silver birch, with dwarf juniper above the tree-level. The road, till recently a mere bridle track, zig-zags steeply up the mountain-side till the peak of Chitrabat looms overhead, dominating the summit of the pass from the west. Graziers' huts cling to the hillside above the path of the vernal avalanches. Beyond the pass the path leads down the Ashreth valley to the first post in Chitral, at Ziarat, in magnificent cedar forest, which is built to withstand heavy snowfall. Here one will meet Chitralis with their slightly mongoloid features, wearing chogas or cloaks and round caps, all of heavy homespun woollen cloth, and leading their sturdy Badakhshani ponies by the reins as they climb slowly up the steep ascent. On the distant skyline, beyond the deep gorge of the Chitral river, are the mountains that culminate in the Afghan boundary, beyond which lies the Afghan region of Nuristan (formerly Kafirstan). Their lofty pastures are grazed by both domesticated and wild goat (*Capra falconeri*).

At Mirkhani the road turns north-east up the left bank of the Chitral river towards Drosh, headquarters of the military garrison of Scouts, now served by the only aerodrome in the State, which is laid out on the opposite bank, for the fort is perched high up the cliff above the river. At times a raging icy torrent flowing in a deep gorge, the Chitral river is again bridged at Ghairat by a high swinging suspension bridge, whose huge steel cables and massive stone supports are an outstanding example of the work of the Royal Engineers. The motor road climbs and falls along the gorge till, on rounding a corner, the huge massif of Tirich Mir looms up and almost seems to block the head of the valley. The wide cultivated alluvial fan of Chitral is on the right bank and is reached by another suspension bridge commanded by the fort.

Chitral State prospered during the long and peaceful reign of H.H. Shuja-ul-Mulk, who was crowned Mehtar of Chitral at the age of fourteen during the siege of Chitral in 1895 that followed the murder of his father, the previous Mehtar, while out hawking. After a pilgrimage to Mekka, Shuja-ul-Mulk, at great cost, built the beautiful white mosque that contains his tomb. H.H. Mohd Nasir-ul-Mulk succeeded his father. He had received training in administration and military matters under Government outside the State, and he proved an enlightened ruler.

The national game of the country is polo, which is played in the traditional style of a one-man-one-horse standard, and on long narrow grounds distributed throughout the country. After each goal the "tam-

"buk" or volley is hit at full gallop from the half-way line, while the local band of drums and pipes plays continuously, as in the days of its Persian origin. Falconry has been practised down the ages by the Mehtars and their clansmen, and the female goshawk is especially prized. Some twenty hawks are usually captured each autumn, and the traditional drives for chakor have long been established by custom, and are practised with feudal regularity.

The Mehtar's summer residence is at Birmoglasht, a very steep climb of 3,000 feet above Chitral on the lower spurs of the Hindu Kush range, from which there is a magnificent view to the east of the Hindu Raj range. The ancient Mehtari fort or Noghor of the siege of Chitral hangs on the river bank, adjoining the palace garden, with its enormous shady chenar trees, orchards of apricot, almond, apple and pear, surrounded by a thick curtain of honeysuckle. The northern, or shady, snow-fed slopes of the mountains above the valley are covered with dense cedar forest (*Cedrus deodara*), while the sun-scorched southern aspect is almost bare of vegetation, and the slopes are exceedingly steep. The tree limit is reached at about 14,000 feet above sea level, where the blue pine (*Pinus excelsa*) stands on the precipitous scarps, scorning alike winds, sunshine and tempest. Here shaly slopes provide scant pastures for sheep and goats; the fleeces yield homespun cloth and rough coloured mats for a simple and primitive people whose cultivation is limited to the small glacial fans, irrigated by snow-fed water channels. With every heavy storm, mud slides descend into the valleys, choking the bridle paths and accompanied by the rumble of thunder, avalanches and earthquakes.


The high cliffs and valleys used to support large numbers of wild animals, ibex (*Capra Sibirica*), markhor (*Capra falconeri*), urial (*Ovis Vignei*), and occasional red and Himalayan bear (*Ursus Isabellinus* and *Ursus Torquatus*), musk deer (*Moschus moschiferus*), common and snow leopard (*Felis pardus* and *Felis uncia*), besides wolves, marmots, foxes, martens and hares.

The record markhor head of the last twenty years was one measuring 52½ inches, which the lecturer shot while Assistant Agent and bequeathed to the Mehtar of Chitral before leaving Pakistan.

Game birds comprise the snow cock (*Tetra gallus*), moonal pheasant (*Phasianus Impeyanus*), chakor (*Caccabis chakor*), and occasional woodcock (*Scolapax*), besides numerous migratory wild fowl.

Life among the mountains, in hamlets cut off from one another by precipitous gorges, is hard and precarious for the simple peasant folk. An "Old Man of the Mountains" such as one may meet on a narrow mountain shelf pathway or "parri," bearded, with rough skins for boots and an axe on his shoulder, as he pauses to scan range upon range of mountains stretching away into the far distance, presents a picture of the unsophisticated but nevertheless satisfying lot of so many in this region.

North of Chitral fort the cultivated fan of Danin spreads itself on the far bank of the river, while the great dome of Tirich Mir dominates the landscape, seeming to block all exit to the north. However, the road to Mastuj and thence to Gilgit and Afghanistan by the Shandur and Baroghil passes takes off along the left bank to the north-east from the



junction of the Chitral and Lutkoh rivers. The road to Afghanistan by the much shorter route over the Durah pass follows the right bank to the north-west from the same junction. In the Lutkoh valley are the old antimony mines once developed by the Chinese, and higher upstream "Garam Chashma" or "Utz" is a thermal area of hot sulphur springs beside a beautiful poplar-bounded polo ground. Two comfortable guest houses there provide refreshing plunge baths, and the adjoining mosque has primitive bathing cubicles for those who come from far and near to take the waters, so effective a cure for various types of skin disease.

The Durah stream leads westward to the foot of the pass into Afghanistan. Here it is a delightful trout stream, for it has been effectively stocked with brown trout (*Salmo fario*) brought by road from Gilgit. It is interesting that a short distance below the Durah pass on the Afghan side of the frontier is found the Oxus trout (*Salmo Oxiana*), which is common to the streams of the Oxus basin.

H.H. Mohd Nasir-ul-Mulk died childless and was succeeded by his brother, H.H. Muzaffar-ul-Mulk, who died after a long period of illness. The Waliabad, or heir apparent, who was his eldest son, was young and insufficiently experienced to handle affairs. He is now being trained by Government, while the State is administered through a Council of Administration.

Trade centres round the bazaars at Chitral and Drosh, which are linked with Gilgit by telegraph, while the Mehtari telephone system covers the whole State. The motor road which now crosses the Lowarai pass cannot be taken far beyond Chitral town on account of engineering difficulties. There are few exports, the chief being antimony, homespun cloth, dried apricots, skins and cedar wood; while the trade with Afghanistan is almost negligible.

As a race the Chitrali has a light complexion, sometimes with blue eyes; his features heavily lined from exposure to the bitter winds and scorching sun; his clothes are the universal choga, or loose homespun robe, and round rolled cap. A simple and carefree disposition with a natural love of music and dancing is combined with improvidence. Used to drinking the ice-cold water from the glaciers and breathing the clear, high mountain air, he soon wilts in the heat of the plains of India, where he is seldom happy for long. His language, "Khowar," is quite distinct from those of adjacent territories and is somewhat akin to Persian.

No visitor to Chitral can fail to be impressed by the enormous mountains that everywhere dominate the scene: not least by Tirich Mir, whose great snow peak, 25,263 feet above sea level, at the north-eastern apex of the Hindu Kush range, watches over the whole country like a "white sentinel." This mountain giant is the heraldic emblem of the State and embodies the essential character of Chitral as the northern bulwark of defence of the Dominion of Pakistan. It may be significant that when, under Norwegian leadership, the mountain was recently conquered for the first time, after years of exploration by Europeans, it was the flag of the United Nations that was planted on the summit.

Since the Political Agency was established at Malakand after the Chitral Expedition of 1895, these frontier States of Dir, Swat and Chitral

enjoyed a period of peace and ordered progress the like of which had never before been known there; especially during the past twenty-five years, after the Wali of Swat first received official recognition, and with the remarkable improvement in all forms of communication throughout the area. When the lecturer was first appointed as Assistant Political Agent at Chitral it was distant ten arduous marches on horseback from Malakand, not to speak of the somewhat primitive conditions at the posts at the end of each stage. Now the journey can be completed in comparative comfort in a single day by car, in summer; or, indeed, in a single hour by aeroplane from Peshawar to Drosh.

Civilization has arrived in these mountain fastnesses in the shape of schools, hospitals, post offices, telephone and telegraph and wireless communications, hydro-electric power, motor-cars and lorries. The British endeavoured to support the rulers in maintaining their religion, their culture, and their own ways of life, dominated by a rule of law which guaranteed peace and prosperity. At partition in 1947 all three States voluntarily acceded to the Dominion of Pakistan, and their ways of living have not been changed to any appreciable extent in the short time that has since elapsed. It is to be wished that they may enjoy prosperity within Pakistan and as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks from the Chairman, who expressed the audience's great appreciation of the fine illustrations from the lecturer's own photographs.

THE WOMAN OF THE LEBANON

By MRS. GERTRUDE JOLY

The report of a lecture given on September 21, 1950, Mr. W. H. Ingrams, C.M.G., O.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mrs. Joly is going to talk to us about women in the Lebanon, and will be speaking out of a very long first-hand knowledge of her subject. She has lived in Beirut for many years as the wife of a business man whose firm claims to be the oldest British firm in the Lebanon—a shipping firm with connections all round the Levant coast.

Before her marriage Mrs. Joly was on the staff of the British Syrian Training College at Beirut, and since her family has grown up she has again been taking part in social and educational work in Lebanon. During the war, when her husband was a Palestine Government official, she was in charge of the training department of the Jerusalem Girls' College, and is still very much interested in educational work in Lebanon.

Mrs. Joly has also achieved fame in having compiled a cookery book in English and Arabic which is just going into a revised edition and is on sale all over the Middle East. When I first heard this I thought perhaps we were going to hear something of the technique of the female's superiority over the male and something perhaps of the tactics of the old policy of "feeding the brute." But I understand from her that one of the objects of it is to help women of the Lebanon to win the hearts of their overseas visitors and *vice versa*. I expect she will tell us about that.

I know I am looking forward to hearing what she has to say very much indeed, because in so many countries we have come to realize that you cannot really have an advanced and civilized country unless you pay attention to "the better half" of the population. I hope that at least I shall get some advice from Mrs. Joly on the subject.

YOU may not have noticed the significance of my title "The Woman of the Lebanon." Up to a short time ago if you asked anyone in the mountain villages "What are you?" meaning "What is your nationality?" they would immediately have replied by telling you their religion. The religious groups are very important and of great influence.

The main divisions are: Maronite, in union with the Church of Rome, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Protestant, Moslem and Druze. There are some smaller sects also, but these are the main groups—all Christians except for the two last-named—the Moslems and Druzes.

It is very interesting, when you go about in the mountains, to see how the villages differ. There is one particular ridge I am thinking of now; it is 2,500 feet above the plain. You look down upon the great town of Beirut burning in the hot sun, while you are up in comparatively cool air.

On this ridge are a number of villages along a kind of main road. It is one of the "summering" ridges where the villagers let houses to summer visitors. The first village is Sûq-el-Gharb, which means the Western market. There the people are mostly Greek Orthodox. The next village is Greek Catholic, and the one after that, a little lower down the slopes with lovely big old evergreen oaks, is a Druze village. Then,

going on along the ridge, you come to a Moslem hamlet of Metawileh Shi'ah Moslems, and lastly you reach Shemlan, which is Maronite.

The Lebanon is very beautiful. From the sea you can run your eye over snow-capped peaks, lower ridges green with pines with villages dotted here and there. When you get up to one ridge you find another behind and yet another, with deep ravines in between. The spring flowers are wonderful, and indeed at all times of the year the country is full of a beauty and charm quite its own.

I have attempted to divide my description of different types of the women of the Lebanon into categories. The main division is of course between the town dweller and the mountain villager. Amongst the latter we find a simpler and less modernized way of life and consequently differences in cultural levels. In spite of these, however, they have certain features in common; for instance, very gracious and generous hospitality, great friendliness and strong family feeling and affection.

Let us begin with the privileged or leisured classes.

Many women amongst these are longing to solve the many social problems of their country. They themselves know that it will take time to acquire the necessary technique and to develop the team spirit. They have often already been more successful than men in getting Government collaboration in philanthropic schemes.

The educated Lebanese woman is demanding a vote, equal pay for equal work, etc. They already have the legal right to enter professions, but they are hoping for the day when their families will stop opposition and the way will be made easier for them.

The professions open to girls at the moment are medicine, dentistry, nursing, law, education; there is a nurses' training school in the American University Hospital of Beirut, and also a French school of nursing. The requisite entrance diploma is that of a school-leaving certificate from a secondary school, and people are coming to realize that it takes intelligence and a good background to be a professional nurse.

There are also women doctors and dentists. I know of no practising woman dentist, but some have taken the course. There are one or two practising women doctors. The new generation is overcoming the old prejudice which twenty years ago thrust the woman doctor down to the level of a midwife and nothing else. Many girls go through the nursing and doctor's training and then marry—they frequently marry doctors. There are also some lawyers and quite a number of law students. Journalism has been attempted by one or two women. The difficulty there is that a woman is somewhat restricted in going about in search for copy.

There are many able teachers, and in the thirty years I have been in the country I have seen girls' schools founded, directed and staffed entirely by Lebanese women educationalists.

The next category under the heading of educated class is the typist and stenographer. In the time I have been in Beirut I have seen a great change there. I remember in the early 1920s there were very few girls in any of the offices in Beirut. In fact, the employment of women had just begun about 1920, and girls who wished to train and learn typing and shorthand and go into offices were warned by their parents and

guardians that they would probably lose their characters if they did anything so fast. However, some more far-sighted people said that if they went into English or American offices they would be quite safe. My husband had one of the very first girl-typists allowed to work in Beirut, and her sister, at about the same time, was taken into a very big Lebanese firm. The mother was a very far-sighted and extremely advanced woman, who had given her daughters a good education. This girl is now not only the prop and stay of that firm, but also has the firm's signature. They are clever, these girls; usually they are trilingual; they can read, write and speak English, French and Arabic. Most of them can take down shorthand notes in English and French. The girl who was so brave as to come into our office in 1921-22 was later sent as a delegate to the World Conference of the Y.W.C.A. in Geneva. That was a long time ago, and yet she was the only woman delegate who needed to have her speech translated into one language only. The official languages were English, French and German, and she spoke first in English, gave it again in French, and then someone else translated it into German.

After that we come to shop-girls. There are not a great many of these. You do get shop-girls in the ready-made clothes and hat shops and flower shops, the equivalent of Woolworths, etc., but not many others.

In the next category there are the girls employed in factories. In the 1930s there was the beginning of industrialization in the Lebanon and many girls were employed. As always when this happens in any country a need speedily arose for government control of conditions and of the hours that girls were allowed to work. The first welfare workers found that girls were kept rolling cigarettes, etc., for hours on end without even a stool to sit on. The Y.W.C.A., which is run in Beirut by Lebanese and American women, got some of the more educated and leisured girls to go into the factories and give lessons during the short rest hours that they had—at lunch-time and so on. They gave them simple drill, so that they got a little physical exercise, and then they tried reading and writing in Arabic. Then there was a demand for English and French. Quite a lot of welfare work has been done in the factories. In 1939 voluntary women inspectors working under the Health Department of the Lebanese Government were able gradually to enforce some features of the law (*e.g.*, hours and ages), and as a result the conditions are very much better.

Next we come to the dressmakers, lacemakers and embroiderers. They are on the whole very good craftswomen, especially the two last-named. It used to be the case that the moment a woman could read and write a little she became a dressmaker. It is really very trying if you have an intelligent housemaid and you give her the chance to go to the Y.W.C.A. and learn to read and write, or perhaps you get a teacher into the house for this, and she goes off to be a dressmaker. Illiteracy is gradually becoming less and there is more choice for the literate.

So far I have been talking mostly about the town girls and women, but the mountain village women are a category by themselves.

The domestic servants generally come from the mountain villages. Those of us who have lived for any length of time in Beirut always try

to get a mountain girl as a servant, and we try to avoid taking one who has lived for long in the town. This is partly because a girl straight from her village is so much easier to train; she has not learned someone else's ways first. Also, most of us who have lived for some time in the country have a pet village from which we draw our servants. Very often they are related, because there is a great deal of intermarriage. Once you have got yourself well known in a village as a good mistress you will always find that a cousin or a niece is ready to come to you. We differ slightly from other parts of the Middle and Far East in that we very seldom have menservants. The big houses in Beirut of the very rich Lebanese people and the Legations have menservants, because the houses are large and there is enough room; it is organized for menservants. But the rest of us mostly live in flats and there is not very much room. We have women servants, and this, I believe, is different from the custom in other places in the East.

I should like to tell you a little more about the mountain women and their occupations. The mountain villager, especially the mountain woman, is an extremely fine person if you get to know her. You have to try to understand their mentality. Though there are some things that one deplures, I have found myself that they compare favourably with similar types in other countries in the Middle East.

Many of the houses are square little boxes, with flat roofs. The old-fashioned roofs were made with trunks of trees laid across, over them planks and brushwood, and the whole covered with mud. This mud has to be rolled, and on the top of every little flat roof you will see a little white stone roller. It used to be said that if you went into a mountain village and counted the red-tiled roofs, every one meant that the family there had a rich relation in America. But I do not think that is true. There are far more of the red-tiled roofs creeping in. I think that is a pity—the original ones are more typical of the country and more attractive.

If they have plenty of money a family might build two rooms at once, but generally they begin with one room and a lean-to kitchen. Then, when they have more money and more children, they build another room, and then another, and so on. So the houses look a little haphazard. However, they are all on the same plan—one square room in the middle, bedrooms opening out, and the lean-to kitchen, which may grow a little more superior but is always out on the side.

When a family decides to go up into the mountains in the summer it starts thinking about it between February and April. You go to the village of your choice and ask round who is going to let a house for the summer. Then the owners arrange to move out of it—usually having one room nearby and an arbour made of leaves where they live for the summer. You must then make sure that you do not go until the work of the silkworm industry is over; then you have to bargain *and make certain* that the house is to be whitewashed all over before you go.

The day you go up the mountains you get up very early. The lorry men arrive. People who have lived much longer in the Lebanon than I tell me that they used to use mules. Now it is lorries.

You used to get yourself and the children up and push them off into the dining-room to have breakfast. Then the lorry men and the servants took up the beds and put them, packed, with such articles of furniture as you would need in the mountains. Then, breakfast being finished, the dining table went on, and then the kitchen utensils. Then, having piled everything on the lorry, you had to follow up by car before noon, in order to take the things off the lorry and put them in their places. You stayed there for three months. It used to take a bit of time to get settled, but after that there was very little to do except watch the children playing, and knit. It is not much better now, but the idea is at last coming into the villages that perhaps they might leave you a few sticks of furniture and call it "a furnished house."

You must not go up until the silkworm industry is over. They revived this very strongly during the war, when the Japanese industry was out of the running and the French also. But it is now dying again, I am afraid. All over the mountain villages you will find rows of mulberry trees, which are kept for feeding the silkworms. They fetch out their silkworm trays and get everything ready, and as soon as there are plenty of leaves on the trees they either build a leafy arbour to put the trays in, or they use one of the rooms in the house. Then they only wait for the hot wind, which Allah sends specially in April, to hatch out the eggs. Now, of course, they are more up-to-date; eggs are flown by aeroplane from France and they get them from a dealer. However, some of them still do it the old-fashioned way.

Only about eighteen months ago I was up in one of the high mountain villages where there is an old monastery. I was showing some friends round and we went into the church; there I saw something I had heard about but had never seen before. The church was vaulted and very high and cool, and hanging up on a nail I saw four or five little white muslin bags. I asked what they were and a little boy told me they were the silkworm eggs. When the eggs are laid they have to be kept until the next season; they must not hatch too soon, but have to be kept somewhere cool, so they give them to the priest and he blesses them and puts them in the charge of God. The priest hangs them as high as he can in the cool roof until this hot wind arrives—it comes at a certain period every year. Then the villagers run up to the church and take the little bags off the hooks and spread out the muslin, and the hot wind and sun hatch out the eggs.

All the family have to work hard picking the leaves off the trees and feeding them to the silkworms. When you go into one of these arbours you find that the silkworms have hatched out at different periods, and there are little tiny ones and great big ones like caterpillars. You can here them munching!

Another very important thing that the woman of the Lebanon has to do is to prepare her stores for the winter, because she cannot then easily get down to Beirut, and the shops in the small villages often shut down. Sometimes the butcher will kill once a week, but she cannot be sure of that. So she has to fatten a sheep and kill it, and dry the meat. She has to pick the lentils and spread them to dry; to prepare the crushed wheat,

and all the year round she bakes her "handkerchief bread." This "handkerchief bread"—as the English people call it—is very interesting indeed. The Lebanese woman makes a dough and forms it into little round cakes. She sits on the floor, usually in the garden, and beside her is a thing like a girdle. Underneath it she puts some small twigs, and she makes the girdle hot by lighting a fire underneath. Meanwhile she has been preparing the dough. When I first went out I used to go and sit beside our woman, and when she was making it for us I used to try to do it. I practised, but it is most fearfully difficult. First of all she puts all her fingers tight together and pats the dough into a circular shape. Then it gets larger and larger until it is about as large as a big meat plate. Then she tosses it, and this tossing process is very graceful indeed. She takes the dough in the right hand and tosses it on to her left arm; then again, and every time she tosses it the bread is stretching. It is rather difficult to explain clearly how it is done, but it is a matter of toss and stretch, toss and stretch, until at last it is the thinness of a handkerchief and completely circular. Beside her she has a cushion, and when the circle is exactly the right size she tosses it on to the cushion. It comes out completely round—they know exactly how to throw it. Then she turns the cushion on to the top of the girdle and in two minutes you have a wafer-thin circle of handkerchief bread, brown and crisp. They make piles of it and wrap it in a damp cloth and it will keep for some time. It is extraordinarily good.

Then the village woman has to make jam—if she can afford the sugar; the cost of living is high. She will make apricot jam and quince or zarur jelly; you know quince jelly is delicious. They grow the fruit there. Zarur is made from hawthorn berries, but instead of being a little tiny berry as we know it, it is about the size of the end of your thumb. The berries are bright scarlet and they make the most delicious jelly; it has a rather tart flavour and is extremely good if eaten with jugged hare or with mutton. I have often thought I would like to try and make it from the hawthorn berries in England, but they are so small and you would have to have such an enormous quantity. The village woman also makes tomato paste—a concentrated tomato paste for use in stews during the winter.

It is the woman's job to carry the water from the fountain. A friend of mine who lived in a Druze village told me once that about three-quarters of an hour before sunset every evening all the young bloods of the village would patrol up and down in front of the fountain. But when the girls came down to the fountain to draw the water, just before sunset, then all real gentlemen retired and did not stay there ogling the beauties. For the Druzes are very beautiful, especially in their teens. They have very fair skins and sometimes fair hair and blue eyes. They are tall and stately and carry themselves beautifully—largely because they carry the heavy pitchers on their heads from the fountain, I suppose. They wear long white veils over their heads, and if a man comes along they pull them across their faces and hold one corner in their mouths, so that only one eye shows.

A woman also has to work with the harvesting and the winnowing,

and in the winter months she will spin. She has the old-fashioned spindle, just like the one that the princess pricked her finger with in the fairy story. It is a long wooden thing; she takes the wool under her arm and holds it and twists it and winds it round the spindle.

Arab cookery is very good, but you have to get used to it gradually—it is hard on Anglo-Saxon digestions until they have got used to it. Some of the dishes have an historical interest: the “mess of pottage,” for instance, for which Esau sold his birthright, or the “bitter herbs” mentioned in the Bible, which make a delicious salad; chick-peas and sesame, stuffed marrow; stuffed cabbage and so on—all sorts of things which are very delicious.

It is a very beautiful country. One of the things that surprised me most when I first went there was that when they saw me picking the beautiful wild flowers the women and children would say, “She is picking weeds.” They always called them weeds. But there is a certain appreciation of beauty in the place. When they sell things on great big trays in the streets they will decorate them with bits of greenery and boughs of trees. When the Persian lilac is out they often take pieces to decorate these trays of wares.

I hope I have been able to make you see that the Lebanon has quite a little civilization of its own. They are very delightful people and my very good friends. I hope that you will now read about them and perhaps one day come out and visit us.

The CHAIRMAN: After that very charming account of the ideal life of the villages in the Lebanon I feel a good many people would like to go and spend a winter there. I should, but it has aroused my interest in one way particularly—that you can still have that sort of life in what I understand is a very small and overcrowded country. I am particularly interested to know from Mrs. Joly if there is any sort of rapid development of industry in the place. Tobacco factories were mentioned, and I wondered how these people adapt themselves to industrial life, and if it is developing. Mrs. Joly mentioned welfare, but I should also be interested to know whether there is any legislation of any particular sort on that side of things, and what sort of hours of work and advantages for women there are.

Mrs. JOLY: As a result of some English and French women trying hard, through the Y.W.C.A. and other societies, some legislation has been passed. The difficulty is to get it kept.

The CHAIRMAN: Are a lot of people going into industry?

Mrs. JOLY: It is rather difficult to develop industries. There is very little raw material in the country, so it is difficult to have industry in a big way. We have a Coca-Cola factory now—I think they have to import the ingredients for that—and a chocolate factory, stockings, textiles, etc. Then, of course, a great many people—men, anyway—are working on the pipe-lines. As you know, there are great oil pipe-lines coming out at Tripoli and Saida. That takes up a lot of men, and some girls on the clerical side of the office work.

The CHAIRMAN: The population still live largely on remittances from abroad?

Mrs. JOLY : Those are not as great as they used to be.

ANOTHER MEMBER : Might I ask how the very small children are looked after?

Mrs. JOLY : It all depends upon the category of the parents.

MEMBER : Are they all cared for differently according to their different sects or religions?

Mrs. JOLY : If the mother is a villager and you saw the way the babies are brought up, possibly you would be horrified. But during the last two years I have been organizing a sewing circle for Palestine refugees in Lebanon, and most of these women were of the agricultural type. I made myself unpopular because I argued that at the present moment, when we were trying to clothe and feed and keep alive the refugees, we were not trying to teach them how to bring up their babies in a modern way, but merely to keep them alive. I therefore said that in my sewing party we would make the old-fashioned swaddling clothes, which the women knew how to use. There was a terrible outcry about this, but I won the fight in the end and I got my reward, for welfare workers in the camps wrote and said, "Send more of Mrs. Joly's swaddling clothes."

SIR JOHN SHEA : I should like to ask what is the status of the women of the villages in the mountains, compared, say, with the purdah women of Pakistan.

Mrs. JOLY : The modern and Druze women are much freer. They go out and work in the fields and have only this little white veil over their heads. But amongst the town Moslems there is still the veiling of the women. It is becoming less and less every year, however. There is definitely more freedom. The Christian women are, of course, unveiled and free.

Some of you present know more about the emancipation of Moslem women than I do, but I think I would say that in the Lebanon it has not been rushed too much. The women are gradually getting the idea of emancipation, whereas in some countries it was all done very suddenly.

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks.

RECONNAISSANCE IN SAUDI ARABIA

BY DR. HENRY FIELD

THE Peabody Museum-Harvard Expedition* to the Near East conducted reconnaissance from February 28 to June 26, 1950, in Syria, Iraq,† Persia (Iran), Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar Peninsula, Trucial Oman Coast‡ and across northern Saudi Arabia. The main objective was to locate surface Stone Age sites along the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Co. (Tapline) in order to fill in lacunæ in the giant mosaic from Sinai§ to the Caucasus|| and from the Black Sea to the southern fringe of the Arabian Peninsula.

Paleolithic flint implements lying on the sands of Saudi Arabia have been collected from time to time. Even now the general trends remain obscure, for the data are few, the surficial area enormous.

The first evidence of inhabitation during the Mousterian Period was made¶ on the summit of Umm Wual (3,200 feet above sea level), north-east

* The staff consisted of Robb White, photographer, Yusuf Lazar, zoological and botanical collector, and local assistants in each country. They did not accompany me in Saudi Arabia.

† Cf. Fuad Safar, *Pottery from Caves of Baradost*, Sumer, vol. vi, No. 2, pp. 118-23, 1950.

‡ The reports on Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar Peninsula and the Trucial Oman Coast will be published in the *South-western Journal of Anthropology*, 1951.

§ Cf. "The University of California African Expedition: I—Egypt," by Henry Field, *American Anthropologist*, vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 479-93, 1948.

|| "Contributions to the Anthropology of the Soviet Union," by Henry Field, *Smithsonian Misc. Coll.*, vol. 110, No. 13, pp. 20-53, esp. footnote 1, p. 20, and pp. 78-85, 1948.

¶ By members of Field Museum North Arabian Desert Expedition, 1928, of which I was leader. Accompanying an Iraq Petroleum Company Survey Party under W. E. Browne, we made a broad 150-mile sweep from R.A.F. Landing Ground "K" to "R," halting at Umm Wual (formerly written Umm Muwal) and passing well south of Jebel Aneze, for which we were searching. At that time the Jordan-Saudi Arabian boundary was poorly defined, so that we presumed we were still inside Jordan and Iraq. This series of flint implements is now in Chicago Natural History Museum. Cf. "Early Man in North Arabia," *Natural History*, No. 1, pp. 33-44, 1929. For other references see Carleton S. Coon, *Southern Arabia: A Problem for the Future*, Peabody Museum studies in the Anthropology of Oceania, 1943; P. B. Cornwall, "Ancient Arabia: Explorations in Hasa, 1940-41," *J.R.G.S.*, vol. 107, Nos. 1-2, pp. 28-50, February, 1946; Raymond P. Dougherty, *The Sealand of Arabia*, New Haven, 1932; Henry Field, "Among the Beduin of North Arabia," *Open Court*, vol. 45, pp. 577-95, Chicago, 1931; "The Cradle of Homo Sapiens," *A.J.A.*, vol. 36, pp. 426-30, 1932; "The Ancient and Modern Inhabitants of Arabia," *Open Court*, vol. 46, pp. 847-72, Chicago, 1932; "The Antiquity of Man in South-western Asia," *A.A.*, vol. 35, pp. 51-62, 1933; "Sulle caratteristiche geografiche dell Arabia settentrionale," *Bolletino della Reale Societa Geografica Italiana*, vol. 11, pp. 3-13, Rome, 1934; "Racial Types from South Arabia," *The New Orient*, pp. 32-9, Chicago, 1936; "Oryx and Ibex as Cult Animals in Arabia," *Man*, vol. 37, No. 67, London; "Contributions to the Anthropology of Iran," *F.M.N.H. Anthr. Ser.*, vol. 29, pp. 1-706, Chicago, 1939; S. B. Miles, *The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf*, London, 1919; and F. V.

of Turaif and south-west of Jebel Aneze (Anazah), the focal triangulation point where Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq meet.

King Ibn Saud granted permission* for an eleven-day trip along the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line† (Tapline), to collect surface archæological material, to record anthropometric and tribal data, and to collect animals and herbarium specimens.

Prior to listing the archæological sites, the following notes are given in some detail, because anthropogeographical data from this region have not been described previously.

From Dhahran Dr. Willard C. Beling drove me to the extensive ruins of Umm as-Saih, south of Al Khobar and south-east of the Dhahran Air-field radio towers. Here amid a raging sandstorm (*shamal*) we collected a series of sherds, fragmentary glass bracelets and shell-middens. On the way we passed hundreds, if not thousands, of small tumuli, similar to those on Bahrain. An air photograph would be of great value to indicate the extent and number of these tumuli. Future excavation will determine their antiquity or at least their age in relation to those on Bahrain.

Since I was advised that there were no archæological sites either in the Ras al Mishaab coastal area or between Ras al Mishaab and Qaisumah, the latter being a flat, sandy wilderness, I flew in the Aramco plane to Qaisumah, whence I drove to Hafar al-Batin on the floor of the wadi called al Batin, which lies north-east-south-west and extends from just north of the Nefud, across the western part of Kuwait, to the south-east corner of the Khor al-Hammar, into which it probably flowed in ancient times.

In the centre of this broad and ill-defined wadi with its many dry tributaries stands the rectangular mud-brick fort of Hafar al-Batin ($46^{\circ}00'$ E. and $28^{\circ}30'$ N.), with corner towers ornamented with crenellated designs. Near the western walls were about thirty Sulubba tents, and on the other side of the deep (180-200 feet) wells with gypsum (*juss*) facings some 300 Mutair tents dotted the plain. To the south-east and south-west of Hafar al-Batin about 1,000-1,500 paces was a range of gravel and flint-covered hills (75 feet); no worked flints were found. In the tributaries of the wadi, which extend in every direction over a wide belt, there were many green bushes.

Next morning along the track to the western limits of al Batin I searched for two hours on many hilltops and slopes for worked flints; a few were found after great difficulty. We reached Hafar al-Batin from the south-west, but were unable to find any worked flints on the hills

Winnett, "A Himyaritic Inscription from the Persian Gulf Region," *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 102, pp. 4-6, April, 1946; "A Himyarite Bronze Tablet," *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 110, pp. 23-5, April, 1946.

* Following the endorsement by Ambassador J. Rives Childs in Jidda, H.E. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, Saudi Arabian Ambassador in London, and U.S.A. Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee.

† As the guest of Aramco, who placed transportation and every other facility at my disposal, I received every assistance. Along the Tapline the generous help of the following is recorded: Philip R. Kidd and Willard Beling at Dhahran; Walter Hough and John C. Kelly at Qaisumah; William Mulligan at Rafha; Sam Clevenger at Badanah; and Don Holm at Turaif.

overlooking the wells, theoretically the most ideal location. To the north and south of Hafar al-Batin stretch the Dibdiba plains; to the north-west lies Uquba at the southern angle of the rectangular Neutral Zone between Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

At Kilo. 511.5 a circular hill (60 feet) with a hard cap stands out from the plain. Worked flints were collected on the flat top. A large bird's nest, probably of a vulture (*nisr*), was tucked neatly into a crevice. West of Kilo. 514 there is a broad, flat plain almost destitute of vegetation. We halted briefly at Kilo. 589 (Station III A). At Juraibah (Kilo. 683) we crossed the Darb es-Salman, which crosses the rough area to the south to Lina on the fringe of the Dahna. Other tracks from Jumaimah and Lauqa link to Lina, and the Darb ez-Zobeida from an Najaf in Iraq to Hayil and Mecca passes about twenty miles to the north-west. At Kilo. 726 there are broad flint bands for a restricted area; some large, coarse flakes were collected 50-100 paces east and west of the road.

From Rafha we visited Jumaimah. About 500 paces north of the large cistern are numerous low (15-25 feet) hills. A series of worked flint flakes was collected on and around three of these hills; the Beduin use this source of flint for their strike-a-lights, some of which were found on the surface, mixed with considerably older techniques. This cistern (96 by 97 by 16.5 feet), which contains about 1,000,000 gallons, has the deepest corner at 18 feet 9 inches and shallowest at 14 feet 6 inches. A sinkhole or well east of the cistern was 61 feet 2 inches deep. Several natural, low (10 feet) mounds were searched about 500 m. north-east of the juncture between the Tapline road and the Darb ez-Zobeida at a point 12 km. east of Rafha. Here a few worked flints were collected.

We drove to Qasr Zubala, a well-known halt on the pilgrims' way from an Najaf to Mecca, known as the Darb ez-Zobeida (*see* Musil, *Northern Nejd*, pp. 188-9, 1928), for the kind-hearted consort of Haroun-al-Rashid who built these resting places and had them supplied with water from large cisterns or deep (150-200 feet) wells. This ruined fort, fifteen miles due south of Jumaimah, stands on a prominence about 1,000 m. east of the present track leading to Hayil; it is easily visible from afar. Driving across a rough, hummocky plain with some thorn bushes, we approached the Qasr from the west. Low walls in great disrepair enclose the main courtyard, now almost filled with sand and the present last resting-place of six Beduins, whose graves lie in the centre. To the north and north-west are the tumbled ruins of numerous buildings. To the south-east a high pile of rubble extends on to the sandy plain. An aerial photograph would be most helpful. Around the outside of the Qasr a series of sherds, many blue-glazed, were collected. No inscriptions were seen. Several agile lizards were caught amid the black rocks. We drove 500 paces northward to examine two wells: (a) 20 feet square with excellent stone masonry, depth about 170 feet; and (b) circular (8 feet), also with stone sides, depth more than 180 feet. Another 300 paces north brought us to two cisterns or catchment basins:

(a) 90 by 60 feet with two towers (15 feet) at southern end; on west wall a series of steep steps built as a triangle led down to the water. The north-south side was 90 feet. This building was very ruined and no

depth could be measured without excavation. A rectangular pit (6 by 4 by 3 feet) stood near the north-east corner; this was presumably the ancient watering-trough.

(b) 150 by 100 by 6 feet, the longest being north-south. At the east end four steps (1.5 inches) led down into the cistern. The north and south walls were recessed with two equal steps. The west end had a 20-foot recess extending southward from the north-west corner and a 5-foot recess just south of the central point; their purpose was not clear.

Leaving Rafha the road crosses a flat plain covered with patches of green brush, then through a sigmoid bend between the 60-foot hills of Jebel el-Faqiq. Near Kilo. 846 on the right of the road were about 30 acres of an olive-green bush bearing yellow flowers (*qaisumah*), the plant which gives its name to former Station III. At Kilo. 883 basalt lapilli covered the surface; this is the most easterly point from the great lava bed to the north-west. Badanah (Station V) is at Kilo. 1025.

At Kilo. 1067 an enclosure (25 by 22 feet), formed by one course of basalt boulders, stands on the southern slope of a range (100 feet). At the western end of this line of hills some eroded Himyaritic inscriptions on basalt blocks were photographed. Across the road stretched a broad wadi.

After Don Holm, Aramco geologist, joined us, we turned south-west at Kilo. 1190 off Tapline road 5 km. to Jebel Riflat Asdah, a basalt-covered low hill with two graves on the summit. Here I collected a good series of typologically Paleolithic flint implements and many flakes of yellowish-brown to chocolate-brown colour. Nearby on another prominence 500 paces north was another grave. Two kilos south-west stands a cairn with many limestone blocks, two of them bearing camel brands (sing. *wasm*). A series of worked flint flakes was collected.

Three kilos south and midway up a 100-foot slope above a wadi full of bushes were blocks of platy limestone (18 inches high, 4 inches thick) arranged in an 18-foot circle with a high pile of stones in the centre. Presumably this is a grave, for it faces due east and west. Two other graves, one to the west, the other to the north, dominate this rather exposed slope. It is unusual for graves to be placed anywhere except on the top of eminences. On the highest point limestone blocks bore camel brands and graffiti. About 200 paces south-west we visited two graves on a hilltop and copied more graffiti and *wusûm*. We continued west to Quzaiz en-Naam (Gazass en-Naame) on the northern fringe of the Amud lava beds. Climbing the twin peaks (894 m.), we reached a large cairn on the highest eastern corner. Worked flints were collected on the western slope below the peak amid large basalt boulders.

Driving north-west past Jebel Khatimi (930 m.), we turned due north before reaching Kutaifat et-Turaif and halted at Turaif (Station VI).

On June 16 I left Turaif with Don Holm and two cars along the track to a sand quarry south for 4 km., then west for 8 km., and south-west across a mudflat to a point 4 km. due north of Jebel Agrin, a peak visible from afar. This mudflat and general area are called Khabra ed-Dauqara (loc. Dogara) and appear from five miles distant as a white strip below a yellow escarpment. In the late spring of this year Holm

said that there was a large lake on the mudflat (5 by 3 km.), now dry and rent with small cracks. We stopped to collect a plant with white flowers. Continuing south-west across the mudflat to the western side, we stopped beside a circular catchment basin (210 by 135 feet), faced with dressed basalt and surrounded by a high ring of basalt boulders overlying the earth removed. The longest axis faces approximately east-west. On the eastern side there is a 12-foot channel separated by 20 feet on each flank before reaching the basalt. Lying west of this catchment basin are about thirty acres of basalt ruins, whose plan will almost certainly be visible from an air photograph. Close to the reservoir is the clearly marked ground plan of a square courtyard (42.5 m.) with a central entrance gate (3.0 m.) and seven rooms (5.3 by 6.2 m.) along the back wall, with an outer wall 1.3 m. thick. The azimuth reading from the south-east corner along the outer wall past the entrance gate (1.3 m. high) N. 8° W. was 352°.

This basalt-built catchment basin and these dressed basalt buildings, combined with the architectural precision, must have been the work of the Romans.

Until I was guided to Qasr ed-Dauqara (31°35' N. and 38°20' E.), twenty miles south-west of Turaif, I had always believed that Qasr el-Burqu (32° N. and 38° E.), north-west of Iraq Petroleum Co. Station H-4 and about seventy miles airline north-west, was the easternmost outpost of the Roman Empire. The next known link in this chain of desert forts was at Qasr el-Azraq, south-west of I.P.C. Station H-5 and about seventy-five miles airline due north-west of Qasr ed-Dauqara.

It now seems probable that another Roman fort will be located in the Wadi Sirhan, thus completing the chain of Roman forts protecting the town from the desert marauders.

Careful search by six of us for two hours failed to reveal any inscriptions, but they may well be there among the piles of basalt. Clearing of the square courtyard down to the ancient floor level might also reveal dating evidence. However, it is probable that the same legion which guarded Qasr el-Burqu and Qasr el-Azraq also occupied Qasr ed-Dauqara.

We collected some sherds, which may give the clue to the period of occupation. Scattered among the basalt boulders and on bare patches of sand were hundreds of flint flakes, many of them microlithic in size. It appears that the foreshore of this ancient lake was inhabited from Stone Age to Roman, Nabatean or later times. Situated on the northern edge of the lava bed with the peak of Jebel Agrin as a superb watchtower, Khabra ed-Dauqara guarded the entrance to the Wadi Sirhan.

Leaving Qasr ed-Dauqara, we drove north-east for 5 km. across the pale brown mudflat, through small basalt lapilli overlying reddish sand, then across a flat area with myriads of small bushes, until we reached the track from Turaif to Qaf in the Wadi Sirhan. We crossed a range of low flint- and basalt-covered hills. Tell el-Hibr on the Saudi Arabian-Jordan frontier is visible on the skyline about 20 km. north. About the same distance west rises Jebel en-Naij and south about 10 km. stands Jebel Agrin. These are the three clearest landmarks in this area.

Don Holm described some roughly crescentic sand-filled water basins

within the triangle formed by Jebel Agrin ($31^{\circ}32'$ N. and $38^{\circ}20'$ E.), Jebel Khalad ($31^{\circ}30'$ N. and $38^{\circ}5'$ E.) and Jebel en-Naij ($31^{\circ}40'$ N. and $37^{\circ}55'$ E.). These stand on the western slope of a hill and are visible from a distance.

The track leads over a low rolling, sandy gravel and flinty area, grey-white with many small olive-green bushes. Two catchment basins are visible 2 km. right in line with Tell el-Hibr on the skyline. We drove through a sandy wadi bed with large bushes, then on to dark gravel overlying golden yellow sand. Climbing a 100-foot range covered with coarse flint over whitish powder, the track turned north to high banks (25 feet) surrounding a catchment basin (*makfur*, pl. *mahafir*) measuring 45 by 50 by 5 m. The open end faced east. The inner walls were well dressed with local stone, not basalt. The inner rim is 5.0 m., the outer maximum is 8.0 metres. Holm supplied the following readings: 135° to Jebel Agrin; 195° to Jebel Khalad; and 265° to Jebel en-Naij. In addition to a few sherds, there were worked flints on the inner south-east slope.

We continued across a black gravel plain toward Jebel en-Naij and turned left to the top of a low hill with a grave visible from a distance. Here were found specimens of fossilized wood and a few worked flint flakes. We passed hundreds of Ruwalla camels moving across the track toward Turaif, then a herd of thirty white camels all browsing together, with their proud owner clinging precariously behind the hump of a superb riding camel.

The track continued across a low rolling, basalt-covered area intersected with small wadis. On the left beside the road some devout Moslem had arranged the basalt pebbles into a 30 by 5 feet prayer-place (*mihrab*) with a niche facing Mecca. The road winds uphill over reddish-yellow sand toward Jebel en-Naij, now only 5 km. on the right almost directly ahead. We crossed the backbone range of Jebel es-Shama with sandy hills on each side. On the downward slope a large (25 feet high) mass of deep black basalt crowns a hill on the right above the track. Some ruined basalt enclosures stand on the southern slope, probably graves or sheep-folds. The track now becomes sandy between 40-foot hills topped with basalt overlying sand. Three stone circles appeared on the north-west side of a 60-foot hill on the left of the track. Shortly afterward we passed a thick patch of vegetation in a wadi bed with a solitary palm rising just above 5-foot bushes. We rested briefly in the shade, an unusual treat in this hot, windy wilderness. Then we continued southwest toward a large black hill. Low hills encircled the track. Basalt lapilli (6 inches in diameter) overlie sand. We passed a Jebel on the left before entering a valley almost devoid of vegetation. Three stone circles were seen on the right hillside. The track led downward into an area surrounded by low hills with basalt overlying firm sand. A large black mass of basalt appears on the right. We drove over a caliché-like formation amid hills and then off the track to a small (3-foot) overhanging limestone ledge, appearing from a distance like a small cave. There were no signs of human habitation, although it might have been used as a wind-break. No graffiti were seen on the rough walls. A startled hare (*arneb*)

dashed madly from its cool form into the brilliant sunshine. The track twisted through hills over gravel in a valley floor. Ahead about three miles lay a huge salt marsh (*sabkha*). We halted to collect an excellent series of basalt "dreikanter," parallel to deep (20 feet) wadi cut on the left, continuing amid hills in a north-westerly direction until around a bend there lay Qaf. In the right foreground across a sloping, sandy plain stood a fort with corner towers. Beyond the flat-roofed village, standing amid a palm grove, extended the mudflat at the north-eastern end of the Wadi Sirhan.

We entered the fort to be greeted by a negro servant of the Sheikh, who was resting during the heat of this day, now Ramadhan. Our informant stated that this fort was built in 1918, but the solidly built guest room with its bevelled stone blocks indicated far greater antiquity.

On a high hill dominating the fort were stone ramparts enclosing buildings. Up to the top a road had been made with walls on each side. The servant told us that on the peak of Jebel Saidi the Sheikh often passed the hour of sundown in prayer. This ruin deserves investigation.*

We returned to Turaif from Qaf along the same track past Jebel en-Naij to a point approximately equidistant from Jebel Khalad and Jebel Agrin and turned north through low bushes toward Tell el-Hibr. Seven km. from this turn we collected worked flints on a hillside. We continued to the south-east corner of Khabra Adhman, a huge mudflat (8 by 3 km.), and sped north-west across the flat surface to Tell el-Hibr ($31^{\circ}50'$ N. and $38^{\circ}10'$ E.). Crossing Tapline near a signpost, we pulled up on the south-east side of these basalt-strewn hills. A sea of flint glistened in the setting sun. This flint is of the finest quality I have seen in this part of south-western Asia, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq. There are patches of honey-coloured flint, which fractures perfectly. The flint from Tell el-Hibr must have been famous far and wide in Stone Age times (*cf.* Grande Pressigny in France). Naturally, on these slopes there are thousands of flakes and rejects.

Tell el-Hibr must long have been a key point, for its peaks dominated the area on the fringe of the great lava bed, excellent quality flint was abundant, and nearby was Khabra Adhman, formerly a large lake. In addition, within a few miles to the north and north-west two other mudflats were lakes in ancient times. These three concentrations of water must have attracted game from north, east and south. Hence, Tell el-Hibr must have been one of the most important prehistoric sites in south-western Asia.

* In a personal communication dated October 8, 1950, Don Holm writes: "We have verified the date of the limestone Qasr as about 1918. The old Qasr atop Jebel Saidi is said to ante-date the Turkish occupation. A Qasr, known as Idhra, a few kilometres east of our camp [GFP₃ Wadi Sirhan], is said to be 700 years old. I have not seen it, but Clements has, and tells me there are carved basalt faces, tablets with inscriptions similar to Himyaritic or other pre-Arabic writing. There is much flint debris in a regolith surface on the east side of the valley, but so far we have seen no worked flints. I have picked up a few pieces of coarse pottery from a small, ruined Qasr, about 2 km. from Qaf, to hold for you. Wadi Sirhan seems to have the setting for a fertile hunting ground, as water comes to the surface in small artesian flows, the climate is moderate, shelter and vegetation are abundant and game must have been plentiful at one time."

The Paleolithic and Neolithic hunters lived on Tell el-Hibr, Jebel Umm Wual ($31^{\circ}45'$ N. and $38^{\circ}50'$ E.), where I had found typologically Mousterian implements in November, 1927, believing this hill to be in Transjordan, and Quzaiz en-Naam ($31^{\circ}20'$ N. and $38^{\circ}50'$ E.). Although as yet there is no direct evidence, I am certain that stone implements occur on Kutaifat el-Khatimi (930 m., $31^{\circ}25'$ N. and $38^{\circ}40'$ E.), Jebel Liss (1,099 m., $31^{\circ}12'$ N. and $38^{\circ}32'$ E.), Jebel Hainnu (1,030 m., $31^{\circ}17'$ N. and $38^{\circ}20'$ E.), Jebel Agrin (969 m., $31^{\circ}32'$ N. and $38^{\circ}18'$ E.), Jebel el-Musalla ($31^{\circ}30'$ N. and $38^{\circ}12'$ E.), Jebel Khalad ($31^{\circ}29'$ N. and $38^{\circ}5'$ E.), and Jebel en-Naij ($31^{\circ}38'$ N. and $37^{\circ}55'$ E.). In addition, stone implements will be found along the Wadi Sirhan, for I have collected them to the west on the peaks of Jebel Thlathakhwat, in the stream bed of the Wadi Araba, from many open-air sites and from the gravel bed at Bayir Wells in the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan (formerly Transjordan), to the north-west, north and north-west from R.A.F. Landing Ground V in the Harrat ar-Rajil, from near Landing Grounds "J," "K" and "R" across to Jebel Aneza, focal point of three boundaries.

Among the richest sites for flint implements are the Wadi Rutga in Syria west of Abu Kemal, Rutba Wells, Telul al-Basatin (midway between Jebel Aneza—Jebel Tenf), Jebel Aneza in Iraq, Tell el-Hibr in north-western Saudi Arabia, and Jebel Thlathakhwat in Jordan. These surface stations, extending from south-eastern Syria to south-eastern Jordan, range over an area almost 400 miles wide.

Only a few flint flakes were found on the peak of Tell el-Hibr, which is covered with huge basalt boulders. No inscriptions were seen, although I would expect them to be there. Descending on the central east side, we visited a series of stone enclosures with low basalt walls. These may have been buildings or sheepfolds. In a small rock shelter (5 by 4 by 3 feet) partly closed by a wall lay a bleached human skeleton. The skull was dolichocephalic (CI = 72?) with parietal bosses, massing of bone at glabella and rounded orbital margins, male, æt. 40. This typical Beduin skull was replaced after examination.

About 100 paces south of this rock shelter a fine series of *Nummulites gizaensis* were collected in a few minutes; some of them were thumbnail size.

On the return trip from Tell el-Hibr to Turaif along the Tapline road we drove 150 paces north to a low rolling hill ($31^{\circ}42'$ N. and $38^{\circ}28'$ E.) with three small cairns. This hill is near Kilo. 1284. Although the ground was covered with flint, it was hard to find more than a few worked examples, for it was almost dark, the sun having set fifteen minutes before. Don Holm guided me to this spot because he had seen on a previous occasion several small blocks of flint with a pinkish surface on which Himyaritic inscriptions had been cut. In the fading light we could not find any examples. However, a series of *wasms* and graffiti had been hammered by passing Bedu on the limestone blocks forming the three cairns, possibly graves.

Flying from Turaif to Beirut, we followed the Tapline north-west over Tell el-Hibr, a huge shining basalt outcrop, crossing the Saudi Arabian frontier a few miles west of these hills. From 3,000 feet the three

mudflats were clearly visible. Between Tell el-Hibr and Station VI A, south-east of I.P.C. Station H-5, there were hundreds of stone enclosures, rectangular and circular, as well as the so-called "kites," stone-walled enclosures with long walls appearing from above like tails.

The majority of these basalt structures stood on the sheltered slopes of the endless series of low hills or on the edges of wadis or mudflats. From our low altitude the location and distribution of these buildings proved conclusively that they were constructed during a time when water was relatively abundant. Furthermore, the enormous number seen on this flight traverse indicates the former heavy population of this section of eastern Jordan, now almost uninhabited and uninhabitable. I presume that flint implements ranging primarily from Middle Paleolithic and Late Neolithic occur throughout this area.

Collections.—The material has been arranged according to the following plan: (A) Sites visited and specimens collected during the period June 7-17, 1950; (B) either examined or described by Aramco or Tapline staff; and (C) other references.

A. Specimens collected, June 7-17, 1950, included:

(a) *Flint Implements*—

1. South-west of Hafar al-Batin Wells.
2. On top of hill at Kilo. 511.5.
3. Near Kilo. 726.
4. North of Jumaimah cistern.
5. North-east of juncture between Tapline road and Darb ez-Zobeida, 12 km. east of Rafha.
6. Top of Jebel el-Markuz, Kilo. 852.
7. Jebel Rijlat Asdah, 5 km. south-west of Kilo. 1190.
8. Two km. south-west of Jebel Rijlat Asdah.
9. Quzaiz en-Naam (Gazass en-Naam) on northern edge of Amud lava beds at $31^{\circ}24' N.$ and $38^{\circ}55' E.$
10. South-west corner of Khabra ed-Dauqara.
11. Catchment basin (*mahfur*) north-west of No. 10.
12. Three miles west of No. 11.
13. Twenty km. south-east of Tell el-Hibr.
14. Tell el-Hibr.
15. Hill north of Tapline near Kilo. 1284.

(b) *Stone Ruins* (excluding small cairns and graves)—

1. Jumaimah cistern on Darb ez-Zobeida.
2. Qasr Zubala on Darb ez-Zobeida.
3. Stone circle on Jebel Rijlat Asdah south-west of Kilo. 1190.
4. Eastern peak of Jebel Quzaiz en-Naam.
5. Qasr ed-Dauqara, Roman fort and catchment basin.
6. Prayer place (*mihrab*) south-west of Jebel en-Naij.
7. Basalt enclosures south-west of Jebel en-Naij near track to Qaf.
8. Three stone circles west of No. 7 on left of track.
9. Three stone circles on right hillside 8 km. before Qaf.
10. Hilltop of Qaf.

11. Basalt enclosures on southern peak and eastern slope of Tell el-Hibr.

12. Hill 100 paces north of Tapline near Kilo. 1284.

(c) *Catchment Basins (mahfur, pl. mahafir)*—

1. In triangle formed by Jebel en-Naij, Jebel Khalad and Jebel Agrin. Described by Holm.

2. Twenty km. south of Tell el-Hibr. Visited June 16.

3. Thirty km. south-east of Tell el-Hibr. Seen south of road June 16.

(d) *Tumuli and Graves*—

1. South of Al Khobar before reaching the ruins of Umm as-Saih.

2. Individual graves have been recorded in the traverse report.

(e) *Himyaritic Inscriptions*—

1. End of low range on right of road near Kilo. 1067.

2. Hill 100 paces north of road near Kilo. 1284. Recorded by Don Holm.

(f) *Wasms and Graffiti*—

1. Jebel Rijlat Asdah 7 km. south-west of Kilo. 1190.

2. Two km. south-west of No. 1.

3. Three km. south of No. 2.

4. Hill 100 paces north of road near Kilo. 1284.

(g) *Pottery*—

1. Umm as-Saih.

2. Qasr Zubala.

3. Qasr ed-Dauqara.

B. In addition to the above specimens from these and other areas, the following were seen or described by Aramco or Tapline staff members, especially geologists, surveyors and members of the Exploration Department:

1. Flint implements from the Tell el-Hibr—Jebel Umm Wual area were collected by Don Holm and Clements during January-February, 1950. Selected specimens from the following surface sites were presented to the Peabody Museum:

(a) Tell el-Hibr.

(b) 15.8 km. west of Turaif, 300 m. north of Tapline with three graves on summit. (Probably same as our No. 15 near Kilo. 1284.)

(c) 9.7 km. east of Tell el-Hibr.

(d) 4.5 km. east of Tell el-Hibr.

(e) North-east of Tell el-Hibr along Jordan frontier.

(f) 25 km. north-west of Turaif; plain covered with flints.

(g) West of Turaif beside Tapline.

(h) Hills 1 km. south-east of Turaif.

(i) 10-20 km. south of Turaif along quarry road.

(j) South-west of Station V A (Kilo. 1118) near Nedfa el-Hamil.

- (k) 30 km. south-west of Station V A (Kilo. 1118).
 (l) Eastern edge of Khor Umm Wual north-east of Turaif.
2. Specimens collected by Mr. and Mrs. W. E. Pearson during 1949 at large ruins due west of Qatif included many sherds, pottery spindle whorls, Chinese and other copper coins, glass bracelets, many beads and several ostrich egg fragments.
 3. John Lash and Homer Klinger described the following:
 - (a) Horseshoe-shaped dams [probably catchment basins (sing. *mahfur*)] just north of the road about 20 km. west of Station V A (Kilo. 1118).
 - (b) Series of inscriptions (probably Himyaritic) on 3-4 acre peak of isolated 250-foot hill (probably Jebel Umm Wual) north-west of Station V A (Kilo. 1118) and north-east of Turaif. This Jebel, described as 50 km. west of Station V A along Tapline and 12-15 km. north, is not visible from the road. There is a long valley running north-south directly east of Jebel.
 - (c) A monolith crowns the Jebel.
 4. Stone circle in Wadi Tathlith (probably Thalith = Third) 100 km. north-east of Bisha (20° N. and $43^{\circ}15'$ E.).
 5. Near Nejran oasis ($17^{\circ}30'$ N. and $43^{\circ}45'$ E.) are many graffiti, including human figures, men on camels, camels and possibly oryx. See H. St. J. Philby, *J.R.G.S.*, 1949.
 6. O. A. Seager, Manager, Exploration Department, collected during December, 1948, typologically Neolithic flint, quartzite and obsidian implements at Irq el-Kudnah ($19^{\circ}51'$ N. and $45^{\circ}24'$ E.).
 7. Specimens similar to No. 6 were collected by O. A. Seager and survey parties in the Wadi el-Fau area from Qaryah ($19^{\circ}47'$ N. and $45^{\circ}09'$ E.), north-west to Jebel Tuwaiq.
 8. The finest specimen I have ever seen from south-western Asia is a quartzite spear-point (24 by 7.5 by 0.75 cm.) with large broad pressure flakes on one side from east of Sulail ($20^{\circ}3'$ N. and $46^{\circ}15'$ E.) collected by Don Holm during October, 1949.

C. Other Specimens:

1. Some sherds collected during 1942 and early in 1950 at Thaj* by Col. and Mrs. H. R. P. Dickson of Kuwait were presented to Peabody Museum.
2. Large Paleolithic hand axe from Duwadami† (24° N. and 44° E.) described by Cornwall.
3. Thomas‡ found a perfect flint arrow lying on the sands of Sanam. He adds that the Beduin still use flint strike-a-lights in this area.

* H. R. P. and V. P. Dickson, "Thaj and Other Sites," *Iraq*, vol. x, pp. 1-8, 1948.

† P. H. Cornwall, "Ancient Arabia: Explorations in Hasa," *J.R.G.S.*, vol. 107, Nos. 1-2, pp. 28-50, February, 1946; and "In Search of Arabia's Past," *National Geographic Magazine*, April, 1948.

‡ Bertram Thomas, "Arabia Felix," No. 207, New York, 1932.

4. Other stone implements* (Field, 1929, 1932 and 1933).
5. Major T. A. Altounyan of the Iraq Petroleum Co. led a survey party during December, 1949, and January, 1950, into the Hadhramaut. After seeing the motion picture in colour of this journey, he showed me the following.
 - (a) A superb Spartan bronze figurine from the Wadi Jerdan south-west of Shabwa (15° N. and 47° E.).
 - (b) Flint point with desert varnish from wadi bed near Shabwa.
 - (c) Series of seals from Shabwa.

Tribal Notes.—1. Encamped beside the numerous deep wells at Hafar al-Batim were about 300 Mutair and about 30 Sulubba tents. Mr. John C. Kelly of Qaisumah (Station III) and I called on Sheikh Ibn Busayyis of the Mutair, whose home is al Lihabah, three days south by camel. Ibn Busayyis gave his genealogy as follows: ibn Mishari ibn Ali ibn Hadhdhal ibn Ulayyan ibn Ghurair ibn Naif ibn Ghrazzai ibn Ali Ghuraib ibn Annaz.

The Mutairi were divided into Ibn Busayyis (1,500 tents) and Bandar-ed-Darwish (3,000 tents). The camel brand (*wasm*) of the former is a bar over a half-moon on the right cheek and a half-moon on the right flank, of the latter a bar over a T on the left flank. The Mutairi assembled around the hearth listed fauna† seen in the Qaisumah area.

Among Beduin tribes they listed as being in the area: Ruwalla, Anaiza, Shammar, adh-Dhafir, Ajman, Beni Hajar, Sbaa, Ateiba, Ruwugga, Al Atala, Qahtan, Al Murrah, ad-Dawasir, Sukhul and Al Adhamin.‡

2. At Badanah (Station V) Sheikh Aiyid ibn Farhan ibn Ajlal ibn Hazim of the Awazim (300 tents) listed the sub-divisions of his tribe and their number of tents as follows: Al Noman (30), Al Bishri (25), Al Thaha (40), Ibn Sherha (20), and Frayhan ibn Hamid (15). The camel brand (*wasm*) of the Awazim is two parallel vertical bars on the left leg and one vertical bar on the left side. Sheikh Aiyid listed the fauna§ of his region.

* Miss Gertrude Caton-Thompson found surface stone implements in Aden and Hadhramaut. At the Museum of Archæology, Cambridge University, I examined this series, which reminded me from the point of view of typology and patina of flint implements from the Rutba area collected by Field Museum North Arabian Desert Expeditions, 1927, 1928 and 1934, as well as series from British Somaliland I examined in the Coryndon Memorial Museum, Nairobi. Other surface finds from the Arabian Peninsula include many sites in Sinai, Jordan, Iraq (especially the Paleolithic hand axes from Barda-Balkha east of Chemchemal) and southern Kuwait.

† Gazelle, fox, hyena (few), jerboa, hare, hedgehog, mouse, vulture (*nizr*), turkey bustard (*houbara*), sand grouse (*qata*), white-winged vulture (*hudaya*), falcon (*sakr*), horned viper (prob. *Pseudocerastes fieldi* since I collected type specimens on Jebel Umm Wual north-east of Turaif in November, 1927), several kinds of snakes and small lizards, large lizard (*thubb*), the desert monitor (*Varanus* sp., Ar. *arwal* in Iraq, *waral* in Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf areas), and scorpions. They agreed that there were now no ostrich, lion nor cheetah (*nimr*).

‡ The Ruwugga, Al Atala and Al Adhamin are tribal sections.

§ Among animals in his area are: gazelle, wolf, jackal (*wawi*), hyena, hare, jerboa, red fox, turkey bustard, eagle (*nizr*), falcon, lizards (*sahaliya*, *thubb* and *waral*). Neither ostriches (*naam*) nor cheetah have been seen in recent years.

3. On June 12 at Jumaimah, a few miles south-east of Rafha, William Mulligan and I visited the black tents of the Abda* section (14,000 tents) of the Southern Shammar, who range from Rafha—Hayil and from Qaisumah to al Jauf. We were received by the Amir Nawwaf ibn Mutani ibn al Asi ibn Shuraim and the Amir Nayif ibn Habbas ibn Mutluq.

The assembled group of forty-five tribesmen gave a list of the animals† now in their territory.

Regarding camel brands (*wusum* or *wasmat*), all Abda place a cross on the left flank. To distinguish the property of the Amir Nayif ibn Habbas a rectangular U is placed on the right cheek and a single bar on the right side of the neck. Amir Nawwaf uses a four-tined comb as his *wasam*.

From Beirut the archæological, zoological and botanical specimens were shipped to Harvard, where they are now being studied.

* The sub-tribes of the Abda, dictated by the Emir Nawaf ibn Shraib, are: Ali Haya, Al Faddhal, Al Waibar, Al Jafar, Al Ghreithe, Al Hussain, Al Traybat, Al Shraya, Al Aleiyat, Al Salith, as-Shumaili, Al Jerri, Al Genida, Al Fadhir, Al Hamid, Al Jeddi, Al Afarit, Al Zigarit, and Al Shuraifat. (For other spellings see Musil, "Northern Nejd," pp. 32-3.) The number of Abda tents is probably greatly exaggerated.

† Gazelle, wolf, fox, hare, hyena (few), cheetah near Hayil, turkey bustard, eagle, falcon, hoopoe (*hudhud*), large bird (*mishr am rithan*), horned viper, small lizards, larger lizard with broad, yellow belly and spiny tail, and large lizard. No ostrich had been seen by any of these tribesmen, but several commented that their fathers had seen them years before between Jebel Aneze and Hayil.

REVIEWS

Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. By the Supreme Allied Commander, South-east Asia, 1943-45, Vice-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma. London: H.M. Stationery Office. Pp. xii+280. 39 maps. 1951. 17s. 6d.

Reports on operations vary considerably. Some are lucid and instructive, while others are apt to reduce the student to tears of boredom and perplexity. The Report on the Operations in South-east Asia by the Supreme Allied Commander happily belongs to the former category. It not only points out many important lessons, but also adorns a tale of absorbing interest, aided thereto by excellent map and cross-references. It is a classic example of co-operation between the three services in conditions of unusual difficulty.

The final victory in South-east Asia was built on the sure foundation of command of the sea. The success of the land operations resulting from the remarkable combination of land and air forces could not have been possible without the regular deliveries by the merchant ships to and within the area. The Allied fleet protected the sea communications. They undertook a series of minor operations and maintained land forces on the Arakan front. They mounted a large sea-borne assault on Rangoon. Sea and air superiority over the Japanese fleet was essential to the preparation for the assault on Malaya.

It would have been impossible to conduct a successful campaign in Burma without air supply, without the transfer of troops, equipment and stores by plane, and without the co-operation of tactical air forces in battle. Sea and air played their part. But ultimate victory on land was due, as always, to the incomparable fighting qualities of the infantry soldier.

Lord Mountbatten had a remarkable command. In addition to the British and Indian troops on whom the brunt of the land fighting fell, it comprised Americans, Canadians, South Africans, East and West Africans, Singhalese, Dutch, Chinese and a Belgian medical unit. Supplementary to his forces which faced the Japanese he had Long Range Penetration patrols, "Chindits," and specially trained American jungle troops known as "Galahad," working behind the enemy lines. The Chindits (so called from their shoulder flash, representing a Chinthe, the guardian lion of Burmese temples), under the gallant Wingate, to whom special tribute is paid, "outfought the Japanese and beat them at their own game of infiltration." There were also intelligence and guerilla forces within the enemy's territory which, as the report says, were necessarily unadvertised.

The Supreme Commander had at his disposal, in addition to his naval and air forces, 15th Corps (Christison) in Arakan, 14th Army (Slim) on the central front, the American Chinese army (Stilwell), termed Northern Combat Command, on the northern front.

It will suffice for the purposes of this brief review to note that the progress of the campaign may roughly be divided into the following stages: the Japanese invasion of India via Arakan and across the Chindwin; defeat and retirement of the Japanese operations in northern Burma; advance of the British across the Chindwin and Irrawaddy, capture of Mandalay and Meiktila; capture of Rangoon by an amphibious force; fighting to clear Burma; surrender of the Japanese.

In addition to the major tactical, strategical and administrative features of these operations, which amply repay the most careful study, there were many

unusual features during the campaign in Burma, of which some typical examples may be given.

Inter-service co-operation in Arakan was so developed that before the army services began to function the navy carried out the entire supply and treatment of casualties for the army; mine-sweepers acted as hospital carriers; a sloop carried a surgical unit; landing craft were used as casualty clearing stations, water carriers and general supply units. The intricate creeks (chauks) on the Arakan coast, and the rivers Chindwin and Irrawaddy, were all reconnoitred by specially trained and equipped swimmers of the Inter-Services Sea Reconnaissance Unit. The Chindits were entirely supported and supplied and their casualties and sick were evacuated by an Air Commando.

In the air, as the campaign progressed, the Americans developed such a high standard of army air co-operation that they were able to drop supplies in suitable places according to the progress of the battle. Air-gunner observation posts were used in the thick jungle to direct bombers and front-gunned aircraft on to their targets from the air.

On the ground, in addition to their usual tasks, the R.E. built, launched and commissioned two armed boats on the Chindwin: "probably the first time that the army constructed warships for the Royal Navy, though to the design of a naval constructor."

The set-up of Lord Mountbatten's supreme command presented many difficulties. It was arranged that his deputy (General Stilwell) should be an American. This difficult commander was also chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, commanding general of the China-Burma-India theatre and operational commander of the Chinese-American forces in north-east Burma. The very definite and wise recommendations for a more simplified chain of supreme command which are emphasized in the report are the measure of how very difficult Lord Mountbatten found the arrangement which he had to accept. The relations with the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek were by no means easy, and required a considerable amount of tact to make them workable. Unfulfilled promises of support, and withdrawal of Chinese troops added to his difficulties. It is astonishing, in the light of the present situation in the East, to think that the generalissimo should have demanded operational control over Siam and French Indo-China!

The difficulties which faced the Supreme Commander in the actual campaign were of a nature to daunt a less courageous and determined leader. Communications were almost non-existent. Any roads which had to be constructed must cross mountain ranges rising at their height to 10,000 feet. Much of Burma is covered with jungle so dense that, in some places, "a patrol would take twenty-four hours, even without enemy opposition, to hack its way for a couple of miles." Air supply was therefore imperative. The south-west monsoon lasted from May to October, and made operations so difficult that the Japanese thought that the British would consider it a rest period. Burma is a notoriously malarial country, and only the advance of medical science, as the campaign progressed, was able to diminish, to a quite remarkable degree, casualties from malarial mosquitoes, scrub typhus and amœbic dysentery. And lastly, but most important of all, the morale of the troops. For two years our forces in South-east Asia had been beaten back; for the first Burma campaign had been a military defeat. Our subsequent attempt to regain the offensive in Arakan in 1943 had met with defeat. South-east Asia was the lowest in priority of all the various theatres of war for all its requirements. The idea of a "forgotten army" was conceived and grew: morale could hardly have been lower. So, first of all, morale must be built up by the assurance that they were not forgotten, and by the explosion of the

myth of the invincible Jap. Gradually, by the most solicitous care for their welfare, by minor successes in small patrol encounters leading to confident success in major actions, the soldiers of the 14th Army became the formidable fighting machine which earned its imperishable name. Not only did the fighting soldier become the superior of the Japanese in battle, but the tactical handling of our troops proved to be of a higher quality.

Before the Russo-Japanese war (1904) their German teacher had imbued the Japanese with the theory that envelopment was the solution of strategical and tactical problems. The Japanese completely encircled our forces in Arakan and at Imphal and Kohima, severing our land communications. But they came to learn the bitter lesson that troops who are prepared to stand and fight can be supplied by air. In both instances the Japanese commander was confident that he could succeed by a swift advance, and consequently calculated that he could overrun supply dumps and therefore need not ensure that his troops should be maintained by his own supply system. The result was a disastrous retreat. This discomfiture was accentuated by continuous assault on his war-supply lines, dumps and troop concentrations, and his calculations were entirely upset by the British decision to fight on during the monsoon, which gave him no breathing space to reinforce and rehabilitate his troops.

Even when assault had hopelessly failed he always seemed bound to continue attacking in the same place instead of shifting his objective. Furthermore, the Japanese General Kimura was completely deceived by General Slim's brilliant plan for crossing the Irrawaddy. But the Japanese soldier, who fought with fanatical bravery, was a formidable foe, and a worthy opponent of his superior, the British and the Indian soldier.

The conclusion of this report contains a warm tribute to the leaders, to the fighting qualities of the soldier, and to the excellence of the supporting services. Three commanders are mentioned—Lieutenant-General (now Field-Marshal) Sir William Slim, who made and led the famous 14th Army so brilliantly; the gallant Wingate; and the courageous but difficult Stilwell.

Readers of this report will surely be impressed by the fact that, owing to the almost complete absence of ego, it would seem that it has been written by an observer rather than by a commander who, faced by almost insuperable difficulties, brought the operations in South-east Asia to such a successful conclusion.

J. S. SHEA.

Before the Curtain. By Thomas Preston. John Murray. 18s.

An author who has prospected for gold in Siberia and the Caucasus, who has represented his country as consul and minister, who has composed the music for a ballet, and who has travelled widely both before and behind the Iron Curtain, should have an interesting story to tell. Those who believe that fact is often stranger than fiction will be absorbed by Preston's book. One is transported on a magic carpet from Siberia to Constantinople, from Vladivostok to Moscow, Cairo, Italy and Lithuania.

Perhaps the most interesting historical period with which the author deals is the chapter "Blood Bath," following the Duma's *coup d'état*. The author was then British consul in Ekaterinburg, a name with such grim memories that even the Bolsheviki tried to forget its existence by changing its name to Sverdlovsk. The town where the Imperial Tsarist family was brutally massacred was to be officially forgotten. Before the assassination "Freedom" had to have its way, and speeches were made at the Opera House in Ekaterinburg where the representatives of the Russian proletariat announced that, "after a thousand years of slavery, Russians were at last allowed to speak their minds." One wonders what would happen to the Russian of today who permitted himself to "speak his mind," if his thoughts were not in accord with the party line.

The author reconstructs the picture of the murder of the Tsar and his relatives in vivid fashion. Its ghastliness is relieved only by the fact that death was instantaneous for most of that tragic family.

As consul in Vladivostok the value of the firm hand in dealing with the Russians is admirably illustrated.

A description of artistic life in Russia is a pleasant change from the murk and darkness of politics. One is introduced to the great Russian musical masters, Glazounov, Rimsky-Korsakov, Stravinsky and Rachmaninoff. Whatever the political state of Russia, the arts of music and the ballet seem to flourish like flowers on a dunghill. Your critic witnessed the most wonderful performance of *Sadko* in Moscow in 1924, when that city was in the depths of a starved depression.

Artistic inspiration seems to emphasize the lack of any inspiration in the work of the collective farms, where incentive has disappeared. The village may have its "cultural centre" with portraits of Lenin and Marx, but the Russian classics provided for the edification of the peasants would probably be more appreciated if the readers had fuller stomachs.

The author sums up in Chapter 26 ("Opium for the People"), and at the end asks the question that is so impossible to answer—Can the difference between Communism and Democracy, Police State *versus* Individual Freedom, ever be reconciled?

This attractive volume can be recommended with full confidence to the Russian specialist and to the general reader for its human and travel interest.

H. ST. C. S.

Anopheles and Malaria in the Middle East. London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Memoir No. 7. By Leeson, Lumsden, Yofe and Macan. London: H. K. Lewis and Co. 1950. Pp. xii+223. Illustrations. 35s.

This memoir bears the hall-mark of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine—a guarantee of its merit. It is well written and well illustrated, and its 223 pages are packed with information. Authors and publisher alike are to be congratulated on a volume admirable in both matter and format.

The authors are four officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps, and their papers are a summary of malarial surveys made by British field laboratories in the Near and Middle East during the second World War. The investigations were carried out wholly under active service conditions, their object being to ascertain the risks to which our troops were exposed in areas of military operations. It was upon these surveys that anti-malarial measures were based, measures that were crowned with very remarkable success.

The papers relate to five countries: Iraq, Persia, Syria, the Lebanon and Trans-jordan (now Jordan); but observations in respect of each were of necessity limited to areas occupied by our forces. In spite of this limitation, however, they give valuable and recent information concerning the incidence of malaria and the vectors of it in these countries.

I saw some of the malaria field laboratories in operation, and I was impressed by the efficiency of their organization, the thoroughness of their investigations, and the enthusiasm and camaraderie of the teams concerned. I should have welcomed more reference to the effective anti-malarial measures which the work of the laboratories engendered, and we must hope for another volume dealing with this aspect of the fight against malaria.

The memoir is essentially a work of reference, and as such is mainly of local interest and importance. It should be of great value to the medical services of the countries concerned; though in some of them, it is to be feared, long association with the disease has tended to its neglect, and a liability to leave it "bid Allah."

There is an introduction by Professor P. A. Buxton, who served in Iraq and Persia in the first World War, and was later entomologist to the Government of Palestine. No one better qualified could have been found to write a foreword; and in it he mentions the interesting fact that most of the *Anopheles* noted in the memoir belong to the Palearctic region, though the vectors of southern Iraq and the lowlands of the Persian Gulf areas are predominantly derived from the Oriental region.

H. C. S.

The Essential T. E. Lawrence. Selected by David Garnett. Jonathan Cape. 1951. 8" x 5½". Pp. 311. 12s. 6d.

To present selected extracts from the works of this or that writer is perhaps as good a way of attracting new readers as any other; and in the present instance the bait includes matter not hitherto offered to the public. By its author's wish nothing of *The Mint* was to be published before 1950, and here are several passages from that book, good to read in themselves and written in a style sinewy, sensitive and vivid, but simpler than that employed in *The Seven Pillars*.

Earlier titles in the series to which the book under review belongs offer a string of names "essentially" associated with literature. *The Essential T. E. Lawrence* suggests inevitably wider associations; and Mr. David Garnett, in his selection and arrangement of extracts from Lawrence's writings, has been at pains to cast them, as a whole, in an autobiographical mould. A "patchwork portrait" composed of facts and opinions about Lawrence, taken in ordered sequence from *T. E. Lawrence, by His Friends*, precedes the chosen excerpts, which are grouped under three heads: "Archæology," "War and Diplomacy," and "The Royal Air Force." Continuity is aided by the scattered use, throughout, of letters selected from Lawrence's enormous correspondence.

In Part I brief extracts from *Crusader Castles*, the *Diary* of 1911 and *The Wilderness of Zin* appear among letters of 1906-14. Part II imposed on Mr. Garnett the necessity of making selections from *The Seven Pillars*—a task which might have frightened the most hardened digest-operator. In conformity, however, with his declared design, Mr. Garnett has interspersed these extracts with passages from *The Arab Bulletin* and certain of Lawrence's letters, contriving thus some outline of his part in the Arab campaign as well as an interesting contrast in expression between the immediate and the retrospective. "Diplomacy" (indicated in the heading of Part II) seems to have vanished from the text—if the term was meant to apply to the post-war struggle which Lawrence called the "Dog Fight in Downing Street." Part III speeds rapidly through the years from 1922 to Lawrence's death.

Undoubtedly the passages from *The Mint*, which this all too short section of the book includes, will attract more notice than any other, but certain extracts from *The Arab Bulletin*, Lawrence's official notes on the handling of the 200 Class R.A.F. Seaplane Tender, and a review of D. H. Lawrence's novels are also published here for the first time. Of the letters, two only were not included in *The Letters of T. E. Lawrence*: one a fragment almost identical, in certain phrases, with Lawrence's letter of June 26, 1929, to H. G. Hayter, and the other probably the last he wrote.

It is long since the reading public has been reminded of Lawrence by any notable publication, and perhaps some now young will scarcely have heard of him. But here Mr. Garnett has put together a serviceable sample-book, which may not be the less opportune for appearing at a time when it cannot well be said that every boy or man is taught to make "Dare quam Recipere" his daily guide.

E. D.

Traveller's Prelude. By Freya Stark. John Murray. Pp. xii + 346. Illustrations. 1950. 18s.

Freya Stark describes her autobiography as a very private history written at the request of Sir Sydney Cockerell. Readers of this remarkable book will not fail to understand how the sequence of events described so happily formed a character which must eventually seek adventures to which these events are a prelude.

The book is charmingly written and reveals a determination to overcome the unexpected, a refusal to submit to ill-health, an intense interest in surroundings, a capacity for love and for lasting friendship, and a sense of humour which nothing can quell. What a constant delight a grandmother must have been "whose gentle grand manner had an unsuspected toughness which managed to resist—without a shadow of annoyance and all through her life—the devoted efforts of friends and relations to think for her good." It is permissible to surmise that her granddaughter may have recognized that she owed her own gentle manner and her undoubted toughness to her gracious ancestress.

Freya Stark's knowledge of languages came very soon, apart from the Arabic which she studied later in life. She was born in Paris and had visited France and Italy, and had known a home in Devonshire at an early age. She knew the Dolomites, and later climbed Monte Rosa and the Matterhorn. Italy, her background for many years, made a deep impression upon her. She would have been quite prepared to live with "Guido," with whom she was deeply in love. Yet her natural balance always remained, even after Guido's cruel and abrupt breaking off of their engagement. When on the eve of a very serious operation, as she did not wish to die outside the Christian communion, she was baptized a Presbyterian, because "the thirty-nine articles seemed to her to be more than anyone could accept as an adult."

She had many and constant struggles against lack of means. She worked in a carpet factory in Italy when she was quite young. In the 1914-18 war she was a censor in London for a short time and then became a nurse on the Italian front. Her experiences during the retreat after Caporetto are vividly related.

It is very remarkable that her extraordinary parental background did not dull the vividness of her nature. She loved both parents devotedly. She describes her mother as tall, with red hair and dark, inherited eyebrows; a gay, irregular, wilful mouth, and a mind and body brilliant and alluring. Her mother was essentially a woman who, except for an appreciation of art and love of children, differed in almost every respect from the man she married. Her father was a true countryman who "seemed always to be in harmony with weatherbeaten things." He was unobtrusively, inarticulately tender towards his wife, and was deeply observant of her freedom and of his own. She took him for granted, and knew as little of him as she did of the sights and secrets of the country, which bored her to distraction. So, perhaps inevitably, these two drifted apart. Mr. Stark stayed in England or visited Canada, while his wife remained in Italy and became deeply absorbed in the carpet factory at Dronero, and equally absorbed in Mario de Roasco, who had started the factory and who bullied them all. It was generally, but quite erroneously, believed that she became Mario's mistress. There appears to be no question that this was absolutely untrue, and he eventually married Freya's sister Vera. Her strange experience of life did not make Freya squeal nor grow bitter, and her conclusion of the whole matter reveals anew her delightful mind and her philosophy. "I do not regret anything except the coming into our lives of Mario—the only person with whom we were deeply involved whom I could truly dislike; it would be unfair to all the good and splendid people who have been our friends if I did not do so. As a matter of fact, even he was not unmitigatedly objectionable; he loved Vera and was making her happy at the last. He also loved his children with his jealous love which, alas! led to anger, malice and all horrors when they grew up to want souls of their own." "The moral of it all seems to be that everyone develops his own soul in the world, and the crime of crimes is to interfere with this process in those you are responsible for. Perhaps that is what is meant by Christ's word about children? Some lives, like my mother's, are terribly expensive in the lives of other people; yet she had something to show for it in her richness which gave out as much sunlight as it absorbed. But the deepest love of young people goes, I think, to those who, like my father, feel tenderly about the living space of other human souls." J. S. S.

Ceylon, Pearl of the East. By Henry Williams. Pp. 460. Robert Hale. 1951. 25s.

This is an excellent and very readable book, with thirty-three striking photographs, as the publisher says, "long overdue." The author is an enthusiast. He loves his beautiful island and communicates his passion to the reader. It is largely unknown and only sparingly developed. There is substance in the author's claim (p. 411) "that the attractions of this one small island have no rival elsewhere," followed by a catalogue of why this is beyond doubt. Knowing both, this reviewer rather doubts whether Hawaii could retain its "resort" value if Ceylon were in that neighbourhood.

The volume aims at being the complete compendium for the island, and in many

respects it achieves this aim. Indeed, it is probably more readable than would be the perfect and scientific treatise. But there are several important criticisms. There is no adequate map. The bibliography is meagre. At least fifteen important authorities (some noted in the Society's copy) should have been consulted. There are several references, in describing the people, flora and fauna, to the ancient continent sometimes called "Lemuria," which included Madagascar, Ceylon and Java, but not India; the biological, anthropological and geological theories in this connection seem to need more attention. The fauna and flora are examined in a very readable way by an enthusiast rather than a scientist, but a few pages on the scientific angles would be appropriate in such an ambitious treatise. The "guide book" chapter of thirty-seven pages describes sports interesting to visitors most attractively, but the arrangement and practical value to the tourist suffer in comparison with, say, Cave's *Ceylon Government Railway*. Perhaps some of these points were never intended in the author's plan, but the very excellence of what is available prompts more attention to matters which might render this book a more convincing treatise than it is at present.

The writer is a tea planter, and gives eighty pages to the tea industry. It is not surprising that tea publicists have used him in their campaign, for to Henry Williams the tea career had few equals. He loved the life and believed it offered more to the educated Briton than most. His reasons are well argued and convincing.

The story of Ceylon's ancient cities and irrigation prospects is well told. Perhaps two millenniums ago the climate in the northern plains was less enervating or the inhabitants were more energetic; I suspect malaria and the anopheles mosquito. It is possible, too, that had Mr. Williams visited Babylon, Karnak, Persepolis, Angkor and a few other of the world's ruined cities, some of his adjectives might have been toned down. Anuradhapura is impressive, but not more than some others.

The best, they say, is the enemy of the good. It is perhaps ungracious to try to paint the lily. Mr. Williams has, in the reviewer's opinion, proved conclusively that Ceylon has a more varied menu to offer to the tourist, the scientist, the sportsman, the economist, the artist, and the mere idler than any single corner of comparable size in our world. If the Sinhalese Government can cash in on these truths the island's future may be a bright one.

G. M. R.

The Hunt for the Buru. By Ralph Izzard. Pp. 176. Illustrated. Hodder and Stoughton. 15s.

It all began with a tradition which Mr. Stonor and the reviewer recorded in 1945 and 1946 in the upland valley of the Apa Tanis on Assam's northern frontier. This tradition, set out in full by Mr. Izzard as recorded and analysed, is to the effect that when the ancestors of the Apa Tanis first settled in their valley an unknown number of generations ago they found in it what can only have been saurians, which they called *burus*; as the settlers drained the swamps these *burus* were driven into the deeper portions, and to this day they point out exactly where they killed four of them, burying them under earth and stones. However this tradition may appear in cold print, no one who heard it first hand could easily doubt its truth. Later Mr. Stonor heard that *burus* still existed in the undrained Rilo valley in the Daffa country, separated from the Apa Tani valley by fifty miles of unexplored hills. It was to seek these living *burus* that an expedition consisting of the author, Mr. Stonor, and Colonel Hodgkinson, an expert cameraman, set out in the late spring of 1948 under the ægis of the *Daily Mail*.

They found no *burus*, and we are left with the mystery of the well-corroborated tales, which can hardly have been entirely pointless efforts of imagination, for the last thing the local Daffa xenophobes desired was the presence of inquisitive Europeans. But they did achieve an extraordinarily interesting and strenuous journey. The author in particular, though he makes light of it, must have suffered greatly, seeing that he had a bad riding accident just before the start. His book not only, without a trace of sensationalism, raises the question of the survival into modern times of saurians believed to be extinct millions of years ago, but gives a wonderful picture of a little-known and untouched people, not described flatly in the mass, but with this man and that portrayed in all his individuality. Above all he describes, as no one has before, what life is like in the Assam hill jungle under monsoon condi-

tions, with maddening blister flies by day, mosquitoes by night, and mud and leeches all the time. The illustrations, some by Mr. Stonor and some by Colonel Hodgkinson, are good, and whet the appetite for the latter's films. The expedition failed to achieve its object and a mystery remains; so, the reviewer is convinced, do the bones of four saurians at pin-pointed spots in the mud of the Apa Tani valley. The book is to be taken seriously and is easily read—a happy combination.

J. P. M.

Antique Land. By Diana Shipton. Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 219. Photographs. 1950. 20s.

This book contains 219 pages of first-hand evidence of what life is like today in Sinkiang. It is based on two years' experience. It makes delightful reading.

In all these respects it is unusual. Fifty or sixty years ago the Central Asian traveller expected his reputation to depend on his being a reliable and observant witness, and he tried to enhance the value of his record by training himself to collect information on some special field of study that would be of use and of interest both to himself and others. One traveller would describe costumes and handicrafts, another would note social customs that might be compared with those of neighbouring countries, a third would survey hitherto uncharted mountain ranges. Their books stand on the shelves of our libraries and are still frequently read. The modern technique is different. Visits to ministries of information and press officers for their propaganda pamphlets are followed by tables of census returns and translations of the counter-propaganda leaflets of anti-government parties. The whole is jammed together like a layer cake of red and yellow, which may or may not be topped with a light froth of "impressions" collected on a flying trip that lasted two months—or two weeks. To anyone with an appetite for the "taste" of a country the result is surprisingly indigestible.

Mrs. Shipton's book "tastes" right. One closes it with the dust of Turkestan still in one's nostrils, the improbable silhouettes of its rocky foothills against the fantastically high Kungur alps before one's eyes, and in one's ears laughter and the clunk of camel bells or the squeak of unwilling wheels churning an unmade road. This book is not about politics except as they directly affect daily life, but anyone interested in the politics of Central Asia will be wise to read it, if only to remember that politics no more fills the whole of life in Sinkiang than in England. The special observation of this witness has been given to the mountains which lie west and south of the plain of the Takla Makan; to the unchanging physical basis of life in Central Asia which is so easily forgotten by those whose knowledge of its peoples has been acquired at secondhand.

It seems unlikely that in any foreseeable future an Englishwoman will again be able to spend two years in Sinkiang. It is therefore fortunate that the last of the "Consul-inas" has put her experiences on record so skilfully, supplementing the books of Lady Macartney and Miss Sykes to complete the series of studies from various angles that were drawn by British Consuls-General at Kashgar from the time of Sir George Macartney to Mr. Eric Shipton.

Journey to Red China. By Robert Payne. Heinemann, 8s. 6d.

This book should have been reviewed before this, but it has improved with keeping. It is an account of the author's visit to Chinese Communist headquarters in Yen-an in 1947, and what is an admiring account of Mao-Tse-Tung's government in the wilderness during the period just after the World War, when the Americans were trying to unite the Kuomintang and the Communists under a blanket of Lend Lease and benevolent Observation (YOG to the Communists), is now of more interest than just a sentimental piece of journalism.

It is journalism, and it is sentimental (the interview with Chu Teh, the commander-in-chief of the Communist forces, is headed "Red Virtue in the Date Garden"), but the characters interviewed at leisure in Yen-an are now of interest on a larger stage, and the process of propaganda Mr. Payne saw starting under

primitive conditions in the Cave of the Thousand Buddhas has now become the re-education of a New China, and the end of all Buddhas for the Chinese.

It cannot be so easy to chat with Mao Tse Tung for three hours now, although the main topic at the party was the now almost legendary Long March of the Communist armies, and the only opinion Mr. Payne got out of him was the remarkably insincere declaration that "when there is democracy, the civil war will end."

The close-ups of Mao are therefore interesting, including two pages of his poetry, revealing another perhaps sinister side to the modern Attila, for was not Hitler's world-wide political and military activity the inspiration of an artist *manqué*?

From the Liberation daily with its printing press in the Cave of the Thousand Buddhas, the prison, the university, the theatre, and the dance in the Peach Orchard, the propaganda tentacles have now spread from Yen-an over the whole of China, and the thoroughness of this propaganda is most apparent in these primitive beginnings in Yen-an.

The Communists aim at a New China with a completely new Communist outlook and 400 million Communists, not 400 million Chinese, and for this the old China has to go, not only what Mr. Payne dismisses neatly as "that where the best starved and the worst achieved epics of corruption," but the historical China, with all its traditions and habits—all Confucius' middle way as well as the peace of the ten thousand Buddhas.

It is sinister in its beginnings, this propaganda in Yen-an, most of all in Mr. Payne's Peach Orchard, where he sees one of the new Yangpo dances, traditional village dances which the Communists have utilized, as they have the traditional Chinese theatre, as an approach to the fundamental in Chinese habits and ideas.

Mr. Payne describes with admiration how Communist objectives were injected into the love dances for which "the villagers were known to have an extraordinary fondness," so that when increased production was an urgent practical requirement, "Brother and Sister Cultivating the Virgin Land" was the first of the adapted productions, with new play between the old dancing.

Mr. Payne's descriptions of these and other Communist activities are given with the one-sidedness and lack of humour that so often accompany fellow-travelling, and though it may be that he found in Mao Tse Tung's Yen-an the "legendary China of his dreams," this bit of journalism might temporarily fit into the picture of the [I quote] "new more vigorous world coming when there will be more equality and sooner than people suspect there will be less corruption."

When it is apparent now how effectively the altered Yangpo dances and other tricks are in converting the Chinese from their ancient principles, it is a matter for congratulation, as well as for history, that European culture consists of individual values that may be destroyed with European civilization, but cannot be "adapted" to the production of collective man as in China, at least not while we retain our sense of humour.

E. K. FORSYTH.

Confessions of a China Hand. By Ronald Farquharson. Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 224. 12s. 6d.

The author of this book is out-of-the-ordinary in that he is a man of business and a skilled writer. He evokes a nostalgia in the minds of the old China Hands of, say, twenty years ago. He catches the spirit of that age, so very different from that of the "New Liberation." His portrait of a war lord will be recognizable to many, as will the description of "Mad-boy McCammond," the picturesque one-armed old Etonian who died in a Japanese prison camp.

In Manchuriana the author reveals that curious lack of humour in the Japanese. The editor of the local paper headlines the fact that "Once again we figure in London PUNCH," overlooking entirely that the appearance is owing to his curious misuse of the English language—*e.g.*, on the occasion of a call by Japanese naval officers on board one of H.B.M. ships, the same paper announced that these officers were greeted in the "well-known hail-fellow-well-met fashion of the British Navy."

The author's first experience of a successful sale of cod liver oil to a Chinese apothecary in Shanghai is typical of the customs and habits of that day. The seller

is given the credit of making the sale. The buyer is given credit for the purchase. At the end of the month the oil appears back in the company's godown, the purchaser's account is credited. Everyone is happy and no one has lost face.

An appreciation, so truly due to the "Travel-amah" and to the "Number-one-boy," is well done, and few foreigners who have served, or lived, in China will read these chapters without a lump in the throat.

The last chapter, "Return to Eden," reads rather like an afterthought, but is certainly an example of far-fetched coincidence.

Some of these chapters have appeared in *Blackwood's Magazine*, so though this is described as the author's first book, a good deal of it has seen the light of day before.

H. Sr. C. S.

Lushai Chrysalis. By Major Anthony Gilchrist McCall, O.B.E. Pp. 320. Photographs. Luzac and Co. 25s.

Lushai Chrysalis is a deep and penetrating study of the Lushai people by one who is thoroughly conversant with his subject. Major McCall's ardent advocacy of their cause loses nothing from the humour and intimacy of his recital. Completed in 1945, the book pleads for an understanding of the problems perplexing the Lushai Hills; the continuance of that sympathetic approach which characterized the administration of Major McCall and so many of his predecessors. In that light it deserves the fullest study by those officers of the Government of India now responsible for the Lushai administration.

The book is oddly uneven in style: at times it bears the hall-mark of a scholarly hand; at times it is involved and ungrammatical.

In view of the obvious love and care which have gone into its preparation, it is distracting to come across evidence of inadequate proof correction.

T. L. H.

CORRESPONDENCE

SCHOOL FOR ARABIC STUDIES,
KANO,
NORTHERN NIGERIA,
B.W.A.

TO THE EDITOR,
ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL.

SIR,

Probably many of the Journal's readers know Famagusta in Cyprus and its mediæval fortifications, but may not be aware of the considerable amount of excavation and work done on them in recent years, in particular on the so-called Othello Tower and the Ravelin, the point which bore the brunt of the successful Turkish attack in 1571.

Many years ago, when reafforestation was in its infancy in the island, the moat of these fortifications was made the site of a tiny forestry plantation (quite negligible in comparison with the much larger schemes since inaugurated) the trees of which have now become so large that they mask, and will soon obliterate, the view of the ramparts from the landward side.

The local authorities have become so tree conscious (a good thing in itself, no doubt) that the efforts of the Department of Antiquities to obtain permission to remove the trees in the moat have so far failed. In the case in question, and seeing that the Famagusta fortifications are a unique surviving example of the mediæval military engineer's art, this seems a great pity and an unfortunate instance of "the closed mind."

KANO,
January 18, 1951.

I have the honour to be, sir,
Your obedient servant,
C. E. J. WHITTING.
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PUBLISHED BY
THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY
2, HINDE STREET, LONDON, W.1

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NOTICES

THE Council acknowledges with gratitude the following accessions to the Library :

The Chinese in South-East Asia, by Dr. V. Purcell; presented by the author.

The New Turks, by E. Bisbee; presented by Dr. Bayard Dodge.

The China Story, by F. Utley; presented by Col. R. Schomberg.

The Government of Bahrein—Annual Report for 1950.

Historical Records of the Survey of India, Vol. II.

And the following pamphlets :

Aus der Geschichte des islamischen Orients, by G. Jäschke/F. Taeschner.

Somatometrical and Somatoscopic Notes on Sundanese, by H. van der Wiel.

Zpravy Anthropologicke Spolecnosti—Brno 1949-50, 4 pts.

Reconnaissance in South-western Asia, by Henry Field, 1951.

The Council would also acknowledge with gratitude the gift of twenty-two original Persian paintings, presented to the Society under the will of the late Sir Vivian Gabriel, C.S.I., C.M.G., C.V.O., C.B.E., who was a member of the Society for forty-two years.

Members and contributors alone are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

The Royal Central Asian Society celebrates its Jubilee in October 1951. It was founded in 1901 by Dr. Cotterell Tupp, D.Litt., I.C.S., in association with Sir Francis Younghusband, Lord Ronaldshay (now Lord Zetland), Sir Edward Penton and others who felt that the time had come to form a society devoted primarily to the study of contemporary life and affairs in Asia, and to promoting friendship between the citizens of those countries and England. They called it "The Central Asian Society" because they believed that the whole future development of Asia would be affected by the impact of Russia on China, Afghanistan and Persia (Russia annexed the Pamirs between 1891 and 1895 as the culmination of her previous twenty years' advance into Central Asia), and by the new possibilities of contact and mutual influence between the civilizations of India, the Muslim world, Buddhism, Russia and Western Christianity. In 1931, H.M. the King was graciously pleased to command that the society should in future be styled the Royal Central Asian Society.

IN MEMORIAM

H.M. ABDULLAH IBN AL HUSSEIN, KING OF JORDAN

IT is fitting that the Journal of the Society should contain a tribute to the memory of an Arab and Muslim ruler who for more than thirty years was a sincere friend and a faithful ally of this country, and who displayed to a high degree those Muslim virtues and that chivalry which have been known and appreciated in the West since the days of the Crusades.

Born in Mecca in 1881, the late King Abdullah was a member of the very distinguished family, descended from the Prophet Mohammed, which for more than a thousand years provided the rulers of the Hijaz and of the Holy Places of Medina and Mecca. Besides spending a portion of his youth with an Arab tribe of the Hijaz, as was traditional, he also received a Turkish education with his father in Istanbul. He thus acquired a mastery of Turkish, as well as of Arabic, and a familiarity with Turkish life which enabled him as ruler of Transjordan to establish friendly relations with the Turkish Republic, though he had been one of the leaders of the Arab rising against the former Turkish régime. It was characteristic of King Abdullah's generous and broad-minded spirit that he appointed his cousin and boyhood companion, the Emir Abd el Majid Haidar, as first Jordan Minister in London, though the latter had become head of the branch of the Hijaz royal family which the Turks had designated during the 1914-18 war to dispossess and replace his father, King Hussein, as ruler of Mecca.

When in 1920 King Feisal's short-lived rule in Syria had been terminated by French military action, the Emir Abdullah, as he then was, advanced northward from the Hijaz with the intention of attacking the French forces in Damascus. By the intervention of Col. T. E. Lawrence and Mr. Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, he was persuaded to accept the alternative of becoming Emir of Transjordan, under a British Mandate, and of thus consolidating that country as a portion of the Arab patrimony. This task he carried out with loyal understanding of the difficulties which were caused to the Mandatory Power by its commitment to the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. The Emir's implied acquiescence in this policy was not understood by all Arabs, and it no doubt played a part in the events which led, by devious paths, to the tragedy enacted in the Haram esh Sherif on July 20, 1951. The decision which King Abdullah took did not, however, mean that he gave up the right of speaking his mind or of asserting his own and his people's rights. It was, indeed, a high tribute to his diplomatic gifts that, in spite of the disparity of resources between the Emirate of Transjordan and the Mandatory Power, he was always able to exercise a real freedom of action and to maintain and develop the Arab character of his realm and of its policy. The reputation which King Abdullah's loyalty won and the respect which his character inspired were

assets to his people in their dealings with the rest of the world. The impression which they made on a Western nation whose history has given them a special understanding of the ideals of Arab chivalry was shown by the reception given to the King when he visited Spain as the guest of the Spanish Government in the autumn of 1949.

The fortieth day from King Abdullah's death was celebrated in London, in accordance with Muslim custom, by a ceremony of commemoration at the Islamic Cultural Centre in Regents Park, at which the Jordan Minister in London, Prince Abd el Majid Haidar, presided and the prayers were recited by Sheikh Ali Abdulkader. In this appropriate setting—for the late King's qualities of heart and mind were the natural flowering of his profound faith in the religion of Islam—tributes were delivered to his memory by His Excellency the High Commissioner of Pakistan, and by several British speakers who had been intimately connected with the late King in a military or diplomatic capacity. "As a ruler," said His Excellency Habib Rahimtoola, High Commissioner of Pakistan, "King Abdullah's mettle and firmness enabled him to carve out a stable kingdom. He recognized an ally when he saw one. He realized that in the difficult times that followed the first World War he could not serve the cause of the Arabs in general, and of Jordan in particular, without reliable friends in the East and West. He was never a fair-weather friend. Having decided to trust a friend—be it a country or a person—he gave his friend his entire loyalty and devotion in the true Arab fashion. He served his people well."

Sir Ronald Storrs mentioned the King's wise and cool directing intelligence and described his unusual blending of accomplishments. "Who that knew him," he said, "can ever forget the animation of his manner, the simple dignity of his presence—that rare combination of the distinguished with the natural? State without pomp; his skill at chess; his brilliance as a rifle shot . . . above all, there was his abiding love of the grand models of antique Arab literature, of which he knew by heart and could declaim thousands of verses; a ripe classical scholar and humanist; recalling and making his English listeners wistful for a return of the great days of Arab history."

Sir Harold MacMichael, former High Commissioner of Palestine, noted that the King, though fully aware of the more modern conception of the constitutional monarchy, belonged by temperament to an age that is passing, to "the patriarchal age, when the man called by birth to high estate was father to his people and exercised a personal authority with justice and forbearance," and he described him as "a child of nature, a lover of children and horses, simple in his tastes, frugal in his living, generous to a fault . . . above all, he was a true and honourable friend both as the Head of a State and as a man. To all who, like myself, loved his kindness of heart, his sense of humour and his breadth of outlook, his passing is a personal tragedy which time can never efface." General Sir Bernard Paget paid tribute to King Abdullah's unswerving loyalty and friendship, recalling "with special gratitude his faith in us and his courage in standing by us in the dark days of 1940 and 1941 when we had very few friends, and even fewer who still believed that we could face up to the disasters which encompassed us and win through to victory."

Most moving of all were the words of Brigadier Broadhurst, who had spent many years in the late King's service as an officer of the Arab Legion and as A.D.C. : " If the world has been robbed of a hero," he said, " I have lost the kindest master I could ever hope to serve. I am deeply proud, an Englishman, to have spent much of my manhood in his service, and when I am asked, often enough, and by men of many nations, what manner of man he was, I reply with pride that he was the very paragon of an Arab Prince, and all that a warrior, a scholar, and a gentleman could wish to be. He was a lover of his faith and his people, without fanaticism."

D. N. B.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. I. EADIE, D.S.O.

LIEUT.-COLONEL EADIE, who died suddenly last November, was a man of varied achievements as a soldier and political officer, one of the founders of Iraq's national army, a linguist of astonishing versatility and a remarkable and attractive personality. He joined the Society in 1922.

John English Eadie was born in 1883, the son of an Irish doctor who settled in Somerset. He passed through Sandhurst, was commissioned in 1902 and appointed to the 4th Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent. Except as a subaltern he was to spend little time in India. In 1910 and 1911 he served under Admiral Slade against the gun-runners of the Persian Gulf and Baluchistan. Prevented by the Balkan Wars from going to Turkey as a language student, he spent a year in Addis Ababa instead and became the Indian Army's only Amharic interpreter. He served throughout the Mesopotamian campaign and did valuable work raising levies among the Muntafiq; his excellent relations with them were to prove helpful in the rebellion of 1920. After the armistice he was sent for a short time to Transcaucasia, a fascinating region to an omnivorous linguist. He then became a political officer and chose to serve in the Dulaim division under Colonel Leachman, whom he admired and liked and who reciprocated his feelings. When Leachman was murdered, soon afterwards, Eadie took charge of a situation of great responsibility and difficulty. There was much disaffection among the Dulaim; had they revolted the Muntafiq and the riverain tribes of the Tigris would probably have joined them and Baghdad would have been isolated and besieged. Fortunately Eadie and the Sheikh were able to keep control. "Siyasa" ("Politics"), however, was not wholly congenial to him and he welcomed the opportunity of being seconded to the nascent Iraqi Army, becoming the first Acting Adviser to the Ministry of Defence. He remained on the H.Q. staff of the new army till his retirement in 1932 and became the intimate friend of many Iraqi statesmen and soldiers. It was characteristic of him that in 1940 he should accept a post at the Air Ministry with the rank of pilot officer. Later he moved to the War Office and then, in 1946, to a department of the Foreign Office. He collapsed soon after returning home from work on November 20, 1950, and died the same evening.

He was a first-class interpreter in seven languages—Urdu, Hindi, Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Amharic and Kurdish—and he had qualifications in Gujerati and Pushtu. At one time he corresponded in Hebrew and he learnt the vernacular of the Assyrian levies. He shared in the Kurdish researches of his friend Taufiq Wahbi Beg, who dedicated to him a work on Kurdish grammar. In 1924 he published *An Amharic Reader*, consisting of texts he had himself collected in Addis Ababa. It was a useful contribution to the study of a language in which there was, and still is, little written material, and it contains interesting information about local manners and, as anyone who knew him would expect, recipes. Other favourite languages were Spanish, Romany and Gaelic. His private notes he kept in Gaelic written in the Arabic alphabet.

In Baghdad he was known as Abu Bazazin ("the father of cats") and Abu Filfil ("the father of pepper"), in allusion to his pets and his cooking. He was not a big-game hunter, but he liked to keep large animals in his house and his "bazazin" might include anything from a tabby to a leopard. He was one of the very few Europeans able to enjoy the hottest Abyssinian dishes, and he travelled habitually with a bottle of Tabasco sauce with which he would sprinkle his food very freely, even when dining with King Feisal. A powerful man physically, a keen polo player and cricketer, Kurdistan in winter or Baghdad in summer made little difference to him. During the last war, however, long office hours ruined his health, and in his last years he hardly ever attended a social function except his regimental dinner. Sociable, hospitable, an admirable raconteur, unaffected and modest, but completely frank in expressing his own highly original opinions, he could be very tolerant of eccentricity in others and worked well with some men whom most of his contemporaries found difficult. It did not occur to him to treat anyone, whatever his race, means of livelihood, or even personal habits, other than as a gentleman, and he was equally at ease with Arab princes and Irish tinkers. Among the Eastern peoples to whose service the greater part of his life was devoted few men of his generation made such numerous, close and lasting friendships.

C. F. BECKINGHAM.

THE JORDAN VALLEY

By M. G. IONIDES

I OUGHT to say that I am really an amateur on this question. I follow it closely, and in the past I have had some practical connection with it; but I do not speak in any officially authoritative sense.

There are some pretty well established facts to start with. First, there are several hundred thousand refugees in the kingdom of Jordan for whom no place has yet been found. Secondly, they are mainly agricultural people and their future, if they have a future, lies in settlement on the land somewhere within the boundaries of the kingdom of Jordan. Thirdly, the only possibility of large-scale agricultural settlement lies in a major irrigation scheme, using the waters of the river Jordan and its main tributary, the river Yarmuk.


No doubt the authorities are looking for every other possibility of squeezing the refugees in where they can on little bits of land here and there, and in other non-agricultural work. There are also lands in other Arab countries which could theoretically be used. But I am speaking of a scheme which could make a major contribution within the kingdom of Jordan itself—to settle something of the order of 100,000 persons or more.

The plan is to divert the river Yarmuk just south of the Sea of Galilee, adding to it the river Jordan, to irrigate the terraces of land in the valley between the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea. This project is being studied by a British firm of consulting engineers, whose report,* I believe, is to be published quite soon.

If you start on the eastern bank—what was formerly Transjordan—the first and obvious thing to do is to lead a canal out from the river Yarmuk and run it southwards, irrigating the whole of the eastern side of the valley. The second step is to dig a feeder canal from the Sea of Galilee, so that water runs into and augments the supply. That requires sluices across the natural outlet from the Sea of Galilee so as to hold up the water and bring it under control. The next stage would be to irrigate the western side by a canal also taking off from the Sea of Galilee, running southwards through the plain of Beisan. Then you would have a pair of canals, one on each side of the valley, on the edge of the escarpment, running all the way down to the Dead Sea. Each of them would irrigate towards the river, and so the whole of the valley would be brought under command. It would be an area of something like half a million dunams (about 125,000 acres) within Arab territory. Another hundred thousand dunams or so could be irrigated in Israel, between the Sea of Galilee and the Beisan plain.

There is one more thing that can be done—that is, to make use of the

* The Report by Sir Murdoch MacDonald and Partners has since been published: "Report on the Proposed Extension of Irrigation in the Jordan Valley," submitted to the Minister of Finance and Economy of the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan.



It should be noted that where the Yarmuk River forms the frontier between Jordan and Israel the left bank is in Jordan.

flood waters of the river Yarmuk, which nowadays, of course, run away to waste. This would be done by cutting a diversion from the Yarmuk into the Sea of Galilee, so that in the winter when the heavy rains fall the flood water would be turned into the Sea of Galilee and be stored up, available for use in the summer.

That is the outline of the project. There is no technical difficulty about it. It would be rather expensive, compared with similar schemes of

a similar size in other countries such as Egypt or Iraq; but it could, I believe, be an economic project.

But it could not be operated, or even constructed, except with co-operation between Israel and Jordan. The two countries would have to work together. The Israelis have control of the outlet from the Sea of Galilee, and the canal on the west bank has to pass through Israeli territory before it reaches Arab land: while the Arabs control the debouchment of the Yarmuk. So it would be necessary to agree on some equitable division of the water between the two countries. How is this to be fixed?

This subject was studied by Professor H. A. Smith in the Quarterly Bulletin of the Chatham House Journal on International Affairs for October, 1949. He quotes several helpful precedents from the United States. I am not going into all of them in detail—they are all on record there—but the general conclusion at which he arrives is that there is no strictly legal basis on which these things can be settled. Professor Smith uses a phrase from a judgment that was given by a Federal Court of Arbitration in the U.S.A.—the “equitable apportionment of benefits.”

In explaining this, Professor Smith quotes a very interesting case which he regards as a helpful precedent:


“The subject matter of the dispute was the Arkansas river, which flows for 280 miles through Colorado before entering Kansas, the complaint of the latter State being that a large irrigation project undertaken by Colorado would exhaust the river to such an extent that scarcely more than a trickle would cross the border between the two States. . . . Kansas, the plaintiff State, asked the court to decide according to the private rule of riparian rights, which forbids an upper riparian owner to interfere to any serious extent with the flow of water which would naturally reach the owner of the lower land. . . . Colorado took her stand upon the principle of absolute sovereignty, and maintained that as sovereign she was entitled to do exactly as she pleased with the whole of the water upon her own territory.

“The court rejected both these points of view, and in effect the court was compelled to find its own principle of decision without help from either of the parties, and the basic principle of the judgment was expressed in the words ‘equitable apportionment of benefits.’”

In other words, they said that the State that holds the headwaters could not reasonably claim that they are entitled to do exactly as they please with it; and that it is equally unjustifiable for the people in the lower reaches of the river to claim that the others must do nothing at all which would interfere with the existing state of the river and its flow. Let us see how the scheme I have outlined meets this idea of the “equitable apportionment of benefits.” Admittedly, the scheme is aimed primarily for the settlement of the Arab refugees, and it provides for the irrigation of far more Arab than Jewish land. But, then, the Arabs occupy by far the greater proportion of the Jordan basin and by far the greater part of the banks of the river, so it does not seem unreasonable that the water benefits should be similarly apportioned. Apart altogether from this, an independent arbitrator would surely have to take into account the fact that

these refugees' own homes and lands have already been appropriated by the Jews and compensation is still owing; there could hardly be a more fitting kind of compensation than water from what would otherwise have been Israel's share, so as to make it possible to give some of the refugees a permanent home.

This scheme is only one way of using the waters, and, as many of you know, another project of a totally different kind has been worked on for some time by the Israelis. It used to be known as the Lowdermilk Plan, a preliminary sketch which was later elaborated by Messrs. Hays and Savage.



This canal would start right up towards the headwaters of the Jordan, in Israel, and would run out westwards, taking the water out of the Jordan basin altogether, into the coastal plain and on into the Negeb.

I have seen no fully official statement about how Israel proposes to develop this scheme; but an article was published in an American journal, *Engineering News Record*—a journal of first-class status, with an international circulation—dated March 22, 1951. It was by the editor, Mr. Walter G. Bowman, and is dated "Jerusalem, 14th February, 1951." It claims—at any rate in broad outline—to represent what the official plan is. The scheme would start with preliminary stages (such as the development of wells, and of the little streams that flow inside Israel itself) which are of

no concern to us in this context; it is the later stages that affect the main issue. It is envisaged that this canal, with a reservoir to take flood water, will divert the whole of the useful flow of the river Jordan. This plan and the other scheme I have described cannot therefore both be executed in full.

The ultimate stage of this Israeli plan provides for a canal running from the bay of Acre, through a tunnel and into the Sea of Galilee, which is well below sea level. The purpose is to let in the sea water for a hydro-electric plant. The consequence, of course, would be that the Sea of Galilee would become a salt lake, and the river Jordan for the rest of its flow would be entirely useless for irrigation.

Mr. Bowman is explicit on this point. He says that this power scheme "is predicated on taking for irrigation all of the fresh water that now flows down the Jordan river and replacing it with salt water from the Mediterranean." Assuming that Mr. Bowman's outline of the project is accurate, and there seems little reason to doubt it, how would it square with Professor Smith's phrase "the equitable distribution of rights"?

Look at the consequences. It would mean not only that no fresh water from the Jordan would be available for irrigating in the main valley; it would mean that existing irrigation by the Arabs in the Jordan valley from the river Jordan would be expunged, because the water would be turned salt. It would mean that such rights as the Arabs have in the waters of the Jordan would be denied. The Arabs could of course still use the Yarmuk, but only to a limited extent, because full use requires that the Sea of Galilee is made available as a reservoir for the flood waters. If the Mediterranean water is let in, this would be impossible, permanently. Very broadly, the effect would be that the proportionate benefits would be reversed in favour of Israel. It would be as if Israel were saying: "Despite the fact that the Arabs occupy by far the greater part of the Jordan basin and banks of the river Jordan, they are to get only so much of the Yarmuk as they can make use of without the Sea of Galilee as a reservoir, and not a drop of the Jordan itself."

To come to a quantitative agreement about how the water should be divided among the people who live in the Jordan valley will be difficult indeed. But there need be no hesitation in insisting that the people who live in the valley—that is, within the geographical basin of the river Jordan—have prior rights over those who live outside it. The waters of a river belong by natural and moral right to the valley it waters and to the people who live in it. How could it be otherwise? There is only one place in the Jordan basin where the waters can be fully used, and that is the valley between the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea. The fact that it is technically feasible to irrigate lands outside the basin—*e.g.*, in the coastal plain or the Negeb—should not give those lands, or the State that holds them, any claim on the rivers of Jordan. You might just as well lay claim to the waters of the Euphrates or the Tigris—or for that matter the Ganges or the Brahmaputra—on the grounds that it is technically feasible to pump them over-land to irrigate the Negeb. Rights must be settled within the Jordan basin first; if there is any water left over which cannot be used for one reason or another, or is clearly not going to be used, claims from outside the basin may reasonably be listened to.

There is another weighty factor I must mention, which is nothing to do with the legal or semi-legal aspects of the matter—human need. Both the Arabs and the Jews can claim that they need all the water that they can get and more. But what is the nature of their respective needs? Israel needs the water because Jews from all over the world are being attracted to settle there. The Arabs need the water to help to settle hundreds of thousands of refugees who were forced to leave their homes. Whose claim is the greater? That of a new Jewish immigrant or that of an Arab whose own home and land have already been appropriated, without compensation of any kind, by an earlier Jewish immigrant? If Israel does seriously intend to exploit her physical power, “taking for irrigation all of the fresh water that now flows down the Jordan river and replacing it with salt water from the Mediterranean,” there will be many besides Arabs who will ask: Is it not enough to possess the lands these Arabs once had as their own? Must you also take away the water that is their hope of livelihood for the future?

Statements set out in the foregoing paper formed the basis of a discussion at the Society's rooms, in the course of which Mr. A. H. BYRT said: This is the third of what I may call three competing addresses which I have heard about irrigation. It must be three years ago, I think, that I heard a very influential American advocating the introduction of the Mediterranean water on much the same plan as has been described this afternoon. The article from an American magazine quoted today was a quite recent one and came after some visit to Jerusalem, so I conclude that in Jerusalem the thought of it is, probably, still alive.

The second authoritative paper which I heard did not mention a scheme, like that described this afternoon, affecting both sides of the Jordan valley, but was enthusiastic about taking the upper waters of the Jordan for the irrigation of the Negeb.

In countries where irrigation takes place there is a whole library of what we may call “case law” concerning the appropriation of the water of rivers which are potentially useful for irrigation. There must be a genuine agreement and not merely agreement represented by a legal formula.

In the second paper which I heard, a great deal was said about the possibility of a real peace agreement between Jordan and Israel. The position between the two is now at a deadlock. One gathers that on the Arab side they say, “Settle our refugee problem first, and then we will talk peace”; and that on the Israeli side they say, “Let us have a peace agreement, and then we will talk about the refugee problem.”

Other questions were: Suppose the Hay-Savage sea-water canal was run into the Sea of Tiberias, would it be possible to canalize the Yarmuk so that the water still was carried into the old Jordan valley and the territories were still irrigated? That is to say, could the Yarmuk be prevented from running in its old river bed, which would have become salt and useless?

Lake Huleh, it has been reported, is being filled up as a reservoir and

a dam has already been made south of that lake, with the possibility of drawing the water off from Huleh to the south, or, anyhow, into Galilee, for the use of the Israelis. Would it not be possible from an engineering point of view to draw off all the water from Huleh? Thus, is the water not already on the point of being switched out of Huleh into Israel?

Would it be possible to put the hydro-electric scheme (using the Mediterranean water) lower down the valley so that the water would be dropped, not into the Sea of Galilee, but below the junction of the Jordan and the Yarmuk? That would obviate a lot of the difficulty if it were possible and would make the full Jordan valley irrigation scheme possible.

Mr. IONIDES replied: There are three points here. First, whatever happens to the Jordan and the Sea of Galilee one can always take off some of the waters of the Yarmuk and irrigate the eastern bank of the Jordan. But if salt sea water from the Mediterranean comes into the Sea of Galilee no feeder from it can ever be used to augment the supply, and the Sea of Galilee can never be used as a reservoir to store up the flood waters, which amount to approximately half the flow.

As regards the second point, I know no details about what the Israelis are doing at Huleh. Technically, I imagine it is quite possible to divert the Jordan below Lake Huleh, but Mr. Bowman's article in *Engineering News Record*, from which I have quoted, clearly shows the diversion much farther up to the north, near the frontier.

On the third point, the idea in the Lowdermilk Scheme was to bring in the Mediterranean Sea lower down the valley, around Beisan. I do not know why the more recent idea is to put it into the Sea of Galilee, unless it is for some strategic reason. Technically, both are no doubt possible, though naturally very expensive.

Mr. BYRT: At the lower end of the Jordan is the Dead Sea, one of the world's main sources of potash. The profits from the potash are equally divided, I understand, between Jordan and Israel. What would happen to all this if salt water, instead of fresh water, were sent down from Jordan into the Dead Sea? What point is there in putting salt water into the Jordan if the fresh water which alone is good for irrigation has gone?

Mr. IONIDES: The plan is to make use of the fall between the Mediterranean Sea and the Sea of Galilee for hydro-electric power. The water that comes out of the hydro-electric station would be waste, and the fact that it is salt is incidental. I cannot think this would make a scrap of difference to the potash works. It might change the level of the Dead Sea a little, but I do not think much difference would be caused by taking fresh water out of the Jordan and putting salt water back; the total flow in the year down the river Jordan into the Dead Sea might be very much the same.

I would judge that the potash works would have to pump their brine a little farther before it gets to the evaporating pans; but, on the other hand, there might be a compensating advantage, because there would be extra mud flats to take new pans; and the disposal of the common salt after evaporation has in the past been quite a problem.

Col. NEWCOMBE: The canal on the western bank of the Jordan, surely, depends on their taking water from the Litani by a tunnel, does it not?

Mr. IONIDES : No; the scheme can be done without the Litani, taking water only from the Jordan. Lowdermilk did also propose additional supplies by diverting the Litani, however.

Col. NEWCOMBE : Will there be enough water from Dan and around that area?

Mr. IONIDES : I doubt if there will ever be enough; but, of course, Israel cannot take water from the Litani without the agreement of Lebanon.

Col. NEWCOMBE : Surely a good deal of the water from Lake Huleh and from Tiberias comes from streams flowing in from the rainfall of that area? At least, a certain amount of it does. It cannot all come from the springs of Dan.

Mr. IONIDES : What happens is this. In the rainy season the water comes not only from the deep-seated springs (which do not vary very much in their flow throughout the year), but also from surface water, and from the little streams and springs in the hills which the people do not want at that time for their irrigation because there is plenty of rain. In the summer every little spring is used on the spot, and the flow of the Jordan comes almost entirely from the deep springs.

Col. NEWCOMBE : There is another thing about the Yarmuk. If you are only going to use the Eastern canal and the Yarmuk: the Yarmuk, surely, varies enormously?

Mr. IONIDES : It varies enormously.

Col. NEWCOMBE : And this affects the eastern canal so much that without the support of the Sea of Galilee as a reservoir I doubt whether it would be really a practical proposition.

Mr. IONIDES : Not quite as bad as that. It is practicable, but, of course, nothing like as good. The flow in the canal would be limited to the steady supply which could be extracted without storage; a big handicap. But it is far better than nothing and it could be started this year, if somebody would put down the money and they were determined to do it, without the slightest difficulty. It could be built in such a way that it would not interfere with subsequent plans.

You need the Sea of Galilee as a reservoir, so that in the summer season you can put the waters in there and use them later, if you want to utilize the maximum possible amount of water; but you can do a lot without it. You do not need to wait for the reservoir in the Sea of Galilee before starting.

Sir DASHWOOD STRETTELL : Would not the canal which the Israelis prepare for hydro-electricity, taking Mediterranean sea water, be very expensive? It would be very expensive to excavate.

Mr. IONIDES : Yes, I should think very expensive.

Col. NEWCOMBE : There is the lake at the head of the Yarmuk, west of Dera'a, which belongs to the Yarmuk. It could be used to a certain extent, if the money was spent on it, as a reservoir and as a waterfall. How much water could be got there, I do not know.

Mr. IONIDES : I know very little about that. I believe that it could be so used, but most of the water comes in, I believe, below it, from the deeper springs.

Technically an artificial lake could be made on the Yarmuk, but the slope is so great that there would have to be a very high dam to save very little water. I believe it might be possible to make some kind of a reservoir to help out a little, but it could not compare with the Sea of Galilee.

Professor CRESWELL: As regards the hydro-electric scheme which involves the tunnel into Lake Tiberias, is not the cutting through limestone rock, and so forth, prohibitive economically?

Mr. IONIDES: I seem to remember that, when I had the pleasure of speaking in 1946, I made the point that Israeli economics are not economics as we understand them at all. I am not necessarily criticizing them for that reason. But they are different, and the sums of money involved for capital development do not enter into their calculations in the same way that they do with ourselves. There is a great deal in the idea that if by expenditure you can reclaim an acre of land for ever, then you are quite justified in writing off the capital cost and not making it a charge. That principle, it always seems to me, is at the basis of their economics, and, humanly speaking, I think there is a lot in it—if one can get the capital.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND SYRIA

Amongst the many other preoccupations of the Middle East, the cold war which has been waged with varying intensity between Beirut and Damascus during the past year and a half has passed relatively unnoticed outside the circles most intimately concerned. At meetings of the Arab League both parties have claimed that they were only exercising their rights as brothers to have a good quarrel and have indicated that any interference, even from other members of the family, would not be appreciated.

This account of economic relationships between the two countries was written towards the end of the summer of this year (1951) and covers the period from 1943 up to the time of writing. If agreement has been reached before these pages appear in print they will give some indication of the processes which led up to the agreement. If no agreement has been signed it will be easy enough to form some idea of the exchanges which are still passing back and forth between the two sides. Most of the information in this article has been taken from the numerous notes exchanged between the two governments and from the polemics of the Damascus and Beirut press.

DURING the French Mandate complete economic unity existed between Syria and the Lebanon. It included all aspects of economic relations—joint customs, a unified currency and tax system, free movement of capital and persons, and unrestricted freedom of work in both countries. The administration of these activities and the sharing out of customs receipts were in the hands of a Council of Common Interests.

On October 1, 1943, while the French were still in occupation, the Syrian and Lebanese Governments signed an agreement at Shtaura which dealt the first blow at complete unity. The Shtaura Agreement is a somewhat vague document, but the one thing which it did state definitely was that Syria and Lebanon were to form one customs area (Article 4).

As soon as both countries achieved complete independence in 1946 the customs union was subjected to severe strain. Each side began to follow a separate monetary and fiscal policy. The Lebanese, as transit brokers, favoured an "open door" and were not greatly concerned at the lack of balance between imports and exports. By 1948 the Syrians became alarmed at the danger of this policy to their newly established industries and proceeded to claim that, since no special provisions were made and no privileges granted to the Lebanon by the Shtaura Agreement, the maintenance of complete unity had been implicit in the agreement. Syria, it was maintained, had taken great pains to observe the spirit of complete unity and during a very vital period had taken none of the measures (such as the control of movement of individuals to the Lebanon) which were required to safeguard and promote Syrian trade.

The Lebanon pointed out that on its side considerable sacrifices were being made in the interests of complete unity. It had agreed to allot to Syria the greater part of wartime import quotas and had permitted Syrian importers to import goods directly and also to dispose of them in Lebanese markets. The Lebanon had tolerated Syrian measures compel-

ling Lebanese automobile importers to establish offices in Syria, "though this violated the natural role of the Lebanon to act as an agent to import goods for Syria." This last phrase, which is quoted from the Lebanese reply to the Syrian memorandum of March 8, 1950, is worth noting, not only because it caused indignation in Damascus but because it summarizes the Lebanese attitude towards Syria. The Lebanese view of their own role is that they should apply their superior skill as business men to buying wholesale as cheaply as possible in Europe or the United States and selling retail as dearly as possible to Syrian business men who find it pleasant to come to Beirut on a Friday and obtain their requirements while sampling the delights of the less austere of the two capitals. Incidentally, the price which the Lebanese have extracted from the Syrians for performing this service is a high one, if the standard of living in commercial Beirut and the fantastic congestion of luxury automobiles in Beirut streets are any reflection of profits. In many ways, this assumption on the part of the Lebanese is the crux of the whole quarrel which has arisen between the two countries. Syria is within certain limits self-sufficient agriculturally; it has an exportable surplus of food grains, cotton and other agricultural products, light industry is being established on a small scale, and with its commercial relations with Europe and America in its own hands there should be no insuperable difficulty about maintaining a favourable foreign trade balance. The Lebanon, on the other hand, is highly commercialized, lightly industrialized, has an exportable surplus of citrus and other fruits, but is deficient in food grains and is highly dependent on remittances from emigrants in the U.S., Africa and Australia.

As further proof of its goodwill the Lebanese Government pointed to its acquiescence in the wartime wheat control, which constituted a violation of the provisions of the customs union and its fundamental aim—namely, the free flow of products between the two countries. Lebanon had also accepted the Syrian imposition of duties on wheat exported to the Lebanon, at the rate of fifteen piastres a kilo. Moreover, the Lebanon had never suggested separation in retaliation for Syrian measures prohibiting the flow of foodstuffs, oils and livestock to the Lebanon. Every time Syria had prohibited the sale of wheat to the Lebanon, the latter had confined its action to notifying Syria formally, that there were stocks in Lebanon for only fifteen days and not sufficient scarce currency to import from abroad. The Lebanon even agreed to a 50 per cent. duty on foreign wheat and its by-products, of which there was a great shortage, as a measure to protect Syria's local production.

The Lebanon had agreed to the exemption of industrial machinery from duty, to reduced duties on raw materials required by Syria, and to restricted imports of forty articles produced locally, even though Syria went on issuing permits without restriction. Duties on cotton and silk textiles had been raised in spite of the great need for these articles in the Lebanon.

During 1948 the situation was further complicated by the fact that, after prolonged negotiations in which the French, Lebanese and Syrian Governments participated, a monetary agreement was drawn up between the three countries. At the last moment Syria backed out and only the

Lebanon and France signed. The Lebanese attitude in tying its currency to France was widely condemned in Syrian Government circles at the time, but "circumstances subsequently changed" and on February 7, 1949, a similar agreement was signed between Syria and France.

By the middle of 1949 causes of economic friction had become so numerous that negotiations were undertaken with the object of finding a comprehensive solution. An agreement was signed on July 8, 1949. It provided for the reduction of dues on raw materials not produced locally but required for local industry; it raised duties on foreign industrial products which competed with local products. It envisaged the unification of exchange regulations and internal taxes and the adoption of joint and effective measures to remove the difference in value between the two currencies. The Lebanese pound was at this time at a premium over the Syrian pound, which varied from 7 to 10 per cent.

From the Syrian point of view the agreement of July 8 did not produce the anticipated results. The Syrian Government accused the Lebanon of not taking effective measures to remove the difference between the two currencies and of not equalizing duties on commodities flowing between the two countries. It added the accusation that the Lebanese Government had shown no desire to restrict the importation of luxuries which was exhausting the wealth of both countries and which hit Syria particularly hard. This would eventually hit the Lebanon as well, since the Beirut market would suffer from the loss of Syrian purchasing power.

In the Syrian view, the removal of the difference between the currencies was necessary for the retention of the customs union. To protect the Syrian pound from the danger of devaluation in relation to the Lebanese pound, which resulted from the bulk of Syria purchases being made through Beirut, the Syrian Government would be compelled to control the transfer of capital between Syrian and Lebanese territory. If, however, the Lebanon accepted the principle of allowing Syria to take such measures separately, the Syrian Government would find itself obliged to prevent the importation of certain commodities from the Lebanon to Syria. Such measures would certainly jeopardize the customs union between the two countries.

Such was the state of affairs when the Syrian Government of Khalid al Azm presented a note to the Lebanon on March 7, 1950. After a formal expression of its desire to strengthen economic relations and cooperate with the Lebanon in every respect, the note went on to review the complicated and unsatisfactory nature of relations during the previous seven years.

The experience of these years and the problems confronting the countries from time to time had proved that the confusion and weakness which had characterized the common interests were due to the fact that these arrangements had been based on temporary and short-term agreements of limited scope. Whenever there were differences the two governments had simply confined their efforts to finding temporary and partial solutions for fundamental questions. There had been no decision and clear agreement or definite policy regulating economic relations. Syria had submitted several projects for the solution of these problems, but the

Lebanese Government, contrary to the spirit of the agreement of July 8, 1949, had attached no importance to them.

The note went on to say that the only workable basis which would safeguard the rights of both parties was the establishment of complete economic unity involving the unification of the customs and monetary systems, a common export and import policy and the equalization of all customs duties. The Syrian Government hoped that it would receive the Lebanese reply within a short period, at latest March 20, 1950. Following acceptance of the principle, negotiations would start immediately for the settlement of details. In case of refusal, the Syrian Government would consider the existing customs union as terminated and would find itself compelled to look after its own interests.

The Lebanese Government was shocked at the form of ultimatum in which the Syrian note had been presented. It considered that the note was inconsistent with the spirit of co-operation and friendship which successive Lebanese Governments had striven to preserve. Its reply went over the old ground and reiterated at length the Lebanese viewpoint quoted earlier in this article.

While leaving the door open for further negotiations, the Lebanese Government said that it could not accept the Syrian proposal. If the two countries were economically complementary, a policy of economic co-ordination should preserve for each one its appropriate characteristics, specialization and natural position. The Syrian proposal for unified currency was unacceptable, since it involved the unification of issuance and cover regulations and would lead to the unification of financial, economic, legislative and political action. If such unification was effected it would prejudice the sovereignty of the two States and would definitely weaken the position of the Lebanese currency without strengthening the Syrian.

The Lebanon reiterated its desire for a negotiated settlement, but if the Syrians persisted in their attitude the Lebanon would reserve its rights and would not be responsible for the consequences.

In its reply the Syrian Government went to great pains to refute Lebanese implications that Syria alone benefited from union. Syria, it said, formed a large market for the industrial and agricultural products of the Lebanon. During and after the war, the Lebanon had made progress both in agriculture and industry, especially in the production of cement, cotton yarns, sweets, preserves, beverages, biscuits and macaroni. It was an error to imagine that Syria alone benefited by selling its products on the Lebanese market. In fact, the two countries were in need of each other to exchange products.

The Lebanon had been benefiting almost exclusively from the trade of the two countries and from transit transactions. Syria had not attempted to obtain a share in these benefits, though it could have done so, as there was no provision preventing Syria from encouraging its commercial activity by every means at its disposal, including the prevention of the movement of funds. The Lebanon had made vast profits from the money which Syria spent in the Lebanon. Syria could have controlled and limited these expenses had it wanted to balance payments between the two countries. Moreover, the Lebanon had benefited in large measure

from the fact that Common Interests and customs administrations, the railway companies, foreign companies and agencies had remained in the Lebanon, where they spent much money. The commercial prosperity of the Lebanon was due to the transfer of capital to the Lebanon and the concentration of commercial activities and exchange transactions there.

So far as wheat was concerned, Syria's farmers had suffered great loss by the imposition of a price ceiling to safeguard the Lebanese during the war, while the latter refused to control the price of cotton yarn, which as a result cost the Syrian farmer ten times its real value. The prevention of the export of other Syrian commodities to the Lebanon had taken place at a time when the Lebanon had signed a unilateral monetary agreement and had deprived the Syrian pound of its purchasing power in the Lebanon. By signing the financial agreement unilaterally in 1948 the Lebanon had caused panic among holders of Syrian currency, which had compelled the Syrian Government to resume negotiations with the French. Had the Lebanon refrained from ratifying the monetary agreement separately the two countries would have obtained better terms and full economic unity would have continued to exist.

On March 13, temporary regulations were issued in Damascus to take effect from the following morning. Exchange control regulations were applied to transactions between Syria and the Lebanon. Travellers to and from the Lebanon were not allowed to import or export more than fifty Syrian pounds. Transport of goods from the Lebanon to Syria was prohibited with the exception of fuels, goods in transit, and commodities exempt from duties. Customs posts were to be established, smuggling was to be severely suppressed and special permits would be required by Syrians travelling to the Lebanon. The decision of the government was submitted to the constituent assembly and approved by an overwhelming majority. Amongst the public there was some enthusiasm at what was called "liberation from the Lebanese Mandate."

The Lebanese Prime Minister, Riadh as Solh, in a speech in parliament on March 14, stated that the Lebanon would not undertake reprisals against Syria. The Lebanon would remove duties on the import of foreign cereals, meat and dairy products, an "open door" policy would be introduced and the government would ask for a free hand to re-organize economic life in face of the rupture.

During the following month relations between the two countries became tense on several occasions. The Lebanon prohibited the import of Syrian products, with the exception of leather, wool, vetch and hay, and Syria retaliated by suspending all imports and exports to and from the Lebanon. Syria also took immediate action to push ahead with the construction of a port at Lattaqia destined ultimately to replace Beirut and Tripoli as the Syrian outlet to the west.

Meetings between Syrian and Lebanese delegations eventually took place at Bludan and Aley between June 20 and 25, and views were exchanged on practical arrangements to implement the "principle of rupture." An agenda for study by a technical committee was prepared and the meeting adjourned. On July 30, 1950, the Syrian Prime Minister, Nazim Bey al Kudsi, disclosed that the Lebanon had rejected further

Syrian overtures for unity and that the Syrian Government had therefore submitted a draft agreement for the exchange of products on the basis of separation. He also announced that he had proposed to the Lebanese Premier Riadh as Solh that Syria should guarantee to supply Lebanese requirements of wheat. This point was formally accepted at a meeting of the two Finance Ministers at Shtaura on September 19.

Reviewing the results of the first six months of rupture on September 14, Hassan Jabbara, a former Syrian Finance Minister, announced that revenue had increased quite impressively. Fiscal stamp receipts had gone up from a rate of a hundred thousand to a million Syrian pounds per year; import permits had similarly risen from a hundred thousand to a million Syrian pounds. Postage and telegraph revenues had risen and the banks and exchange markets were experiencing a boom. Syrian industry was facing the future confidently as a result of protective duties imposed on foreign competition.

At the same time the Syrian Prime Minister, Dr. Kudsi, denied in the Syrian Chamber that relations with the Lebanon were based on economic rupture and advocated only customs separation. In replying to an argument that he contradicted himself by insisting on customs separation from the Lebanon while advocating at the same time economic unity between the Arab countries, Dr. Kudsi said that he had defended himself against similar accusations in the Lebanon by explaining that Syria and the Lebanon were like two brothers, one economical and the other extravagant. Not only would the continuation of economic relations between the two be of no benefit to the extravagant party, but it would ruin the economical one.

Another meeting of the two Finance Ministers followed on October 3. Syria put forward a proposal for unity on the basis of free agricultural and limited industrial exchange, free import to Lebanon of Syrian rice and cotton, and an open door for Syrian imports coming through in transit. The Lebanon should undertake not to import from abroad products manufactured in Syria or articles considered by Syria to be luxuries. Syria would supply Lebanese requirements of wheat. The forty-four million Syrian pounds held by Lebanon would be liquidated by purchases, but Lebanese debts to Syria would be settled in dollars or Lebanese pounds.

The Lebanese Government intimated that such proposals could not be accepted under any circumstances and prepared counter-proposals, but these were overtaken by a three-day strike called by the inhabitants of Tripoli, followed by protests from other towns and economic circles in Beirut, urging that the economic stagnation in the country demanded an agreement with Syria at all costs. The strike in Tripoli was particularly embarrassing to the government and was settled only by the award of one million Lebanese pounds to the citrus growers of the town to compensate them for the loss of their Syrian market.

On November 9, 1950, a delegation from Tripoli, which is very heavily hit by the present situation, appeared in Damascus to urge agreement on complete union and not only on an agricultural exchange. The Acting Prime Minister, Zeki Khatib, said that Syrian industry must come

first and that the list submitted by the Lebanese Government, which included radios and vegetable oils as duty-free Lebanese products, was absurd as the Lebanon produced neither of these items.

No further progress was made until December 25, 1950, when it was agreed to exchange agricultural products within the limits of each country's requirements for domestic consumption, and subject to the customs tariff and regulations in force in each country.

On March 14, 1951, the first anniversary of the rupture, Akram Rikabi, the Syrian Director of Customs, declared that customs receipts for this period amounted to over forty million Syrian pounds, as compared with the twenty-seven millions which Syria used to receive before the rupture.

During the period between the rupture and the time of writing, talks have been going on intermittently between the two governments. Activity was intensified during the Hussein Oueini caretaker-government in the Lebanon in the spring of 1951, and at one time it looked as if a permanent settlement might emerge, but once again it foundered, this time on the question of free circulation of Syrians in the Lebanon, which Damascus would not accept.

The advent of a new government in the Lebanon on June 5, 1951, under Abdulla Yafi, made the renewal of negotiations a strong probability and the new government was assailed from two sides by the press. On the one side the pan-Arabs urged complete unity with Syria on the best terms that could be extracted, on the grounds that the present state of economic stagnation, and the failure of the 1951 tourist season which would result from the absence of Syrians, were ruining the country. They held that the economies of the two countries were complementary and that the fears of the separatists were groundless.

The separatists, of which the paper *Orient* in the French language is a leading mouthpiece, said on June 19, 1951: "We still reject as we did on March 8, 1950, the offer of economic unity which Syria wishes to carry out under conditions of blatant inequality. Syria has introduced a directed economy which is perhaps applicable to Syria but is not necessarily acceptable to Lebanese agriculture, industry and commerce. For Khalid al Azm union means in the first place an extension of Syrian antarkie to the Lebanon without giving the latter a chance to discuss it. Union means the exploitation of the port of Beirut, the Lebanese market, and all the country's resources, for the greater glory of the Syrian republic. We all love Syria dearly, but not to the point of committing suicide for her. Fifteen months of rupture have shown us the attitude which is deliberately encouraged at Damascus towards everything Lebanese. If there is a serious crisis in the Lebanon now it is due to riotous overstocking at the time of the deterioration in the international situation at the end of 1950 and not to the rupture. If we admit any error it is that we have not reoriented our economy towards complete independence from Syria during the first fifteen months of the rupture."

SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN TEHERAN

By J. E. F. GUERITZ

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, July 11, 1951, Group Captain H. St. C. Smallwood, O.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Gueritz is a member of long standing in the Society, having joined it in 1936, when he was a subaltern in the Royal Garhwal Rifles, then stationed in the United Provinces, and later in Baroda and other Indian States. He has always been much interested in the Moslem world, and after the war he held a post in the Middle East.

He lived for several years at Baghdad, and recently at Teheran, and we may be quite sure that we shall get an objective point of view of a situation which bristles with many difficulties. Mr. Gueritz is not connected with oil, so we shall be given impressions of life in that part of the world as seen by someone whose work lies right outside that controversy.

I HAVE never ceased to regret the rashness which made me agree to speak to this Society on the subject of Persia, since I feel sure that most of you know much more about it than I do. In addition, I labour under the handicap of being obliged to confine my remarks to strictly non-political and non-controversial subjects, which in a matter like this leaves me with little but the scenery about which to talk. In fact, I feel rather like a race-horse which has been entered for the Grand National on condition that it does not jump! However, I hope to give you some idea of conditions and the way of life in Persia today, as a background to the more exciting facts which are to be found in the newspapers.

Just over a year ago we set out from Baghdad by car with all our worldly goods in a lorry behind us. At Khanaqin, on the borders of Iraq and Iran, we left the world we knew, and on driving under the triumphal arch at Khosrovi we passed into an atmosphere which was entirely strange to us. The magnificence of the customs house and stucco glories of the palace across the road made us wonder what we were going to find at the end of the journey. Our passage through the passport and customs office was, I think, aided by a kindly inscription on my passport in red ink by the Persian Ambassador in Baghdad, and further speeded up by the fact that it was a holiday and only a skeleton staff was on duty. In due course, after innumerable cups of tea in the vast and echoing waiting-room, of which we were the only occupants, and in which our only amusement was to admire ourselves at various angles in the many mirrors on the walls, we set off on our way.

The country was majestic and more deserted than we had expected. The road was fair, but it seemed clear that the Administration was fighting a losing battle against the ravages of snow and frost. In fact, my wife and I nearly came to blows over the avoiding of pot-holes, since it always seemed that the driver had selected the biggest and deepest over which to steer the car. We plaintively pointed out that if you avoided one you went into another. We reached Teheran on the second day without

incident and with an impression of barren hills interspersed with small oases of fine trees and fair crops. The oases were, however, all too far apart and the crops did not give an impression of great prosperity. Unfortunately, we reached Teheran in the dark, and so our first impressions were confined to lighted avenues and the curious colour and aroma of the bath water. I had heard much about Teheran from friends who had been there during the war, and I was looking forward to seeing it all for myself, but, to misquote the Queen of Sheba, "Behold, the one half of it was not told me."

When thinking of Persia I always feel that criticism is easy but comparison difficult, since it is not clear by what standards it is to be judged. We have had two hundred years in which to solve the problems set by the Industrial Revolution, whereas Persia has not had the quarter of that. Yet Persia has all the problems that we had, and others imposed upon it by its climate and geography. I never know whether the word "oriental" has a derogatory sense in these days or not; but I can think of none other to express what I mean. Oriental countries have, by their nature, a different background and outlook from occidental countries such as ours. Persia is without doubt oriental, however occidental it may be in matters of dress and the outward trimmings of life. Again, what is modern Persia? Is it the wide streets of modern Teheran and the factories of Isfahan, the hovels of the peasants in the provinces or the sturdy nomadic tribes of the south? It clearly is a combination of all these, but I am going to speak about it as if it were the modern country the Persians would like it to be considered, and to comment upon the results which recent Administrations have achieved. I hope that this will be considered non-controversial, since I am speaking only of facts.

Teheran is a fine city and its buildings could hold their own anywhere, but that in itself is perhaps a condemnation, since vast sums have been spent on the ministries and other official buildings not only in construction, but in the installation of air conditioning, central heating, restaurants and sanitation, when the country outside is in crying need of roads, water and proper housing.

Efforts have been made at decentralization and the building up of provincial administration, but these, so far, have not succeeded. Teheran remains not only the source of power but also the sole reservoir. So much so is this true that not only do the rich flock there to build their palaces and summer villas in the hills, but also the poor in search of bread. Persia today, therefore, is in many ways Teheran, and here, as in other countries, lies the main problem. Wealth, talent and labour must be encouraged to return to the provinces to develop their resources and restore the balance between city and country.

Going from a predominantly Arab country to one which is basically Indo-European by race and tradition, one might expect to find more in common with ourselves and our outlook, but I did not find that this was so. The Persians have kept themselves a race apart; and they are so aware of the past history of their country and of the things of beauty that it has produced that they have developed an inordinate national pride which, though admirable in its way, has also produced a less fortunate

indifference to foreigners and a tendency to depreciate the value of their work or ideas. Persia has often been accused of xenophobia; this is not, I think, justified, as they do not really fear foreigners as a whole nor do they hate them; they merely despise them as inferior beings.

A short anecdote may illustrate this point. When we took our house we paid our electric light bill by cheque on the last day before it was due, and the servant came back with the message: "We do not accept cheques from foreigners or Armenians." This attitude, of course, is not so common amongst the higher ranks, or amongst those Persians who have been educated abroad, and we had many good friends and kind helpers amongst the ministers and high officials. It is, however, a background to one's whole life in Persia, and it makes things less easy and life less comfortable than they might otherwise be.

There is also another and more tragic aspect of the Persian attitude to the outside world, and that is the feeling of many young men, trained and educated overseas, towards their own country and life there. Many young Persians to whom we spoke referred to their time in Europe or the United States with much pleasure and affection. They had appreciated all that had been done for them and the training they had received, but they were discontented and unhappy because they felt they had no opportunity to use in the service of their own country their talents and the experience they had acquired. They felt frustrated, and often said that their only wish was to return to the United States, Great Britain or France, and to work there in an atmosphere of greater freedom and greater opportunity. That, it seems, is due very largely to the present system of administration and to the attitude towards foreign ideas to which I have referred. Openings for young men are not easily come by, and they are suspect because their ideas are not indigenous to Persia. The discontent of these young men must create a problem for Persia, a problem which will demand early solution, and only an enlightened Administration can offer this.

Persia has realized that there is a crying need for development, and has for this purpose set up the Seven Year Plan organization. Originally this plan was based on a cadre of foreign experts to advise and plan the schemes necessary for the welfare of Persia in the future. Unfortunately, there was not only veiled hostility towards the foreigners but also excessive centralization and theorizing, entirely unbalanced by action. Young men entered the organization full of hope and, I believe, anxious to avail themselves not only of the experience they had acquired overseas but also of the advice of the advisers on the spot. Gradually they lost heart and became suffocated under a mass of paper. Now Persians quite openly laugh and talk of the "Seventy Years' Plan."

One Persian to whom I was talking on this subject complained that other countries in the Middle East had received far more aid from the West than had been given to Persia, and when I asked him whether Persia would agree to accepting foreign experts to aid and advise in the application of any funds granted and to ensure that they went into the right channels, he immediately replied: "No, certainly not; we are quite capable of applying money ourselves." There seems, therefore, at present

to be a deadlock. Funds will not be provided without guarantees and, if possible, supervision by foreign experts, and Persian pride will not agree to what they consider an insult to their race and history.

There are, however, still a number of advisers in Persia, who are doing good work in prospecting for and cataloguing Persia's natural resources, and there are a few schemes which are working admirably for the benefit of the country. Of these the most striking are the Agricultural Institute and the Vaccine Research Centre at Hessarak, outside Teheran, and the Princess Aschraf School for Nurses in Teheran. The Agricultural Institute has fine premises and has done much to develop an interest in good seed and better stock, and to show what can be done if farming in Persia is run on scientific lines. Also the Razi Institute, where animal vaccines are made and where experiments are continually being carried out to find means of combating the innumerable diseases from which cattle suffer in Persia and which hinder the full development of Persian agricultural resources, is a monument to its French director, who retired recently. He was there for twenty years, during which time he inspired his assistants with such enthusiasm that they are carrying on entirely in the old tradition of loyalty and hard work. The present director is a Persian; he is extremely keen and all the staff at the Razi Institute showed great intelligence and skill and a real anxiety to produce something really good and worth while. In fact, a visit to the Razi Institute is a most refreshing experience, and one comes away with the knowledge that with will and selfless devotion Persia can produce institutions as efficient as those anywhere else in the world. The trim gardens, the spotless corridors and well-equipped laboratories, and not least of all the attitude of the workers there, are an inspiration to anyone who hopes that Persia will ultimately produce a balanced economy with an efficient agricultural industry.

The Princess Aschraf School for Nurses is another very bright spot among the institutions of Teheran. And when I say "bright spot" I mean a bright spot, because everything was shining and spotless. This school is run by a devoted staff of British nurses and is supported by all far-sighted Persians, who see in it the source of a steady stream of trained nurses. Its wards are a model of cleanliness and the equipment of the demonstration room the best that money can buy. Its lecture halls provide everything that the training of nurses can demand. Also, and this is extremely important, the school provides comfortable and bright living quarters for the nurses, where they can learn the art of living in a corporate community and, under keen supervision, learn not only the essentials of their work but also the way to take part in public life in the service of their country, which is most important in a country like Persia in which women have only comparatively recently come out from behind the veil. Another important point about the school is that the girls in training come from all grades of society, and they all seem to be extremely happy together.

There was, however, a strike, organized by trouble-makers to protest against the failure of certain candidates in their examinations. Princess Aschraf spoke to them of the great work that the school was doing and rebuked the strikers for hindering the development of a scheme which

could only bring blessings to Persia. She went on to say that behaviour such as theirs could only result in continued dependence upon foreigners, against whose presence in Persia they were protesting. It is not necessary to say that the strike received little sympathy and that, as a result, it has not affected the good work that is being done.

We need not despair, therefore, that Persia cannot or will not turn her hand to schemes that benefit the poor and the wretched peasant, but such schemes are at present all too few, and probably the cause is to be seen in the present desire to see rapid returns and a large profit. Teheran is a city of immense wealth, and never have I seen so many fine cars or such a display of grandeur. Whereas elsewhere the normal private cars are Fords and Chevrolets, in Teheran the commonest cars, except for taxis, which are British, seem to be Cadillacs and Packards. The show of furs in the shop windows and the rows of jewellers' shops, full of gorgeous gold and jewelled ornaments, would not disgrace the Rue de la Paix or Bond Street. Money flows, and yet one wonders where it all comes from, since surely only a small proportion of the people can afford the prices charged. Rents are fantastic; a flat with two sitting-rooms and two small bedrooms, with a squalid kitchen and primitive bathroom, furnished with decrepit furniture, will cost at least £1,000 a year. A wretched room, unfurnished, may cost £5 12s. a month, which is an absurd proportion of a servant's salary of £14 per month. Business men often hope to recover their capital outlay and a handsome profit within a year or two of letting a newly built house. Customs duties and demurrage charges at the docks and transport dues are all exceedingly heavy; yet there is no sign of lack of business. The shops seem prosperous, and always have fresh stocks.

One of the most striking features of life in Teheran is the smartness of the people in the streets. There seems to be no intervening gradation between the smart tweeds and gaberdines of the youth and beauty and the rags of the poor. I always felt very out-of-place in a tweed jacket and grey flannel trousers, and often wondered whether it was not I and those like me who provided the missing link!

This emphasis on outward show permeates all spheres of life in Teheran. The exterior grandeur of a building by no means guarantees an equally high standard of interior decoration. "Face," whether in the matter of outward appearance or personal dignity, counts for much in Persia. I often felt that more importance was given to the outward appearance of a building than to cleanliness and efficiency within the building.

The uniforms, which one sees in all the streets of Teheran and which give the city a somewhat artificial air, are an example of this. The material of the police officers' uniforms is superfine and they are extremely grand in their blue tunics, gold braid and with red bands round their hats. I often felt that a less showy uniform might mean a little more pay and thus a greater contentment amongst the lower ranks of the police.

The other aspect of this outward show is the squalor which it is concealing. Behind the façade of fine avenues and grand buildings lies a state of poverty which has to be seen to be believed, and which is far worse than

anything I have seen anywhere else. The contrast between the mansions of the rich and the hovels of the poor is a standing indictment of the wealthy factory- and land-owner. The sight on a bitter winter's day of a wretched old man, wrapped in a cotton shawl, trying to warm his hands at the stub end of a candle contrasts very badly with the stout women in their fine cars wrapped to the eyes in mink and fox, or whatever fur it may be. And the size of the babies in the children's wards of the hospitals is so horrifying that one wonders how they manage to keep alive at all. Until the slums of Teheran are cleaned up and comprehensive schemes for relief of the poor are established, Teheran can never claim the position of honour which many Persians would like it to hold amongst the capitals of the world.

In saying this, it is not so much the state of affairs that I am criticizing because, as I said earlier, Persia has not had as long to tackle the problems of industry in this modern age as we have, and I have no doubt that many Persians would turn round and say to us: "Well, your slums would take a lot of beating." That is probably true. What I am criticizing is the official state of mind regarding the present conditions; the acceptance of their existence and the attitude "Well, some day perhaps things will be better." However, there is a feeling amongst certain people that all is not well, and much is done by individuals for the relief of the poor. There is a school for beggars where they are trained in carpet-making, furniture making, and a number of other useful crafts; some of the furniture they make would hold its own anywhere and is a good deal more sound and more stable than furniture sold in the grand shops in the main shopping centres. There are clinics for mothers and children where milk and medicines are distributed free. Recently I believe the milk has been administered on the spot, for there was a danger that the babies might not get the milk but that other people would get it instead; in fact, sometimes it may even have been sold. Individual Persians are doing their best to alleviate the existing state of affairs, but individuals cannot hope to get far alone. Little can be done without governmental aid and sweeping housing schemes. Any such scheme will require a great deal of money and call for much work, none of which will bring any profit, and hence it is one of the schemes which has been relegated to the future.

There are many State hospitals in Teheran and they are mostly housed in fine modern buildings, externally well up to present-day standards. The doctors are keen, and many of them have spent years overseas training themselves for this work in France, Germany, Great Britain or the United States, so that they are up to date in all the latest methods, both surgical and medical, and also they have a great faith in all the latest drugs. As for conditions inside the hospitals, I am not an expert and I have seen them only on special occasions, so that I do not feel qualified to make any comment upon the actual working of the hospitals.

But one comes back to the emphasis laid on outward show and the inequality of the distribution of wealth, for it is the most striking thing in Teheran. There are two fine roads up to the summer resort, which roads would hold their own anywhere; they are lined by beautiful trees, and the surface is extremely good. As one gets farther south in and around Teheran the roads become extremely bad. In fact, a magnificent building

to house a ministry is liable to receive more attention than a scheme for slum clearance or the building of a road to a distant provincial city in Kerman or Khorasan. I do not mean to say that nothing is done to raise the standards of the poor. That would not be true, since the schools in Teheran, where education is free and compulsory, are fine buildings, but the allocation of funds to such purposes is by no means adequate, nor is it proportionate to the importance of the subject.

We all know that Persia needs financial aid to carry out the development of the country, but such aid would be useless without a change of heart amongst the wealthy and the governing classes. Coupled with the intense national pride, there is a grave lack of a sense of personal responsibility for the administration and well-being of the country. Evasion of income tax is considered clever and an indication of one's business acumen. The attitude seems to be that only fools pay income tax, and of course amongst the fools they include foreigners, who have no option. The proportions of the national income derived from direct and indirect taxation are ample proof of this, and quite recently the Shah himself drew attention to the fact and appealed for greater co-operation in the matter, so that the disproportion between direct and indirect taxation could be remedied. Until this is remedied and until existing sources of wealth are tapped, Persia cannot expect a full flow of sympathy from other countries. No one feels impelled to give money or assistance to a beggar who is wearing a mink coat.

Behind all the outward show there are other causes of irritation to Persians and foreigners alike—namely, the electricity and telephone systems, the water supply and the sanitation. These necessities of modern life are so administered as to cause incredible inconvenience. Electricity is so uncertain that at peak periods there is often barely light enough to read by. In fact, some of my friends went so far as to buy oil lamps for reading in the evening. In our house there were magnificent fittings for fluorescent lighting of the hall and main rooms, of which the landlord was extremely proud when he showed us round the house. He said as he switched on the lights, "Isn't this a grand sight!" but when the evening came and we switched on the lights it was not so grand, because they just did not work. Never at any time at the height of the season could we have all lights on at the same time or run an electric fire when we wanted the lights to read by. If I said I did not wish to read a book or paper in the evening my wife took the opportunity to do some ironing. This was all due to lack of adequate supervision and the desire for profit of which I spoke earlier. The company did not consider the convenience of the user, but only the money which it would get by adding another connection to an already very heavily loaded line.

The telephones are run on a scarcity basis, and telephone numbers are sold to the highest bidder. So grave was the shortage that it was not uncommon for one number to be run as a private exchange. The result can be imagined, and one never used a telephone unless there was plenty of time to spare or a secretary to get the number.

The water system of Teheran is, I believe, world famous. I have known visitors to Teheran go dirty rather than wash in the brown reeking fluid

that often passes for bath water. I often wonder whether the prevalence of shower baths is due more to the fact that one cannot see the colour of the water than to the religious custom of the country. Certainly, after seeing what is removed daily from the water-channels that carry the city's water, I was thankful that I lived on the hill above Teheran, where the water was comparatively uncontaminated and comparatively clean. Sanitation is no better, and while one does not necessarily expect a comprehensive water-borne sewage scheme, one does object to ill-designed plumbing and mis-directed economy which places septic tanks immediately under a house or at the minimum possible distance from its outer walls.

The shortcomings of these essential public services are recognized by Persians, but they are accepted as normal in the present state of affairs and as an inevitable part of their own way of life. This is, of course, needless, since a willingness to forego large profits and to reinvest some of the takings in new equipment and larger supervisory staffs, or in better planning of the houses and better construction of the drainage, would surely result in immediate improvement. It was always interesting to watch a new house being built, not only because of the speed with which it was built, but also because one wondered whether the more essential parts of the building were going to be put in. Not a single drain-pipe went into one house we watched being built, and so we were not surprised at the state of affairs in our own house. There seems, in fact, a complacency in regard to these trimmings, if you like to call them so, of civilization, which is typical of the Persian attitude towards foreign appliances. If, however, such an attitude persists, the frustration of the young Persians, to which I have already referred, must increase, since they have seen better and know better, and gradually they will lose heart and sink into that disillusioned lethargy which is so harmful. Persia has great need of two things: initiative and the opening of the way to fresh talent. The initiative and the talent exist, but at present the gate is firmly barred.

I have not touched on problems existing outside Teheran, since I cannot speak of these from personal experience, and, in any case, much has been written about the state of the peasants and tribesmen, who make up the vast majority of the population, but it is well to remember that 85 per cent. of the population is dependent upon agriculture and that there are only nine cities in the country with over 100,000 inhabitants. Of these Teheran has over 600,000, and the second largest is Tabriz with 272,000. However, it seemed, from what I saw on our journeys to and from Teheran, that far too great a proportion of the revenues is spent on the capital and all too little on the provincial centres or small towns. We saw little in the way of schools or hospitals to compare with the fine buildings of Teheran, and we rather felt again that nearly all the goods were in the shop window.

That this is probably all too true is, it seems to me, shown in the disinclination of doctors to serve in the provinces or in small towns. According to figures given in 1947, two-thirds of the doctors in Persia practise in Teheran. Although efforts have been made to remedy this, there are at present few signs of improvement, and reliance has to be placed on Germans and the many other displaced persons to serve in the country

districts to treat the peasants in the hospitals or travelling dispensaries. Furthermore, the present uncertainty has discouraged landlords from investing a proportion of their revenues in the development of their property. They seem to prefer to spend their money on comfortable living in Teheran and on tours abroad; they feel that at least they are getting something for their money instead of, perhaps, putting it into land from which somebody else will reap the benefit in later years. And it is this preference which fills the luxurious hotels on the Caspian Sea and gives Teheran an atmosphere of "Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow who knows what may happen?"

However, I visited property outside Teheran and saw what can be done by proper application of funds and the development of scientific methods. The soil properly handled and irrigated can, with enlightened treatment, produce magnificent crops, and the landlords, if they were encouraged to experiment and, if necessary, compelled to invest some of their revenues in land reclamation, could do much to save Persia from her present economic plight. Absenteeism and a shuffling off of responsibility are no foundation for prosperity, and inevitably largely nullify whatever action the Government may take to improve the standard of life of the peasant. It is extremely striking what can be done by a keen landlord who avails himself of the experiments at the agricultural stations, and it does show what a sense of responsibility amongst those who ought to serve their country most—*i.e.*, the rich—can do to assist the Government in its wish to improve the lot of the people.

The sense of insecurity which is reflected in the landowners' aversion to investing money in their estates is a common feature in Persia today, and it is this instability which requires serious attention by the Government if any improvement in the economic condition of the country is to be achieved now or in the future. It is not only landlords who feel insecure, but also government officials and foreign advisers, since their salaries are paid with the utmost irregularity. Recently the postal officials went on strike because their pay was three months in arrears. Even the Government itself is affected, since the Budget is not voted for the year, but only in twelfths. You can well imagine the difficulty of planning or running any schemes if you do not know whether next month the Budget is going to be voted to provide funds for their continuation. This system, in fact, prevents any real planning ahead and must have its effect upon the outlook and policy of the Ministers, who have to prepare the schemes and make them work, and when the schemes demand at least a year at a time for their development. Another aspect of this irregularity in the payment of salaries and their meagreness is that government officials are subjected to serious temptations, which are bound to have their effect upon the efficient working of the Administration and the development of the country as a whole.

Persia, and Teheran in particular, have been cut off by geographical features, and the days are long since passed when movements of people brought fresh blood and new ideas. Persia absorbed much that is good from her invaders and yet remained Persian, interpreting the new ideas in her own fashion, but isolation in recent centuries has resulted in stagnation and that national pride and indifference to foreigners of which I have

already spoken. World traffic now passes outside the confines of Persia, and Teheran is a terminus and not a junction. There is not the contact with the outside world which brings with it the impetus for reforms or the opening of men's minds to new ideas and influences. Further, Persians have not the urge or necessity to emigrate, and there are not those contacts with the outside world which affect all grades of society and which have so widened the outlook of the people of a country such as the Lebanon. Those Persians who have travelled are usually drawn from a comparatively small class of society and their influence on public opinion in general has so far been slight. Again, the closed shop in government administration, which has barely yet been breached, has prevented many who have talent and breadth of vision from taking their part in the development of their country and the education of public opinion. The general attitude is thus still parochial and problems such as those to which I have referred are all too often considered from far too narrow a point of view. The education of public opinion to see the problems of Persia as compared with the problems of other countries to realize that they are not alone and that other countries have similar problems, or have had them, and would be able to help the Persians if they would be willing to accept help, is a very important matter for Persia today.

I hope that I have not appeared too critical and that I do not appear to be expecting too much of Persia as a modern country. This is not so, since I know that it is the ambition of many Persians to see the advancement of their country proceed rapidly and to see the whole people brought to a far greater state of prosperity than is the case today. And again, in this age when all countries are becoming more and more dependent upon each other and mutual aid is the aim of us all, it is essential for us to know and understand, so that we shall be better able to give assistance of the right kind in the right place.

Mr. C. G. HANCOCK: Would the lecturer tell us something about gambling in Persia today, whether it is very prevalent, and how much is spent on horse-racing, dog-racing or football pools? And could the lecturer amplify what he said about housing? How many houses were built in 1950 and how many people are without a house or flat in Persia?

Mr. GUERITZ: I am not really in a position to answer the first questions, because I do not gamble and therefore I did not come into contact with the gambling classes. Horse-racing takes place in Teheran, but I understand that there are only two meetings a year and it is not a very permanent feature of life in Persia, although it is very different in Baghdad, where they have three meetings every week for nine months in the year. Football pools, as far as I know, do not exist in Persia, but football is played.

As regards housing, there are, as far as I know, no recent statistics, but the rate of construction is extremely rapid; those are, however, houses built by individuals for renting in summer resorts or for living in themselves, and they are chiefly in the Shimran suburb of Teheran, in the north, and they certainly do not affect the poor in the south. As to the number of people without a house in Persia, I feel I would rather say nothing.

Miss LAMBTON: The lecturer spoke a good deal about the hostility to

and the contempt of Persians for Europeans, and as one piece of evidence of that he quoted the difficulties which the European had in dealing with minor officials in particular. I feel the only fair standard of comparison is to compare the treatment which the Persians themselves receive at the hands of officials of that kind. If that is done I think it will be found that the European comes off undoubtedly best.

Can the lecturer say whether the direction of and teaching in the Princess Aschraf School for Nurses are in Persian hands or not?

Mr. GUERITZ: It is under a committee of which Princess Aschraf is the chairman, and the staff is British, paid by the Persian Government.

Mrs. GREGORY: Are not the mobs a somewhat new feature of Persia?

Mr. GUERITZ: I have only been there nine months; certainly there were no mobs during the first five of those months, but I did hear a number of them in the last four. I would not like to say there had not been any before. Certainly they were more prevalent latterly, probably due to the fact that a certain political party had been allowed to appear again in public, which may have been all to the good, as it brought to the surface what may well have been going on underneath all the time. The mobs were not usually visible to most of us in Teheran; we heard about them and read about them in the *Daily Express* or *The Times*, but we did not see them, and, while we were there, they were certainly entirely inoffensive, a gathering of a few school children or students. In fact, one could not really call it a mob; they seemed to be boys out on the spree at that time; not necessarily now.

A LADY: Does the Moslem Foundation do anything in these days to relieve distress, or is it in abeyance?

Mr. GUERITZ: That is its object, I gather, and it will certainly organize education in schools for Moslems; it is not, perhaps, as prominent as it should be in alleviating the very great need which is in south Teheran; maybe the funds are not sufficient. I have not studied that question, but the only people I really heard of as responsible for producing any schemes were individuals. There are a series of maternity and child welfare centres which are extremely well run, not by the Waqf but by individuals.

Miss WOOD: I remember that in 1928 an article appeared in *The Times* in which the then Shah—Riza Shah's predecessor—said the coffers were empty, that there was nothing, and at the time I was trying to put something together and I put at the end of the chapter: "Persia is looking for someone who will make Persian history." Of course the new Persia had not then emerged. What have the Persians in the way of a steady income apart from oil royalties?

Mr. GUERITZ: I admit I tried to ascertain what the national Government revenues of Persia are today, but I could not find a figure which looked anything like accurate or up to date. Persia could have certainly quite a handsome revenue if people paid their taxes and they were suitably taxed—that is, relieved of as much as they can afford to pay, which is quite a lot. We had some drain-pipes stolen from off the wall of our building. I protested to one of our Persian clerks that I thought it was a scandal that this should happen, and he said: "What can you expect when people are so poor?" I said: "Do you call that poor?" pointing to a

large Cadillac. "The money is there." The Persians' coffers are not dry, but the Government's coffers are very empty.

Asked what were the ordinary wages of a working man,

Mr. GUERITZ said: They vary, as far as I know, from £3 to £4 a month up to £20 which is paid to the average servant in a house. A man receiving £20 to £30 a month will be an extremely well-paid working-class person.

Miss WOOD: Does that apply to other places than Teheran?

Mr. GUERITZ: They probably get a good deal less, but the average working man gets what is really a pittance in comparison with what he needs.

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks.

ANNUAL MEETING

THE Annual Meeting of the Society was held on Wednesday, June 13, 1951, at 4 p.m., at the Royal Empire Society, London, W.C. The President, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., took the Chair, and called on Mr. O. White, C.M.G., to present the Honorary Secretaries' Report for 1950-51.

HON. SECRETARIES' REPORT

Since the last Annual Meeting, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., has taken office as President of the Society.

The Society lost a distinguished member and Honorary Vice-President in Field-Marshal Lord Chetwode, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., who died shortly after our last Annual Meeting. The vacancy was filled by the election as an Honorary Vice-President of Lieut.-General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart, V.C., K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

One hundred and twenty-six new members joined the Society this year, the large majority of them being young men engaged on work in one or other country of Asia, so that this is an accession of strength to the Society. On the other hand, fifty-one members resigned and the membership of another forty-two lapsed through non-payment of their subscriptions. It has been a year in which foreign members of the Society, particularly some in Persia, seem to have found it unusually difficult to remit payments in British currency. So that beside those whose membership has lapsed, there are more members abroad whose subscriptions are in arrears than usual. The total number of members is now 1,766. The Honorary Secretaries venture to draw attention to the suggestion in the last number of the JOURNAL that members should celebrate the Jubilee of the Society by bringing in at least one new member each.

The Council regrets to report that eighteen members died during the year, among whom, besides Lord Chetwode, were Sir Francis Lindley, G.C.M.G., and Dr. Bertram Thomas, who was a former Member of our Council and well known for his work at the Middle East College for Arab Studies.

There were twenty-one lectures this year. Mr. Philips Price, M.P., and Mr. Edward Sykes lectured on Persia, and the former described the dangers inherent in the situation there of which we are already beginning to see the effects. There were four lectures on South-East Asia, three on China, three on different parts of the great mountain areas of Central Asia, and three on the Near East. Syed Waris Ameer Ali discussed the relations between the Islamic world and the British Commonwealth, while Sir George Sansom discussed Japan's present and future problems. Specialist members of the Society also continued their study of important questions; from time to time conclusions of these panel studies have appeared in the Journal.

Acknowledgment is warmly made of the services which Miss Wingate

and her staff have given to the Society and its members during the past year. Though the standard of these services is now traditional, it is perhaps not widely appreciated how diverse and constant they are. The flow of inquiries is perpetual and, though their connection with the aims of the Society is sometimes not readily apparent, they are all dealt with in the same spirit of cheerful help.

Acknowledgment should similarly be paid to the work of the Local Honorary Secretaries who are doing much to make the Society more effective in their respective areas. The extended appointment of local Honorary Secretaries is a recent development and has been thoroughly justified.

Both at home and abroad everything possible is being done to maintain and improve contacts between members and the Society and between the members themselves.

The Annual Dinner was held on October 10, 1950. The President, General Sir John Shea, was in the chair and it was again a very successful evening. It is hoped to hold the dinner this year on October 11 next in honour of the Society's fiftieth birthday: for although the record of the exact day was lost in the Blitz, we know it was founded at a committee meeting in October, 1901, and that the first thirteen members of the Society joined it in that month.

The President then called on Major E. Ainger to present the Hon. Treasurer's Report for 1950.

HONORARY TREASURER'S REPORT

The Honorary Treasurer presented the Accounts for 1950 as audited, and reported that up to the present time the financial position was in accordance with what had been expected by the Honorary Secretaries two years ago.

In September, 1949, Major Ainger had said that it would be necessary within three years to raise the annual membership subscription unless receipts from subscriptions could be increased by an annual amount of £200. The Honorary Secretaries had then made an appeal to members to increase the membership instead of raising the subscription. Members had responded to an extent that would have put the annual income on a satisfactory level had circumstances remained the same. In 1950 the expenditure of the Society was only £68 in excess of the year's income, and it had not yet been necessary to draw on any reserves.

But the Korean war and the rearmament programme put a different complexion on affairs, and the Honorary Treasurer was now very doubtful whether, even if the Honorary Secretaries achieved their objectives by next year, the position would be satisfactory, because of the heavy rise in expenses that must be envisaged. Both office expenses and the cost of the Journal would be rising substantially in the near future. As everyone knew, the cost of printing and paper had gone up very steeply this year, and that was a substantial item in the Society's budget. A higher annual income would therefore be necessary, and the Honorary Treasurer appealed to members to get their friends to join the Society, since a substantial in-

crease in the membership was the only alternative to raising the subscription.

There being no questions, the adoption of the Accounts for 1950 was put to the meeting on the motion of the Honorary Treasurer, seconded by Colonel S. Newcombe, and carried.

The President announced that the Council had re-elected as its Chairman Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., and as Vice-Presidents for the coming year, Major-General W. A. K. Fraser, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O. M.C., and Group-Captain H. StClair Smallwood, O.B.E.

On the motion of the Chairman of Council, seconded by Colonel E. F. Barker, the Honorary Officers of the Society were re-elected, and the following were elected Members of Council: Dr. Laurence Lockhart, Mr. E. Nathan, O.B.E., and General Sir Bernard Paget, G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

The PRESIDENT then spoke of recent events:

I was thinking the other day of the course of events which have taken place since hostilities ceased in 1945 and of their cumulative effect, and I was very struck by some sentences that I came across in P. J. Grigg's book, *On Judgment and Prejudice*, in which he says that it profits a man and country little if they gain the whole world and lose their own souls. He goes on to say that it profits them a great deal less if they give away bits of the world and lose their souls as well. By "giving away bits of the world" I think he means prestige as well as position.

To us in this Society, to whom the honour of this country and its prestige are precious things, I think the lesson is that we must endeavour to remind those in authority as often and as vehemently as we can that there are such things.

I think also that it is the duty of the Council of this Society to endeavour to keep you completely in touch with current events by getting for you lecturers and writers as soon as they return from interesting parts of the world.

I do not think that what has happened in Persia was in any sense unanticipated, because those who had watched events in that country saw the tendency that more and more there seemed to be resentment at the principal industry in that country being entirely in the hands of foreigners, not forgetting a certain amount of jealousy for the efficiency with which that enterprise was run.

I understand there was also the whispered advice of our enemies, "If England can arbitrarily nationalize steel, why does Persia not nationalize oil?"

One also remembers the rich and selfish landlords who wish to prevent any action on the part of the Government to do anything that will be useful to the peasants.

All this is readily understandable; but what is the reason for the manner in which Persia has behaved towards this country in pressing her claim, a manner which I submit she would not have dared to use some years ago?

I believe there is a direct and a contributory cause. One of my earliest recollections as a schoolboy was the bombardment of Alexandria in the

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 2, HINDE STREET, W. 1.

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1950.

1949 EXPENDITURE.				1949 INCOME.			
£		£	s. d.	£		£	s. d.
	To <i>Office Expenses:</i>						
993	Salaries and National Insurance ...	1,095	4 8	1,786	By <i>Subscriptions received</i> ...	1,894	11 4
205	Rent, light and heat ...	146	8 11	241	„ <i>Journal Subscriptions and Sales</i> ...	293	17 11
14	Telephone ...	17	2 5		„ <i>Interest Received:</i>		
79	Stationery and printing ...	89	6 11	39	Government Securities ...	47	1 3
108	Postages ...	115	14 11	10	Post Office Savings Bank ...	15	11 7
200	Cleaning and upkeep of premises ...	206	16 0			62	12 10
5	Audit fees ...	5	5 0	203	„ <i>Income Tax Repayment claim</i> ...	250	19 10
6	Insurances ...	6	2 4	8	„ <i>Sundry Receipts</i> ...	57	3 11
8	Bank charges ...	7	7 10				
39	Repairs and renewals ...	—	—				
40	Sundries ...	25	7 5				
		1,714	16 5				
1,697							
	Less: Contribution from Palestine						
200	Exploration Fund ...	200	0 0				
1,497				1,514			
	„ <i>Journal:</i>						
713	Printing ...	781	1 7				
46	Postages ...	62	9 10				
68	Reporting ...	72	6 8				
			915	18 1			
156	„ <i>Lectures and Study Group</i> ...		166	8 4			
5	„ <i>Library</i> ...			18			
16	„ <i>Professional Expenses</i> ...		15	15 0	2,287		
31	„ <i>Lawrence of Arabia Medal</i> ...		6	6 0		2,559	5 10
7	„ <i>Persia Fund Lecture and Subscription to "Iraq"</i>		6	16 0			
—	„ <i>Loss on Conversion of National War Bonds</i>			17	257		
	into 2½ per cent. Funding Loan 1956/61					68	9 5
			£2,627	15 3		£2,627	15 3
2,544							

year 1882, and there was a song about a British gunboat. Seventy years have passed since that event, and today we have a Government which has submitted to our oil tankers being stopped in the Canal by that same country.

Let us hope that the outcome of the negotiations which are now taking place in Persia will preserve for us some remnant of self-respect and some vestige of prestige. (Applause.)

It is now my duty to announce the award of the Sykes Memorial Medal. The Medal has been awarded in 1951 by the Council to MISS FREYA STARK.

Miss Stark studied the language and customs of the Arabs in Syria and Baghdad, and then proceeded on her very adventurous journeys in the Arab countries and in Persia, and such was the happy manner she carried with her on these journeys that, often facing the unknown alone, she was very readily received into places that had scarcely been touched by a European before.

She was employed by Government between 1939 and 1945 in Aden, Egypt and Iraq, and founded a Society which did a great deal of work—The Brotherhood of Freedom—and, what was possibly more effective, she penetrated and was received into Arab homes, where her talks to the women were quite definitely of great advantage to the Allied cause.

She has, with great benefit to the literature connected with the East, produced some of the most delightful books which give a vivid, clear and compelling and attractive picture of those countries in which she was and which indeed have made her name world-famous.

It is not for her great services to Government, but because of her work as a traveller and as a writer, that the Society has asked her to accept this Medal.

THE LOHIT VALLEY IN 1950

BY F. KINGDON-WARD, F.L.S.

Anniversary Lecture 1951, given at the Royal Society of Arts on June 13, 1951, the President in the chair.

The PRESIDENT: Mr. Kingdon-Ward is very well known to everyone both as a botanist and as a Central Asian traveller. He has been an Honorary Member of this Society since 1946.

He is a Fellow of the Linnæan Society, a Founder's Medallist of the Royal Geographical Society, and a medallist of other geographical and horticultural societies.

He has written a number of books on the botany and the geography of Eastern Tibet and Assam. He was the first to explore some of the country between the sources of the Irrawaddy and the Brahmaputra river, and his knowledge of the Mishmi hills and the area round Fort Hertz and to the north was of great value to Government at the time of the evacuation of Burma during the war, in 1942.

Mr. Kingdon-Ward was in the Lohit valley last year when the great earthquake took place in the hills of Eastern Assam and Tibet. He has just come home on leave, and his experiences at that time will be the subject of his lecture today.

OUR objective was the upper Lohit valley, our object botanical exploration. At the end of 1949, apart from the Himalayas, there were not many accessible places to choose from where we could hope to find alpine plants; even the Lohit valley was threatened with a Communist invasion in the autumn! This might be our last chance for some years.

The Lohit is the second largest of the three rivers which unite at the head of the Assam valley to form the Brahmaputra, the others being the Dihang (or Syan) and the Dibang. There is a fourth but much shorter river, the Sisseri, at the Lohit-Dihang confluence, not usually reckoned as one of the big affluents.

The Lohit rises on the deeply eroded south-eastern escarpment of the Tibetan plateau, and after flowing southwards for 200 miles swings abruptly round to the north-west, eventually reaching the plains by a circuitous route. It is between 300 and 350 miles long, which is of course very short for this part of the world; what is more important, except for a few miles on the plain it is completely unnavigable for any sort of craft.

We wanted to get through the foothills before the heavy spring rains brought out the leeches and made travel in the forest uncomfortable; so we decided on an early start. We left Tocklai (near Jorhat, in the tea district of Assam) by road in January, 1950, and having crossed the Lohit river by the motor ferry reached Sadiya the same evening. The Lohit here, when in flood, is a mile wide.

From Sadiya we travelled eastwards 48 miles by road to Denning, an outpost at the foot of the hills, not far from where the Lohit emerges on to the plain. Here the motor road ends. To put it briefly, the first 200 miles of our journey, from Tocklai to Denning, took us twelve hours.

actually a day and a half. The next 150 miles from Denning to Rima took us sixteen days (exclusive of halts).

After a century of intermittent exploration, the upper Lohit valley at least is still very little known. The gallant "A.K." trained by the Survey of India reached Rima from the east about seventy years ago, but long before that several attempts had been made by Europeans to enter Tibet from the west via the Lohit valley. All ended in failure, and the French fathers Crick and Boret were murdered by the fanatical lamas or by their Mishmi agents.

It was not till 1911 that Col. F. M. Bailey succeeded in reaching India from China via Pitu and the Zasha La, south of "A.K.'s" route to Rima. The journey proved difficult, and it was clear that no Indian Government need fear invasion down the Lohit valley on a large scale.

Nevertheless, the position had to be regularized. In 1912-14 a passable mule road to Walong was constructed and the country surveyed up to the great bend at Minzong. The frontier was established beyond Walong; but the Chinese Government, acting for Tibet, has never accepted the "MacMahon Line" as the frontier.

During and after the first world war the "road" gradually deteriorated. Meanwhile, several Political Officers from Sadiya visited Rima; and within the last decade the main valley and its principal affluents were to some extent explored by the late Mr. F. P. Mainprice and the late Mr. Campbell. (Mr. Campbell was killed in the great landslide in the Delei valley in 1948.)

No doubt we were the first botanical collectors to work in the middle reaches of the Lohit valley. I had worked north of Rima in 1933.

From Denning onwards we walked, our baggage being carried by coolies—not the local Mishmi tribe, but by forty-one Tibetans recruited in Sadiya bazaar. These people had come down to the plains to trade and were returning to their homes in Tibet.

Before we start I had better say a few words about the organization of the expedition.

Besides ourselves we had two Sherpa servants from Gangtok, and we planned to be self-contained or locally fed for a minimum of ten months. Now basic rations for four people for 300 days weigh over 2,000 lb., or 35 loads. It was therefore obvious that in a country so sparsely populated we must draw most of our rations locally. I believed we could do that; but it seemed doubtful whether we would get very much else. However, it was impossible—and hardly desirable—to carry tinned food for ten months, and in the end we compromised. Unfortunately local supplies other than rice, flour and salt turned out to be practically nil.

Our 41 loads included, besides tents, bedding, kerosene oil, cooking pots and the usual camp furniture, botanical presses, a vast weight of botanical drying paper, and several thousand rupees in coin. We had also to carry twelve days' rations for the journey through the Mishmi hills.

So on February 5 we started from Denning on the twelve marches to Walong, the last outpost and the last village in India, one of three outposts established in the Lohit valley after the war.

February is usually a fine month in Upper Assam, and even sometimes in the hills; but we were unlucky in our starting date, as it rained incessantly. A violent thunder-storm brought heavy hail, and crossing the first range we found the Tidding Saddle (6,000 feet) ankle deep as though in snow. A freezing mist hid the world in a dead-white shroud, through which the high Mishmi hills loomed vaguely ahead, terrifyingly steep. Two days later we found ourselves again beside the Lohit, and henceforward it was in sight or sound the whole way to Rima.

From Theronliang on the Tidding river to Walong is ten stages, though the distance measured along the path is not above 80 miles. The going, however, is rough, except crossing the river terraces. Often the path ascends several hundred feet to traverse round a cliff, with a thousand-foot drop to the whirlpools of the Lohit. We were now deep in the Mishmi hills, which form an effective barrier between the plains and the plateau.

The Mishmis are a backward tribe living in small villages built on the shoulders of spurs, or on terraces usually high above the main river and its larger affluents. There is very little arable land in this steep country, and the Mishmi is no patient cultivator; he wrings a bare living from the harsh soil. A village comprises a few huts, but they are sometimes 100 feet long and house several families. The rounded end of the roof, projecting over a platform, is supported by radial bamboos, which suggest fan-vaulting.

The Mishmis cultivate and smoke opium, though only mixed with tobacco. Of late years they have become tea addicts. They will do more for a handful of tea than they will for a handful of coins, which merely represent ornaments for their womenfolk. The Digaru Mishmis, who occupy the lowest part of the hill valley, have a great idea of their own importance, are childish, unreasonable and given to petty theft. The Miju, who occupy the valley above Hayuliang, are better, less suspicious and more co-operative.

For the first week we marched through broad-leafed evergreen rain forest, typical of the Assam foothills. Palms (though of few species), bamboos in variety and screw-pines (*Pandanus*) are abundant, and there are probably a hundred species of broad-leafed trees, big and small. This type of forest prevails, so far as one can see, to the tops of the outer hills and for some miles up the valleys of the larger affluents. The flanks of the main valley are exceedingly steep, and it is surprising to see them so densely forested. Looking ahead, one notices that on either side of the river the hills rise in several tiers, one above the other, and it is obvious that the valley, deep as it is, has for a long time past been water-eroded. I could see no clear signs of glaciation here, and hardly expected to in such a wet climate.

On the seventh or eighth march from Denning a change comes over the valley, a change most clearly reflected in the vegetation; pine trees appear close to the river, together with such temperate trees as *Carpinus viminea*, *Fraxinus Griffithii* and *Ulmus lancifolia*, while many hitherto familiar trees, notably *Terminalia myriocarpa*, *Sapindus detergens* and *Pterospermum acerifolium*, disappear altogether.

You notice also a group of peaks on the south-eastern skyline that is in the direction from which the Lohit is flowing; the inference is that it rises somewhere near those peaks on the Burma frontier, though they seem rather close to give birth to so big a river. There is a deep gash in the mountains ahead, where a tributary from the north appears to enter the Lohit.

The track now curves far round a huge buttress high above the river, and presently you find yourself in a deep gorge shut in by cliffs several thousand feet high, marching no longer south-east but due north! The whole illusion is now revealed. What looked like the main valley, stretching south-east, is a smaller valley, occupied by a tributary rising amongst the peaks just referred to; while what looked like a tributary from the north is really the main river itself! We have reached the great bend at Minzong, where the Lohit swings through 120° in two or three miles.

The geographer naturally asks, Why does not the Lohit continue southwards like the big rivers farther east, the Salween and Mekong? Why does it suddenly shy off westwards? The fact is, there is no real comparison. The Lohit was originally a small westward-flowing river draining from a range of high peaks which stretched from north to south more or less through the present knee bend at Minzong. At that time the upper Lohit did not exist; its present valley was occupied by a glacier, from which only a small stream flowed into the Lohit. Gradually with the retreat of the glacier this tributary became the main stream, while the south-east tributary dwindled. The main stream now flowed parallel with the high range from whose western flank the original Lohit sprang. This north-south range, whose peaks are still 16,000-17,000 feet high (Dapha Bum, 15,003 feet, lying south of the river, is lower), was, however, itself only a southward-projecting spur of the main Sino-Himalayan range stretching eastwards out of Tibet. The Salween and the Mekong have cut their way through the *main* range.

Inside the gorge the view north and south is restricted. On either side the barren-looking cliffs tower up towards the clouds, shutting out all but a ribbon of sky. The vegetation, too, completes its change-over from broad-leafed to coniferous forest, pine being the commonest tree with bracken and grass undergrowth. As might be expected, this is due to a change of climate—a reduced rainfall and colder winters. Another compelling factor is wind, which blows up the gorge with great fury throughout the year, and especially during the hottest season, when both flanks are exposed to the high sun. Below 7,000 feet, only in the deep ravines does broad-leafed forest prevail.

On February 18 we emerged from the narrowest part of the gorge into a wider valley, where gravel terraces, alluvial fans and at least one big moraine are prominent. Across the valley to the north the Tibetan ranges stretched in a dazzling white curtain against the turquoise sky. We had reached Walong.

Early in March we continued our journey northwards to Rima, reached on April 2, after a month's collecting on the way. The flora of Rima is different from anything we had seen yet, though the same pine forest

dominates the lower slopes; the commonest broad-leafed tree is probably *Quercus glauca*, a very hardy oak. Even in the bottom of the valley, where the summer temperature may exceed 90°, the flora is more or less temperate; at 7,000 feet it is predominantly so, with five or six different conifers, magnolias, rhododendrons, species of *Cornus*, *Ulmus*, maple, and many another tree. In Rima itself the most conspicuous woody plants were species of *Cotoneaster* and *Pyracantha*, crowded with brilliant berries.

Rima comprises half a dozen small villages situated at the bottom of a basin, on the left bank of the river where the valley widens. The sides of the basin are high and steep and the river, following a tortuous course, flows through it at an altitude of nearly 5,000 feet. There are two islands, covered with pines, in the wide river bed opposite Rima. Within 25 miles, on the Burma frontier are peaks over 19,000 feet high.

About a mile north of Rima the Lohit splits into two nearly equal halves, one coming from the north-west, the other from the north-east. Above the confluence the gradient steepens appreciably, and what either stream loses in volume it gains in velocity. The north-west branch, which rises near Sanga Chu Dzong, is usually regarded as the main stream (Zayul Chu). Its sources lie amongst mountains 17,000 feet high, but there is not a single glacier here.

The north-east branch rises on the snowy range between the Lohit drainage and the Dibang, and is fed by numerous glaciers. In late spring, when the snow is melting fast, it contains a great volume of water. After seeing the sources of both rivers in 1933, I came to the conclusion that the more thickly populated north-west branch called the Rong Tho Chu is the main stream.

The western-flowing limb of the Lohit between Minzong and the plains receives more water than does the southward-flowing limb between Rima and Minzong, three big tributaries from the north and three from the south joining it in a distance of about 50 miles. This also suggests that the two limbs of the river are of different ages.

Wet rice is cultivated at Rima and for several miles up the Rong Tho Chu; this is the only rice bowl in Tibet.

We spent a week in Rima exchanging hospitality with the Tibetan officials and collecting plants. The country at first sight looks bare and forbidding, but fields of green barley and the almond and pear trees now in full bloom added splashes of bright colour. Actually there are many interesting plants both down by the river and especially higher up the ravines.

The importance of Rima to the Tibetan government lies in the fact that not only is it a frontier village, but it is the only rice-growing district in the country—and therefore not geographically part of Tibet at all. Its significance must not, however, be overrated. The total amount of rice produced in the entire valley cannot exceed a few hundred tons annually; nor could production be greatly stepped up. The indications are that the supply is decreasing because the population is decreasing.

The province of Zayul, comprising the valley of the Lohit for a few miles below Rima, and the two valleys, the Rong Tho Chu and the Zayul Chu, above the confluence, comes directly under the authority of Chamdo.

The distance by road between Rima and Chamdo is usually reckoned at eighteen or twenty days for a caravan; a mounted messenger takes about fifteen days. The only two places of importance in Zayul are Rima and Sanga Chu Dzong.

The question which of course most interests India at the moment is whether the Lohit valley offers a possible route for the invasion of Assam.

Any advance from China or from Tibet would have to be down the eastern branch, and not down the Rong Tho Chu, which is a mere cul-de-sac. Entry into the upper Tho Chu is not practicable.

From the north and east three possible routes into the Zayul Chu valley exist. These are:

- (i) From Shugden Gompa, via Sanga Chu Dzong.
- (ii) From Gartok, across the Mekong and Salween gorges and the Tila La, to Michi-Rika.
- (iii) From Ya-ka-lo (Yen-ching) on the Mekong, via Menkong on the Salween, the upper Taron valley, and the Zasha La, to Michi-Rika.

All these routes are closed by snow for at least four months in the year, the last probably for six months. This greatly reduces the chances of invasion; moreover, all three routes traverse poor, sparsely populated country, with an absolute minimum of supplies and no grazing.

No large body of troops could live off the country, and an invasion force would have to keep open a long line of communication with Gartok, Batang or Atuntzu. This would be dependent on bridges over the Lohit and other larger rivers, and on the passes being open. Such a force would have to concentrate at Rima, where a brigade could camp. Rima, however, is within easy flying distance of Sadiya; and only the right bank of the Lohit is passable.

Thus while the Lohit valley offers access to India, and has been a long-term migratory route in the past, it is far from being an invasion route. The earthquake has sealed it off even more securely. Surprise would not be possible. Finally, the objective, Sadiya, besides having the tactical disadvantage of being on the wrong side of the river, is far from any strategic objective.

From Rima we went to the Di Chu confluence, a long day's march down the left bank of the Lohit, and just within the Assam frontier. The path is unfit for pack transport, nevertheless we took half a dozen ponies and did not lose any of them.

Some weeks later, however, a pony bringing us rice from Rima slipped off the path and was drowned in the whirlpools.

A very rough track climbs up through the Di Chu gorge, and crossing the Lohit-Irrawaddy divide by the Diphu La, at over 14,000 feet, descends into the Seinghku valley, one of the source streams of the Irrawaddy. Even under favourable conditions it takes ten days, through uninhabited mountains to march from river to river.

During the next four months, while we were camped by the Di Chu, two parties of American missionaries, expelled from Communist China, passed through Rima on their way to India, and stayed a few days with

us. The invasion of Tibet was coming nearer. Meanwhile we watched the snow gradually melting on the high ranges across the Lohit.

Early in August we got porters from Rima and returned there on the 10th, a very hot day. Transport was promised for the 16th, and we made all preparations to go three days' journey into the alps, where we intended to spend some weeks.

On the evening of the 15th, having finished packing, we ate our supper and prepared for early bed, as we had to be up at crack of dawn next day. Soon after dark there came a sharp jerk, and suddenly the solid earth began to tremble violently, then to jump up and down. The noise was appalling. Rocks roared down the gullies all round the basin; the shaking mountains had a fuzzy outline as though completely out of focus.

The earthquake lasted four or five minutes and did tremendous damage. Morning revealed the rope bridge across the Lohit broken and the villages all badly knocked about. Fields were ploughed up, paths cracked, walls thrown down, the river in flood. Every hillside was scarred with slips, which reached to their summits; a thick dust hung over the valley, and increased as rocks continued to thunder down; luckily our camp was just out of danger.

On August 31 an Assam Rifles patrol, which like us was on the wrong side of the river, reached our camp. They were very short of food, and we all wanted to get back to Walong, though until the rope bridge was replaced we were unable to do so. However, a week later the local experts had fixed a new rope in position, and on September 7, more than three weeks after the earthquake, we all crossed safely to the right bank, and started south.

That same afternoon we met a rescue party from Walong, bringing up rations for all, and on the 11th, after a dangerous journey, we reached Walong and Rima on the night of the 15th. His camp had been buried, ourselves, had been out on the night of the earthquake, and the casualties had been far fewer than might have been expected.

The Political Officer, who had come up from the plains to get first-hand information on the Communist threat, was camped halfway between Walong and Rima on the night of the 15th. His camp, had been buried, three porters had been killed and several of his officers wounded; this party had lost everything but the clothes on their backs, and all the survivors had had a narrow escape from death.

Reinforcements for the Walong garrison were camped two marches below Walong. They had made a gallant effort to get through after the earthquake, but had found it impossible (which didn't make our chances of getting out look so good!), and were on their way back to Sadiya, which was reached only with the greatest difficulty about the end of September.

As for the patrol, I have already recorded how they reached us on the last day of August.

The wooden barracks at Walong had withstood the shock remarkably well, and being in the middle of a broad terrace had neither slipped over the edge nor been hit by rock falls from above.

We still had to do twelve marches through the ruined mountains to

reach the plains. However, there was no immediate hurry, as Walong still had plenty of rice and, what was equally important, fresh vegetables from the garrison garden. We were all in need of a rest.

We spent the next five weeks here, waiting for porters, air drops, or a chance to reach the alps. Day and night severe tremors shook the valley, while the mountains continued to disintegrate with a roar. I made several efforts to reach the alps, but was baulked each time, once at 8,000 feet. At last we found a track which would "go," and after crossing several bad cliffs camped for three nights at 7,000 feet, whence on two occasions I climbed to over 10,000 feet. Lack of water and the danger from falling rocks made it impossible to go higher. Short as the visit was, I secured seed of a few good temperate plants, mostly shrubs such as rhododendron, Berberis, Viburnum and rose.

It will be convenient here to consider some of the conditions in which the earthquake took place.

First it is to be noted that it happened halfway through the rainy season, when the heaviest rain was already over, and *all* the winter snow, below about 15,000 feet altitude, was already melted. Thus there was comparatively little water coming down the gullies. Of course the main rivers were still bringing down snow water from the highest ranges, as well as from glaciers, and the water, though not at its highest (which it is in June and July), was nevertheless high. Had the earthquake occurred six weeks earlier, however, the immediate destruction must have been far greater than it was; it could be inferred from the condition of the slopes that when the next snow melt took place in the early months of 1951, especially if it coincided with heavy rain, which is not unusual in the Mishmi hills, further slips would take place on a big scale.

Many factors led to the slipping of the slopes, including their unusual steepness, the nature of the rock, the annual burning of the pine forest, and not least, the composition of the mountains.

The interior ranges are composed of a variety of granite extremely vulnerable to weathering, with the result that the felspar is easily leached or decomposed, and the rock becomes rotten and crumbly. By the middle of August the monsoon rains and melting snow must have saturated the subsoil to the maximum depth, thus greatly increasing its weight and increasing any tendency to slip. The pine forest, moreover, is shallow-rooted, and there is comparatively little vegetation to bind the loose material. Further, the hot dry winds which blow through the gorge help to loosen the surface soil; while the annual fires, which on the outer cliffs of the gorge burn the forest up to 8,000 feet, check the vegetation.

I was struck by the fact that apparently solid-looking slopes seemed to be covered with many feet of loose rubble; wherever the earthquake had caused slips, these had developed into running sores right to the alpine region, with no solid rock to stop the rot. The Lohit, even in flood, could not cope with the enormous amount of gravel and rock poured into it, and even above Walong visible sandbanks appeared; sometimes, where a low bank had been engulfed, there were pine trees still standing partly submerged, an extraordinary sight.

I have mentioned some of the reasons for the great destruction wrought

here, but probably the chief reason is the composition of the mountains themselves, and the nature of the Lohit gorge.

This gorge, from Minzong northwards, was occupied during the ice age by a glacier whose bed was 5,000 feet or more above the present river bed. Later it appears to have been filled with gravel to a depth of at least 1,000 feet, derived partly from the main glacier moraines and partly from lateral glaciers which long persisted. In this gravel the Lohit has cut a series of terraces, the three main ones still visible at Rima, on the left bank.

At the present day the loose material which was left behind after the disappearance of the ice still covers many of the slopes, or has been spread out in alluvial fans by affluents such as the Di Chu; and there is at least one recognizable moraine at Dong, just above Walong, but on the opposite bank.

Although the amount of gravel remaining is only a small fraction of what must once have filled the gorge, it is nevertheless a huge bulk. As a result of the earthquake it lost all cohesion and gave way in every direction. At higher levels, where the mountains are composed of more solid rock, the leaching of the felspar probably accounts for the loosening of the surface in a climate of harsh extremes.

On October 16 we finally left Walong. I had noted on the way up the valley in February that the path, wherever it crossed a buttress, was difficult and needed caution. Now there was no path. One traversed across each cliff 1,000 feet above the river on a slope of 60° as best one could. The danger of a slip was perhaps less than the danger from sudden rock falls above. Nevertheless we made the same stages as on the way up; the local porters, who seemed to have recovered their morale completely, were superb in the face of danger.

By the end of the first four marches, round the great bend, we were over some of the worst bits, and approaching a part where the main river itself had been blocked for a day or two. I had hoped that where the slopes were covered with broad-leaved forest the slipping would have been less. There were in fact fewer slips below the great bend, but those which had taken place were at least as bad as those near Walong; whole mountains had been split open.

Approaching the outer ranges we learnt that the steel cable suspension bridge over the Tidding river, and two temporary bridges, had been swept away in turn as that river alternately blocked and unblocked itself. My wife fell and cut her leg slightly on a rock. This resulted in an abscess, and we halted a week while this was attended to, and also for heavy rain which made travel dangerous and the construction of yet another temporary bridge over the Tidding impossible.

Finally, after a tough climb over the outermost range, which in spite of its dense cover of forest was terribly damaged, we reached the edge of the plain on November 4, and Sadiya on the 6th. We had been away just under ten months.

From Sadiya we could see the outer faces of the hills, sweeping in a semicircle round the head of the valley. The slopes were dazzling white; the forest had proved no protection at all, and had gone down in ruin

with the hill faces. The presence of sedimentary rocks, which give rise to clay and form slip surfaces, may have been partly responsible for the peeling off of every visible face north and west of Sadiya, and for the terrible landslides in the Tidding valley.

In February, 1951, the pilots who were doing air drops to the frontier outposts several times took us up. Twice we visited Walong, following the Lohit river from a point above its emergence on to the plain. This gave us a new vision of the earthquake damage in the hills, and was certainly illuminating. No part of the Mishmi or Abor hills had escaped.

Of one thing I am convinced. If we could have seen the gorge of the Lohit from the air before we started to walk out, we would have stayed in Walong!

NOTICES

THE principal object of the Royal Central Asian Society is to maintain in England a centre for the provision and dissemination of information concerning Central Asia and adjoining countries.

The Council welcomes applications for Membership from those whose work, studies or military service may now lie in one of the countries of Central and Western Asia in which the Society is interested. Such Members are of the greatest help in keeping the Society up to date in its information. Members also can maintain their existing interest in these countries by keeping in touch with fellow Members.

Persons who desire to join must be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and must then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible. The Annual Subscription is £1 5s. There is an Entrance Fee of £1 payable on election.

NOMINATION FORM.

.....
.....
.....
(Name, with Rank, Appointment or Occupation and Address)

being desirous of becoming a Member of the ROYAL CENTRAL
ASIAN SOCIETY, we recommend ^{him}_{her} for membership.

Proposed.....

Seconded.....

His
Her connection with Asia is :

(Entrance fee, £1. Yearly subscription, £1 5s.)

NOTICE TO MEMBERS

FOR the last few years the journal has carried a notice appealing to members to sign a deed of covenant. We are still only receiving almost £250 in income from this source. Now that members once more are living a more settled life, the Council again appeals for the signature of covenants by those who pay British Income Tax, and would particularly ask that those proposing new candidates for election should point out to them the advantage which will accrue to the Society if they sign such a deed at the time when they take up membership.

DEED OF COVENANT

I
of
hereby covenant with the ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY that for a period of seven years from the date hereof or during my lifetime whichever period shall be the shorter I will pay annually to the said Society such a sum as will after the deduction of Income Tax leave in the hands of the said Society *a net sum of one pound and five shillings* such sum to be paid from my general fund of taxed income so that I shall receive no personal or private benefit in either of the said periods from the said sum or any part thereof.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this

..... day of 19.....

Signed, sealed and delivered by the said

In the presence of.....

Address of Witness to your signature.....

.....
Occupation of Witness.....

A RUSSIAN EXODUS FROM SINKIANG

By H.R.H. PRINCE PETER OF GREECE

ON July 17, 1951, there arrived at the Indian frontier with Tibet, at the Jelep-la, between the Chumbi valley and Sikkim, a party of Russian refugees who had fled from strife-torn Sinkiang, over the Tibetan plateau, to the comparative safety of the Indian sub-continent. It consisted of twenty-one Old Believers plus two Siberian Greek Orthodox, there being two women among the former, a mother and daughter, the latter aged only thirteen years. They had had a gruelling four years' journey, during which the greater number of those who had set out originally from their home in the Altai mountains had perished. They had been preceded along the same route earlier this year, firstly by the Californian student Frank Bessac with a Russian companion; then by the Torgut Prince Min-Wong, his two wives (one Mongol and the other Polish) and a few personal retainers; and finally by the Kuomintang Vice-Governor of Sinkiang at Hami, Yolbars Beg.

The weary, although still sturdy-looking, little band, dressed in American surplus army clothes and broad-rimmed British army hats acquired in Lhasa in exchange for their arms, which they had disposed of there, but still in the characteristic high Russian boots, were brought into Kalimpong in West Bengal from the road-head to the north at Algarah in two civilian trucks generously put at their disposal by some local traders, and accompanied by officers of the Indian Frontier Police. Tea was prepared for them on their arrival at the Tibetan restaurant of Kalimpong, expenses being borne by its kind-hearted owner, Mrs. Gompu, and it was while they were partaking of this thoughtfully offered refreshment that I was able to interview them and get their story from them first-hand.

As this story throws a most interesting light on the recent events that disrupted the previously existing order in Central Asia, it is well worth being made more widely known, it seems to me, to those who have a special interest in this remote part of the world, from which very little news has recently come out.

The Old Believers, I am told, were part of those settlers in the Altai mountains, on the Chinese side, who moved there many hundreds of years ago, when they were persecuted for their religious convictions by the established Greek Orthodox Church under the Empress Catherine the Great. The families of those whose remnants have now arrived in India had, however, been there only since 1912. They were farmers and cattle breeders, bee-keepers and horse dealers, who possessed small holdings of private land at Shing-Kure, near Shar-sume (Tulta) in north-western Sinkiang. The two Siberians—an old N.C.O. of the Tsarist army, and a younger man—were both from Omsk, the former having fled to the Altai in 1927 after his property in Russia had been forcefully collectivized.

Migration to India had taken place in two stages. First when they had been forced away from their homes to another part of Sinkiang by interior disturbances in the province; and next, when they had had to leave again, this time for abroad, by the arrival of the Communist Chinese. Asked why they had not stayed, as people of their social condition had not much to fear from a Communist régime, they answered that they had no desire to be "regimented," and wanted to retain as they had always done the freedom of their religious convictions. They preferred the risk of "dying in the steppe," they said, to being compelled to partake of a social order in which they would never, they felt sure, be able to fit.

The first act of the tragedy occurred on October 7, 1947, Old Style (that is, in accordance with the Julian calendar, or fourteen days later than the same date of the Gregorian calendar), when their village was shelled by a combination of Kazak rebels and of Soviet troops arriving from Kulja. Word went round that these insurgents and their supporters, who were attempting to set up an autonomous, Soviet-orientated republic in Sinkiang, were going to sack the town, butcher all the men, but spare the women and children. All the male population of Shing-Kure then banded together under a leader called Josif Samuelov and set out to fight the intruders with whatever means they had. Samuelov told them they would probably be back within five days!

They were accompanied by only two women, the wife and daughter of one of their number, who had firmly refused, unlike the families of the others, to be left behind. They were naturally no match for their opponents, were defeated, and the 111 survivors trekked away south-east towards the sources of the Kara Irtish river. From there they went on to the Bala Irtish and the Ku Irtish, finally reaching Sartagai, where, completely famished, they slaughtered most of their horses and ate them.

They went on to the Baitik Bogdo mountains, on the border of Outer Mongolia, where they were shot at by guards from the other side of the frontier and lost five more horses of those that still remained. A K.M.T. garrison, stationed on the Sinkiang side, however, received them well. They gave them food, clothes, boots and supplies, and despatched them twenty days later to the south, to Ku-chen (Tsonji), where they settled in their old agricultural pursuits for two whole years. Those who had left their families behind could get no news of these, and it was presumed that they had been lost in the upheaval. Some of them wanted to return home, but Samuelov kept them from doing so, assuring them that soon they would be able to return, and must do so all together.

Then came the great exodus. During the summer of 1949 the K.M.T. troops of the area surrendered to the advancing Chinese Communists. Without waiting for the latter to arrive, the remaining Old Believers immediately set out for Fu-yüan (Jabser). Here they met the American Vice-Consul in Urumchi, Douglas S. Mackieran, who with Frank Bessac, a Fulbright student from Lodi, California, had preferred to attempt reaching India through Tibet than over the Karakorum as Mr. Hall Paxton, the Consul-General, had done, following the closing of the U.S.A. Consulate-General in Tihwa on September 27, 1949. Mackieran and Bessac took two

of the Russians with them and left at once for Tibet. They were to get stranded in a small village after savage winter storms blocked the mountain passes ahead of them, and when they eventually started off again in the spring Mackieran and one of the Russians were shot dead on April 13, 1950, by Tibetan frontier guards, who mistook them for Kazak raiders; F. Bessac and the surviving Russian alone reached India.

The 109 remaining Russians themselves left, soon after Mackieran had departed, for Barkul, which was considered safer. They stayed there some time to replenish their stores, and one of them was killed—by what they believe to have been Chinese bandits—when a party of them went on a food-seeking foray at Santai, to the north. At Barkul they found the Kazak leader Osman Bator (see the late Ian Morrison's article "Some Notes on the Kazaks of Sinkiang" in the *ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL* of January, 1949, Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 67) encamped here with about 5,000 of his followers. The Kazaks invited the Russians to stay with them, which they agreed to do. On February 14, O.S., the camp was moved to the Pei-shan, where winter quarters were taken up. Twelve Russians elected to remain behind at Barkul, so that there were only ninety-six of them who went on to the new camp.

At the end of March, 1950, Yolbars Beg, K.M.T. Vice-Governor of Sinkiang, with his seat at Hami, himself a Uighur-Turki and not a Chinese, arrived in the Pei-shan camp with ten followers. He proposed to Osman Bator that they should all go south, as he feared, he said, a Chinese Communist attack if they remained where they were. Osman refused, however, giving as reason that he had many ewes who were about to lamb and that he wanted to wait for this to happen first. Yolbars did not wish to leave alone and so reluctantly agreed to wait in the camp. As he was short of food—he could get but very little from Osman Bator—he sent twenty of the Russians out on a new foray, which they successfully managed for him.

Soon after, 1,600 defeated Tungan troops also arrived in the Pei-shan and declared their allegiance to Yolbars. Encouraged by this, the Vice-Governor decided to make an attempt to recapture Hami, and set out with these troops to do so. There was a battle at a place called Bagdash (?) and Yolbars was defeated by the Chinese Communists. He came hurrying back to Osman Bator's camp.

Unfortunately, he was followed. Chinese Communist troops now attacked the camp, and everybody who was in it split up into three parties: Yolbars, some followers, his Chinese wife and the Russian family who were by now looking after her; Osman, his Kazaks and some of the Russians, including J. Samuelov; the remaining Russians, numbering about twenty. Confusion followed. There were skirmishes and fighting, in which they could not quite make out, they say, whom they were fighting. They were completely cut off from Osman Bator, and so went off towards where Yolbars was. They joined him all right, but were attacked and cut off from him too. Giving up hope of rejoining him, they moved off on their own to Turkul Dawan and Umer-tau, where they stopped in comparative safety to rest for about a month.

It was here that, in view of the desperate nature of their circumstances they decided to give up the struggle and to take refuge in Tibet. There was very good grass for the horses at this spot, which enabled the latter to recuperate. A short time afterwards Yolbars and his party joined up with them, having ascaped from their pursuers.

A month later they started off. They entered Kansu province at Argalante (?). Here, to their surprise, Osman Bator caught up with them. The Russians who had been with him were, however, no longer so, and he was quite unable to say what had happened to them in the fighting.

All of them now moved off farther south. They went to Sulusum-tagh, and after having crossed a desert, where they suffered privations and many of the Kazak women and children died, they arrived at Kara-gurun. From this place they intended going west, but ran into Chinese Communist troops on the march and turned quickly back towards the east. They encamped in what they thought was a quiet spot to rest a day or two, but a Chinese Communist plane flew over them, spotting them. They moved on immediately, and that night saw Chinese Communist troops in trucks travelling from Sinkiang to Kansu on the highway which passed close to where they were. Happily they were not seen, so that, crossing the road, they made good their escape into the Tun-huang mountains.

They next passed Anhsi-chou on their way to Aste-su, where they unfortunately again encountered Chinese Communist troops, who immediately attacked them. They fought a running battle now, retreating towards Kurumshar (?) and travelling two days without water. The Communists followed them and attacked them again, so that they were forced to go on without halting to Karadavan (Hei-davan) and without being able, as they told me, "to eat their *kasha*." Here they spent the night, having beaten off the Chinese. In the morning the latter returned, however, and Osman Bator was cut off from them. The last they saw of him was that he was fleeing towards the east, with Chinese Communists in trucks equipped with machine guns hotly pursuing him. They were unable to say what happened to him eventually, and have not heard if he was killed or captured. They told me that they thought he might well be alive and still in hiding in the mountains. (From the Torgut Prince Min Wong I heard that Osman Bator had been captured and that the Communists had talked him into being flown to Peking for negotiations with the new Government, but that on arrival in the capital he had been carried out of the plane dead, having suffered heart failure on the journey, which took place at a very great altitude. Later, Prince Min Wong told me that he had received other information, and that Osman Bator had been rounded up and killed by the Communists together with his followers.)

The Russians were now without horses, having lost them all in the fighting. So they walked back to Kurumshar, got supplies there and trekked on to Sharagolji and Yen-chuen, where they heard that the Mongol chief Bovro was encamped. They, however, did not find him there, and so continued their march over the Ulan-davan pass to a place called Makhai (appr. 94° long. E. by 40° lat. N.). There they met a Mongol who volunteered to take a message from them to Bovro, who, he said, was in hiding.

Shortly after they had sent the message as suggested he came to see them in person. He had forty-eight followers with him, men, women and children, all Mongols.

A conference followed, in which it was decided that they would all go on to the Taijinar area—themselves, Yolbars and Bovro's party. This they did, arriving safely at their destination.

Here, however, they had a quarrel with Yolbars, who wanted to join another Kazak leader, called Hussein, at his camp at Gass in the Baga Sertang (desert). They refused to follow him, and he left them in a huff, taking the Russian family with him to look after his Chinese wife as usual.

They then travelled along the road to Sining with Bovro, on horses that they had succeeded in acquiring. They passed Tingelik, Nomkhon (Nomoro Kutum)—where they bought some food—and reached the Gorbun Neiji river, where they stopped to rest for eight days. They next branched off over the Neiji göl, where they were told by local inhabitants that many others had preceded them on the road to Tibet. They could not find out who these were, however.

All was plain sailing now to the Tibetan outpost at the Tang-la. They were able to live off game which they shot on the way. The Tibetans received them very well indeed. They went on to Nag-chu-ka without being delayed at all, where a very crestfallen Yolbars joined up with them again with his wife, the Russian family and only one camel left. It was here that they heard that Mackieran had been killed, although they did not get the details of how it happened.

While they were at Nag-chu-ka, Mrs. Yolbars died, and the Russian family who had been looking after her joined the other twenty Russians, thus bringing their numbers up to twenty-three. They set off after that with Bovro and his people for Dam, where the Tibetans directed that they should proceed. Yolbars beg left on his own for India, from here eventually making his way to Formosa with funds supplied to him by the K.M.T. agency in Delhi.

The Russians went to Dam over Radeng (Reting) gompa, and when they reached that place Bovro said he would go no farther. He received permission from the Tibetans to remain behind, and as far as is known is still in the vicinity, perhaps with the Mongol settlers of Nam Tso (Tengri Nor).

It was December by the time the Russian party reached Dam. They stayed there for about a month, and the Tibetan Government then ordered them on to Takse Dzong. A demand which they had made to enter Lhasa was refused. Instead, they were offered permanent residence in Tibet provided they split up into parties of two, each of these to be assigned to a dzong; they would be given women to live with if they accepted, they were told.

The offer was naturally refused, none of them agreeing to be separated from the others. An understanding between Tibet and the Chinese Communist Governments was also in the offing, which made them apprehensive of their future. So, when they had been in the new place a little while, the Siberian ex-N.C.O. and one of the others, who had come to be looked

upon as a leader because of his resourcefulness and the smattering of Tibetan which he had picked up, escaped one night to Lhasa. They reached the capital successfully, and made their way to the Potala, where they insisted on seeing Si-lön Lu khang, the acting minister who was in charge of the administration in the absence of the Dalai Lama, the latter having already departed for Yatung in the Chumbi valley.

They had some difficulty in meeting this personage, and even more in convincing him that the others of the party be allowed to join them in Lhasa, but they eventually succeeded, and were all quartered in Se-shi lingka. They interviewed the head of the Indian Mission, Sri S. Sinha, with whom they were able to converse in Chinese. (For talks with the Tibetans, they made use of some of the Kazaks in Lhasa.) They applied for permission to proceed to India from the Indian Mission, but were advised to go on first to Gyantse, where they were told they could better obtain this through the Trade Mission.

The Tibetans did not object to their moving south, which they soon did. In Gyantse they met the Austrian Peter Aufschneider, and with his help they telegraphed to the International Refugee Organization in Geneva (Switzerland) to request assistance. Aufschneider also helped them fill out the forms necessary for their application to enter India. From Geneva they never received any answer. Things were difficult here, they told me, as they could not find any interpreters to help them.

Formalities thus completed, the party moved on to the Chumbi valley, and were quartered by the Tibetans in Sharsima. They stayed a month and ten days here, awaiting the answer from Delhi and, they hoped, permission to enter India. This they were now particularly eager to obtain, since negotiations between the Tibetans and the Chinese in Peking seemed about to be successfully concluded, and they feared that they would after all fall into the hands of the Communists.

The Sino-Tibetan treaty was signed, and shortly after permission came through to proceed to India, provided the Indian Government did not assist them in any way. They got ready to leave, and actually crossed the Jelep-la the very same day as the Chinese delegation to Lhasa, headed by General Chang Chin Wu, was travelling from Gangtok to Yatung by way of the Nathu-la.

From Kalimpong the Russian party, minus the family consisting of father, mother and daughter, who stayed behind, moved on to Calcutta, where they were all hospitably received by the West Bengal Government. Their stay in Kalimpong and their fares down to the plains were looked after by private charity, everybody in the bazaar, from rich Marwaris to ordinary merchants, being exceptionally generous in their assistance—and this despite local Communist propaganda that the new arrivals were “Anglo-American agents who had sabotaged the Russian and Chinese people’s revolutions.” At the moment of writing the Russian Old Believers, refugees from the Altai, are in a camp at the Belvedere in Calcutta, on three months’ temporary visas, awaiting a decision as to what is to be their ultimate destination and future place of resettlement.

A RECENT VISIT TO JAPAN

By SIR GEORGE SANSOM, G.B.E., K.C.M.G.

Notes from an informal meeting at the Royal Central Asian Society, on Wednesday, May 2, 1951, Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, G.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: We have the great good luck today to have with us Sir George Sansom. Without any exaggeration I think I may say that he is the greatest authority in the world today on Japan. He passed some forty-odd years there in the days of his youth, and he has just returned from Japan as a member of the Allied Far Eastern Commission. I don't propose to attempt to read out all his history—he seems to have been a Professor at Columbia University, a member of the Allied Commission in Japan and a Minister of the British Embassy in the United States. Personally I look forward very much—as I am sure you all do—to hearing what he has to tell us about Japan at the present time.

I AM afraid I can only give you a very rambling kind of account of this recent visit of mine to Japan. I have only recently returned and the purpose of that visit was purely academic. I had no political mission and any political information I picked up was purely accidental—therefore it is not really very connected and, possibly, not even accurate.

I went by the almost obsolete method of making a journey round the world—by ship instead of by air. I stayed a little while in India and visited some of the countries of South-eastern Asia, and then was in Japan for about two months. My main object was to give some lectures by invitation at the University of Tokio, with the idea of forming closer connections between the Japanese universities and those in Western countries. That part of the journey was, I think, fairly successful.

I found a very warm welcome in academic quarters, not on personal grounds but because, I think, the Japanese have felt isolated for so long in the intellectual world that they were glad to resume contact. I said that I saw something of India and the South-eastern Asian countries, but I must confess that although I started out with some rather firm ideas about politics and social life there, at the end of my journey my mind was entirely confused. I am, therefore, not going to dwell on that part of the journey. I would like to say, however, that there were two rather clear impressions that I brought away from that part of the world: the first was that it is very noticeable that people in Asian countries today—I mean the peoples of those countries—complain and feel very strongly that we Western peoples look at their problems not from their point of view but almost entirely from the point of view of our own interests and our own safety. We think of them, they say, in strategic terms. There is a good deal of truth in that, and possibly we cannot do otherwise, but it is a real issue as between East and West at this juncture. That came out in discussions at the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference and in conversations elsewhere.

The second clear impression I had—and this was very strong indeed—

was that the most important problem in Asia today is really a population problem. That, I suppose, is not new to anybody, but it is a thing that one feels at every turn. There is a great problem and yet you are also confronted with the feeling of its apparent insolubility. I am no demographer myself, but I had an opportunity of discussing this population question with a number of experts—professional demographers. Among them were members of a mission which went out from the United States, composed of four or five people who make a special study of population, and I was discouraged to find that at the end of their long stay in Far Eastern countries (east of India, that is) they had no real solution to offer. Their recommendation at the end of their report simply says that it is necessary for each country to make a thorough study of the population question itself. They thought the West could do very little to help—could make a very small contribution, and that the population problem had to be solved in each country by that country. Then you look round and find that practically no effort—or anyhow a very small effort—is being made to cope with it. You get famine, or the approach of famine, challenges to the standard of living, because of inadequate resources. You see it not everywhere, but pretty generally. I am dwelling a little on this population problem because I think it is of very great significance in the consideration of the whole problem of the future of Japan.

You get, of course, the familiar conflict between population and resources—the one growing rapidly, the other growing slowly. You get competition between countries for those resources, and that I think—quite as much as nationalistic sentiment, which is also extremely strong—is the prime cause of what it is now fashionable to call the revolution of Asia.

I have dwelt a little, without being statistical, on this population problem, because I think it lies at the root of all Japan's major political and social problems. We speculate a good deal as to what turn Japan will take in her domestic and foreign affairs. We ask ourselves how far is the policy of democracy succeeding there—have democratic principles taken root, will Japan do this or that or the other thing in the future? I am convinced that the leading economic fact—the shortage of resources for the population now and certainly for the population in the future—is what will mainly determine the course of Japan's political development. I am very poor at figures, but I think I have this more or less correct—the figure of population now is round about 85 million. It is almost certain to reach 90 million by 1955, and by 1960 it will be well on the way to 100 million, in so far as these things are predictable. All kinds of interruptions occur, of course; the war in Asia actually caused Japan's population to remain stable in numbers for about five years. I think there was even a very slight drop. That was very soon made up, and there you now have this great and rapid increase of a population which had—anyhow before the war—the highest standard of living in Asia. Now today there is less accumulation of capital than before and a density per unit of arable land (according to some Japanese economists, I don't know how accurate they are) which is twice that of Java, which is the next highest density on the list, higher than India or any other Asiatic country. It doesn't matter

whether it is the highest or not, but I quote that as giving you some idea of the dimensions of the problem.

The natural resources in Japan are man-power, coal, the ability to feed herself up to a point (within 20 per cent. of the total requirement), and rather satisfactory hydro-electric power, which probably can be developed on T.V.A. lines and would help, but would not solve the problem by itself. I don't see any other possible solution. They are in the position very much of the United Kingdom—they must have exports to live.

With that background I will just run over what seem to be the conditions at present in Japan. I had been in Tokio with the Far Eastern Commission in 1946, only a few months after the surrender, and then I arrived again, nearly five years later, in November, 1950. I was amazed by the improvement in material conditions and also in morale, the appearance of the people, their health (so far as one can judge by looks), the amount of food available, the amount of building which has been done, general reconstruction, development of communications—all that kind of thing has improved in a really astonishing degree. There is no doubt that morale is vastly better. There is a feeling in the air of self-reliance and self-confidence, which was almost entirely absent in 1946, when the people were bewildered, hungry and even dirty—which was astonishing for a country like Japan, where all classes pay such attention to bodily cleanliness.

What are the reasons for that change? Of course there has been a good deal of United States aid—direct financial aid, or the equivalent of financial aid in the supply of raw materials and some foodstuffs. I don't know what the figure was in 1946, but at its peak it was of the order of at least \$500 million a year, and I think it may have been rather more than that if you add certain kinds of American expenditure in Japan at that time which gave some dollar exchange. That was presumably the main cause; without that assistance nothing else could have been done. Then there was a very strong effort—fairly recently—made to cope with inflation. Deflationary steps were taken. At that time there were about 300 times as many yen about as before. That has been rather well dealt with by a method which I will mention presently, and there has been some reduction in prices and also a certain stability in the price level, which was very important. On top of that, all these favourable factors came into operation, I think, because of the character of the Japanese people. That is to say, without their common effort, energy and enterprise these things would not have fructified. I don't want to give the impression that life is yet easy in Japan. I think it is still, statistically speaking, about 30 per cent. below the pre-war figure. Among the middle class, the professional class—lawyers, doctors, professors—things are very difficult, they have a very hard time. I spoke to one friend of mine, a man of forty-five or so, with a grown-up family. He was a good lawyer with a fairly good practice; after the taxes had been paid, and by working very hard day and night, he had about 20,000 yen a month, which is the equivalent in sterling of about £5 a week—not very much even in good times, but with prices as they are it is extremely low, and means great difficulty.

Life is a little easier, but it is still hard. The public buildings are unheated, universities are unheated. I lectured at the University of Tokio

to students who wore overcoats and mufflers. The libraries are very dimly lit, and altogether life is very difficult for that kind of people.

Moving on from purely material conditions, I might say a little about the effects of the occupation. I think there is a general interest in that question. We all ask what has been the effect of the occupation on political thought in Japan. What will happen when the occupation comes to an end and Japan regains a certain degree of independence, or full independence? I can quote the highest authority on that because I had a long talk with General McArthur on this subject and he assured me that he thought that although the Japanese may change some of the legislation, some of the institutions which have been set up under Allied pressure—generally American pressure—although that will probably happen he thought the main elements of democracy would remain. Well, one doesn't argue with General McArthur, and I did not say that I thought he was being rather optimistic, but I do think so. I think the difficulty is going to arise (and I come back once more to economic questions) precisely from this problem of population and resources. I think that the resources of Japan are so small, so exiguous, that no government can abstain from very carefully husbanding them. They will have to apply controls. There will have to be a planned economy. You may say, "Well, other people have planned economies and they are successful," but on the whole I think we have to admit that the Japanese will not even be able to have only a partially planned economy. I think they will have to start with an economic plan in one kind of undertaking and gradually find themselves with further controls, further planning, until the whole economy or most of it may be planned. That kind of planning involves controls, restriction on economic freedom, on social freedom and ultimately on political freedom. To give an example, I have seen studies by Japanese economists who have suggested that a future Government of Japan may feel obliged to depress wages in order to promote their export trade. Once you do that, once you have a policy of that kind, then bang goes your democratic legislation, which consists largely of labour legislation and some Western-style political institutions. So that I think from that point of view you may say pretty safely that the Japanese economy cannot sustain a liberal, free-enterprise, democratic political system.

As to the actual Constitution, I think that if things go on as they are the Japanese people will be satisfied to retain a constitutional monarchy with some kind of responsible Cabinet Government. There is no doubt that the Emperor and the people around him are determined that there shall be a constitutional monarchy in Japan very similar to that which we have in England. I noticed that the people around the Emperor, in the Court, displayed a great interest in the relationship of the Crown with the people under a socialist Government, such as we have in this country today.

To quote one example of the difficulty of dealing with economic questions in Japan today—I had a long talk with the Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, in which he mentioned a plan which was very successful in keeping inflation down—a plan called "The Dodge Plan"—a fiscal disinflationary plan. It is named after an American adviser. That was very

drastic; it entailed very serious budgetary cuts, rather drastic taxation, and was accompanied by a lot of fiscal measures which bore very hardly on the whole public. Mr. Yoshida said it was so drastic that although he and his financial advisers (Japanese financial advisers) thought it was an excellent plan and should be adopted, he himself would never have been able to put it through Parliament except by saying that it was introduced on the Supreme Commander's instructions. This has a very interesting bearing on Parliamentary institutions in Japan. Will the Japanese Government in the future (suppose they come up against a problem of that kind and are convinced that such-an-such action can be taken), instead of depending upon General McArthur, resort to some authoritarian method of their own? I think they will, and that will mean a gradual diminution of the degree of democratic thinking and the degree of democratic action in Japanese political life.

I think the feeling in Japan for order and stability is very strong. I think that whatever kind of Government emerges after the independence of Japan is regained, it will have a very strong authoritarian character. I cannot see how the Japanese can afford the luxury of free enterprise and a very high degree of personal liberty. There is, it is true, in Japanese intellectual life a liberal tradition which many observers have not noticed. I think it has grown in influence in the last five years, but it is not powerful or widespread and it has no effective political counterpart, so far as I could judge.

Of course the working class in Japan welcomes legislation and other arrangements which emphasize their rights, and to that extent the policy of indoctrination carried out by G.H.Q. in Tokio—General McArthur and his people, his staff—has had some success, but the tradition of personal liberty in Japan is neither deeply rooted nor of long standing, and I very much doubt whether it would stand up to strong political action by a Conservative Government, and I think it is very significant that in the past two years there has been a Conservative trend in public opinion.

It is very interesting to approach Japan from the rest of Asia—not to go from the democratic countries like the United States. When you approach from the west by way of India and Malaya you feel, after you have been in Japan for a short time, a sense of order. You don't feel there is a strong, any really very strong Communist trend. You feel a sense of order and discipline which is absent, I would say, in these other countries. In the last elections the Communists and the extreme Socialists lost nearly all their ground and the present Yoshida Government, I would say, is a little "right"—anyhow it is not a remarkably liberal government, but it has a great deal of support throughout the country. I would add here that one ought not to exaggerate the importance of that particular feature, because at the moment, the Japanese not being free agents, in general there does not seem to be any strong political opinion at all—neither strong nor very vocal; rather negative really, especially on foreign affairs. Mr. Ashida, who is the rival of Mr. Yoshida—rather more liberal than Mr. Yoshida perhaps (he is an ex-Prime Minister)—complained at the end of the year that there was no very strong or definite public opinion at all about anything in Japan and that it was very difficult for the Government to carry

out any policy in the absence of such opinion. But, of course, there is no real freedom of action yet and there is also a very strong feeling that, in the light of the condition of the world in general and the Far Eastern situation in particular, Japanese political life must be very largely conditioned by what is going on around her. So you will have quite a variety of views on such questions as the rearmament of Japan.

Most Japanese industrialists and business men are against rearmament because it is costly and it would interfere with the gradual re-growth of industry in general. Others, on the ground of national pride, want to have some degree of rearmament, but it is a little surprising that there is so far no general sentiment in favour of Japan having an army of her own.

I think I have given you as much as I can of a sketch of present-day conditions. I would like to say a little about the misgivings of Australia and New Zealand and other countries too—the Philippines, for instance—as to the possibility of renewed aggression by Japan. One cannot look into the very distant future, but my feeling is that conditions in Japan are such today that only with a very powerful ally could she ever become a menace to other countries, a military menace. I don't think the conditions for aggression which prevailed in 1941, or 1937, are likely to recur for a long time. I think the United States policy at this moment with regard to Japan is based on that view, and the general line with most Americans who are interested and who think about this question is "Better to have a hundred million Japanese on our side."

On the question of Communism—a point everyone wants to know about Japan—on the whole I think (as I have already suggested) there is less of a Communistic trend in Japan than anywhere else, certainly anywhere else in the countries I have visited. The Communist Party has gained no seats. In Kyoto at the end of last year, at the University, there were some riots of students. They were Communist students, and I asked the President of the University what was the percentage of Communist students. I had been told it was as much as 10 per cent. He said that was nonsense—it was not even 1 per cent., but one Communist student made more noise than a hundred of the others, therefore there appeared to be about 10 per cent. I would not say there is any danger of the development of Communism in Japan. Certainly the Japanese are accustomed to dictatorship and authoritarian governments. I need hardly say that if economic conditions deteriorated very badly the power and position of the Communist Party in Japan (which is very cleverly managed) might expand. The work done by them is very ingenious. They are hard-working and very subtle and make themselves felt in many indirect ways. And if economic conditions worsened very much they might gain much support and influence. But I do not think, as things are now, there is any likelihood of an effective Communist development in that country.

One of the things I was most interested in—as I said, I was not on a political mission—was the condition of education in Japan. The American Occupation Authorities have planned a new educational system or systems for Japan, and personally I think that here was one of their major errors. I think their ideas were entirely unsuited to Japan. I had some extremely interesting conversations with the present Minister of Education

and three of his predecessors, all of whom were men of high attainments and great experience. They were not resentful, nor did they express any animosity towards the American officials who had imposed the system upon them—in fact, they displayed gratitude—but in recounting their experiences they could not help an ironical smile from time to time. I take that as a token that very soon after Japan regains her independence there will be another change in the educational system, and that, I should think, is likely to happen in other spheres of Japanese political and social life.

One cannot speak too highly of the courage and energy of the professors and the students at the main universities. They work hard and long, are miserably underpaid, and the conditions of work are appalling—cold, inadequate supply of books, no light in the libraries, miserable salaries—and yet one has the feeling of the beginnings of an intellectual revival in Japan. Which way it will go no one can predict.

I am afraid that is as much as I can tell you today.

CHAIRMAN: Has anyone any questions?

Mr. O. WHITE: With regard to the question of Communism, it has been reported in this country that there are Communist cells in most of the trade unions, that some of them are riddled with Communism. That is one point on which I would like Sir George Sansom's view. The other point was that I noticed the other day, in the elections, the Socialist seems to have rowed in with the Communist. Does Sir George attach any significance to that?

Sir GEORGE SANSOM: I have seen some rather careful studies of the degree of Communism in Japan, in trade unions and elsewhere, and there is no doubt that there is a Communist element in the trade unions. And the leading Communists, who are well-known public figures, do have something to say in advising the other political parties (not the extreme right ones) on strategy. Nevertheless, I think that at the present time—and the elections seemed to show this—Communism is not strong.

One of the ways by which the Communists have gained influence was extremely clever. They went into the country, where there were new local government bodies—school boards and all kinds of things that the country people had never had anything to do with before—and without proposing themselves as members of these boards the Communists gave a line to the farmers, the peasants and the village headmen, who were all very glad to receive this kind of advice. This got them into a rather favourable position for giving advice later on other subjects. So I would not say there is no effective Communism, but it is less popular than it was two years ago, as far as I can see at present.

Major C. AINGER: Arising out of that—talking of a long way back, the position in the country used to be that the more intellectual people in the village who had been in the army were controlled by the army. Presumably there is a certain amount of that, but against it there seems to be now this other influence you were mentioning. How is the village controlled? Obviously the town can be more easily controlled.

Sir GEORGE SANSOM: I don't know that the village is controlled. Life

in the village is much richer, partly because of what I think was the best thing that the Occupation Authorities did—the reform of the land system, giving the small tenants ownership. The whole atmosphere in the village now is different. They are not taking instructions from people as they were before, but getting used to running things themselves.

There is a little difficulty, because the farmers when they made profits (as they did when there was a shortage of rice and a black market) accumulated them. Then, as consumer goods came on to the market, they bought a great deal—furniture, clothes, etc.—and they are now unable to pay the instalments on the price of the land they contracted to buy. But farmers don't pay their debts in Japan, anyhow!

Mr. GULL: Psychologically speaking, would you say that the occupation has been a success? What is the general attitude of the Japanese towards the approaching end of that occupation? Is it one of relief, regret, or a mixture?

Sir GEORGE SANSOM: Quite definitely a mixture, I think. One of the things which strikes one very strongly is this: whatever mistakes the Occupation Authorities have made (or rather some of them have made), whatever bad behaviour there has been among the Occupation troops (and on the whole they behaved well), there has, speaking generally, not been any visible resentment amongst the Japanese against the occupation. And on the whole there should not have been. They might have been in worse hands and they have had food and help of every kind. For that they can thank the Americans in particular, the Allies in general; but of course they are tired of being occupied. They want to run their own affairs. General McArthur told me in 1946 that he believed that military occupation always gave diminishing returns, and he thought it should come to an end after not more than three years. Of course the reason for continuing it has been strategic, not political. But the great effect of the occupation has been not in any specific field, not in legislation nor in the amount of indoctrination which has been absorbed, but in the stirring up of Japanese thought—confronting them with all kinds of new, strange, wise and foolish ideas. It has been very good for them in that way.

Col. GARCIA: Arising out of the last question, how soon will the Japanese be free? They have been kept going by American aid and their economic condition is improving very rapidly. How soon do you think they might be able to go on an even keel?

Sir GEORGE SANSOM: I really don't know. The economic experts in G.H.Q. all say that within four or five years Japan can go on an even keel. But I don't see how it can be done myself. However, for the moment one must bow to their authority—they are basing their policy on it.

Mr. E. J. NATHAN: Can you tell us whether Japan can be made a viable economic State if they are not able to trade with China both ways?

Sir GEORGE SANSOM: They don't think so. They all think it is essential for them to trade with China. Every industrialist I spoke to—and I saw many leading industrialists and bankers and so on—all said "We *must* trade with China." How much they would really get by it I don't know. I had always supposed that their trade with China was not really very important to them, but certainly that is their view.

Mr. R. H. SCOTT : What is the feeling of Japan towards this country? Also, those industrialists and bankers whom we saw in Osaka and elsewhere, how far have they got in thinking out their commercial overseas trade policy? You made one or two remarks about pushing exports—are they thinking still in the same sort of terms as they practised before the war?

Sir GEORGE SANSON : I don't think they are. But I think they might. The economist whom I quoted as saying this policy of wage depression might come—*he* thinks there are other methods and he doesn't approve of it. But I don't know whether the Japanese business men have worked out a complete policy. I don't see how they can until they see what the world is going to be like—at least the part of it around them.

Mr. TAUSIG : I would like to ask whether Sir George could expand a little on the remarks he made about the mistakes the Americans made with regard to the educational plan. Was it in the textbooks or in the general attitude? Also, could he tell us a little more about the standard of living. I think he said that at the present moment it is, generally speaking, about 30 per cent. below pre-war. Would that apply to the workers, or are they a class which is better off today than before the war?

Sir GEORGE SANSON : I think it applies to the workers too. I don't think they are better off than before the war. The latest improvement in conditions is very largely due to the Korean war. The new industrialist activity—the position of the workers (there have been very few strikes in the last twelve months—I think that simply indicates not that the standard of living is particularly high, but it is stable, and there is a little surplus. It isn't all going on food or clothes; they can go to a movie or buy a little of this and that.

As to education, that is a very complicated thing. I can only deal with it in a very brief way. First of all, I think the attempt to produce the textbooks was foolish and it was not very well done, but it was done with the best of intentions. And then the plan—they have created a large number of new universities, but there are not enough teachers, not even enough to sustain the two great universities at a high level, which is essential. There will never be enough teachers at that rate. It is that kind of thing—trying to reproduce something like an American system in Japan, where there is a strong tradition of education and learning already. This has been done (and I say this with all respect) by rather inadequate and immature people.

Miss KELLY : What do you think will be the effect of McArthur's removal?

Sir GEORGE SANSON : I don't think it will make very much difference. He was going to leave anyhow, once the Peace Treaty came, and I don't think that has altered much so far. It has made a ripple—a wave even for the moment. I think the McArthur legend will remain, but I don't think his departure will affect things. The problems now are far too different, not the kind of thing he could handle.

Mrs. FORSYTH : What is the mentality of the Communist leaders in Japan? Are they of the patriotic type? What is the point of their Communist attitude?

Sir GEORGE SANSOM: I think they are Marxist, and therefore Marxist before they are patriots. I used to know the wife of a leading Communist and I should have thought she was a convinced Marxist. Therefore they are not at any rate like the old-style patriots.

Mrs. GREGORY: I would like to know if the feeling in Australia and New Zealand is any better towards the Japanese? Will they allow them in?

Sir GEORGE SANSOM: I do not think so at the moment—feeling is still very strong.

ANOTHER MEMBER: What is the attitude of the common man now towards the Emperor? They used almost to worship him.

Sir GEORGE SANSOM: That is very difficult to say. I think the Emperor still receives respect amounting to veneration, pretty well throughout the country. I don't know what the rising generation thinks. I don't think they have the same kind of sentiment at all. One thing I am sorry about is that during my stay in Japan I was prevented by illness from meeting younger people as I had planned. So what I said is all true probably for the middle-aged and elderly, but won't be true any longer ten years from now.

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks.

CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND THE WEST

DURING the first six months of 1951 two developments, apart from the day-to-day swing of military fortunes in Korea, particularly occupied the minds of those concerned with China's relations with the non-Communist world. They were the tightening restrictions proposed by the United States in the United Nations on trade with the People's Republic, and the progress being made, also under the auspices of the United States, towards the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers, raising the problem of Chinese representation in treaty negotiations.

In the light of these developments, the Society's China Panel at a meeting in June discussed the general question of Sino-Japanese and Sino-Western economic relations. Reference was made to the problem of population pressure in Japan as an underlying economic cause of the last war in the Far East, and it was pointed out that the loss to Japan of raw material sources and markets in China, particularly in Manchuria, had if anything increased the danger of a similar situation recurring. Information from Japan suggested that while the Japanese assumed that Western countries had "written off" China as a trading partner (which was probably true of the United States at least), and while they publicly called on the West to open up to them alternative sources and markets, they in fact envisaged working, through whatever political situation, to a renewal of the economic pattern in which before the war much of their rice and sugar had come from Formosa, their coking coal from North China and Manchuria, their iron ore from Central and South China, and their cereals from Manchuria. There were even those who foresaw the replacement of Hong Kong as an *entrepôt* by a Japanese port. At all events, it would be wise to look to the pre-war pattern of Sino-Japanese trade to gain a picture of Japan's likely economic policy when conclusion of a peace treaty abolished the controls to which she was now subjected by the occupation authorities.

At the same time doubts were raised whether China under her present political leadership would be willing to trade on terms acceptable to Japan. While it was reported that discussions for barter business had been conducted between Chinese representatives and British firms as recently as the beginning of 1951, there was also a feeling that the present Chinese Government was interested in foreign trade only in so far as it brought them political advantage. It was pointed out that if China is to achieve her declared aim of becoming a great power by contemporary economic standards she must develop and exploit for herself the resources of Manchuria. In her present mood it was thought unlikely therefore that she would be willing to exchange her real assets for consumer goods. Also to be taken into consideration was the new sense of self-respect which

the revolution had given the average Chinese, together with his bitter memories of Japanese treatment in the recent past. This, it was argued, besides providing a grave objection to a Western policy of reviving Japan, implied that a Communist China, while she controlled Manchuria, would provide no answer to Japan's production problems.

On the other hand, a case was made that China is only momentarily dominated in her economic outlook by the international political situation, particularly as a result of having received a genuine fright when American forces last winter advanced to the Manchurian border. On this hypothesis, her rulers would like, if they could disentangle themselves from the complications in which their intervention in Korea had involved them, to settle down to thirty or forty years of an internal consolidation policy. It was pointed out that the revolution in both the political and economic fields was still far from complete, especially in the south and west. Such a gradual policy, it was thought, could well lead—whatever the political situation—to an intensification of *ad hoc* economic contacts with the outside world, and particularly with Japan. One consideration raised in this connection was the possibility of Western policy-makers becoming “prisoners of their own propaganda” in confusing with strategic goods the capital equipment whose supply to China might be the legitimate and useful lubricant of such a reconstruction policy, and the starting-point for wider trade on terms acceptable to all parties, regardless of political considerations. There was some measure of disagreement as to the most likely trend of Chinese economic policy along these possible lines, and no indication was forthcoming of the possible Chinese response to economic approaches in a less inflamed international political situation. But it was generally agreed that recognition should be given both in the Japanese peace treaty and in United Nations measures concerning China to the particular needs of the two countries in the matter of mutual trade.

NOTE ON THE POPULATION OF SINKIANG

IT is difficult to estimate the population of any country which has no census at all. Moreover, when the inhabitants of that country are largely nomadic and their numbers are of no interest to the government, the difficulty of any enumeration increases.

The population of Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan—that is, the whole of the province before it was divided by the separation of the area at Ili or Kulja from the authority of the government at Urumchi (Tihwa)—is probably about six millions in all. This estimate is necessarily a rough one, and can be regarded as only approximate.

South of the Tian Shan mountains, but inclusive of the Ili valley or area, there are five million persons. The Chinese number probably 100,000 and are widely scattered. The Kalmuks are about 125,000.

The Kasaks or Kazaks are divided into the following classes or kinds, and the numbers given are put against each.

The Kirei Kazaks, between Tacheng and the Altai mountains, 200,000.

The Western Kirei Kazaks, south of Tachen, 150,000.

The Nauman Kazaks, east of Tacheng, 4,000.

The Kazaks of the Ili valley, 60,000.

Other Kazaks near Urumchi (Tihwa), 8,000.

To the above figures must be added the Moslem nomads of the south, the Kirghiz and the Tajiks. These latter are of Persian origin. They dwell in the extreme south of the province, in Sarikol, and are more peculiar than interesting. It is by no means easy to estimate the numbers of either Kirghiz or Tajiks. Many of these nomads pass their lives partly in Russian and partly in Chinese territory, as the seasons demand. They are thus constantly crossing the frontier, and their movements are determined by the demands of their animals. In other parts of the province it is possible to move from one grazing ground to another and keep within the limits of Sinkiang, but this is not possible in the south of Turkestan. All nomads are a law unto themselves, and the town-bred officials of the Soviet cannot understand this. They do not seem to realize that these pastoral people cannot settle down, and that for many centuries they and their flocks, on which their livelihood depends, are ever on the move, as grazing and other conditions demand.

The Kirghiz are unquestionably the pleasantest of the nomads, as the thieving habits of the Kazaks and the extraordinary grime of the Kalmuks deter the hardiest. Any traveller can enter a Kirghiz tent with confidence. The number of Kirghiz and Tajiks does not, however, affect the estimate of the population of Sinkiang. It must be borne in mind that any estimate of population is no more than guesswork. The reckoning has been put as low as two millions for the whole country and as high as eight millions, but the figure of six millions is probably right. It has been arrived at after much discussion with those qualified to judge. Chinese Turkestan is a potentially very rich country, and quite undeveloped. The population could be easily trebled, and perhaps even more so.

THE KAZAK HEROIC EPOS

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[Short extract from a longer paper.]

THE nomadic peoples of Central Asia have presented the world with an almost inexhaustible reservoir of folklore productions representing a wide variety of genre from the simple; songs, tales and legends, to the more complex; ceremonial songs and the heroic epos. Doubtlessly the most highly developed folklore complex in this area is that composed of the many heroic epics which spread throughout Central Asia and were handed from people to people across national boundaries. It appears that from earliest times a widespread and dynamic epic tradition pervaded all the Central Asiatic nomadic Turkic cultures.

An epic tradition was well suited to the culture of the Kazaks* and of the other nomadic groups of this area, for the epics expressed, in a most effective fashion, the national spirit and sense of tribal history of a people who were engaged in constant communal struggle and warfare for conquest or for defence against transgressors. The economy of the nomads depended to a large extent on warfare with neighbouring tribal federations in order to gain scarce grazing lands, or on excursionary wars for plunder against the settled population of the southern oasis regions. The Kazak epic tradition, like epic traditions the world over, immortalized warlike heroes who, by their bravery and strength or by their supernatural powers, led their people to victory or safety. The hero seems to have embodied the greatest dreams and the highest ideals of the nomads, their conception of honour and prestige, chivalry, love and war. It is actually from the epos that we obtain the most vivid picture of these horse-riding tribes, of their early history, their traditions and of their whole way of life. The epic spirit has remained a vital force and a living part of Kazak society even today. Modern Kazak literature is steeped in the material of the early epic heritage, and many contemporary Kazak historians and scholars have devoted considerable time to the study and recording of the early unwritten epics. The rapid development of Kazak literature during the Soviet period, when mass literacy first became a reality, was to a large extent possible because Kazak writers had at their disposal the rich heritage of the old folk art.

Antiquity of the Central Asiatic Epos.—The intensive development of the epos in the nomadic culture as well as the content of the epics themselves indicates the considerable antiquity of the whole epic complex. Certain early documents also provide us with quite convincing evidence of the early appearance of this most important folklore form. The

* Strictly: Qazaq.

Orkhon inscriptions,* the earliest known documents of the Central Asiatic Turks, contain strong elements of the epic tradition. These tomb inscriptions are concerned with the history of the Turkic Khaqanate, a powerful federation of nomadic tribes in northern Mongolia which existed from the sixth to the eighth centuries.† Most of the Orkhon inscriptions were dedicated to the ruler of the Turks, Bilgā-Qaghan, and to his younger brother and military leader, Kül-Tegin. The whole story of the Turkic Khāqanate is related, beginning with the rule of the first Khāqan Bumyn (Tu-men of the Chinese chronicles). The struggles to attain independence of the Chinese and the constant raids and attacks of the Orkhon Turks against neighbouring and related tribes, such as the Oghuz, Kirghiz and Türgesh, are all described.

Certain passages of the Orkhon inscriptions contain rhythmic patterns and rhyme schemes which foreshadow the style and structure of the later heroic epic :

Tabghach budunqa bāglik ury oghlyn qul bolty
 Silik qyz oghlyn kün bolty
 Türk bāglār Türk atin ytty
 Tabghachghy bāglār Tabghach atin tutupan
 Tabghach khaganga kormüş
 Älig jyl äshig küchüg bärmish
 Ilgärü kün toghsuq-da
 Bökli khaganga tägi süläjü bärmish.

Your manly sons became slaves of the Chinese people,
 Your pure maidens became slaves [of the Chinese people],
 The Turkic *begs* abandoned their Turkic titles,
 And after having received Chinese titles, like Chinese *begs*
 They looked into the eye of the Chinese khagan [obeyed the
 Chinese *khagan*].

For fifty years they gave their work and strength,
 Forward towards sunrise‡ they went to Bökli-khagan.§

Not only are the rhythmic structure and rhyme scheme of these verses of interest, but also notable are the parallelism and repetition, so typical of the epic (*cf.* lines 1-2: “. . . ury oghlyn qul [a male slave] bolty . . . silik qyz oghlyn kün [female slave] bolty,” and lines 3-4: “Türk bāglār Türk atin . . . Tabghachghā bāglār Tabghach atin . . .”).|| Radloff, who has observed this form of narrative in his studies of the Kirghiz epos, asserts that it is typical of the Turkic epic in general.¶

* The Orkhon tomb inscriptions were found in the nineties of the last century in the Orkhon region of northern Mongolia.

† Written evidence of these tribes has been recovered not only from their own tomb inscriptions, but also from the chronicles of the Chinese in the records of the T'ang dynasty, the *T'ang-shu*. *Cf.* Edouard Chavannes, “Documents sur les Toukiue (Turcs) occidentaux,” *Sbornik trudov Orhonskoi ekspeditsii*, vol. vi, St. Petersburg, 1903. These Turks called themselves *kök Türk* (*i.e.*, heavenly or green Turks) or simply *Türk* (*cf.* V. V. Radloff, *Die Altuerkischen Inschriften der Mongolei*, St. Petersburg, 1895, *passim*), the plural form of which, *Türküt*, became in Chinese transcription tu-kiue. ‡ Towards sunrise”—*i.e.*, towards the east.

§ Radloff, *Die Altuerkischen . . .*, Neue Folge, St. Petersburg, 1897, p. 132. (All translations into English, unless otherwise identified, are the author's.)

|| Tabghach—“Chinese.”

¶ V. V. Radloff, *Proben der Volksliteratur der tuerkischen Staemme Sudsibiriens*, St. Petersburg, 1886, V. Introduction.

The epic character of these inscriptions emerges most clearly in the choice and treatment of subject matter, particularly in descriptions of the hero and in depicting battle scenes. In typical epic fashion Bilgä-khaqan fights forty-seven campaigns and engages in twenty battles.* He is quoted in the inscription as saying :

With my younger brother Kül-tegin we . . . had come to the conclusion that the name and fame of the people which our forefathers had won should not perish, [and as a result] I have not slept by night on account of the Turkic people and have not sat [still] in daytime. With my younger brother Kül-tegin . . . we have conquered as much as was in our power [until we were dead tired] . . . †

The most convincing evidence of the antiquity of the epic in Turkic culture appears in a somewhat later document, Mahmūd al-Kāshgārī's *Dīwān lughāt at-Turk* (*Dictionary of the Turkic Language*, c. 1077). ‡ In this work there are preserved a great number of fragments taken from early Turkic folklore, including a number of verses of such definite epic character that there remains little doubt that these were taken from epic poetry extant in Mahmud's time. The largest of these epic fragments refers to the struggle of the Turks against the Tangut, with whom the Orkhon Turks were in a constant state of war.

Another of these fragments described the struggle of one of the Moslem Turkic tribes with the Buddhist Uighurs in the region of the river Ili. This fragment may refer to the period following the destruction by the Kirghiz of the Nomadic Uighur empire on the Orkhon river in 840, since it was only after this event that there was a mass migration of Uighurs south towards the Ili region and East Turkistan :

Like a wild mountain stream we ran down, against the cities we moved, we destroyed the idolatrous temples and dropped dung on their idols.
At night we attacked them, on all sides we lay in ambush, their locks we cut off . . .
We put our insignia on the horses . . . against the miserable dogs we flew like birds.
The red flag rose, the black dust rose. . . . §

Mahmūd's work also contained two heroic weeping songs, a genre closely related to the heroic epic. Both of these fragments also exhibit a great number of elements characteristic of the later epos.

The fragments preserved by Mahmūd al-Kāshgārī are full of the crude and rough heroic spirit and are characterized by a liberal use of the clichés so widely employed in the heroic epos. Manliness is celebrated; bravery and the battle prowess of the heroes are exaggeratedly described. When the heroes throw themselves on the enemy they "roar like lions,"|| they

* Radloff, *Die Altuerkischen* . . . , N.F., p. 134.

† *Ibid.*, p. 137.

‡ For a discussion of the folklore significance of this work and for excerpts from it, see C. Brockelmann, "Alturkestanische Volkspoesie," *Asia Major* (introductory volume), London, 1922, pp. 1-22 (part one); *Asia Major*, II (1922), pp. 110-24 (part two). Also: C. Brockelmann, "Alturkestanische Volkswisheit," *Ostasiatische Zeitschrift*, Berlin, 8 (1920), Heft 1/4, 49-73.

§ Brockelmann, *Alturkestanische Volkspoesie*, i, pp. 10-11.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 14.

“spread like a wild stream,”* and they are so strong and brave that none can escape from them.†

The form and the metric structure of these fragments anticipate the later epic even more clearly than in the Orkhon inscriptions. The lines consist of seven to eight feet, anticipating the form of Kazak epics, and the rhyme scheme is very similar to that of the later Central Asiatic epos. The stanza consists of four lines, the first three of which usually rhyme, while the last line contains the rhyme which goes through the whole poem. Thus we have: a a a b, c c c b, d d d b, etc.

Other factors which suggest the antiquity of the Central Asiatic epos are the many evidences of wide diffusion of epic traits and the occurrence of some epics which appear to be shared in almost identical forms in various national groups. There are indications that a number of such epics may have originated before the period of national separation of certain tribal groups. Equipped, as we are, with only a scant knowledge of the very early history of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, we often find it difficult or impossible to determine with accuracy the exact national origin of a particular epic which may have travelled back and forth from one Turkic culture to another before it was first noted by the folklore scholar. Thus most of the epics now considered Kazak were actually composed during the period before the formation of the Kazak tribal federation in the fifteenth century, and it is often difficult to determine whether these epics belonged initially to the Kazaks or to another group. Even the content of the epics often fails to give us exact information about their national origin, for a great number of Central Asiatic epics pertain not to one nationality alone, but to many of the Turkic and Mongol tribes, and are concerned not only with the problems of a particular nation, but with broad problems which affect the history of many or all of the Turkic nomads. For example, some Kazak epics are concerned with the common problems faced by the Turks as a result of the Mongol domination of Central Asia. Professor Orlov maintains that the Central Asiatic epos cannot be regarded as a purely national one.‡ Whether the supranational character of a particular epic in Central Asia is a result of diffusion, or of a common historical past of many of these tribes under the Golden Horde and the Crimean and Kazan Khānates, is sometimes hard to determine and would depend on the age of the prototype. The fact remains that we are confronted with a truly amazing degree of identity of subject matter among the epics of the most varied tribes, and even with what might be termed “international epics” (epics known to many of the Central Asiatic Turkic tribes). Orlov reckons five epics known to the Kazaks as belonging to the “international” group of epics, including the Kazak lyrical epos *Oozy Körpösh and Bayan Sulū*,§

* Brockelmann, *Altturkestanische Volkspoesie*, i, p. 10.

† *Ibid.*, p. 15.

‡ A. S. Orlov, *Kazakhski geroicheski epos*, Moscow, 1945, p. 5.

§ Radloff, *Proben . . .*, iii, 261-97; Sobolev, *Pesni . . .*, pp. 74-91 (fragments of M. Tarlovski's poetic translation). This was the poem which interested Pushkin so greatly when he visited the approaches to the Kazak steppes in search of material for his *History of Pugachev*. The first Russian partial abstract of this lyrical epos was made for Pushkin and copies of this translation have recently been found among his papers. *Vremennik Pushkinskoi komissii*, vol. iii, 1937, quoted in Orlov, *op. cit.*, p. 5, n.

which is based on the widely used Romeo and Juliet theme and is also found among the Oirat, and as far East as the Uighurs in Chinese Turkestan.*

Another factor indicating the great interchange of epic material among the various Turkic tribes is the occurrence of a number of epics found throughout Central Asia which share common *dramatis personæ* and thus seem to belong to common epic cycles.

Although it is clear that the epic traditions of the peoples of Central Asia were closely interwoven and drew much of their material from a common source, the various traditions also developed their own national character. Epics, whether adopted from other nations or shared in similar form by various nations, were integrated into the traditions of the nations of which they were a part, and thus they provide not only extensive information about the whole way of life of nomadic Central Asia, but also invaluable material for the individual cultures of this area.

Trends in the Development of the Kazak Heroic Epic.—The basic repertory of the Kazak heroic epic includes the following main epic productions: *Edige-batyr*,† and *Alpamysh-batyr*,‡ treating of the period of the “Golden Horde,” and its ruler Tokhtamysh; *Shora-batyr*,§ in which the destruction of the Qazan khānate is depicted; *Qoblandy-batyr*,|| a comparatively late epos, which tells of the struggle of the Kazaks (already depicted as Moslems) against the pagan Kalmuks; and finally three further epics which deal with the struggle against the Kalmuks, *Qambara-batyr*,¶ *Er-Targhyn*** and *Er-Sajn*.††

The typical Kazak epic centred around the life and adventures of a national hero and his struggles and triumphs against his or his nation's enemies. The basis for the story was very often an actual historical event, but, as Professor Orlov states, such events represented merely the “historical substratum” †† of the epic, while much of the subject matter went far beyond the framework of the early period. Thus the epics reflected both Kazak folk myths and all the varied national customs and attitudes, which are part of a culture.

* Radloff, *Proben* . . . , vi, 236-47.

† Orlov, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-47 (fragment).

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-33 (fragment).

§ Prose translation by A. Divayev, “Etnograficheskiye materialy,” *Sbornik materialov dlya statistiki Syr-Darinskoi oblasti*, vol. iv, also Orlov, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-114 (fragment).

|| For a Russian translation of this epos see Mark Tarlovski, trans. *Qoblandy-batyr*, Alma Ata, 1937; also L. Sobolev, ed. *Pesni stepei*, Moscow, 1940, pp. 17-29 (fragment). Some fragments are also contained in Orlov, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-49.

¶ Sobolev, *Pesni* . . . , pp. 60-7 (fragment).

** Radloff, *Proben* . . . , iii, 153-205, Sobolev, *Pesni* . . . , 47-59.

†† Radloff, *Proben* . . . , iii, 205-61, Sobolev, *Pesni* . . . , pp. 30-46, Orlov, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-71 (fragments). The best collections of the Kazak epos are contained in translation in Radloff's *Proben*, vol. iii, and in Sobolev's *Pesni* The most complete collection of these epics in the original Kazak language are in Qalynjan Bek-Khojin, *Adebijettik oqu kitabi* (“Literary Reader”), Alma Ata, 1939, and the edition of the Kazak branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences devoted to the epos exclusively, *Batylar Djyry*, Alma Ata, vol. i, 1939.

†† Orlov, *op. cit.*, p. 7, n.

Over a period of centuries certain changes took place in the character of the Kazak epos which affected the style as well as the kinds of subject matter used and the role and treatment of the hero. Russian folklorists and historians have found it useful to divide the epic repertoire chronologically into two groups each of which has its own particular characteristics. The first group, the texts of which are assumed to be of earlier origin, includes epic stories of the heroes Qoblandy, Shora Qambara and Targhyn, and the second group, the texts of which are presumed to be of later origin, includes epics about the heroes Alpamysh and Sajn and also includes the lyrical epos *Qozy Körpösh and Bayan Sulū*. It is the earlier epics which are most directly an expression of folk history. The hero, in the early group, is motivated by a strong social and national spirit. His strength and prowess, which he revealed in battles against tribal enemies, symbolized the wished-for strength of the group in the face of the enemy. On the other hand, the later epics are not so full of symbolism. Personal motivation, as love of family, of wife, etc., is given more importance, as the hero begins to fight not only for the interests of the tribal group but also for those of his immediate family or for his beloved. The descriptive passages are more lyrical and often more emotional. Nevertheless the *batyr* is still relatively stereotyped and highly idealized. He is characterized by the same general traits of superhuman strength, bravery and incorruptible honour as is the *batyr* in the earlier group. It is only in the very late epos, *Ajman-Sholpan*,* that we find some convincing evidence of a more realistic approach. This epic, which must be considered independently of the first two groups, is the only example of its type available to us, and there are no sources to indicate the existence of other epics of similar type. In *Ajman Sholpan* the hero is no longer idealized in the traditional manner and many attitudes toward old values are changed.

One of the most popular of the early epic group is the epic *Er-Targhyn*, which is available to the Western student in two translations, that of L. Penkovski† and that of Radloff‡. This epos tells the story of the internal strife within the Crimean khānate. The events occur in the region of western Kazakstan between the rivers Volga and Ural. The following is a short synopsis of the epos.

The hero Targhyn flees from his own tribe to the Crimea after having killed a high noble of his own people. At that time in the Crimea there are forty khāns, the most powerful of which is Aqsha-khān. Targhyn lives with Aqsha-khān's people incognito for many months. "No one knew that he was a hero."§ Aksha-khān is engaged in constant warfare with two neighbouring tribes, whose fortress he besieges but is unable to take until Targhyn jumps into the breach and takes it single-handed in the name of the true faith.

Thereafter Er-Targhyn is much honoured by Aqsha-khān and made

* The epos *Ajman-Sholpan* most probably can be dated after the Russian invasion of the Kazak steppes, as there is already mention of the Russian garrison town of Orenburg. (Cf. Sobolev, *Pesni . . .*, p. 117.)

† Sobolev, ed., *Pesni . . .*, pp. 47-59 (fragments).

‡ Radloff, *Proben . . .*, iii, pp. 153-205. § *Ibid.*, p. 153.

the leader of his armies. The khān has a daughter, Aq-Junus, of exquisite beauty.

Hearing of the heroic exploits of Targhyn, Aq-Junus bribes a servant to admit Targhyn to her tent and "they spent six to seven hours together, playing and joking."* Aq-Junus falls in love with the hero, but another khān asks for Aq-Junus's hand. Aq-Junus tells Targhyn that she will marry no one but him and asks him to prove his heroism by eloping with her. Targhyn mounts Aq-Junus on a black horse of the Khān's and flees with her, but the angry Aqsha-khān calls his people and promises his daughter's hand to the man who returns Aq-Junus and Targhyn to him. No one, however, can match the speed of the fleeing couple. Only one, an old and experienced *batyr* by the name of Qart-Qojaq, on his famous horse Qasqa Azban, finally overtakes them. Targhyn's horse snorts in warning and Targhyn, encouraged by Aq-Junus, turns to meet the enemy. Seeing that Qart-Qojaq is an old man, Targhyn, true to the Kazak custom of veneration of old age, greets him politely. The unwritten code guides their words in the typical verbal exchange between the two heroes before battle, which includes greetings and praise of the opponent, questions about names and intentions, and also boastings and threats. Qart-Qojaq, the older, begins by boasts. Targhyn learns that his opponent is a famous *batyr* from the Crimean khānate, descended from a long line of *batyrs*. Qart-Qojaq had already taken much booty.

Wherever there was battle, I took my way,
The prepared enemy I attacked,
Straight through them I took my way.†

But Qart-Qojaq also extends the customary praises and greetings to his opponent :

You yourself are a great and wise man,
You burn like lighted dry grass,
Your manly bravery is without blemish.

Qart-Qojaq does not fail, however, to warn his opponent :

If fate overtakes me, I shall die,
If fate does not catch up with me
I shall take from you
The maid Junus, who is at your side.

When the duel begins, Qojaq, being old and experienced, pities the young Targhyn and purposely shoots his arrow in such a way that it misses Targhyn, but shatters all the arrows in Targhyn's quiver into dust. He then persuades Targhyn that any further struggle against him is useless and Targhyn departs, leaving Aq-Junus to the old Qojaq. Weeping, Aq-Junus covers herself with a rug, but Qojaq orders her to show him her entire body, adding that if he likes her body he will take her, but "if only one little part does not please me, I will not take you."‡ Aq-Junus refuses, and sings with much feeling a song in which she depicts her own beauty and Qojaq's age. Qojaq relents and releases her to Targhyn.

Targhyn and Aq-Junus continue their journey and soon come to the

* Radloff, *Proben* . . ., iii, p. 156.

† *Ibid.*, p. 162.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

land of the Nogai, where they are received with much honour by Khānzāda, one of the Nogai khāns. Khānzāda, who has heard of Targhyn's bravery, asks his aid in the struggle against the Kalmuks. Targhyn agrees, and with three Nogai *batyrs* he approaches the Kalmuks, who, afraid to battle with Targhyn, flee. Targhyn then climbs a tree to reconnoitre, but a branch breaks and he falls to the ground, dislocating his spine. Despite the great care of Khānzāda he does not recover, and when Khānzāda decides to move to his summer pastures he leaves Targhyn and Aq-Junus behind with food supplies for one week, planning to fetch them after having completed his migration. After one week, when nobody returns to fetch them they begin to starve. Feeling death approaching, Targhyn sings a deeply emotional song to his wife and his horse Tarlan, while Aq-Junus sings a similar song to Targhyn. Both curse the faithless Nogai people. Furious at the thought that people would say he did not die in battle, but only from a fall from a tree, Targhyn grips his back and presses it hard, and miraculously he recovers. He rejoins Khānzāda, who begs his forgiveness for abandoning him, which Targhyn readily gives after learning that Khānzāda had been surrounded by Kalmuks and had thus been unable to rescue him. Khānzāda again asks Targhyn's assistance against the Kalmuks. Targhyn defeats the Kalmuk *batyr* in a duel and then single-handedly defeats the entire army of seven thousand Kalmuks. For twelve days and nights he fights. On the twelfth day not a single Kalmuk remains alive on the battlefield. Targhyn and his proud horse Tarlan have lost none of their courage, but physically they present a sad picture.

When he looked at his grey-white horse,
 Of the hoofs, large as a hearth,
 Only something of the size of a thimble remained,
 Of the lips, large as two coat tails,
 Only the width of two fingers remained,
 Of the ears, which looked like cut reeds,
 Only a hand's width remained,
 Of the flowing mane
 Only a yard's width remained,
 Of the tail, which you could hardly embrace with both arms,
 Only a handful remained.
 When he looked at his own body,
 He was wounded in seventeen places.*

Khānzāda had promised his daughter to Targhyn as a second wife, as reward for defeating the Kalmuks. But Khānzāda betrays Targhyn and refuses to release his daughter. Targhyn departs in fury with Aq-Junus, planning to make his peace with Aq-Junus's father Aqsha-khān, collect an army and with it revenge himself on Khānzāda. Frightened, Khānzāda sends messengers after Targhyn with rich gifts, and, thus mollified, Targhyn returns, is given large herds and land by Khānzāda, and finally becomes himself a khān.

"Thus living, Targhyn became old, and when death took him he left this world. From Aq-Junus he had a son Arda-bi, who was also a great hero and a noble ruler. Arda-bi had two sons; the elder was Asy Kerai Mirza. Asy Kerai died in his

* *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.

twentieth year. There remained the younger son, the seven-year-old Aj Qosha. This Aj Qosha ruled over five *auls*, thus he was the ruler of the people—a prince—he mounted the throne, and, ruling over these five *auls*, he died.”*

The later epics, as has been noted, tend to be more lyrical. The central theme is often the struggle of two young people for happiness and love. The oldest and most popular of these lyrical epics is that of *Qozy Körpösh and Bayan Sulū*.† This poem, based on the widespread motif of *Romeo and Juliet*, tells of the love of two young people, Qozy and Bayan, who have been promised to each other by their respective fathers before their birth.‡ Shortly after the birth of the two children, however, Qozy’s father dies and Bayan’s father, not wishing to marry his daughter to an orphan, promises her hand to Qodar, another *batyr* of his tribe. The main part of the poem tells of the search of Qozy for Bayan and of Bayan for Qozy. When the two lovers finally find each other, Bayan’s father and Qodar kill Qozy. Grief-stricken, Bayan kills herself over her lover’s grave. But even death does not release the two lovers from persecution. Qodar, whom Bayan had slain before she killed herself, is laid in the grave between the two lovers, and between the beautiful flowers emerging from Bayan’s and Qoby’s grave there grows the wild rose of Qodar’s grave.§

The Kazaks had no particular name for their heroic epics, but called them simply *jyr* (song) or *qissa* (an Arabic loan-word which means “story” or “tale”). The authors of the epics, as well as of the other folklore productions, were in most cases unknown. As the epic could never be written down, and as each performer (either the *aqyn* or the more specialized singer of epic songs, the *jyrshy*) frequently changed the song to suit his own taste or to adjust it to a particular occasion, there developed a great number of variants of the main prototypes. The performance of the epic, like that of other folklore types, was characterized by a large degree of syncretism—gestures, exclamations, music and songs were all elements of the epic performance.

The most common Kazak epic style includes both verse and prose. The versified parts were sung to the accompaniment of the *qobyz* or the

* Radloff, *Proben* . . . , iii, p. 205.

† The epithet *sulū* means “beauty.” Bayan Sulū therefore simply means “Bayan the beautiful.”

‡ In the epics of many cultures we find reflected the custom of uniting two families through agreements for marriage of the children. Such agreements sometimes took place even before the birth of the children.

§ The story of the love of Qozy and Bayan exists among the Kazaks in a great number of widely differing versions. The version recorded in the last century by Radlov ends in a happy reunion of the lovers and in the death, by Bayan’s hand, of Qodar. In this version Bayan is not called Bayan Sulū, but Aq-Bayan—*i.e.*, the “white Bayan.” Cf. “Kosy Körpösch,” Radloff, *Proben* . . . , iii, 216-97. The above version (Sobolev, *Pesni* . . . , pp. 74-91), however, seems to be the one most commonly told and the one which was consequently most frequently recorded by modern folklore collectors.

The subject matter of this tale has a wide distribution in Central Asia. We find it not only among the Kazaks but also among the Uzbeks, Turkomans, Turks of Siberia and Uighurs in the variant form Tahir and Zuhra.

dombra,* while the prose part was spoken. The poetic verse is usually syllabic, with no consistent rhyme scheme. Rhyme was not, however, absent, and was frequently based, as in the other Turkic languages, on the repetition of identical agglutinative elements of the word, such as the plural suffix *lär*, the verbal personal suffixes, etc. In addition the musicality of the verse was commonly underlined by alliteration, tonal repetition and assonances.

The Kazak epic centres around a core of relatively constant *dramatis personæ*, who are characterized throughout the epic cycles in a manner consistent enough to justify a number of generalizations concerning their treatment and role in the epic.

The main hero (*batyr*) generally symbolizes the virtues of bravery, military prowess, beauty and physical strength with which folk fantasy usually endows ideal heroes. Above all, the *batyr* possesses unshakable ideas of military honour. Thus Qoblandy-batyr, when escaping from captivity among the Kalmuks, refuses to accept help from a Kalmuk girl because he considers such a way to freedom degrading for a hero of his stature. Frequently the hero's prodigious strength becomes apparent in his earliest youth. Thus Alpamysh is able as a child to shoot from a big bow, and in his duel with the Kalmuk hero Kökäldäsh he is strong enough to throw Kökäldäsh high into the air.† As a child Alpamysh is so strong that when he accidentally hit one of his playmates the playmate fell dead.‡

The epic heroes were also often invulnerable. Thus when Alpamysh is to be put to death by the Kalmuks, they learn that he cannot burn, he cannot drown, a sword will not cut him and he will not die by hanging.§

The epic rarely provides detailed introductory descriptions of the hero's external characteristics. A picture of the hero is built up only from the description of battles and in the speeches of the heroes. Since the most important virtues of the *batyr* are military ones, his characteristics are best portrayed by his struggle with the enemy.

The heroine of the heroic epos, the hero's wife or beloved, is usually endowed with qualities similar to or complementary to those of the *batyr*. It is interesting to note that in the epics, not only of the Kazaks but of all the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, the heroine is depicted as the equal of her husband or lover in moral worth and intelligence, and that she is always highly idealized. It seems reasonable to assume that this attitude in the folk fantasy of the Turkic peoples goes back to the period before the Moslem influence. There is, however, some evidence in the earlier epics of the later attitude towards woman as inferior and subject to the will of man.|| In most cases, however, woman is almost as brave as her husband or lover, or she surpasses him in intelligence and thus complements his manly bravery by her wits. This is truly the case in the epos *Er-Targhyn*, where the heroine Aq-Junus is able, by her wit and womanly intuition, to

* The *gobyz* and the *dombra* are both primitive stringed instruments. The *dombra* is a plucked instrument, somewhat similar to the Russian balalaika. The *gobyz* is a two-string instrument played with a short, thick bow. It is held between the knees of the performer like our violoncello.

† Orlov, *op. cit.*, p. 11, n.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

|| Cf. the epos *Qoblandy-batyr*, Mark Tarlovski, trans.; *Tvorchestvo Naradov*, i, especially pp. 366-7.

extricate herself and her *batyr* from a difficult situation. The character of the heroine is usually the main centre of lyrical digression and of colourful and emotional expression; her beauty is frequently described in the most exalted language, with a liberal use of metaphorical device.

In general, it may be said that the element of romantic love in the Kazak epic, though it plays an important role, is commonly subordinated to the more important theme for which it serves as a background; the prowess of the hero. This is not true of the later epics, in which romantic love has a more important role; and in sharp contrast is the epos of the southern Turks, particularly of the Uzbeks, in which, probably as a result of the more intensive influences of Persian culture, romantic love is given a far more important position.

An important figure in the Kazak epos is the friend who is united to the hero through the ties of a friendship-in-arms. In some of the Turkic epics the actual ritual of fraternization by exchanging or drinking each other's blood or sucking the same breast is described: as in the Kirghiz epos *Manas*, in which the hero Manas and his Chinese friend Alambet become "milk brothers" after they have drunk from the breast of Manas's mother. But more generally the ritual is not described, and we assume that such rituals were probably not of great importance among the Turkic peoples. In the Kazak epics we find a description of two inseparable heroes who are not necessarily united by a ritual tie. The friend is often drawn in such terms as to bring into relief the excellent qualities of the hero. Like Qaraman in *Qoblandy-batyr*, he may be greedy, haughty, or even a little treacherous. Or he may play the role of a comic character.

Apart from this group of the hero, heroine and friend, there are usually two groups in the Kazak epos who are treated in a more formal fashion: first, the enemies of the hero, usually depicted without much differentiation in the darkest possible colours, and secondly the immediate family of the *batyr*. The hero's family, as relatively passive figures, have only a limited role in the action of the epic. But they are utilized for the insertion of long, lyrical monologues, usually in the form of lamentations which frequently form the most beautiful sections of the epic. The laments are usually highly emotional and rhetorical in character and further aid in embellishing the character of the hero.

The horse is a most important participant. As the main companion in battle of the hero, and as his helper in all the battle exploits, the horse is often a hero himself. He is the *batyr's* closest and most trusted friend and is regarded with almost as much affection as the hero's wife. He is frequently endowed with supernatural powers: he may carry a wounded master at terrific speed through waterless steppes. He can jump wide rivers, and always brings his master to the desired place in the shortest possible time. The horse cannot be held prisoner, he understands human speech, speaks with a human voice, encourages the hero and even advises him about behaviour in battle.

All the varied elements of Kazak life, their mores, beliefs, emotions and ideals, found expression in their epos.

The student of modern Kazak literature will find it very worth while to examine this heritage, for many contemporary writers have leaned heavily

on the early art of their forebears. Moreover the oral art of the nineteenth century, which developed into a protest against Russian expansion as well as the expression of a new Kazak nationalism, grew directly out of the epic tradition, with its stress on the bravery and strength of the Kazak warrior heroes who defended their people at all costs.

THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN WAQF ENDOWMENTS

By J. N. D. ANDERSON

ALMOST the only point concerning Waqfs on which all Muslim lawyers seem agreed is that their basic purpose is a "good work" (*qurba*), or an "approach to God" (*taqarrub*). It is true that in many Waqfs the "good work" is by no means evident, at least to the Western mind, and that it is sometimes stated unequivocally by modern Muslims that only the Ḥanafī school insists on this element.* This, however, seems to be an overstatement, for the author of the Mālikī "al Sharḥ al Kabīr" probably gives the true explanation of those ancient texts which appear to support this view when he remarks, "The author (Khalīl) denies that the element of a good work is evident rather than that it is present, an indication that a Waqf must necessarily be an act of beneficence or a *qurba*."† An instance sometimes quoted of a Waqf in which this element is not apparent is one devoted to beneficiaries who are neither needy nor related to the founder. Provided, however, that a Waqf is not devoted to anything contrary to God's law (*ma'sīya*, disobedience), the presence of a desire to approach God will be presumed among the Mālikīs, just as in the case of a *sadaqa* (or ordinary gift made with the hope of a heavenly reward) when bestowed upon the rich. And the Shāfi'ī attitude in this respect seems to be substantially the same.

The Ḥanafī school, it is true, traditionally insists on an ultimate dedication to the poor or to some other work of charity or piety which humanly speaking cannot fail. Muḥammad al Shaybānī‡ even insisted on the express mention of such an ultimate dedication in the declaration or Waqf deed, while Abū Yūsuf‡ (according to that report whereby he is alleged to have held that a Waqf must always be perpetual) regarded this dedication as implicit in the very use of the word "Waqf" or of some similar expression, provided that nothing inconsistent therewith was actually included. Even Abū Ḥanīfa (who really seems to have regarded Waqfs as unlawful and void) is represented as coupling an insistence on an intention of perpetuity with his assertion of their subsequent revocability. It seems, however, that this ultimate dedication to a work of piety or charity which cannot fail is regarded as essential among the older Ḥanafīs, not as providing an element of *qurba* absent in a prior dedication to e.g. the founder's family, but as providing a beneficiary as permanent as the Waqf itself.

Evidence to support this statement is not far to seek. Thus Abū Yūsuf, who alone allowed the founder of a Waqf to reserve its income initially for his own enjoyment, is reported§ to have supported this view

* Cp. below.

† alSharḥ al Kabīr (al Dusūqī), V.4, p. 88.

‡ One of the two "Companions" of Abū Ḥanīfa.

§ Cp. Hamilton's Hedaya, vol. ii. (2nd Edit.), pp. 237-8.

not only from alleged Prophetic precedents but on the arguments (*a*) that the founder of such Waqfs had in fact performed a "good work" by immobilizing the substance of his property, which had thus become the property of God: he had not, therefore, reserved for himself any control over his own property, which would certainly have invalidated his Waqf, but had merely reserved for himself a temporary use of the income of what was now God's property, and this was perfectly lawful; and (*b*) that his enjoyment of this income was not in itself inconsistent with the religious element in Waqf, for the Prophet himself was reported to have said that a man providing his own maintenance was giving *ṣadaqa*. Muḥammad al Shaybānī, moreover, in opposing the view that the founder might reserve an interest in the income for himself, argued that such a reservation was inconsistent with his complete alienation of the property (*tamlīk*) rather than that it conflicted in any way with the element of *qurba*. As for a dedication in favour of some third party or, still more, of the founder's family, neither of the two Companions would, it seems, have had any doubt whatever that this was entirely consistent with a desire to approach God.

This becomes the more apparent when we consider the views expressed in the Shāfi'ī and Hanbalī schools concerning the ultimate disposal of the income of Waqfs whose founders name only beneficiaries who may (and do) fail. Such Waqfs, termed *munqatī' al ākhir* ("cut off at the end"), must be clearly distinguished from temporary Waqfs, for the latter are admitted only by the Mālikīs.* One Shāfi'ī view, it is true, agrees with Muḥammad al Shaybānī that a Waqf which is not expressly dedicated to a purpose which cannot fail is void; but the other agrees with Abū Yūsuf in regarding it as valid and (according to one report of Abū Yūsuf) perpetual, but differs from him in devoting its proceeds, after the failure of the named beneficiaries, not to the poor but to the nearest relative of the founder. Among the Hanbalīs, moreover, three views are found—that the proceeds in such cases should be devoted to the relatives of the founder (whether heirs, on one variant, or relatives, in general, on another), or to the poor, or to the Muslim treasury (*bayt al māl*). The Shāfi'ī "al Muḥadhdhab" is very clear on this point. After discussing the opinion that such Waqfs are void, the author turns to the view that they are valid and perpetual and that their proceeds must be devoted, after the extinction of any named beneficiaries, to the nearest relative of the founder, and continues: "Since the purpose of a Waqf is a perpetual heavenly reward, it is applied, where express, to what is stipulated and, where silent, in accordance with this purpose. . . . So if the express purpose comes to an end it is to be devoted to the nearest relative of the founder, since this is one of the principal sources of reward. . . . The Prophet is related to have said 'Your *ṣadaqa* to the poor is mere *ṣadaqa*, but to your relatives it is double, for it is both a *ṣadaqa* and a link [or 'favour'—*ṣila*].'" Finally, moreover, he discusses whether it is to be granted to the nearest poor relative, or to the nearest relative whether rich or poor. Some, he

* The Ithna 'Asharīs distinguish "Waqf," which they regard as perpetual, at least in intention, from *ḥabs*, which is temporary: but it seems evident that both spring from the same source.

affirms, insist on the former, since the poor are the normal recipients of *sadaqāt*; while others maintain that rich and poor should share, "since in Waqf the rich and poor are alike."*

This makes plain the serious misunderstanding of Islamic law into which the Privy Council slipped in *Abul Fata Mohamed Ishak v. Russomoy Dhur Chowdhry*.† In this case their lordships failed to see "how it comes about that by the general law of Islam, at least as known in India, simple gifts by a private person to remote unborn generations of descendants, successions that is of inalienable life interests, are forbidden," while it was contended that "the very same dispositions, which are illegal when made by ordinary words of gift, become legal if only the settlor says that they are made as a waqf, in the name of God, or for the sake of the poor." Having reviewed previous judicial decisions their lordships concluded that they could not assent to these conclusions. "They make words of more regard than things, and form more than substance. . . . A gift may be illusory whether from its small amount or from its uncertainty and remoteness. If a man were to settle a crore of rupees, and provide ten for the poor, that would be at once recognized as illusory. It is equally illusory to make a provision for the poor under which they are not entitled to receive a rupee till after the total extinction of a family; possibly not for hundreds of years; possibly not until the property had vanished away under the wasting agencies of litigation or malfeasance or misfortune; certainly not as long as there exists on the earth one of those objects whom the donors really cared to maintain in a high position. Their lordships agree that the poor have been put into this settlement merely to give it a colour of piety, and so to legalize arrangements meant to serve for the aggrandizement of a family."

The error of this judgment has been so generally recognized and commented on—and its authority so largely abrogated by the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913, which was passed by the Indian legislature in order to re-establish Shari'a law in this respect‡—that little need be said here on the subject. Their lordships saw clearly that the real intention of founders of Waqfs was often only or chiefly to create a family "perpetuity of the worst and most pernicious kind," and that the ultimate gift to the poor was in such cases a mere device or afterthought. What they overlooked was, firstly, that it is eminently possible in Islamic law to do under one form what is utterly precluded under another (as the books of Evasions by means of Devices§ eloquently testify); and, secondly, that a Waqf does not, even in the Hanafi system, necessarily consist in a dedication to charity in the English sense to which certain other dispositions of a minor or temporary nature may exceptionally be added, but rather in any perpetual dedication—professedly, at least, in order to obtain a heavenly reward—of the corpus of some property to God and of its income to any purpose approved by the law. It is only where other beneficiaries fail that the Hanafis, and some others, regularly pay the revenue to the poor as the

* Quoted at pp. 35, 36 of *Kitāb al Waqf*, by Aḥmad Ibrāhīm.

† (1894) 22 I.A. 76.

‡ And similar Acts in Zanzibar, Aden and elsewhere.

§ *I.e.*, *al makhārij fi 'l ḥiyal*—a subject in which J. Schacht has been a pioneer.

most natural beneficiaries of a *ṣadaqa*. It seems clear, therefore, that the reservation of all or part of the income for the founder himself and the dedication thereof to his family in perpetuity can all be regarded as partaking of the nature of a *qurba*, and that the insistence on an ultimate dedication to the poor, etc., is not to supply a religious or charitable motive otherwise lacking, but rather to ensure that the Waqf shall never lack beneficiaries.

But other misconceptions, too, have crept into the interpretation of the law of Waqf in India which have not received the same recognition. It seems possible that the source of two of these may be found in an apparent confusion of thought regarding the idea of *qurba* in Baillie's *Digest of Moohummudan Law (Hanifeea)*. Thus at p. 559 (2nd edit.) he states: "Its [a Waqf's] cause or motive is *seeking for nearness*," adding in a footnote (with quite unnecessary diffidence), "To almighty God is, I think, intended." But on the next page he somewhat inconsequentially observes: "It is a further condition that there be a *nearness*, that is, some relation between the appropriator and the objects of the appropriation"—a remark which seems to betray a confusion between the technical meaning of *qurba* in this context (*i.e.*, good work as a means of approach to God) and the alternative meaning (shared by *qurbā*, another derivative from the same root frequently transliterated in identical form) of nearness or relationship. And this misapplication of the Arabic term has been quoted without disapproval by Tyabji at p. 607 of his *Moohummudan Law* (3rd edit.)* and continually reappears in other authors.

The most obvious error to which this has led is in the discussion of the validity of Waqfs made by non-Muslims. Thus Baillie† attributes the invalidity in Hanafī law of Waqfs devoted by non-Muslims to *e.g.* a mosque, to the absence of any relation or "nearness" in such cases between the founder and the object of his Waqf, and he has been followed in this reasoning by other writers. The real reason, however, for the invalidity of such Waqfs is that the purpose is not such as is considered a "good work" according to the founder's religion, and therefore does not constitute a means by which he can "approach God." Thus the Hanafīs insist that a Waqf can only validly be created for a purpose regarded as *qurba* both by the founder and the religion of Islam—*i.e.*, a Waqf by a Muslim for a church or temple, or by a Christian for a mosque, would alike be void. The Shāfi'īs and Hanbalīs, on the other hand, have regard only to the religion of Islam in this context: provided the purpose is not an act of disobedience thereby, they accept it as possessing the necessary element of *qurba*. The Mālikīs are divided among themselves: one view agrees with the Shāfi'īs and Hanbalīs; another regards only the religion of the founder and whether the object of his Waqf is considered therein as meriting a heavenly reward; while a third view makes distinctions in matters of detail; but the second view is frequently preferred.

It seems possible, however, that the same misapplication of the word *qurba* underlies a further misconception. Even the Mussalman Waqf Validating Act reverses the authority of previous judicial decisions only in

* But he translates *qurba* correctly as "approach to God" at p. 354 (note 35).

† Baillie, I. (2nd edit.), p. 561.

so far as concerns "the maintenance and support wholly or partially of (the founder's) family, children or descendants," or, if he be a Ḥanafī, "his own maintenance and support during his lifetime" (Sect. 3). Again, Sect. 4 provides that "no such Waqf shall be deemed to be invalid merely because the benefit reserved therein for the poor or other religious, pious or charitable purpose of a permanent nature is postponed until after the extinction of the family, children or descendants of the person creating the Waqf." But the ancient texts make no such distinction between a Waqf for the family or descendants of the founder, and one for the family and descendants of anyone else whom he likes to name as the beneficiary of his pious dedication. At first sight, indeed, it would appear to the Western mind that such a Waqf might be regarded as more "charitable" than one for his own family. This, however, would be a misapprehension, as the traditions regarding the duty of providing for one's own relations clearly show: particularly, perhaps the Prophet's alleged statement that "the most excellent *ṣadaqāt* is that which a man bestows upon his family." But it is still true that a Waqf in favour of named beneficiaries and their descendants in perpetuity, however unrelated to the founder, is perfectly valid in Islamic law.

It might, of course, plausibly be argued that the Act saves this point when it states in Sect. 3 that "it shall be lawful for any person professing the Mussalman faith to create a Waqf which in all other respects is in accordance with the provisions of Mussalman law, for the following among other purposes . . ." and when it adds in Sect. 5: "Nothing in this Act shall affect any custom or usage whether local or prevalent among Mussalmans of any particular class or sect." This is perfectly true in itself, but the trend of judicial decisions in India has been almost entirely contrary to any such extension. Thus a Waqf in favour of strangers has been held to be invalid;* disagreement has arisen as to whether a Waqf in favour of servants and dependants is legitimate; and much dispute has surrounded the question of whom the term "family" includes.† The primary basis of many such decisions was the fact that the courts still felt bound by *Abul Fata v. Russumoy* except in so far as the Act expressly authorized the contrary: but one can scarcely help wondering whether the misconception that there must be a "nearness" or relation between the founder and the objects of his Waqf, rather than that the object of the Waqf must be consistent with a desire to approach God, may not underlie the interpretation of the law adopted by both the courts and the legislature.‡

But it is not only in India that there has been a departure from the ancient texts, for in the works of contemporary Egyptian authors a somewhat similar trend can be traced—although here, of course, no question of a misapplication of the Arabic arises. Thus in a recent monumental work on the new Egyptian Law of Waqfs (1946) Muḥammad Faraj al Sanhūrī observes (at p. 83): "The Waqf which must be made temporary is the Waqf for other than charitable purposes; that is, the Waqf which

* *Ismail Haji Arat v. Umar Abdulla*, I.L.R. [1942], Bom. 441.

† *Ibid.* Also *Mohammed Afzal v. Din Mohammed* (1945), I.L.R., 27, Lahore 300, 354-6. *Mohammed Azam v. Hamid Shah*, I.L.R. [1946], All. 575.

‡ In so far as the Act may be considered unduly limited in this respect.

is not of the nature of a *qurba* or *ṣadaqa*, but of the nature of an act of beneficence (*birr*) or favour (*ṣila*), such as a Waqf in favour of one's descendants . . . or those of someone else." Similarly, in an article on that Law while still in draft contributed by Muḥammad Abū Zahra to the *Majallat al Qānūn wa'l Iqtisād* (1943, pp. 391 ff.) it is stated that the draft law, by abolishing the rule that a Waqf must ultimately be dedicated to some charitable purpose of a permanent nature, has abolished the need for the element of *qurba*. This, the author maintains, is based on the views of the three non-Hanafī schools, which do not insist on this element, but merely provide that the purpose to which the Waqf is devoted must not be one forbidden by the law. Yet again, in a book on the law of Waqf as applied in Egypt before the promulgation of the Law of 1946 by 'Abdul Wahhāb Khallāf, the definition of Waqf includes these words ". . . and the gift of its income to some charitable purpose at once or ultimately" (p. 7); and this is expanded at p. 34, where the author observes: "It is a condition that the Waqf should be a *qurba* or beneficence (*birr*) by which the founder seeks to approach God and hopes for a heavenly reward, whether it be an act of beneficence and charitable gift (*taṣadduq*) from the beginning . . . or ultimately."*

The point at issue, of course, is not that the words *qurba*, *ṣadaqa* and *birr* are here somewhat differently used by different writers, but that the very distinction which they endeavour to suggest seems largely alien to the ancient texts. Abū Zahra, moreover, clearly differs from the author of *al Sharh al Kabīr* in the latter's contention that the fact that certain Mālikīs do not insist on the manifestation of the element of *qurba* by no means involves its absence, since its presence is fundamental to the very nature of Waqf. Yet again the obvious implication from Khallāf's definition that the element of *qurba* is lacking in a "family" Waqf and only provided by the ultimate dedication to some permanent charity is scarcely consistent with the argument he attributes to Abū Yūsuf later in the same book† that "the fact that the founder devotes the income of his Waqf . . . to himself does not conflict with . . . the charitable disposition (*taṣadduq*) of that income, since a man's expenditure on his own maintenance is *ṣadaqa*. So it is a *ṣadaqa* at once and, since its ultimate beneficiary is a beneficent purpose which cannot cease, it is also a *ṣadaqa* subsequently."

It may well be asked, then, whence springs this confusion of thought and language in the treatment of Waqf in modern Egypt. The most probable explanation seems to be that it represents the outcome of an increasing tendency in Egypt and elsewhere to make a sharp distinction between "charitable" (*ḥayrī*) Waqfs on the one hand and "private" (*ahli* or *dhurri*) Waqfs on the other; while this distinction (which is not at all apparent in the classical texts) is itself the result of a growing dissatisfaction with the Waqf system as it has developed. This system has been attacked from many angles. Economists have inveighed against the removal of so large a part of the national wealth from industry and commerce to lie moribund under the "dead hand"; against the frequent neglect of the property concerned and the lack of any incentive, or even opportunity, properly to develop it; and against the removal from useful

* *Aḥkām al Waqf fi 'l Shari'ati 'l Islamiya*.

† P. 57.

employment of generations of beneficiaries. Moralists have made stringent criticisms of the indolence thus engendered in the beneficiaries and the rapacity and dishonesty so frequently found in Waqf administrators. As a result, reformers have challenged the genuineness of the element of *qurba* in Waqfs which are primarily family settlements in perpetuity, in much the same spirit as their lordships of the Privy Council in *Abul Fata v. Russumoy*. Men of religion, moreover, whose whole instinct is to rally to the defence of the system, have often felt compelled to deplore its persistent use to defeat those laws of inheritance which they hold to be divinely revealed and to impose conditions on beneficiaries contrary to the spirit of the sacred law: for it is clearly somewhat farcical to regard a disposition which is contrary to the whole spirit of the law as a means of approach to the Lawgiver.

The difficulty in such cases, of course, is satisfactorily to determine the motive behind the act. This, indeed, is in large part the classical objection to the modern attitude, for the majority of jurists have always held that the courts are not competent to judge a man's inner motives, but only his outward acts and professions. If, therefore, a man expressly states that a gift to some rich acquaintance is a *ṣadaqa*, it must be accepted as such, and the gift will be irrevocable. Similarly a desire to perform a good work as an approach to God must be presumed whenever a man makes a Waqf, provided it is in favour of beneficiaries or purposes not manifestly inconsistent therewith (*i.e.*, expressly forbidden by the law). True, some jurists remark that regard must be had to facts rather than words, and that just as many authorities regard a gift to the poor, however expressed, as a *ṣadaqa*, so a gift to the rich should not be so construed, whatever words were used. *Ibu al Qayyim*,* indeed, even went so far as to maintain that contracts which were perfectly lawful in themselves but inspired by a wrong motive must be regarded as void. This, obviously, is a counsel of perfection, but a quotation from a late *Ḥanbalī* jurist concerning family Waqfs may be of interest in this connexion: "If a man makes a Waqf in order to injure his heir his Waqf is void, for this is something which God has not permitted. In reality He has not permitted any Waqf which is not a continual *ṣadaqa* from which its founder may profit: certainly not one which is a continual evil and cause of perpetual punishment. . . . The result is that Waqfs, the purpose of which is to prevent persons receiving what God has commanded and to evade the laws of inheritance are *ab initio* void and without effect. An example of such is a Waqf in favour of male progeny to the exclusion of females, etc., for the founder of such a Waqf does not desire to approach God, but to transgress His commands and resist His law. . . . The same applies to the Waqf of one who makes a family Waqf solely because he longs that his property should be secured to his descendants and never leave their hands, for such a man only desires to transgress the law of God that property shall pass by inheritance and that the heir shall be free to deal with it as he pleases. The matter of the wealth or poverty of his heirs is not the business of the founder of a Waqf, but of God. But the element of *qurba* may occasionally be present in a family Waqf of this

* A *Ḥanbalī* reformer of the fourteenth century A.D.

sort, . . . as when a man makes a Waqf in favour of such of his descendants as keep to the path of righteousness or engage in study. In such a Waqf the element of *taṣadduq* may be pure and *qurba* realized, since actions depend on intentions.”*

The fact remains, however, that motives and intentions are not readily susceptible to legal proof. It is not surprising, therefore, that the reformers have preferred to deal with the problem more radically and to demand the re-examination and reform of the Waqf system as a whole: and while the need to maintain those Waqfs which consist of mosques or cemeteries or which have been established as endowments for religious, charitable or educational purposes has been widely felt, the total abolition of private or family Waqfs has frequently been demanded. It is scarcely surprising, then, that the distinction between these two sorts of Waqfs, virtually unknown though it was in classical times, should today be increasingly emphasized, and that a tendency should appear to decry the element of *qurba* in family Waqfs in accordance with what are known to be the real motives, more often than not, of the founders, however inconsistent this may be with the theory and logic of the law.

In the event drastic action has recently been taken regarding “family” Waqfs in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. The most uncompromising reform of all has been introduced in Syria, where such Waqfs were completely forbidden, and provision made for the liquidation of those then existing, by Law No. 76 of 1949. Meanwhile, what many regard as a happy compromise was reached in Egypt by the Law of the Provision of Waqfs, 1946. This provided, *inter alia*, that charitable Waqfs (except those consisting of mosques or cemeteries) might be either permanent or temporary, while family Waqfs must never in future be created to extend for more than sixty years or two series of beneficiaries after the founder’s death; that all Waqfs (again excepting mosques, etc.) created after the promulgation of this Law might be revoked by the founder at any time during his life; and that no Waqf must in future exceed that one-third of the founder’s property† over which alone he had the right of unrestricted testamentary disposition, except one in favour of his parents, spouse, or such of his offspring as were heirs (to each of whom an “obligatory entitlement” corresponding to their rights of inheritance was ensured in any Waqf in excess of this limit)—unless, of course, the founder had no heirs or they consented to forgo their rights. And the Lebanese Law of Family Waqfs of 1947 substantially follows the Egyptian model in these respects.

* Al Rawdata ‘l Naddīya of al Shawkānī (d. 1250 A.H.) and its commentary al Durr al Bahīya by Sayyid Siddīq Khān (d. 1303 A.H.).

† To be estimated at his death, after which the Waqf of any excess would be cancelled, unless his heirs consented to its continuance.

REVIEWS

The Chinese in South-east Asia. By Victor Purcell. Oxford University Press. Pp. xxxviii+801. 50s. 1951.

Anyone interested in international affairs should read this volume if he wishes to inform himself on one of the most important factors in the present state of the world. The author is uniquely equipped to expound the relations of the Chinese with the other peoples of South-east Asia, which he has done in this well-documented and scholarly study. Through the whole book runs the question as to whether or not the different countries in this area, to which the Chinese have emigrated, have benefited or otherwise by their coming; the author quotes the opinions of many writers holding contradictory views on this subject, but is himself careful to sum up the arguments for and against the Chinese as immigrants with studied impartiality. It is interesting to note that in the countries covered by this survey the Chinese have been subordinated to the colonial policies of Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, France and the United States, and to observe the origin, *mutatis mutandis*, of many of the practices to which nationals of these Powers have been subjected in China since she threw off in 1943 the so-called "unequal treaties," although there is also to be found in these pages some evidence that the Chinese themselves enjoyed extra-territorial rights in Sumatra as early as the end of the fourteenth century. Examples, too, can be found of other modern trends such as the "nationalization" in 1854 of the cotton trade of Burma—up to then in the hands of Chinese merchants—which became a royal monopoly, and the repudiation in 1896 by the British Government on the ground of "altered circumstances" of the obligation of their vassal, the Government of Burma, to send decennial missions to China bearing tribute. The story of the Chinese immigrants in the early days of their arrival in the Nanyang follows much the same course in each of the different countries: arriving as traders they remained to become in an ascending scale peddlers, shopkeepers, merchants and capitalists; the author does not fail to note the similarity both in their characteristics and in their histories of the Chinese of South-east Asia and of the Jews of the Diaspora: both peoples were obliged to put up with indignities and injustices, which they were quite willing to do provided only they were allowed to continue their businesses; events in China and Palestine since the end of the war show, however, that they had been intelligent observers and possess long memories. There is a touch of irony in the fact that the first political society with revolution in China as its object was founded in Honolulu—the Hsing Chung Hui founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1894—and also in the following quotation from his Three Principles of the People under the heading of "Livelihood. . . . When the capitalists improve the living conditions of the workers, and the workers can produce more for the capitalists, this means both increased production and higher wages. . . ." Not unnaturally, in view of the author's career and experience, the most interesting chapter in the book is that on the constitutional experiment in the Malayan Peninsula since the end of the war, and, in endorsing his conclusion that "it seems a great opportunity was lost in these pre-war years to encourage the Malayan-born Chinese to resist the pretensions of Chinese Nationalism and to regard themselves as Malaysians first and foremost," the present reviewer would express the view that had those responsible for framing British policy at that time had the opportunity of reading this book some of the more grievous mistakes would have been avoided and would hope that those now charged with the direction of affairs there will seize the chance denied to their predecessors and benefit by it.

E. J. N.

The China Story. By Freda Utley. Henry Regnier Company. Chicago. 1951. Pp. xiii+274. No map and no illustrations.

This is quite an interesting book. It is well informed and it is topical, and very useful at the present moment. The authoress, moreover, is in a position to write

with authority. She was once a communist, has married a Russian, and has even lived in Russia. Like so many others, however, who have lived in the Soviet paradise, she found that conditions were impossible for anyone who had known freedom, and that Bolshevism was in every way objectionable. So she wisely left Russia, escaping after her husband had been sent to a concentration camp. She abandoned communism and finally settled in the United States.

It is true, no doubt, that a great deal of the book is of more interest to Americans than to others, but generally the whole book is of great importance at the present time, as has already been said. "The Case of Owen Lattimore" (pp. 188-218) should especially be read by everyone who has any knowledge of his books.

The authoress can speak with authority on communism, and has remarks on Chinese communists, especially on pages 197 *et seq.*, which are worth studying. It is manifest that without the support of Russia the people of China would never have known anything about communism, or about a movement that has brought no good at all to a venerable and contented country, and one that asked only to be left alone.

The same views may apply to the days before the Chinese revolution; but the bogus nationalism which is now such a feature of the China of today has been intensified but hardly improved by Bolshevist-inspired communism and the inevitable propaganda which accompanies it.

As has been pointed out, this book is of greater appeal to persons in the United States than those elsewhere, yet it is a book that is well worth more than a cursory examination. It is political and argumentative, but it is authoritative. The writer is enthusiastic and is sure of her facts. She throws a light on China, a country sadly maligned and in the West so misunderstood, and so badly treated by the falsehoods of the Kremlin.

Malay Proverbs. Chosen and arranged by Sir Richard Winstedt, K.B.E., C.M.G., F.B.A., D.Litt.(Oxon.). The Wisdom of the East Series. Pp. 85 + viii. John Murray. 1950. 4s.

It is one thing to make a collection of proverbs from a language; it is quite another to classify the collection according to subject and origin, to relate it to other cultures and languages, and to analyse its content in the light of the spirit and experience of the race. The first task can be undertaken by anyone with a sufficient knowledge of the language; the second can be accomplished satisfactorily only by a scholar, philologist and historian of the calibre of Sir Richard Winstedt. This little collection of Malay proverbs is prefaced by an essay in which their sources as diverse as the *Mahabharata* and the literature of Persia, China, Japan and Afghanistan are traced, and the proverbs themselves are classified under the headings of Man and the Universe, Society, Government and Law, Economic Life, Morality, and the Intellect.

The reader is likely to look first of all for the individual twists and oddities which differentiate the popular wisdom of the Malays from that of other peoples. "On one subject, the weather," (says Sir Richard) "no proverbs are founded. In a region of perpetual summer, March never 'comes in like a lion' or 'goes out like a lamb,' and there is no inclement Christmas to 'make a fat graveyard.'" Of the special nature of the Malays Sir Richard says:

"The internationalism of so many Malay sayings reveals the intellectual curiosity of the Malay, and his borrowings illustrate an independence of outlook that has picked only material suited to his cynical and fatalistic realism. If there is no romance in his proverbs, there is no false sentiment. Affection and rhodomontade are absent as well as chivalry and love. Work is a necessity, not a virtue. Woman? There is 'more than one flower in the world.' A flower may be scentless, and all flowers fade, however they may pretend to be buds again. . . . Old age is unhonoured and old men are often foolish. Death, too, is a natural phenomenon. 'The flower and the bud drop as well as the ripe and the old.' And after death? There is no mention of heaven or hell in a Malay proverb. For the Malay has none of the fanaticism of the Arab, with his cry that 'there are no fans in hell. . . .' Excess of all kinds is deprecated. . . ."

This attitude towards death and the next world is very nearly on all fours with that of the Chinese, and the realism of the two races is similar. One misses, however, the satiric fantasy of some Chinese proverbs (e.g., "The stone lion does not fear the rain") and their scepticism (e.g., "If you believe in a god, then it is a god: if you don't believe in a god, then it is a lump of mud"). There is, too, a more indolent attitude towards life among the Malays than among the Chinese—"If one paddles when the current is carrying one downstream," (says one Malay proverb) "even the crocodiles will laugh." Whole sets of proverbs centre around the dog, the tiger, the crocodile, and the elephant, and another set around boats, ships and fishing. In this collection there is a great deal of shrewdness, a great deal of humanity, and a great deal of humour. *Malay Proverbs* is a slim volume to be read and enjoyed and then slipped in among the bulkier tomes of the Wisdom of the East Series, ready as a reminder of the special imprint of tropical Asia on the common clay of humanity.

V. P.

Cochin-Malabar: Palms and Pageants. By T. W. Venn. Printed at Calicut by Messrs. Peirce Leslie and Co., Ltd., for private circulation (only 250 copies printed). Pp. 249, and illustrations.

This book, by Major T. W. Venn, M.B.E., who spent his life in the south of India, describes the most fascinating coastline of the East. It was once famous, but it is now almost forgotten. It has faded away from the memory of man, but no one who has ever been on the Malabar coast can ever forget the charms of the district and the exotic, luscious atmosphere of the whole land. Acute nostalgia must assail so many who know the coast and who read this book. The illustrations in it—they might be better and are not worthy of the excellent letterpress—are redolent of the old days, those distant days when politics, emancipation and nationalism had not invaded India.

Major Venn tells the tale of the Dutch and their predecessors, the Portuguese, who were first in Malabar, and also of the French and the British, who came later. The book is a remarkable record, and the author is to be congratulated on preserving so much of what would otherwise be lost.

If it is thought that too much detail is devoted to shipping, and that the names of ships and sailors figure too often, it must be remembered that the way to the steaming dank coasts of Malabar and of Cochin is by the sea, and the sea only. This land of the south is rich in pepper, copra and all the produce that one associates with the East. That is, the East as we picture it: the East of palms, monsoons, dark fairies and pagoda trees, where everything smells of decay, and where time stands still. This might imply that business is a mere sideshow in this area, but that is not the case. Roads and railways mean little to the long line of coast, fringed with palms and backed with blue hills, and the sea is the only easy means of reaching this delightful land. It is true that harbours are few, with the exception of Cochin, and that ships lie five miles out, far from their "port," and this is the case even at Calicut. But ships and boats are the life of this part of India. There are yards everywhere for building the local craft, and the natives are skilled sailors and well accustomed to the sea. So a detailed account of the maritime activities of this part of the world is by no means out of place. Chapter vi has an interesting reference to the local craft.

Major Venn gives many curious details of the past, and not of the remote past either. Indeed, he brings his book down to quite modern times. It is sad to think that the good days of Cochin and Malabar have gone. The British now belong to the olden days as did the Portuguese and the Dutch, and one wonders whether the pleasant friendly folk of this lovely land are glad to be free of the West.

Major Venn has compiled a valuable record. Those who do not know Cochin and Malabar may think the details many and the incidents trivial, but anyone who knows that district, and can still remember the roar of the waves and the souging of the palms, and the strong spicy smells and the ladies with their dark locks, will think otherwise.

Clendon Daukes. A Biography by Lady Daukes. 251 pp. Hodder and Stoughton. 20s. 1951.

Clendon Daukes's career is a good illustration of the variety of work and environment that made service in the Political department full of interest in the days of British rule in India. Frequently such service was as attractive as it was interesting, but not always so. In Daukes's case most of his earlier Political years were spent in Seistan, Turbat-i-Haidari, Makran, Chilas and Zhob, where the ordinary amenities of life were practically non-existent and the majority of his contemporaries would have been bored to extinction. But Daukes was never bored. Outside his work, wherever it happened to lie, he invariably found plenty of occupation. Sport in any form and gardening were his two main resources. No matter how lonely and remote his surroundings might be, he found in everything a *joie-de-vivre* peculiar to his nature. It was indeed remarkable how unusual experiences so often came his way. He certainly never missed any that offered whether it was to hunt tiger in Northern Persia, or to collect poisonous snakes in Makran at night with a German scientist who subsequently proved to be not only a zoologist but an Intelligence agent, or to give a Russian consular colleague a practical lesson in how to use his fists.

Daukes was essentially a frontier officer, but it was not until after the first World War, by which time he had married, that he became Political Agent in Loralai and held independent charge of a district. Lady Daukes gives a vivid description of those troublous days. For many years Loralai had an evil and well-earned reputation for fanatical outrages and it fell to Daukes to restore law and order. No man was better qualified to do so. He was a fine linguist and endowed with a keen sense of humour that appealed to the local tribesmen. There was, however, as they quickly found out, much more to him than an ability to speak their language fluently and to share a laugh. For he was a first-class District Officer. Fearless, a man of the highest principles, for ever on the move and accessible to all, high or low, it was not long before his parishioners, as he called them, were as quiet as mice. He also had the gift, so essential on the frontier but not always to be taken for granted in a Political, of getting on well with the local military authorities. He was marked out to become the Head of his Province, and it was with the greatest regret that his brother officers and his friends, of all classes and communities, heard, when he was offered the appointment of Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, that he was unable to accept it.

The last six years of Daukes's service were spent in Nepal, first as British Envoy and latterly as His Majesty's Minister to that country. Here he could at least go about without the risk of being shot up, but his tenure of this important post was none the less far from uneventful, what with long official visits with the Maharajah to India, the deaths of two Maharajas and the ever-present possibility of internal political complications. In a sense it constituted a quiet ending to a career that had so often been physically arduous and exciting but one not out of keeping with Daukes's great and varied qualities.

But for enforced separations Clendon Daukes was supremely happy in his home life. His house radiated happiness and infectious humour. In writing his story, which no one else could have done so ably, it may be assumed that Lady Daukes's intention was primarily to give pleasure to his friends and family. She has done more than this as her book cannot fail to be of interest to a much wider circle of readers.

R. C. T.

A History of the Crusades. By Steven Runciman. Volume I: The First Crusade. Cambridge University. Pp. xiv + 377. 1951. 25s. net.

Hitherto there has been no detailed history of the Crusades comparable to M. Grousset's *Histoire des Croisades* published in the thirties. Therefore there was ample room for such a work as Mr. Steven Runciman has planned in three volumes, of which this is the first. It is obviously a momentous book, written not only by a scholar who has carefully weighed all available contemporary sources as well as modern works, as his full bibliography of 19 pages shows, but by a historian whose "supreme duty," as he himself says, "is to write history, that is to say, to attempt

to record in one sweeping sequence the greater events and movements that have swayed the destinies of man." His narrative, while thus meeting the needs of the historian, is also told in a way that enthralls the general reader. The whole movement, which started as a result of a "great announcement" made at Clermont by the Pope, Urban II, in November, 1095, is fitted into a background, which, although complicated by the clash between East and West and between Cross and Crescent, is nevertheless so well told that what happened during the next five years appears as the inevitable evolution of history. Events, indeed, swamped the leaders. Thus Urban "in fact launched a movement greater than he knew" and had not completed his preparations; and Peter the Hermit set in motion a motley crowd of men, women and children in answer to the appeal of the Emperor Alexius; while Alexius himself, who was prepared to cope with Western mercenaries, was confronted by vast undisciplined hordes moving on Constantinople by two great routes.

With the help of a map the march of the armies across the Balkans can be clearly followed. Faced with this unexpected invasion of between 60,000 and 100,000, between the summer of 1096 and the spring of 1097, Alexius proved himself to be a better organizer than had been hitherto realized. He not only kept an imperial eye on the Crusaders, fed them and welcomed them to his capital, but he established his authority over the leaders by making them take an oath of allegiance to him, which so soon they were to ignore.

Once across the Bosphorus the story of the Crusaders gets uglier. It soon became "painfully clear that the Crusading princes were not prepared to co-operate for the good of Christendom when a chance arose for acquiring personal possessions." Even before the capture of Jerusalem great feudal fiefs had been established, such as that of Antioch by the crafty Norman, Bohemond, and that of Edessa, at the expense of the Armenians, by Baldwin of Boulogne, ultimately the first King of Jerusalem. What Mr. Runciman has been able to do is to invest each important prince with a distinctive personality. A man of very different calibre, however, from these worldly leaders was Adhemar, Bishop of Le Puy and Papal Legate. He was the spiritual leader until his untimely death at Antioch. While he lived he represented the true papal policy of co-operation with the Christians of the East, and it seems likely that he had envisaged, on the capture of Jerusalem, an ecclesiastical state under an Orthodox Patriarch with himself as Papal Legate. Nor probably at Antioch, if the Bishop had lived, would Bohemond have had the audacity to appoint a Latin Patriarch in the place of the rightful Orthodox Patriarch, re-established there by Adhemar. Of more immediate importance, he would probably have been able to prevent the frightful massacres which took place in Jerusalem after its capture. "It was," says Mr. Runciman, "this bloodthirsty proof of Christian fanaticism that recreated the fanaticism of Islam."

That there was surprisingly little opposition on the part of the Arabs to the Franks is shown in a graphic account of the march south from Antioch to Jerusalem, again easily followed by the help of a map. It is unnecessary to touch upon the history of the siege and capture of the Holy City, as the story of the two "wooden castles" of Godfrey of Bouillon and Raymond of Toulouse, and the scaling ladders, is too well known. So too is the fact that Godfrey refused to bear the title of King, contenting himself with that of *Advocatus Sancti Sepulchri*, a delicate point not appreciated by his brother Baldwin, Count of Edessa, who succeeded him. The volume ends with the coronation of Baldwin at Bethlehem on Christmas Day, 1100, by the Patriarch Daimbert (Dagobert), who had succeeded Adhemar as Papal Legate. To him Baldwin paid homage, thus recognizing that the Holy Land was a patrimony of the Church.

If succeeding volumes are as valuable and interesting as the first is, Mr. Runciman's place as the leading historian of the Crusading period is unlikely to be disputed.

J. D. T.

Contemporary Jewry. A survey of social, cultural, economic and political conditions. By Israel Cohen. Methuen. Pp. 410. 25s.

Mr. Israel Cohen has been writing on Jewish affairs for nearly fifty years, and during that period has produced half a score of books and unnumbered articles on the Jewish people and on Zionism. He has travelled everywhere in the Jewish world, and he has had an important part in the building of the Zionist movement and the Jewish National Home. In this book he has garnered the fruits of his labour into a comprehensive survey which, like the comprehensive school, covers every aspect of learning. These fifty years of which he writes have been the most momentous in the history of the most historical of peoples. The three revolutionary changes of that period have been the creation of the State of Israel, by which after nineteen centuries the Jews have regained their national independence: the extermination by Hitler of two-thirds of the Jewish population in Europe, "a colossal act of genocide without parallel in the history of any nation in modern times": and the migration of Jews to America, where the proportion of the whole people has grown from one-tenth to more than one-half.

The book is divided into seven parts: the social, the cultural, the economic and the political aspects; the world war, the peace, and the national aspect. And the author brings a fullness of knowledge to each part. Nothing is omitted of what the Jews have done and suffered either in the land of Israel or in any part of the dispersion. The one feature of Jewish life about which it is not illuminating is the religious life. Mr. Cohen describes indeed the religious organization, but says little of the development of Judaism in this monumental period.

Occasionally certain parts of the story appear to be a little out of perspective, as where he deals at length with the provisions about the Jews in the peace treaties negotiated at Paris with the Satellite States in 1946. For those provisions proved futile. In the same part dealing with the peace we have a full and melancholy account of the recrudescence of antisemitism after the war. By and large, however, he gives a well-balanced and complete picture of these fifty years of Jewish tragedy and Jewish achievement. And the facts which he mentions in passing are often startling. Thus it appears that today the Jews are less than one 200th part of the population of the world; and that in Asia, that continent of teeming millions, their total number—in 1950—was only one and a quarter million, of whom over two-thirds were in Israel. For all who are concerned about the place of the Jew in the modern world, Jewish culture and the Jewish contribution to general culture, their economic activity and their constant migration, the history of Zionism, of Palestine under the Mandate, and finally the formation and the constitution of the State of Israel, this book is a sure guide to knowledge and indispensable.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

History of Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine. By Philip K. Hitti.

London: Macmillan. 1951. Pp. xxv+749. Illustrations. Maps. 9" x 6". 42s.

Professor Hitti's deservedly successful *History of the Arabs* demonstrated his zeal in collecting data and his skill in assembling them; and these qualities are fully confirmed in this full-length history of Syria from Palæolithic times to the creation of the Arab League, with copious source-references and an index of some 3,300 items. The earlier work left some doubts, however, about his ability to achieve a synthesis, to extract the essence from the mass of facts he had so conscientiously gathered, and the present volume again confirms these doubts. Part of the trouble lies in the fact that Syria ceased to be a creative historical factor at the end of the 'Umayyad dynasty. But surely the country has not thereafter been merely a supine cadaver which successive predatory dynasties have used as their dining-table, as in the gruesome story which he narrates on p. 532? One feels that Bernard Lewis (author of *The Arabs in History*) could have extracted from these sources a sketch of how Syrians actually lived under the successive mediæval dynasties; but Hitti contents himself with the bare annals, although he is aware of their meagre historical significance: "A dominant leader carves a principality for himself, is followed by incompetent successors; the State moneys are squandered; discord within and foes without bring the story to an end" (p. 566).

He writes that his personal researches are limited to the Arabic and Islamic field and acknowledges the collaboration of experts in other fields, with the conspicuous exception, however, of the ancient oriental empires. Assistance here might have saved him from the signal confusion of chapter xi, where, after tracing the history of Mesopotamian influences from the Sumerians right through to Nebuchadnezzar, he abruptly transports us back a thousand years to survey the Hyksos, Hurrians and Hittites. He would have been better advised to compress Part II ("Ancient Semitic Times") to one-third of its present length, and give us instead an elaboration of Part V ("Syria under the Ottoman Turks").

His Syrian patriotism has rallied him to an uncritical extolling of the oriental separated churches. It is true that "both Jacobitism and Nestorianism were basically protests against foreign intrusion"; but it is preposterous to see in Orthodoxy only "the process of syncretism that was turning Christianity, a Syrian religion [*sic*], into a Greco-Roman institution" (p. 520). He might justly argue that the Islamic conquest gave the oriental churches no opportunity to develop their intrinsic qualities and that they have done well to survive even as "fossils of an extinct Syriac society," in Toynbee's phrase; but the significant fact is that that "Syriac" society bequeathed to the Arab conquerors the whole of its heritage except its "Syrian religion." The Church in Western and Eastern Europe also endured the shock of invasion, by northern barbarians no less formidable foes than the Arabs; but *capta ferum victorem cepit* (cf. Christopher Dawson, *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture*, especially pp. 40-3 on the significance of the liturgy). To call Syrian Christianity "Protestant" (p. 518) may give satisfaction in some quarters, but if anything weakens Hitti's case: for had the oriental churches maintained their catholicity, it might conceivably have had the power to subsume the new heresy of Islam as it reabsorbed the attenuated Christology of the Arians, and Muhammad might have had a place in the canon alongside Saints Methodius and Augustine of Canterbury! In fact, however, after two centuries of resistance, the apostasy from oriental Christianity to Islam began and has continued steadily to the present time.

It is understandable also that a Syrian patriot should feel diffidence about the place which the French Mandate of 1920-45 should occupy in a history of Syria; but his historical sense should not have allowed Hitti to pass it over in complete silence, for the political experience of the "elder statesmen" of the Syrian and Lebanese Republics owes more to their struggles against the French than to their callow schooling in *al-Jam'iyah al-'Arabiyyah al-Fatah*. Has the "Arab Awakening" proved so inglorious in comparison with the Arab dream that Hitti's secular piety is driven to take refuge in "the Glory that was Damascus" (p. 457) under the 'Umayyads? Toynbee has warned us that Archaism is as ineffectual as that Futurism which is now expressing itself, it seems, in the murder, one by one, of every Arab statesman that dares to display some moderation.

GEORGE KIRK.

Rulers of Mecca. By Gerald de Gaury. George G. Harrap and Co. Ltd. 21s.

In addition to providing an interesting account of the history of Mecca from its early days to the death of Ali, the last Hashimite Sherif of Mecca, in 1935, in a form readable for both the layman and the specialist, *The Rulers of Mecca* clearly indicates the importance which the surrounding Muslim powers have always attached to the suzerainty, or at least the possession of influential control, over Mecca, the centre of the Islamic world. This fact might easily be overlooked in the study of the histories of these powers, since their campaigns in Arabia were frequently overshadowed by those conducted against their more formidable adversaries.

The history of Mecca in the first few centuries of the Muslim era is the struggle of both the Umayyads and the Abbasids to gain control over it, both meeting opposition from the adherents of the Shi'a sects, who regarded themselves as the Muslim legitimists. Later the rivalry for suzerainty continued between the Turkish rulers of Iraq, the rulers of Egypt and, on a lesser scale, the Imams of the Yemen up till the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, when the Sultans sought to

impose their rule either directly or through their representatives in Egypt. Sustained opposition to the imposition of foreign rule was offered not only by the Sherifian descendants of Muhammad, the rulers of Mecca, but also by the tribal inhabitants of the Hidjaz, Asir and the Yemen, and finally by the puritanical Wahabi tribesmen of Central Arabia. It was the latter who in the long run were to show themselves capable of imposing peace on the Arabian peninsula such as had never been known within historical times.

One of the lessons to be learned from this volume is that up till recent times the subjugation of Arabia was pretty nigh impossible, owing to the difficulties of supplying an adequate force with the necessary transport, provisions and arms. Since only small areas of Arabia were cultivated, provisions for both men and beasts of burden had to be brought overseas to indifferently good ports or by long land routes. When faced by the threat of foreign attack the Sherifs frequently withdrew from Mecca towards Central Arabia with their Meccan and tribal supporters. The extended lines of communication of the foreign forces then became subject to the harassing raids of the Arabs, past masters in this form of warfare, resulting frequently in the withdrawal or even defeat of the invaders. A decisive victory resulting in permanent control over the Arabs was under these circumstances practically unattainable by any foreign army. Whether the introduction of mechanized and aerial warfare, together with the presence of vast oil supplies in the country, will make Arabia more vulnerable to foreign attack remains to be seen.

Bearing in mind that this history, like so many others of this part of the world, is one continuous tale of warfare, in which internecine strife played an important role, and which was accompanied by much bloodshed and an inexhaustible list of murders, assassinations and executions, the author has presented his material in as attractive a form as possible. He has, however, not made absolutely clear the very legendary character of the accounts of the founding of Mecca contained in the sources at his disposal. A somewhat erroneous conception of the early Islamic society in Mecca, which was of a fairly primitive type, might be formed from the writer's description of Abu Sufyan, a kinsman of Muhammad, as a "banker." Might it not be considered slightly presumptuous to state that the temporary form of marriage known as *mut'a* (not *mit'a* as transliterated by the author) "worked admirably for many centuries, and under it was born chivalry itself, copied by the West from Arabia . . ." without any supporting evidence to this effect? His interpretation of the great schism of Islam—*i.e.*, between the Sunnis and the Shi'as, as arising out of the opposition between the rich and the materially minded descendants of Abu Sufyan and the descendants of Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, described as the spiritual lords—might be considered an over-simplification of this question. A short account of the origin of the Shi'a sects would have helped to make this issue clearer.

A consistent method of transliteration is not always employed. For instance, one finds *Jebel Qubais* in the text (p. 27) and *Jebel Abu Cubays* on the map (p. 72), while the second Caliph is named *Omar* and *Caliph Omr* on the same page (p. 47). Personalities bearing similar names are not always clearly distinguished, thus causing confusion in the reader's mind as to their identity. Nor does it seem quite accurate to refer to *Muhammad Ali Pasha*, an Albanian, as "this Turk." There are a certain number of printing errors, such as *qanum* for *qanun*; *tashilat* for *tashkilat*; *Ha'afar* for *Ja'afar*.

The genealogical tables interspersed in a practical manner in the text are a valuable aid in following the complicated lineage of many of the rulers of Mecca. A map of Arabia, or even one of the Hidjaz, Asir and Central Arabia, would have been helpful for following the numerous campaigns to which the text refers.

A Mirror for Princes. The *Qabus Nama* of Kai Ka'us ibn Isfandiari. Translated from the Persian by R. Levy. The Cresset Press. 1951. 15s.

The *Mirror for Princes* is a translation of the work more generally known to Persian scholars as the *Qabus Nama*, a series of letters written at the end of the

eleventh century by one Kai Ka'us to his favourite son. The writer was a petty chieftain on the southern shores of the Caspian, but his grandfather, Qabus ibn Washmgir, from whom the book takes its title, was an independent king of some importance who ruled over an extensive kingdom in what are now the northern provinces of Persia, and whose mausoleum, the Gumbad i Qabus near Gurgan, is still standing.

Professor Levy in an admirable introduction gives the background against which the letters were written, and explains how the author's own experiences led him, in giving practical advice to his son, to a curious mixture of idealism and expediency not uncommon in Asia, "where inconsistencies between acts and axioms trouble no one." He advocates the highest moral principles, often from the lowest motives. Thus he advises obedience to the Islamic law, but adds: "If you wish to commit a transgression it should at least not be a flavourless one. If you drink wine let it be of the finest; if you listen to music let it be the sweetest; and if you have an affair let it be with a beautiful partner; so that even though you may be convicted of sin in the next world, you will at any rate not be branded as a fool in this." Or again: "Never tell lies. . . . Rather become known for veracity, so that if ever in an emergency you utter a lie it will be believed."

In the eleventh century in Persia fortune was fickle, and the author, who had seen his ancestral kingdom reduced to vassalage by the Seljuks, was alive to the possibility of his son's becoming anything from a king to an artisan. He realizes, however, that the boy, "as is the way of the young," will probably not follow his father's advice, and finds solace in the thought that others may find it useful, and that in any case he will have done his duty as a father. It is strange that this delightful book has never before been translated into English. Although the manuscript is somewhat rare, the work was by no means unknown to European scholars. It was translated into German as long ago as 1811, and into French in 1886, while Professor Browne's *Literary History of Persia*, published in 1906, contains copious extracts. In the present translation Professor Levy has succeeded to a remarkable degree in making the book a joy to the ordinary reader without departing from the original text, except to make a few minor additions in order to make the meaning of obscure passages clear.

There are in all forty-four letters. The first nine are of a general nature; a man's duty to God, to his parents, to his fellows and to the aged. Then follows a section devoted to etiquette and the practical affairs of life, such as eating and drinking, hospitality, the playing of polo, the purchase of slaves, of houses and horses, marrying a wife, and the rearing of children. Finally comes specific advice how to achieve success in the various walks of life for which fortune may destine his son—trade, medicine, astrology, poetry, music, the service of kings, or kingship itself. There are many gems, and the reviewer cannot refrain from quoting a few at random:

"I neither urge you to drink wine nor can I tell you not to drink. . . . Should it happen that you do not drink, you will not only win divine favour but you will also be spared public disapprobation, the society of witless companions and senseless conduct. Moreover, there will be great saving to your economy."

"Be ever compassionate towards the aged, for an old man is an invalid to whom nobody pays visits. . . . Usually, when illness befalls a man, if he does not die of it he recovers; the exception is the illness of old age . . . from which there is no recovery. I have read in some book that up to the age of thirty-four a man increases in strength. . . . Thereafter until the age of forty he remains unchanged. . . . Between the ages of forty and fifty years he experiences each year a progressive enfeeblement which he had not perceived in the year before. Between fifty and sixty he sees each month a certain failure . . . and between sixty and seventy a certain failure each week. Between seventy and eighty he sees some failure in himself that he had not seen the day before, and if he passes eighty he finds some pain or affliction that he had not perceived the hour before."

"Allow them [your sons] to be beaten; children acquire the arts not by the light of nature but by the use of the rod. Yet if a child should be unmannerly do not strike him with your own hand but threaten him with his instructors. Bid them inflict the correction and so prevent any rancour against you from lodging

in his heart. . . . If you have a daughter . . . entrust her to a preceptor so that she will learn the provisions of the sacred law and the essential religious duties. But do not teach her to read and write; that is a great calamity. Once she is grown up, do your utmost to give her in marriage; it were best for a girl not to come into existence, but, being born, she had either better be married or buried."

"Give no one advice unless he desires it. Admonish no person, and especially no person who refuses to listen; in any event give no counsel in public, for there is a proverb that 'Exhortation given before all men is a reproof.'"

"It is highly useful to become competent in penmanship and able to copy any variety of script that you may see. But you should not inform all and sundry of your possessing it, if you desire to escape the reputation of being capable of forgery. . . . Commit no forgery of a trivial object, but reserve it for the day when it will be of real service to you and the benefits substantial."

But the reader must be referred to the book itself. He will discover for himself many passages that will appeal to him, whether for their common sense, for their humour, or for their aptness and applicability to the past or the present.

G. F. S.

Readings from the Mystics of Islam. By Margaret Smith. Luzac. Pp. 141. 12s. 6d.

Von Grunebaum, in his book *Medieval Islam*, writes: ". . . the great movement of mysticism, which in spite of the Greek (and Indian) origin of much of its philosophical skeleton and terminology is the most significant genuinely Islamic contribution to the religious experience of mankind." This statement is one with which Dr. Smith would surely agree. She reveals herself in her books, not as scholar alone, but as a true lover of Sufism. This, her latest publication, is a collection of translated passages from Muslim writers in Arabic and Persian, together with short biographical introductions.

The book might almost be described as devotional, and therein lies its value. Some of the passages are singularly beautiful. The introductions are too short to allow for balanced descriptions of the various writers. The reader new to the subject might imagine, for example, that Ibn Sīnā, scientist and logician as well as mystic, was almost entirely concerned with mysticism. To say that Al-Ghazālī gave up his academic career "to seek for God only" is an oversimplification of his passionate search for reality in religious experience. Such condensation, however, always contains the danger of on-sidedness, and since this book is not on Muslim thinkers as such, the scholars included find a place because, whatever else they were, they were also mystics.

On p. 4 *fanā* is described as "the passing away of mortality." Such a description is misleading without qualification. In Sufi terminology it means rather the losing of personal consciousness in an absorption in God.

K. H. H.

An Arab Philosophy of History. Selections from the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun of Tunis (1332-1406). Ed. and trans. by Charles Issawi. Murray, London, 1950. Pp. xiv + 190. Bibliography. Index. 6 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ ". 6s.

Professor Issawi has performed a useful service in producing this first English selection from the *Muqaddama* of the outstanding political theorist of the medieval Islamic civilization. The passages selected are classified under the headings: method, geography, economics, public finance, population, society and State, religion and politics, knowledge and society, the theory of being, and the theory of knowledge.

The introduction helpfully places this solitary genius and forerunner of modern sociology in his contemporary perspective. The tentative suggestion that he may have been influenced by some lost "Frankish" source is rejected, almost certainly with reason, for the alternative that he "reached his conclusions by an independent process of study and meditation on the events he saw around him or read of in the chronicles" (pp. 10-21).

Professor Issawi expresses the view (pp. 22-5) that Ibn Khaldun was "singularly

unlucky in his times. . . . Hardly any great thinker has been hemmed in by such close intellectual barriers, hardly any has had so little material with which to build up a theory of society. . . . Knowing practically nothing of the history of the ancient empires and the Greek and Roman city-states and republics, the only records to which he had access were those of the Persians, Arabs, Berbers, and, to a lesser extent, Spaniards, in all of which he could meet only the same fundamental forms of State—viz., tribal States and despotic kingdoms or empires." On the other hand, Ibn Khaldun's outstanding merits have been exaggerated by some historians with an anti-classical bias (*cf.* p. xi); and Issawi rightly observes that the very limitations of Ibn Khaldun's experience brought their compensations: "The relative simplicity of social changes in Muslim history, especially in North Africa, and the frequent recurrence of the same pattern or cycle . . . made it easier for a keen mind to generalize from the accumulated data and set up a comprehensive and harmonious system."

GEORGE KIRK.

The following information appeared in *Dagens Nyheter*, Stockholm, of September 18th, 1951: The Royal Library at Copenhagen has lately received, under interesting circumstances, a most valuable accession: a copy of the Kan-gyur, the holy book which is the Bible of Tibetan Buddhism.

When H.R.H. Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark joined the Haslund Christensen Expedition to Central Asia, he called first at the Royal Library, Copenhagen, to ask if there were any books they would like him to try to find. The instant reply was that the Library would, of course, like to possess the Kan-gyur, but there was hardly the remotest chance of the Expedition being able to get a copy. The only "authorised version" of the Kan-gyur is printed at Lhasa from hundreds of wood blocks on which the text and illustrations are carved. Only one copy is printed at a time; there has never been any question of publishing a large edition. So far as is known, only a few hundred copies have ever been made, and only one has previously found its way beyond Asia: it is at Harvard University, U.S.A.

Each copy of the Kan-gyur is made separately to the express order either of a monastery or of a wealthy Tibetan—it is a task that takes months. It was by chance that one such private order had just been completed when the Expedition reached Lhasa. But the Tibetan who had ordered it was unable to take delivery as he had fled to India, and H.R.H. Prince Peter persuaded the press to let him have it at a nominal price for the Danish Royal Library. He took it in his own care to an aerodrome in northern Bengal, whence S.A.S. transported it free to Calcutta, and there the East Asian Company accepted and sent it, also free of charge, to Copenhagen.

The Kan-gyur is in a hundred volumes, which arrived wrapped in eight yak-skins, bound with heavy gut that it took a saw to cut. There is more than one edition of the Kan-gyur, but that of Lhasa is in a class by itself in beautiful gold characters on Tibetan hand-made cartridge paper. Its Tibetan translation of part of the Buddhist canon is believed to come nearer in some passages to the original Sanskrit than any other version now existing.

